
Cyprus: Separate but Together?

A. J. R. GROOM*

AS THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR, reaches the end of his first year of his new term of office, there is one dossier on his desk with which he is more than familiar — that of Cyprus. Cyprus has been an albatross around the neck of Secretaries-General for more than two decades. Dr. Waldheim, Perez de Cuellar's predecessor, was confident that he would be able to achieve a settlement of the dispute. Although Mr. Denktash and Archbishop Makarios, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders respectively, and later the Ethnarch's political successor, Mr. Kyprianou, and Mr. Denktash, were able to agree on a set of principles, neither Dr. Waldheim nor his Special Representative for Cyprus at the time, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, were able to persuade the parties to agree to a detailed resolution or process towards resolution of the conflict.

After he became Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar undertook a sustained effort to reconcile the differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the autumn of 1984 his efforts were considerably buttressed by Britain, the USA and Turkey, all of whom put considerable pressure upon Mr. Denktash in particular. Mr. Denktash had broken the rules in the eyes of the world by declaring the Turkish Cypriot-controlled part of Cyprus to be an independent Republic in 1983. He has recently acknowledged that his timing was deliberately such that even Turkey would be presented with a *fait accompli*.¹ Whether Turkey was willingly duped or not, it is evident that Turkey

*For the background to this article, see A. J. R. Groom, "Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy," in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), *Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985* (London, 1986) and A. J. R. Groom, "Cyprus: Back to the Doldrums," *Round Table* (October, 1986). The present reflections have been facilitated by briefings in Nikosia in December, 1986 organized by the Public Information Office of the Republic, for which the author is most grateful. The views expressed, however, are solely the author's responsibility and should not be attributed in any way to officials of the Republic of Cyprus. The author has benefited from the comments of interested parties on the draft article. The sensitivity of subject and sources makes detailed attribution of the views expressed in footnotes impracticable.

¹*Northern Cyprus Weekly*, 15.xi.86, p. 6.

has not gone to any lengths to secure international recognition for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Mr. Denktash himself in his independence and post-independence declarations was careful to leave open the possibility of re-creating a Cyprus Republic on the basis of two partners who, although asymmetric in many respects would be equal founding fathers insofar as the future arrangements were concerned. Mr. Denktash's threat was clear, but independence was not irrevocable.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar and his colleagues made good progress with the parties in late 1984 and it was widely mooted that a breakthrough had occurred which would be marked by a "high level" meeting of the leaders of the two communities in January, 1985. The notion of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, and bi-zonal federal republic had been reaffirmed, the powers of a federal government were defined, the Turkish Cypriots agreed to a significant territorial adjustment in favor of the Greek Cypriots, non-Cypriot armed forces would be withdrawn and international guarantees made. Further questions were to be dealt with in working groups, but nothing would become final until everything was agreed. When the high-level meeting convened on January 17, 1985, Mr. Denktash accepted the Secretary-General's document *in toto* as an "integrated whole."² Mr. Kyprianou, to the surprise of the Secretary-General, Britain, the USA and Turkey, felt unable to do so. Countless international meetings, continued efforts by the UN Secretary-General backed by Britain and the USA, and pressure from Turkey on Mr. Denktash to ensure that his agreement was still available, as well as turmoil in Greek-Cypriot politics, have failed to induce Mr. Kyprianou to endorse Mr. Perez de Cuellar's proposals. After two years' sustained effort, the Secretary-General has every right to consider them dead if only (but not only) because the two parties cannot even agree now on how a negotiating process can be kept in being. Mr. Kyprianou is pressing for an international conference, which has not found general favor apart from Greece and the Soviet Union among the potential participants, or a high-level meeting with Mr. Denktash. The latter suggests that the 1986 proposals of the Secretary-General form an appropriate basis and framework for negotiation. Hence the impasse at the official level.

The situation for the Secretary-General in his new term of office is thus changed. The principal Western Powers concerned, the UN Secretary-General, and Turkey have all made an effort, as desired by the Greek Cypriots, to induce movement on the part of the Turkish

²As stated in a Turkish-Cypriot Official Statement, *International Herald Tribune*, 26.ii.85.

Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot position did change, as was acknowledged by Mr. Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, when he declared, on January 2, 1985, that the Turkish Cypriots had "undoubtedly made significant steps in the direction of a viable and just settlement of the Cyprus problem."³ That the Greek Cypriot leadership has not been able to accept this has had two consequences of note.

