

Meetings on the Frontier: The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the Israel-Jordan Conflict, and the Local Commanders' Agreements, 1949-1956

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The 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the Armistice Agreements that followed partitioned what had been Palestine between Egypt, the newly-created state of Israel, and Jordan. From August 1949 until the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in November 1956, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) peacekeepers attempted to supervise the Arab-Israeli armistice, despite the unwillingness of the parties to accept an actual peace settlement. To the extent that any particular peacekeeping mission was successful, what happened on the ground is usually considered far less important than broader politics. Nonetheless, UNTSO operations, which provided a means for otherwise implacable enemies to communicate with each other, served as the most important mechanism for regional moderation and stability. An analysis of the Local Commanders' Agreements supports this assertion. These extra-parliamentary accords helped moderate the conflict through meetings between military and police leaders, especially along the winding frontier between Israel and the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. But, for all the hopes of the United Nations, this cooperation did not lead to peace talks, in large part because Israel withheld consistent cooperation with the peacekeepers in the hopes of bringing Jordan and the other Arab states directly to the peace table.

Traditionally, the strategies proposed in the United Nations Security Council have been viewed as the ideal ways for scholars to critically assess peace operations. These examinations commonly describe the peacekeepers in less than flattering terms. Even the staunchest defender of the United Nations, former Under-Secretary Brian Urquhart, defined UNTSO as "pitifully inadequate."¹ Most importantly, assertions that UNTSO failed its responsibility to resolve the Israeli-Jordanian impasse are misplaced, as it was the intransigence of the parties themselves that made the quest for peace secondary to simply containing the violence. While the resolution of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict may be no more apparent today than it was in the 1950s, historical experience emphasizes the importance of a mediatory body that facilitates communication. Such a body is of enduring value to establishing a culture of peace.

During Great Britain's tenure as the mandatory power in Palestine from 1920-48, tension between native Arab Palestinians and the hundreds of thousands of Jews entering the country, motivated both by Zionism and the anti-Semitic actions of states such as Hitler's Germany, often flared into open fighting, notably during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39. After the Second World War came to an end in 1945, the United Nations sought to foster a mutually acceptable compromise, but the Palestinian Arabs rejected the result, the 1947 partition plan.² Britain, badly battered by the war, lost patience with the deadlock and withdrew from Palestine on 14 May

1948. This withdrawal led to Israel's unilateral declaration of independence, which precipitated open war with the Palestinian Arab population and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

The Security Council, aided by the fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States immediately recognized Israel, promptly ordered a truce, and established, on 29 May, a Truce Commission composed of civilian observers from Belgium, France, and the United States.³ Military observers from the same three countries, operating as UNTSO, soon superseded these civilian personnel. UNTSO played an active role in bringing the parties together, particularly after the 17 September assassination of the original UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden.⁴ To that end, the 16 November Security Council resolution threatened Chapter VII military intervention in ordering an armistice to "facilitate the transition from the present truce to the permanent peace."⁵ The combination of this tacit threat and Israel's military success prompted the signing of the General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) in 1949.

With the assistance of UN mediators Ralph Bunche and Henri Vigier, four separate Armistice Agreements were signed between Israel and its neighbors Egypt (24 February 1949), Lebanon (23 March 1949), Jordan (3 April 1949), and Syria (20 July 1949).⁶ As a result of these accords, Israel controlled over 75 per cent of mandatory Palestine, a much larger area than the partition plan had granted the state.

The Arab states, however, considered the armistice negotiations purely military discussions. All of the final agreements recognized this, with each declaring that the accord had been "dictated exclusively by military considerations," and noting that it did not prejudice final territorial claims.⁷ The Palestinian refugee crisis precipitated this continuing enmity. During the 1948 fighting, approximately 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes, becoming refugees in neighbouring territories, especially the Jordanian-controlled West Bank and the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip. After the war, Israel sought to gain regional legitimacy and foster the secure environment needed to stimulate Jewish population growth and prosperity. The Arab states worked to prevent Israel from realizing those goals through economic boycott and the infiltration, often violent, of Palestinians into the newly-established state.⁸

Cooperation and Opposition

The greatest territorial shift occasioned by the Armistice Agreements involved the Israel-Jordan frontier. Indeed, the armistice line represented the 600 kilometre-long fronts across which the two armies faced one another. The British-officered Jordanian military, the Arab Legion, occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem and the Old City.⁹ For its part, Israel welcomed corrections of the West Bank frontier, particularly a land corridor to Mount Scopus, a strategic Jerusalem exclave beyond the armistice line, and access to Jewish religious sites.¹⁰

Peace settlement bodies, notably the civilian United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, struggled to bring Israel and Jordan together. The lack of progress, with Israel refusing to make territorial concessions and Jordan refusing to make recognition concessions, characterized the inherent difficulties.¹¹ As these attempts at moving from armistice to peace stalled, UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) – the four committees created to oversee the separate Armistice Agreements – assumed greater importance.

The Security Council ordered UNTSO to aid in the implementation of the Armistice Agreements and to uphold the ceasefire order of 11 August 1949.¹² As the size of UNTSO in August 1949 – 21 American, Belgian, and French officers under command of American Brigadier William Riley – suggests, the discrepancy between the peacekeeping goal and the means of attaining that goal revealed that the UN conceived of the mission as temporary support for wider peace efforts in which international military officers would play no direct role.

When incidents occurred along the Israel-Jordan frontier either party could lodge complaints with the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJKIMAC, or simply MAC). The HJKIMAC consisted of a senior delegate from Israel and Jordan, plus an UNTSO chairman, who cast the deciding vote in investigations of alleged violations, thus producing a theoretically binding resolution. The HJKIMAC was the only place where Israelis and Jordanians openly met, and a rare forum where the peacekeepers retained consistent influence. As an administrative body, the HJKIMAC needed the support of the parties to ensure that it functioned effectively.

