OPTIMAL QUANTITY ALLOCATION DECISION IN REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT

Authors

  • Muhammad Shafiq Industrial Engineering and Management Institute of Quality and Technology Management University of the Punjab
  • Huynh Trung Luong Industrial Systems Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23055/ijietap.2021.28.6.6847

Abstract

This paper is focused on facilitating the manufacturer in making quantity allocation decisions. A revenue-sharing model with prior commitment from the retailers, two-way penalties, and reallocation of pre-allocated quantities is proposed to coordinate a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two retailers facing stochastic demand. Over and under-purchase penalties are introduced to motivate the retailers to commit close to expected demand. In contrast, the under-supply penalty is presented for the manufacturer to compensate the stock-out loss of the retailers. Reallocation of pre-allocated quantities is also allowed to reduce the allocation risk of the manufacturer. The analysis reveals that the proposed model helps motivate stakeholders to share accurate demand information through a reward-penalty mechanism. Moreover, coordination improves the performance of the supply chain with a “win-win” solution for the stakeholders. The case study results reveal that the proposed model through the reward-penalty mechanism ensures true information sharing. Furthermore, reallocation reduces the possibility of waste. This is the first revenue-sharing model, including prior commitments, two-way penalties, and reallocation of pre-allocated quantities.

Published

2022-01-19

How to Cite

Shafiq, M., & Luong, H. T. (2022). OPTIMAL QUANTITY ALLOCATION DECISION IN REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT. International Journal of Industrial Engineering: Theory, Applications and Practice, 28(6). https://doi.org/10.23055/ijietap.2021.28.6.6847

Issue

Section

Operations Research