EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL ANALYSIS OF COUNTY-LEVEL INTEGRATED HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA

Authors

  • Qianqian Wu School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, China
  • Kejia Chen School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23055/ijietap.2023.30.5.9237

Abstract

China is actively encouraging the development of County-level Integrated Health Organizations. This study's goal is to evaluate a balanced approach to patient, government, and county-level hospital involvement in the development of County-level Integrated Health Organizations. To encourage tripartite collaboration, a tripartite evolutionary game model of CIHOs is created, and behavioral tactics and important parameters of the three stakeholders are carefully examined and introduced. Simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis reveal that under government and county-level hospital decisions, patients' choice of graded access is a dominant strategy for themselves. However, the presence of this equilibrium is influenced by the strength of government incentives and the level of county-level hospital participation. It is possible, in certain circumstances, to build CIHOs with the active support of the government, patients who follow graded access, and county-level hospitals who actively participate in the building of CIHOs. However, this requires the interaction of several variables, including the volume of government subsidies, the prestige gain of the government, the benefit of patients who follow graded access, and the cost of labor and financial resources of county-level hospitals.

Published

2023-10-17

How to Cite

Wu, Q., & Chen, K. (2023). EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL ANALYSIS OF COUNTY-LEVEL INTEGRATED HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA. International Journal of Industrial Engineering: Theory, Applications and Practice, 30(5). https://doi.org/10.23055/ijietap.2023.30.5.9237

Issue

Section

Service Engineering (Healthcare, etc.)