Despite the failure to promptly conclude a peace settlement, progress initially prevailed. This seemingly contradictory reality highlights an important theme, namely cooperation on certain issues of mutual concern, especially if this collusion would not become public knowledge in Jordan or the other Arab states. The Israelis and Jordanians even carried out small territorial exchanges and conducted regular, clandestine, high-level peace talks.¹³

Interest in frontier exchanges and other coordinated measures soon waned, however. By mid-1950, HJKIMAC meetings focused on matters such as animals that had crossed the armistice lines and thefts, issues which friendly states would have handled with police cooperation rather than the intervention of international military officers. The lack of progress toward a peace agreement emphasized this but, at the same time, the partiality mechanism inherent in MAC voting strained relations. Even if the UNTSO chairman of the HJKIMAC voted in support of a resolution proposed by one of the parties during an investigation, no mechanism existed to sanction the guilty. As a result, the parties often used the meetings to attempt to convince the peacekeepers of the righteousness of their general cause rather than to clarify the specifics of the investigation at hand.

Throughout, the steady infiltration of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel most conspicuously threatened the armistice regime. Infiltrators sought to return to their former lands, harvest crops, smuggle goods, or carry out other proscribed activities. Israel actively discouraged this infiltration, especially since Jewish refugees from the Arab states had settled many of the formerly Palestinian areas. Jordan annexed the West Bank in April 1950. The formal

incorporation of the new territory granted citizenship to the inhabitants, who outnumbered the conquerors, and ensured Jordanian support for Palestinian infiltration into Israel.¹⁴ While West Bank Palestinians may well have been better off than their brethren elsewhere, the East Bank Jordanian elite retained firm control of power and the Bedouin, trusted allies of the monarchy, dominated the ranks of the Arab Legion. Many Palestinian-Jordanians resented this situation and the loyalty of the new citizens remained in doubt, particularly following the 20 July 1951 assassination of King Abdallah, murdered by a Palestinian Jerusalemite because of fear that he favoured peace with Israel.¹⁵

The murder of the Jordanian king, and the confused interregnum under first his son Talal and, after Talal had been declared mentally unfit to rule in August 1952, Talal's teenage son Hussein, ended the covert Israel-Jordan talks. The internal dissent came coupled with threats from the other Arab states, where Jordan was viewed as an artificial construct doomed to collapse – a collapse from which they could benefit. Iraq, governed by another branch of the Hashemite family, sought paramount influence, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria further conspired to weaken Jordan for their respective gains.¹⁶

These intrigues ensured that some degree of cooperation with Israel had to be maintained. If Jordan acted shrewdly enough, the country might even be able to play the disparate threats off against one another. The limitations of the HJKIMAC as the method for doing this had long been revealed, though, as Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb, the British commander of the Arab Legion, acknowledged. In a letter to Riley, the UNTSO chief of staff, Glubb laid out the basic problem: "Even if the M.A.C. does ascertain the truth, it can only make a decision blaming one side. As I have already said, a decision blaming Israel or Jordan for stealing a mule or shooting a man three months ago is purely academic. A hundred animals have been stolen since then and fifty more people have been shot."¹⁷

The Local Commanders' Agreements

As a result, Israel and Jordan signed Local Commanders' Agreements (LCAs), beginning with the 7 June 1951 agreement to allow Christian monks at the wine-producing Latrun monastery to harvest their vineyards in no man's land.¹⁸ This was followed by an "Agreement on Extraordinary Measures to Curb Infiltration," itself superceded by the "Agreement to Reduce and Solve Incidents along the Demarcation Line."¹⁹ Subsequently, Ahmed Bey Tuqan, a civilian soap factory owner more interested in improving export prospects than in fighting, became the senior Jordanian HJKIMAC delegate.²⁰ The number of both official and unofficial complaints fell precipitously, as meetings between local commanders, with a peacekeeper present only to take general notes, obtained results.

In spite of these agreements, according to Israel Police statistics, 8,000 Jordanian infiltrators entered Israel in 1952.²¹ The Israelis alleged that the Jordanian National Guard assisted infiltrators, a claim Jordan denied.²² Certainly, Jordan's Palestinians did not always welcome

attempts to improve relations. For instance, after local Palestinians physically prevented Jordanian government surveyors from working near the West Bank frontier village of Qalqilya in late 1951, the Israelis became involved. “We must now make the maximum trouble along the border, particularly in the vicinity of wells used by the Arabs from the other side,” stated a report from Israel’s HJKIMAC delegation to Israel Defence Force (IDF) headquarters, “so as to bring pressure on the Arabs to demarcate the line and to come to a settlement on the question of the wells.”²³

During this mutual maneuvering, most infiltration remained peaceful. The problems stemmed from the armed interlopers who attacked Israelis. Israeli frontier settlements became fortified strongpoints in response, with armed guards, wiring, lighting, minefields, and booby traps. Captured infiltrators were expelled or sentenced to long terms of manual labour in Israeli prisons.²⁴ The Israelis also passed intelligence information, including the names of known infiltrators, to Jordan via UNTSO, in the usually vain hope that the authorities would act on the information. Jordan also announced general steps to counter unauthorized crossings.²⁵ The infiltrators still came.

Early 1952 saw one of the initial cases of what became a brutal pattern. First, men from the West Bank crossed into Israeli Jerusalem and raped a Jewish woman. On the night of 6-7 January, Israeli vigilantes retaliated against the village of Beit Jala, outside Bethlehem, the supposed home of the perpetrators. In addition to destroying houses and killing one woman and her four children, the attackers left menacing Arabic messages promising more of the same if infiltration persisted.²⁶ These events demonstrated that not all Palestinian infiltrators were peaceful and that not all Israelis preferred restraint.