The attentive public on the Cyprus problem, both governmental and non-governmental, now views the Greek Cypriot position in an unfavorable light. While in the past individual aspects of the Greek Cypriot position have been criticized, the attentive public has been disposed generally to view their case favorably. However, there is now less of a predisposition in favor of the Greek Cypriot thesis and a rather more neutral attitude. The positions of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be evaluated on their merits. The second consequence is that those outside parties, such as Britain and the US Administration and Congress, that did their best to lend power to the Secretary-General's elbow have had enough of Cyprus. They feel that they have done their bit and are only likely to stir themselves if Cyprus threatens to become an international crisis, and then their principal concerns will not be the interests of Cypriots, be they Greek or Turkish, but their own interests which go beyond the island or the region. For the time being Cyprus is low on the agenda notwithstanding a Soviet proposal for an international conference which, despite support from Mr. Kyprianou, has evinced little enthusiasm from Britain, the United States, the Secretary-General, Turkey, or the Turkish Cypriots. If the TRNC and Turkey, in the next two or three years, decide to pursue international recognition of the TRNC in a determined fashion, then opposition will have a stronger ritualistic element than hitherto and the securing of such recognition is therefore likely to be less difficult.

But matters are different in another respect. Just as the Turkish Cypriots over the years felt the need to establish their presence as an *interlocuteur valable* in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict before they were willing to be forthcoming to the Secretary-General in January, 1985, so, too, have the Greek Cypriots, or at least their leadership, established that they cannot be charmed, chased, chastised, or cajoled into an agreement against what they see to be their best interests. Indeed, there are those who will not contemplate or accept any outcome other than one bearing a close resemblance to the situation before 1974 with Turkish troops and settlers withdrawn and Turkish Cypriots treated as a minority with guarantees for their rights. This is a minority view in the South but it is expressed vociferously and to great effort such

³Athens news agency.

that it helped Mr. Kyprianou to survive a sustained attack on his policy and position after the breakdown of the January, 1985 high-level talks. However, Cypriots have had the unhappy experience of one constitution foisted on them against their better judgment, and both communities have now given ample evidence that they will only accept voluntarily a constitution or set of arrangements that they both want. And no one has the stomach for the alternative, which is to impose a constitution or settlement as was done in 1960 — not even Turkey, unless gravely provoked. What, then, are the future possibilities?

The most likely outcome is the continuation of the present trend. The Republic of Cyprus is prosperous and well-established and will continue to enjoy international legitimacy. However, in the new international climate of a growing "neutrality" over Cyprus, the TRNC will gradually accrue international recognition and free itself of some of the fetters of the economic and other constraints imposed by the Republic on northern Cyprus. For example, the UK High Commissioner and some other Ambassadors make informal, but official, contacts with TRNC authorities and these seem to be increasing. The situation is likely to be anomalous, particularly in regard to the European Community. However, an EC that can live with the anomaly of East German goods circulating in the Community as "German" domestic products, not to mention the arrangements for Berlin or Gibraltar, will surely find a way to accommodate another anomaly and to reconcile its interests and its rhetoric, not to mention its principles. Too much is at stake for Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the EC for there not to be a determined effort to find a practical accommodation. The process of separation, while not inexorable, smooth, or always in the same direction, is the most likely outcome of present trends and all parties will learn, willy-nilly, to live with it. However, this does not mean that Cypriots of both communities will not continue to regard themselves as such and to acknowledge the other community as Cypriots albeit of a different cultural tradition. Thus, despite the entrenching of separation Cypriots will still in this sense be "together." Can we thus all quietly bide our time and await this outcome?

Perhaps yes, but surely not. If nothing is done about Cyprus, then there is the risk at some point of someone forcing the issue. This could mean from any one of the four parties principally concerned, Greece, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey. This is least likely from the *status quo* parties, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, since they are in a position of strength, but Turkey could act in a pre-emptive fashion if it felt its geostrategic position on the island to be threatened, or in the context of changes elsewhere in the Greco-Turk relationship such as the Aegean. For their part, some Turkish Cypriots might eventually

come to feel themselves to be suffocated by Turkey, although this is a price that most would surely be willing to pay while any sense of insecurity prevails. Insofar as the Greek Cypriots are concerned, from time to time there is a suggestion that Greek troops should be invited to the South in greater numbers which could result in provoking Turkey. Moreover, the Samson coup in 1974, aided and abetted by the Colonels in Athens, does show the extent to which reckless and ruthless men can go in order to overturn a *status quo* that they find to be humiliating and contrary to their dearest dreams.

