Teacher Incentive Pay Programs in the United States: Union Influence and District Characteristics

Authors

  • Guodong Liang University of Missouri
  • Ying Zhang
  • Haigen Huang
  • Zhaogang Qiao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22230/ijepl.2015v10n3a491

Keywords:

incentive pay, performance-related pay, teacher recruitment, teacher retention, SASS

Abstract

This study examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs in the United States. Using the 2007–08 SASS data set, it found an inverse relationship between union influence and districts’ incentive pay offerings. Large and ethnically diverse districts in urban areas that did not meet the requirements for Adequate Yearly Progress as defined under the No Child Left Behind Act are more likely to offer a larger number of economic incentives. Although rural districts are likely to reward teachers in hard-to-staff schools, they are not more likely to reward teachers who are certified by the National Board or who teach in the subject areas of shortage, nor are they more likely to offer multiple financial incentives.

Author Biography

Guodong Liang, University of Missouri

Dr. Guodong Liang is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis at the University of Missouri. His research interests include comparative and international education, educational policies and student learning.

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Published

2015-05-06

How to Cite

Liang, G., Zhang, Y., Huang, H., & Qiao, Z. (2015). Teacher Incentive Pay Programs in the United States: Union Influence and District Characteristics. International Journal of Education Policy and Leadership, 10(3). https://doi.org/10.22230/ijepl.2015v10n3a491