Meetings between local commanders still produced improvements for frontier dwellers, but Israel regularly used both these meetings and the HJKIMAC proceedings to demand that the Jordanians do more to combat infiltration. The first step to doing this, in both Israeli and UNTSO opinion, was to mark the armistice line. The Jordanians opposed this. No matter how often UNTSO reminded them that the marking of the line would not prejudice any final territorial settlement, they refused to act.²⁷ The Jordanians also combined an unwillingness to risk civil strife – for how would the Palestinian majority respond to any formal marking of the frontier – with an inability to guard the length of the boundary. Glubb further feared that deploying troops along the armistice line would place the Arab Legion, composed of only two infantry brigades, at the mercy of the larger and better-equipped IDF.²⁸

Under these pressures, local cooperation collapsed, the Israelis withdrawing from the LCA “to Reduce and Solve Incidents along the Demarcation Line” in January 1953. On 4 January, three unarmed IDF soldiers and their lost civilian driving instructor crossed the frontier near Latrun. Jordan initially denied holding the soldiers and then sought to try them as infiltrators, even though the LCA, renewed just days earlier, decreed that members of the security forces who accidentally crossed were to be returned following questioning.²⁹ The incident demonstrated that local meetings had glossed over wider problems. Israel therefore changed tactics, paying little heed to UNTSO and the HJKIMAC. Contemporary Israeli correspondence supports this

contention, describing the MACs as “useless instruments” and asserting that “Israel derives no benefit from their operation.”³⁰ Once the Israelis had come to this conclusion, it proved difficult for them to retreat: after they asserted that they would, for example, not talk to the Jordanians except to negotiate peace, anything less represented a concession. Jordan used the HJKIMAC and the LCAs to address minor problems without official recognition of their neighbour, much less peace, a situation unacceptable to Israel.

In the aftermath of the Latrun incident, the HJKIMAC convened an emergency meeting. At that time, the chairman, Belgian Major-General Bennett L. de Ridder, prevented the senior Israeli delegate from making a statement on the grounds that the action was not on the agenda, thus forcing him to announce Israel’s withdrawal from the HJKIMAC in writing.³¹ In response, the Israelis alleged that de Ridder had stricken their commentary from MAC records and carried out “illegal” UNTSO investigations.³² The dispute caused the head of Israel’s MAC delegations, Lieutenant-Colonel Haim Gaon, to ask that UNTSO keep de Ridder out of Israel.³³ This greatly reduced the peacekeeper’s effectiveness, resulting in his transfer to the United Nations Military Observer Group in Kashmir.

The Israelis then returned to the HJKIMAC, and to the infiltration problem, with a more aggressive policy. In March 1953, a list of proposals enumerated the actions Israel believed Jordan should carry out, including marking the armistice line and collectively punishing infiltrators’ villages.³⁴ The Jordanians resented this ultimatum. As their senior MAC delegate, Azmi Nashashibi, explained to UNTSO:

The frequent Israeli attempts to obstruct investigations by procedural methods, her insistence (voiced as long ago as 1921, and still maintained today) that Arabs can be made good neighbours by violence alone, and her repeated denunciations of arrangements to solve frontier difficulties quickly, on a police level, and without publicity, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Israel has a case to establish, and is determined to establish it, if necessary in the teeth of the facts.³⁵

Before these positions clashed, the arrival of a new UNTSO chief of staff, Danish Major-General Vagn Bennike, convinced both sides to give an LCA another try.³⁶ On 8 June 1953, weekly local police meetings resumed. Mutual familiarity sped investigations of frontier crossings and thefts, but troubles persisted.³⁷

The Israeli cabinet decided to act through the only means it believed still available: military action. Since the IDF could only retaliate against actual infiltrators in extremely rare cases, it collectively punished frontier villages through reprisals.³⁸ The Israeli government feigned ignorance of these attacks, and official statements always cited Jordanian provocations to justify them, universally painted as the last recourse available to the long-suffering population.³⁹ After the first reprisals made little impact, the IDF developed a specialized formation handpicked by Major Ariel Sharon, a decorated intelligence officer; his Unit 101 became the primary instrument of the Israeli anti-infiltration policy.⁴⁰

A still bloodier phase of the Israel-Jordan conflict opened on the night of 14-15 October 1953, when Unit 101 carried out an assault on the West Bank village of Qibya. The scale of the IDF reprisal far exceeded the size of those Jordanian infiltrations that had provoked it. Sharon's forces killed 69 people, mainly women and children who died when explosive charges demolished the houses in which they had sheltered.⁴¹ The Arab Legion failed to confront the attackers, who safely returned to Israel. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced that frontier settlers, pushed over the brink by Jordanian violence, especially the murder of an Israeli mother and her two children in Yahud on 12 October, were responsible.⁴²

The ensuing UNTSO investigation, headed by Commander Elmo Hutchison of the United States Navy, turned up conflicting evidence, including the attackers' use of weapons in IDF service, such as 81 millimetre mortars and Bangalore torpedoes. Reflecting the seriousness of the situation, Bennike personally presented this evidence to the Security Council in New York on 27 October.⁴³ A resolution co-sponsored by Britain, France, and the United States subsequently condemned both the attack and the role of the IDF in it.⁴⁴ Condemnation aside, Unit 101 markedly improved the effectiveness of the reprisals. Jordan responded to the attack by moving Arab Legion units to the West Bank.⁴⁵

Bennike's Security Council testimony led to death threats and an Israeli smear campaign against him.⁴⁶ The Security Council nevertheless ordered Bennike to draft reports on improving compliance with the Armistice Agreement.⁴⁷

In response – and buttressed by the fact that the Security Council had also censured Jordan for the many crossings of the armistice line – the Israelis invoked Article XII, 3 of the Armistice Agreement, which stated:

either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.⁴⁸

Although United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld supported the conference, the Jordanians prized the HJKIMAC, which allowed communication with Israel while avoiding the direct talks that implied recognition of the state.⁴⁹ The secretary-general never announced the conference, realizing it would be pointless to do so without Jordanian cooperation; it never convened.⁵⁰