But these are negative considerations. There are other, more positive reasons for suggesting that we should not bide our time. Cyprus, as Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria before it, is an international responsibility. Like those countries, Cyprus is situated at a sensitive point in the international political system (which is one of the reasons why Britain acquired it as a *place d'armes* in the first place). However, unlike the above cited countries, it remains so, to its chagrin. This was recognized in the manner of its independence in 1960 which was accompanied by Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance and the British Sovereign Base Areas and facilities. It was not a unique situation as the Diego Garcia base separated from Mauritius suggests, although it had a nineteenth-century air about it, reminiscent of Belgian independence. But privilege implies responsibility — *noblesse oblige* — and the three guarantor Powers, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, which are also allies, have all been found wanting as has that informal but ever present guarantor, the United States (not least in 1974 when it refused to back actively a British intervention to nullify the Greek Colonels-inspired coup of Nikos Sampson and assured the British that Turkey would not intervene). Thus Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the USA have a responsibility to provide a framework within which the Cypriots can broach their problems if they are to demand of Cypriots an internationally responsible attitude.

Moreover, the situation of the Cypriot people — both Greek and Turkish — cannot easily be ignored. In proportion to their numbers they have suffered enormously, something approaching half of them have left their homes *bon gre, mal gre*. That they have shown great resilience and initiative in adversity does not mean that their suffering can be discounted. It is a sobering and humbling experience to meet a man of retirement age and his family making a success of life for the third time. Cyprus has no need of a Bob Geldof but those outsiders who have a role to play may need to demonstrate a degree of compassion and to let their heart strings control their purse strings should the need arise.

These considerations are not the prime ones for the Secretary-General

as he contemplates his dossiers for his second term. The Security Council resolution instructing him to proffer his good offices remains valid.⁴ He must, therefore, act, but how? Where do matters stand now on Cyprus? Is he merely to go through the motions or are there new possibilities to be explored in the light of the failure of his previous initiatives?

The sticking point for the Greek Cypriots was several fold. They were (and are) not willing to bargain their legitimacy as the Republic of Cyprus for a constitution that seemed to them to give the Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) a veto in their previously inviolate affairs, despite the territorial adjustment. Moreover, they were not willing to leave their Republic status for a transitional federal one before there was an agreement for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops. They feared that, with a Turkish Cypriot veto in a federal arrangement, the Turkish military withdrawal might be halted on some pretext and they would have lost irretrievably the legitimacy of their status as the Republic of Cyprus without gaining what for them was the most important element of the new arrangements. It is a classic case of worst case analysis inducing immobility and making the worst case more likely. However, it is the genre of fear that must be addressed by timing, guarantees and legal and drafting virtuosity but, above all, by political leadership which knows when and how to take a political risk (albeit one which seems far-fetched to others) with the prospect of a real gain. Such mediatory and facilitating skills and political courage are not abundant either in the case of Cyprus or elsewhere so that for the moment the Greek Cypriot leadership sticks by its view that Mr. Perez de Cuellar's constitutional proposals are unworkable. In short, they do not want to go back to 1960-63 as they saw it, they have two unsatisfied claims against Turkey — its troops and its settlers in Cyprus —, they want the three freedoms of movement, property, and residence.

While Greek Cypriot figures on both Turkish troops and settlers need not be taken as gospel, the numbers are considerable. But the impact of the two is different. Historically, Turkey has shown restraint in intervening militarily in Cyprus and only did so, although in force, *in extremis*, as even Archbishop Makarios recognized in his speech to the UN Security Council following his temporary deposition. It is a fact of life that Turkey will intervene in Cyprus, even at very considerable cost — military, political, and economic — if the well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community is in peril. Greek Cypriots clearly feel that Turkey wishes to occupy the whole island — a fear that is understandable, if not very realistic. What Turkey requires is the well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community and that Cyprus does not constitute

⁴Security Council Resolution 367 (1975).

a threat to Turkish security. Its aims are not expansionist, but defensive, although there is little doubt that, if needs be, it will take preventive action. Such preventive action is likely only on these two basic conditions, if the Turkish Cypriot community is under threat or, more generally, if Turkey's control of its southern geostrategic sphere looks like being compromised. At that point, it would probably seize the two Greek Cypriot-controlled airports, avoiding large concentrations of Greek Cypriot population, and establish sea and air supremacy in the region. But the relationship that it requires and desires is one of no bother from Cyprus — a sort of Finlandization of the island, such as at present exists, although not necessarily in its present form. This does not require a large number of, or perhaps eventually any, Turkish troops on the island. There are no Soviet troops in Finland and Finlandization seems far from being an intolerable burden to the Finns. Can there be a similar process for Cyprus?