On 1 March, the United Nations released Bennike's report, which revealed that the number of infiltrators from Jordan had fallen.⁵¹ Might Qibya have proven successful? That question was answered on 17 March, when 11 passengers on a bus travelling from Eilat to Beersheva were murdered, the worst atrocity perpetrated against Israelis since the armistice. Maale Akrabim, the site of the attack, was located 27 kilometres from the armistice line, in the midst of desert and salt marshes. As the bus struggled up a steep incline at 11:45 am, attackers opened fire from the surrounding hilltops. The first shots killed the driver and disabled the vehicle, whereupon two

men entered the bus and sprayed the occupants with sub-machine gun fire. While some theft occurred, murder, evidently, was the motive.⁵²

By the afternoon of the attack, a peacekeeper was at Maale Akrabim to begin an investigation. Swedish Captain Gerhard Svedlund could not have been better suited to the task: unlike every other member of UNTSO, he spoke fluent Arabic and rudimentary Hebrew.⁵³ The Israelis, accompanied by Svedlund, began searching for the attackers the next morning, but even expert Bedouin trackers lost their trail in the desolate landscape.⁵⁴

The investigation turned to the testimony of the five survivors, each of whom had feigned death during the attack. All identified the attackers as Arabic-speakers, but none could provide a description. The eldest survivor, IDF Sergeant Hakoon Morris, had not seen the faces of the attackers from the floor of the vehicle, but told Svedlund that he knew they were Arabs by “the smell.” Similarly, 20-year-old IDF Private Esther Levi, shot in the chest during the assault, noted that all she heard the attackers say was “*yalla, yalla*,” Arabic for “hurry, get moving.”⁵⁵

The Israeli HJKIMAC complaint alleged that the attack had been carried out by a “well-organized and highly trained Jordanian unit.” At an emergency meeting on the subject convened on 22 March, the Israeli delegates passed the names of three Jordanians supposedly involved in the attack to the chairman, Hutchison. The Israeli resolution condemning Jordan for the attack came to a vote after heated debate. With the investigation having failed to turn up evidence of Jordanian complicity, Hutchison abstained from the vote and the Israeli resolution failed to pass.⁵⁶ In response, Israel again walked out of the HJKIMAC and began campaigning for the chairman’s removal.

New Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett, widely perceived as more moderate than predecessor David Ben-Gurion, chided the peacekeepers in a rousing speech to the Knesset, asserting, “To leave undecided, on this occasion, the question of guilt is to proclaim complete moral bankruptcy of the entire machinery for the implementation of the Armistice Agreements under their supervision.”⁵⁷ When it became known that Bennike seemed to believe that non-Jordanians had carried out the Maale Akrabim attack, the death threats against the UNTSO chief of staff resumed.⁵⁸

For two weeks after the attack, the Jordanians and the peacekeepers travelled to the regular local commanders’ meeting points, but the Israelis did not appear.⁵⁹ Then, on the night of 28-29 March, Unit 101 attacked the West Bank village of Nahalin. The reprisal killed nine, wounded 19, and sabotaged what remained of the Israel-UNTSO relationship. On 9 May at Khirbet Illin, Israeli forces shot at a white UNTSO jeep displaying a white flag, aimed loaded rifles at Hutchison and Svedlund, and tried to induce the two peacekeepers to reveal Arab Legion positions. While retreating back to Jordanian lines afterwards, Hutchison and Svedlund narrowly avoided being killed when a lengthy firefight, complete with mortar and artillery shelling, broke out around them.⁶⁰ Next, after three IDF soldiers were killed attacking the West Bank village of Husan on 19 June, UNTSO tried to avoid further violence by retrieving the bodies. While informing Israelis from the adjacent community of Mevo Beitar about the operation, Svedlund and Canadian Captain Leslie Barden watched as a man brandishing a loaded rifle ran at them,

only to be forcibly restrained by his comrades.⁶¹ The HJKIMAC officially continued to meet and the peacekeepers searched for the perpetrators of the Maale Akrabim attack, but the identity of the murderers remained a mystery.⁶²

Throughout, the embattled Bennike criticized both Israel and Jordan in his reports, describing how “The populations are being submitted to a steady stream of hatred propaganda to provide a convenient external outlet for fundamental internal difficulties.”⁶³ While United Nations Headquarters publicly professed support for Bennike, in June Hammarskjöld informed the Dane that he had decided on a new policy of one-year rotations for chiefs of staff. Bennike agreed to depart.⁶⁴

In their desperation to revive the status quo shattered by Maale Akrabim, the Jordanians sparked an incident in Jerusalem. Both Israel and Jordan normally practised restraint in the divided city, but once fighting broke out UNTSO mediation was required. When firing began around the Old City on 30 June, the peacekeepers faced more challenges than usual. On the day the firing started, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan informed UNTSO that “UN Observers have been sent on duty not in accordance with the GAA and unaccompanied by Israeli officers assigned to the MAC. The sending of UN Observers under these conditions can only cause unpleasantness between them and Israeli units in the field, a situation which, I believe, should be avoided.”⁶⁵ The peacekeepers turned to the Western members of the Security Council for assistance and, after scores of casualties on both sides, a special joint appeal by Britain, France, and the United States brought about a ceasefire on 2 July.

Five days later, Israeli intelligence intercepted a cable written by Hammarskjöld, which read, “I consider it obvious that no resolution condemning either side possible unless firmly and conclusively supported fullest evidence.”⁶⁶ The Israeli government presented these comments as evidence of United Nations favouritism toward Jordan.⁶⁷ In a complaint to the Security Council, Israel directly criticized UNTSO for its perceived failure, claiming that “The fact that the painstaking investigation carried out by the United Nations observers failed to lead to the eventual identification and censure of the guilty party is liable to undermine the moral authority of the United Nations and serve as encouragement for further aggressive violence.”⁶⁸

The fighting in Jerusalem reinforced that any peace settlement would first require the relaxation of frontier tension. In order to improve UNTSO, the peacekeepers made a clear break from the events of Bennike’s tenure, starting with a new chief of staff. Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns assumed command of the mission on 2 September 1954. A highly-decorated 31-year veteran of the Canadian Army, he possessed extensive, albeit chequered, experience. While serving as the commander of I Canadian Corps in Italy during the Second World War – a position from which he was dismissed – he developed a reputation as a distant and humourless leader.⁶⁹ Burns was determined to succeed in his new post,⁷⁰ but a general who had failed in operational command would surely find it difficult to make progress in the trying position of senior Arab-Israeli peacekeeper.

Burns’ challenges began with his arrival in the region. On the night of 1-2 September, an Israeli battalion attacked the village of Beit Liqya, near Latrun, capturing three Jordanian

prisoners. Israel, still boycotting the HJKIMAC, refused to allow an UNTSO investigation on its side of the frontier. Burns' report on the incident included a request for Israel to return to the MAC and an exhortation that "only well-trained and disciplined military or police personnel be employed in the first line of the defensive organizations of both parties, particularly in sensitive areas like the Jerusalem area."⁷¹

The arrival of Burns tempered the anti-UNTSO feeling in Israel, but reservations remained. Through "top secret" sources, the Israelis knew a Canadian would be selected to replace Bennike by late July, which prompted Foreign Ministry Director-General Walter Eytan to write, "I think we have a rather poor experience with the Scandinavians. Bernadotte, Lundstrom, Paul Mohn, Bennike – these are the neutral types of what Leo Kohn likes to call the 'pseudo-objective' kind, after the pattern of former British High Commissioners of Palestine. I don't know how much better Canadians are."⁷² Burns' decision to take Arabic lessons in the West Bank, under the assumption that he could always communicate in English or French with Israelis, but not with Arab representatives, contributed to Israeli mutterings.⁷³ Despite these concerns, as a goodwill gesture, Dayan released five captured Jordanian police and soldiers, including the three men seized at Beit Liqya, on 4 September.⁷⁴ Pressure from Burns induced the Jordanians to release the Israeli soldier they held, who was returned home, through UNTSO, on 29 October.⁷⁵

The departure of Hutchison prompted Israel to return to the HJKIMAC that same month.⁷⁶ However, with every previous LCA having failed, Burns compartmentalized the peacekeeping effort by proposing an accord for the Jerusalem area alone. Both sides welcomed this proposal. Jordan needed an LCA to increase Christian tourism to East Jerusalem, one of its few sources of external revenue, while Israel wanted a relaxation of tension in order to extract political concessions.⁷⁷ Yet, when the Jerusalem LCA ceremony convened on 15 November, the Israeli representatives refused to sign the accord. IDF Chief of Staff Dayan asserted that Burns should not sign an agreement between two states;⁷⁸ Jordan, fearing that a signature under these circumstances would amount to *de facto* recognition of Israel, refused to sign without Burns as a witness.⁷⁹ Finally, on 18 April 1955, Israeli Colonel Haim Herzog and Jordanian Colonel Abdul Halim al-Sakat agreed to the accord. Both ratified their agreement by informing UNTSO that they would respect all of the provisions, including direct telephone contact, but they did not sign any document.⁸⁰ Despite the informal nature of the accord, the LCA succeeded in reducing violent incidents in Jerusalem and contributed to the cooperation between the regular forces along the armistice line.⁸¹

Regional tension derailed even this modest success. In January 1956, a combination of Egyptian pressure and homegrown dissent prompted the Jordanian government to decline to join the Baghdad Pact, a British-inspired regional military alliance.⁸² To protect his precarious position, King Hussein then dismissed General Glubb, the British commanding officer of the Arab Legion.⁸³ The king's decisions effectively ended Jordanian cooperation with Israel. By May, the Jerusalem LCA had been reduced to an "arrangement," with the Jordanians refusing to continue direct telephone contact with their Israeli counterparts and new Jordanian Army Chief

of Staff Major-General Ali Abu Nuwar issuing bombastic public statements against Israel.⁸⁴ Shortly thereafter, Israel and Jordan began a frontier conflict in which hundreds were killed.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the Israel-Jordan LCAs did not survive this fighting – much less the Suez Crisis that followed – they aided the cause of peace. Even after their final collapse, the connections forged by the agreements kept open the lines of communication. Moreover, the other options chosen by Israel and Jordan proved to be even worse. For instance, the fate of de Ridder and the campaign against Hutchison demonstrated Israel's policy of treating the peacekeepers as meddling obstacles to direct relations with Jordan. The latter's plight showcased not only Israel's changed opinion of the peacekeepers, but also the peacekeepers' altered views of Israel. Hutchison, by his own admission ignorant of the conflict when he arrived in the region, hardened into a public advocate for change in the United States' allegedly "pro-Israel" foreign policy, as did Bennike and others, all of whom came from Western states where Israeli policy enjoyed wide public support.⁸⁵ Indeed, Israel's periodic HJKIMAC withdrawals emboldened extremists on all sides and damaged relations with Jordan: the day that the two states eventually made peace – in 1994 – did not come any sooner as a result of the reprisals. To Israel, however, these were necessary responses to the threats posed by criminals and infiltrators. Israeli governments further believed that UNTSO and the LCAs enabled Jordan to avoid direct peace talks, but the Jordanians, as the reprisals and the Article XII conference effort demonstrated, desired only carefully structured local meetings.

Of course, throughout this period, the Jordanians refused to recognize Israel and refused to meet Israelis outside of the HJKIMAC and the LCA arrangements. The shock of the collective Arab defeat at Israeli hands in 1948, the desire for revenge, and Israel's unwillingness to accept compromise, especially territorial compromise, was also important to sabotaging UNTSO efforts. Essentially, Jordan did not want to accept Israel and Israel was unwilling to allow this lack of acceptance. The only time that Israel had conducted direct and overt negotiations with the Arab states was in 1949, after defeating those states in war. When their neighbours subsequently refused to recognize Israel, Israel understood that it would only be accepted by its neighbours through force. Under the circumstances, UNTSO and the LCAs could only establish the groundwork for future peace efforts.