By giving such prominence to and forcing the issue on Turkish troops, the Greek Cypriots create more difficulties than need exist and thereby bring Cyprus into the front line of Greco-Turk relationships. They are batting on a sticky wicket of their own making. Turkish troops and international guarantees either through the UN or separately from it, in addition to the UN peacekeeping force UNFICYP, are a recognition of the geostrategic facts of life. But if the issue is de-escalated by moving away from the demand for the immediate and complete withdrawal of Turkish troops to a discussion of their reduction, perhaps to 5000 under the Treaty of Guarantee, in relation to other measures in stages according to a flexible timetable, then this could serve as a prelude to a situation in which there are, eventually, merely international guarantees and forces. The security issue is not a real issue to the extent that it is a question of geostrategic environmental issue which can be subject to amelioration, but slowly. The security issue cannot be forced without risking catastrophe. Yet, just as the Turkish Cypriots are aware that they are a numerical minority on the island, so are Greek Cypriots aware that they are a numerical minority in the region. In effect the security fears of the "minorities" need to be dissipated in associative ways and not at the expense of the other. But it is more a question of perceptions than actual military dispositions, although these, and guarantees, can both help and hinder. A functional strategy of association through mutually beneficial and acceptable projects and greater interaction in a supportive framework facilitated by third parties is also called for. This may be at both the local level and in the context of the European Community as will be suggested below. The question of the Turkish settlers does not have the same propensity for catastrophe as that of security, although it is of great significance to

both communities.

It is perhaps salutary to recall that Turkish Cypriots are Cypriots. Like most Greek Cypriots, they feel themselves to be part of a wider culture, be it Turkish or Greek, but they have in addition a Cypriot dimension — to some extent a shared dimension but certainly an island dimension that differentiates them somewhat from the larger cultural sphere of which they remain, nevertheless, fundamentally a part. While a Cypriot may be Greek or Turkish, a Greek or a Turk is not Cypriot. The issue of Turkish settlers is therefore not one that excites Greek Cypriot alone. Why then have the Turkish Cypriots accepted settlers from the mainland and continued to do so despite the strained relations that such population movements are at times almost bound to entail?

The short answer of Greek Cypriots is that this is a prelude to integration, in due course, of the whole island into Turkey or, at best, double Enosis — the division of the island between metropolitan Greece and Turkey. But this is surely too simplistic because it ignores the genuine Cypriot dimension in the Turkish Cypriot community and it assumes that Turkey is in complete control of the north and has imposed its will. The response can better be found in the needs of security and identity of Turkish Cypriots and, to some extent, the need to have available a full range of competence necessary for a new administration.

The security needs go back to the Turkish military intervention in 1974. The initial intervention secured a corridor from Kyrenia on the northern coast to the Turkish sector of Nikosia. But that bridgehead was subsequently extended considerably. Several reasons can be deduced for this: the Turkish military felt the need for a more militarily secure position giving them defense in depth; substantial numbers of Turkish Cypriots were still enclaved and vulnerable elsewhere on the island and therefore the need was felt to hold Greek Cypriots as hostage and to facilitate population regroupings; and, finally, by seizing significant assets, such as Varosha and the fertile lands in the north, "bargaining chips" would be available for the future. Indeed, it was precisely some of these "chips" that Mr. Denktash was willing to throw into the pot in January, 1985.

These notions of security meld with those of identity for the Turkish Cypriots insofar as the settlers are concerned. Marshal Joffre is reported once to have said that he only needed one British guardsman in the frontline to be killed to ensure that Britain would side with France against Germany. The US forces in Germany have a similar function of being a symbolic hostage against misfortune and so do Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus. The Turkish guarantee to the TRNC is strengthened

by their presence (and correspondingly makes the presence of Turkish troops less necessary). But they also serve other functions.

In a classical battle of statistics, the Greek Cypriots seek to demonstrate that the Turkish Cypriots will be equalled in number by Turkish soldiers and settlers whereas the Turkish Cypriots affirm that some settlers and soldiers have returned home, some are temporary experts, and others are Turkish Cypriots returning from the diaspora. Still others have been awarded citizenship rights. To be sure, in 1974, after a decade of enclavement and marginalization, both of which encouraged a brain drain, the Turkish Cypriots had difficulty in manning adequately an administration and an economy. The experts needed were, by definition, few in number whereas the economy demanded labor, hence the influx of Anatolian peasants (who are, in fact, little suited to Cypriot conditions and pursuits). They had few other sources of assistance, if any, than Turkey and, as the saying goes, beggars cannot be choosers. However, the size of the Turkish presence in its various forms in northern Cyprus is both a threat to and a safeguard of Turkish Cypriot identity and their security.