Notes

¹ Brian Urquhart, *Hammaraskjold* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 134.

² UN Document, GAS A/RES/181 (II) (A+B), 29 November 1947, General Assembly Resolution 181.

³ Summaries of Truce Commission activities may be consulted in Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, Volume 1, The Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 18-31; Michael Dwight Davis, "The United States, the United Nations, and the Invention of Multinational Peace Operations, 1946 to 1968" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland College Park, 1998), pp. 45-51.

⁴ In addition to the assassination of Bernadotte, nine Truce Commission/UNTSO observers were killed and 20 wounded in 1948.

⁵ UN Document, S/1080, 16 November 1948, Security Council Resolution 62.

⁶ Analyses of these accords may be found in Shabtai Rosenne, *Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States* (Tel Aviv: International Law Association, Israel Branch, 1951); David Brook, *Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Armistice System* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964), pp. 16-26; Earl Berger, *The Covenant and the Sword: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-56* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 14-19; *The Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements: February-July 1949: U.N. Texts and Annexes* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967); Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 32-52.

⁷ For example, see UN Document, S/1264/Rev. 1, 24 February 1949, Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement, Article IV, 3.

⁸ Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 55; Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three: The United Nations, The Great Powers, and Middle East Peacemaking 1948-1954* (London: F. Cass, 1997), pp. 127-28.

⁹ For more on British support for the Jordanian military, see Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence," *Armed Forces & Society*, 4, 1 (1977), pp. 75-99; Robert Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 5-6.

¹⁰ Motti Golani, "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question 1948-1967," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 31 (1999), pp. 577-604.

¹¹ For more information on these efforts, see Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three*.

¹² UN Document, S/1376, II, 11 August 1949, Security Council Resolution 73.

¹³ State of Israel, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel (DFPI), Volume 5: 1950* (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1988), p. 140, Document #105, 24 February 1950, "Draft Agreement between Israel and Jordan;" United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Volume V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 796-97, 9 March 1950, US Ambassador in Israel James McDonald to Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Mordechai Gazit, "The Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations (1949-51): King Abdallah's Lonely Effort," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 23 (1988), pp. 409-24; Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, pp. 9-10; Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken*, pp. 111-67; Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three*, pp. 73, 87.

¹⁴ Avi Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-1957* (London: F. Cass, 1981), pp. 16, 158. See also Shaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978).

¹⁵ Gazit, "The Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations," pp. 409-24.

¹⁶ British National Archives (BNA), FO 371-98861, ET 1018/1, 1 July 1952, Arab Legion Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb to Foreign Office (FO), Eastern Department. See also Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, pp. 33-35.

¹⁷ UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 8 February 1951, Glubb to UNTSO Chief of Staff William Riley.

¹⁸ UNA, S-0375-0077-File 6, 7 June 1951, Major V. Loriaux to Colonel Bennett L. de Ridder.

- ¹⁹ UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 31 January 1952, "Agreement on Extraordinary Measures to Curb Infiltration;" UNA, S-0375-0103-File 2, 13 November 1952, "Agreement to Reduce and Solve Incidents along the Demarcation Line."
- ²⁰ For more on Tuqan, see Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, pp. 46-47.
- ²¹ Israel State Archives (ISA), FM 2429/4, 26 January 1953, IDF GSO i/c MACs Lieutenant-Colonel Haim Gaon to UNTSO Political Officer Henri Vigier. See also Israel Defence Force Archives (IDFA), 1956-636-32, pp. 213-46.
- ²² BNA, FO 371-110925, 11 July 1954, Arab Legion HQ, "Jordan's National Guard." See also Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 57, 69.
- ²³ IDFA 1954-79-65, p. 108, 12 December 1951, Report No. 266, Israel Delegation HJKIMAC to IDF General HQ.
- ²⁴ Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, pp. 166-67.
- ²⁵ UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 8 February 1951, Glubb to Riley. See also John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 285-86; Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, pp. 383-84.
- ²⁶ State of Israel, *DFPI, Volume 7: 1952* (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1992), pp. 44-48, Document #25, 23 January 1952; UNA, S-0375-0077-File 4, 1 February 1952, de Ridder to Riley; Elmo Hutchison, *Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956), pp. 12-16; David Tal, "Peilut Tagmul: miEmtzaee Yomyomi leEmtzaee Bitahon Bsisi" in Motti Golani, ed. *"Hets Shahor:" Pshitot al Aza veMediniyut haGemel shel Yisrael bishnot haHamishim* (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1994), p. 68.
- ²⁷ UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 18 June 1952, "Record of Meeting between HJKIMAC Chairman Colonel Bennett L. de Ridder and Jordanian Authorities." See also UNA, S-0375-0103-File 1, 26 September 1951, de Ridder to Riley. As de Ridder noted in the letter, "Neither the Arab civilians, nor village mukhtars, nor many of the police and National Guards, nor Arab Legion personnel, have the slightest idea of the location of the demarcation line."
- ²⁸ Peter Young, *Bedouin Command: With the Arab Legion 1953-1956* (London: William Kimber, 1956), p. 21.
- ²⁹ UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 14 January 1953, Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. McAnnich to Riley. See also 8 January 1953, "Declaration made by Rav Seren Nutov."
- ³⁰ State of Israel, *DFPI, Volume 8: 1953* (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1995), pp. 352-54, Document #203, 10 May 1953, Gaon to Israeli Foreign Ministry (FM). See also pp. 391-92, Document #214, 14 May 1953, Israeli FM Legal Advisor Shabtai Rosenne to Israeli FM Director-General Walter Eytan; Rosenne, *Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States*, p. 81; Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three*, p. 148.
- ³¹ UNA, S-0163-0006-File 2, 9 January 1953, de Ridder to Senior Israeli HJKIMAC Delegate Major Nutov.
- ³² ISA, FM 2429/4, 18 March 1953, Gaon to de Ridder; 25 March 1953, Nutov to de Ridder. See also ISA, FM 2428/2, 12 June 1953, Michael Comay, "Telephone Conversation with Sgan Aluf Gaon on 12th June, 1953."
- ³³ UNA, S-0375-0103-File 4, 30 April 1953, Gaon to Riley.
- ³⁴ UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 25 March 1953, "Memorandum Regarding Measures Against Infiltration submitted by the Senior Israel Delegate to the Senior Delegate of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom." See also Tal, "Peilut Tagmul" in Golani, ed. *"Hets Shahor,"* p. 70.
- ³⁵ UNA, S-0375-0077-File 4, 25 May 1953, Senior Jordanian HJKIMAC Delegate Azmi Nashashibi, "How Serious is the Infiltration Problem in Fact?" See also BNA, FO 371-104777, ER 1091/63, March 1953, Glubb, "A Note on Refugee Vagrancy."
- ³⁶ UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 4 June 1953, Riley to Cordier. The text of the renewed LCA may be found in UNA, S-0375-0077-File 4. See also IDFA, 1956-636-32, p. 467, 1 December 1953, "Local Commanders' Agreement."
- ³⁷ See UNA, S-0375-0098-File 4, 9 June 1953, Commander Elmo Hutchison to de Ridder; 1 July 1953, Major G. Pinon to de Ridder.
- ³⁸ See Michael Comay, *U.N. Peace-keeping in the Israel-Arab Conflict, 1948-1975: An Israel Critique* (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1976), p. 83; Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, p. 173.

- ³⁹ ISA, FM 2949/4, 26 August 1953, Aryeh Eilan to Eytan. See also Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, p. 177.
- ⁴⁰ Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life: An Autobiography* (New York: Warner, 1977), pp. 214-16; Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, pp. 212-16, 238.
- ⁴¹ UN Document, S/PV.630, 27 October 1953, 630th Security Council Meeting.
- ⁴² State of Israel, *DFPI, Volume 8: 1953*, pp. 774-76, Document #449, 19 October 1953, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's Radio Broadcast on Qibya; Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, pp. 252-53 (n 121), 256 (n 134), 302.
- ⁴³ UN Document, S/PV.630, 27 October 1953, 630th Security Council Meeting.
- ⁴⁴ UN Document S/3139/Rev. 2, 24 November 1953, Security Council Resolution 101.
- ⁴⁵ *Falastin*, 17 October 1953, entire issue devoted to the Qibya attack; Young, *Bedouin Command*, p. 53; Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, *Jordan: A Political Study 1948-1957* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 110-14; P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion* (London: F. Cass, 1967), pp. 79-82, 120; Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, p. 216; Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, pp. 82-84.
- ⁴⁶ For more on the campaign against Bennike, see ISA, FM 2425/8, 26 November 1953, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett to General Manager; 2 February 1954, Israeli Minister in Italy Eliahu Sasson to Israeli FM Counselor in Charge of Middle East and UN Political Affairs Gideon Rafael. The Israelis later tried to plant material against Bennike in Danish newspapers, with little success: see ISA, FM 2425/8, 21 May 1954, Eilan, "Report of Trip to Copenhagen." On the UN response to the threats against Bennike, see UNA, S-0373-0008-File 6, 8 October 1953, UNTSO Administrative Officer P.S. Messinesi to UN Field Service Chief Carey Seward; 9 January 1954, "Invoice."
- ⁴⁷ UN Document, S/PV.630, 27 October 1953, 630th Security Council Meeting.
- ⁴⁸ UN Document, S/1302/Rev. 1, 3 April 1949, Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel General Armistice Agreement. See also UN Document, S/3140, 23 November 1953, Israeli Permanent Representative to the UN Abba Eban to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld; IDFA, 1956-636-32, pp. 356-57, 22 January 1954, Acting Director of IDF Intelligence Department Lieutenant-Colonel Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Article 12 Committee Meeting;" ISA, FM 2432/3, 23 February 1954, "Agenda Proposal for Israel-Jordan Conference under Article XII;" Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three*, pp. 230-56.
- ⁴⁹ UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 22 December 1953, Outgoing Cable 433, New York to Jerusalem.
- ⁵⁰ BNA, FO 371-111069, VR 1072/10, 14 January 1954, Glubb, "After Qibya." See also Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three*, p. 256.
- ⁵¹ UN Document, S/3183, 1 March 1954, "Chief of Staff's Report Pursuant to S/3139/Rev. 2."
- ⁵² UNA, S-0163-0008-File 5, 21 March 1954, "U.N. Investigation of Israeli Complaint No. X 486 Agreed Upon by Both Parties and Carried Out on 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21 March 1954."
- ⁵³ Swedish Military Archives, Arméstaben, "FN-avdelningen," Serial D5, Volume 1-3, Personal Register, Gerhard Gylfe Svedlund.
- ⁵⁴ UNA, S-0163-0008-File 5, 21 March 1954, "U.N. Investigation of Israeli Complaint No. X 486."
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ UNA, S-0163-0008-File 5, 23 March 1954, "Report on the 177th Emergency Meeting;" UN Document, S/3252, 25 June 1954, "Chief of Staff's Report on Scorpion's Pass [Maale Akrabim]."
- ⁵⁷ UNA, S-0163-0008-File 5, 24 March 1954, "Prime Minister Moshe Sharett's Knesset Speech on Scorpion's Pass."
- ⁵⁸ UNA, S-0373-0005-File 4, 26 March 1954, UNTSO Chief of Staff Vagn Bennike to Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew W. Cordier. In this weekly summary, Bennike wrote that Israeli Bedouin, Gazans, and terrorist organizations "in either country" may have been responsible for the murders at Maale Akrabim; he did not believe that the Jordanian military had carried out the attack. See also Hutchison, *Violent Truce*, p. 52.
- ⁵⁹ UNA, S-0373-0005-File 4, 9 April 1954, Bennike to Cordier.
- ⁶⁰ IDFA, 1956-636-32, pp. 147-49, 12 May 1954, "Statement of Capt. Svedlund, re: Khirbet Illin Incident."
- ⁶¹ UNA, S-0163-0007-File 2, 21 June 1954, "UN Investigation of HJK Complaint No. X 770 of 19 June 1954."
- ⁶² See BNA, FO 371-111094, VR 1078/2, 5 April 1954, G.W. Furlonge, British Embassy, Amman to FO; UNA, S-0375-0088-File 1, 24 August 1954, "Report on the 193rd Emergency Meeting" and 14 September 1954, "Report on the 198th Emergency Meeting;" Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, p. 320; Hutchison, *Violent Truce*, pp. 63-78; Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, p. 298.
- ⁶³ UNA, S-0373-0005-File 4, 14 May 1954, Bennike to Cordier.

⁶⁴ UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 4 June 1954, Outgoing Cable 169, Hammarskjöld to Bennike; UNA, S-0168-0002-File 1, 5 June 1954, Incoming Cable 76, Bennike to Hammarskjöld.

⁶⁵ UNA, S-0163-0007-File 2, 30 June 1954, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan to Bennike.

⁶⁶ UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 7 July 1954, UNGVA 809, Hammarskjöld (Geneva) to Cordier. See also 12 July 1954, UNGVA 855, Hammarskjöld (Geneva) to Cordier.

⁶⁷ Bennike, who wrote a report on the Israeli press campaign against UNTSO, saw the effort as a move by the IDF to win over the Israeli public by blaming the peacekeepers for the Arab states' opposition to peace talks. See ISA, FM 2425/8, 21 July 1954, Rosenne to Israeli Legal Counselor to the Permanent Mission at the UN Yaakov Robinson; UNA, S-0156-0003-File 1, 1 August 1954, Bennike to Cordier.

⁶⁸ UN Document, S/3275, 29 July 1954, "Statement on Jerusalem Incidents."

⁶⁹ J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp. 116-44. See also E.L.M. Burns, *General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970).

⁷⁰ Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 31, Volume 7, E.L.M. Burns diary entry, 23 June 1954.

⁷¹ UN Document, S/3290, 14 September 1954, "Report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General Concerning the Incident in the Beit Liqya Area." See also ISA, FM 2425/9, 8 September 1954, Israeli Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon to UNTSO Chief of Staff E.L.M. Burns; ISA, FM 2949/4, 23 September 1954, Eytan to Burns; Zeev Drori, "Hashpaat haSegel haTzvayi haZutar al Hahrafat haBitahon" in Golani, ed. "*Hets Shahor*," p. 140.

⁷² ISA, FM 2425/8, 26 July 1954, Eytan to Israeli Minister in Canada Michael Comay.

⁷³ LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entries for 27 September, 20 October, 26 October 1954.

⁷⁴ E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & Company, 1962), pp. 34-39. See also IDFA, 1956-636-32, p. 36, 4 September 1954, IDF GSO i/c MACs Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Shalev to Burns.

⁷⁵ UNA, S-0373-0005-File 5, 4 November 1954, Burns to Cordier. See also BNA, FO 371-111081 VR 1073/211, 8 September 1954, British Ambassador to Jordan C.B. Duke to Evelyn Shuckburgh, FO Levant Department.

⁷⁶ UNA, S-0163-0007-File 2, 14 November 1954, UNTSO Press Release. See also ISA, FM 2425/9, 20 October 1954, Eilan to Tekoah; 27 October 1954, Jerusalem District Commissioner Avraham Biran to FM General Secretary.

⁷⁷ Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, p. 334; Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan*, p. 163.

⁷⁸ UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 17 November 1954, Dayan to Burns; 18 November 1954, Burns to Glubb.

⁷⁹ BNA, FO 816/191, 30 October 1954, Duke to Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sayyid Walid Salah; 1 December 1954, C.T. Brant, "Jerusalem Local Commanders' Agreement." For the Israeli position, see State of Israel, *DFPI, Volume 9: 1954* (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2004), pp. 861-62, Document #527, 8 December 1954, Tekoah to Sharett; IDFA, 1956-636-33, pp. 70-72, 9 December 1954, Shalev to Dayan, Harkabi, and FM.

⁸⁰ UN Document, S/3394, 18 April 1955, "Cablegram from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General Concerning Arrangements between Jordan and Israel in the Jerusalem Area."

⁸¹ UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 29 April 1955, Burns to Cordier; LAC, RG 31, Volume 1, UNTSO/UNEF, Glubb Correspondence Folder, 2 July 1955, Glubb to Burns; Ehud Yaari, *Mitsrayim vohaFedayeen: 1953-1956* (Givat Haviva: Centre for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1975), pp. 21-22.

⁸² UNA, S-0163-0006-File 2, 12 January 1956, UNTSO, "Recent Disorders in Jordan;" Young, *Bedouin Command*, pp. 138-58; Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, Jordan, 1955-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 25-30.

⁸³ Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, pp. 6, 364-68, 426; Abidi, *Jordan: A Political Study*, pp. 133-36; Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan*, pp. 116-18; Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, pp. 134-48.

⁸⁴ ISA, FM 2428/3, 30 May 1956, FM, "Fedayeen Activities in Jordan;" UNA, S-0168-0003-File 4, 7 June 1956, Incoming Cable 389, UNTSO Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Richard Hommel to Hammarskjöld; UNA, S-0168-0003-File 4, 12 June 1956, Incoming Cable 412, Hommel to Hammarskjöld; 12 June 1956, Incoming Cable 415, Hommel to Hammarskjöld; UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4, 17 July 1956, UNTSO, "Implementation of the Agreements reached during the Secretary-General's mission (April 1956) and of the Security Council's resolution of 4 June 1956;" UNA, S-0163-0006-File 2, 8 August 1956, Jordanian Chief of Staff Major-General Ali Abu Nuwar to Burns.

⁸⁵ See the forewords written by Bennike, American Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. McAnnich, and American Captain John De Barr in Hutchison, *Violent Truce*, pp. v-xii. See also pp. 4-6, 129-30, 142-50; Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three*, p. 270.