It is a threat in that it diminishes the Cypriot dimension in the Turkish community in Cyprus and leads Greek Cypriots to react in terms of Turkey (and therefore Greece) rather than their fellow Cypriots whom they now view as captives. By arguing that only Turkey is important, at least in the last resort, the Greek Cypriots push matters towards the very situation which they wish to avoid — a self-defeating policy analogous to that of the blockade of the north which only pushes Turkish Cypriots into the arms of Turkey and thereby forces Turkey to play an increased role in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots do not wish to be Turkey's poodle, nor does Turkey wish for more than peace and quiet in Cyprus in regard to the Turkish Cypriot community and its geostrategic role in the area. In this sense, then, if the Turkish Cypriots are denied a viable Cypriot dimension, as they see it, either they will slide incrementally into the Turkish state — as a sort of Inner Mongolia or Ukraine or, on the British or US analogy, an Isle of Man, Channel Islands, or Puerto Rico — or they will be forced to assert their identity internationally with a vigorous drive for recognition, no matter the extent to which the settlers play a role in the TRNC. Such is the nature of the threat, but the settlers also represent a safeguard for Turkish Cypriot identity.

If Cyprus is reformulated as a working entity, there is little doubt that the south will exert a considerable pull, especially economically, on the north. The three freedoms so dear to Greek Cypriots, those of movement, settlement, and of property ownership on an island-wide basis, are likely, if fully implemented, significantly to dilute the Turkish

character of the northern entity in the federation. As Greek Cypriots go north and Turkish Cypriots go south, a new enclavement of Turkish Cypriots is in the cards. However, these tendencies do not apply to the settlers. They have no historic role in, or probably desire to go to the south, that is, to the Greek Cypriot entity. Thus they constitute a solid base for a northern Turkish entity — they have nowhere else to go — and thereby act as a guarantee of the Turkish identity of the north. Moreover, being vulnerable, they are more likely to do as they are told, at least until they have put down firm roots in Cypriot society. The need to have a solid basis for the northern Turkish Cypriot entity in the federation may also explain Mr. Denktash's willingness to make substantial territorial concessions in 1985.

Besides contributing significantly to diminishing the refugee question in the south, the territorial adjustments offered in 1985 would also have strengthened the long run viability of the Turkish Cypriot entity in any future federation. Varosha and the rich agricultural areas in the Morphou district would permit the resettlement of a substantial proportion of those refugees in the south who were not satisfied with their new lot. In short, the refugee boil in the south would be lanced. At the same time, the reduction in the size of the Turkish Cypriot entity together with a population fixed in size would enable Turkish Cypriots more easily to man their entity and to be a viable self-sustaining unit in the federation. It was a decisive offer which benefited both communities and it is, therefore, all the more regrettable that it was not seized by the Greek Cypriots since a larger Turkish area implies more settlers (and also possibly a greater Turkish military presence). For the time being, the settler issue remains a paradox: by strengthening the viability and Turkish identity of the north, the settlers enable the Turkish Cypriot entity to enter federation with a degree of equanimity, but at the same time, the settlers diminish the Cypriot dimension of the Turkish community in the north. Perhaps the situation will be resolved if the children of the settlers develop a genuine Cypriot consciousness. Others, who have not taken to an island way of life, might welcome repatriation (and international funds could smooth the process), thus leaving properties available for those Turkish Cypriots who will be displaced as the TRNC contracts in geographical size.

Over the last two years, the Greek Cypriots have made a great play of the three freedoms — that of movement, settlement, and property ownership — which they regard as a fundamental attribute of human rights in any state — rights to which Greek Cypriot refugees naturally hold particularly dear. In theory this argument has force: the strict application of bizonality is not usual in a federation. But then Cyprus is an unusual case: the manner of its independence and the continuing

formal limitations on its sovereignty confirm this. The problem is not to construct a textbook federation — any half-competent lawyer could do that — but to arrive at mutually satisfactory constitutional arrangements. Moreover, the choice of human rights cannot be selective but has to be all-embracing as the parties see it for, unless they are both satisfied, then those rights are at risk. For the Turkish Cypriots, the overwhelming human rights are those of security, identity, and recognition as a founding constituent party, not as a minority. The three freedoms risk undermining that sense of security, identity, and partnership and they are, therefore, not acceptable in the short run. On the other hand, without the three freedoms, and with the Turkish Cypriot entrenched veto in the constitution — and notwithstanding the territorial adjustments — the Greek Cypriots feel vulnerable to spoiling tactics. They consider that the Turkish Cypriots would be invulnerable and that, having ceded the Republic of Cyprus, they would be open to manipulation.

However, the Greek Cypriots are beginning to realize that a lack of movement on the Cyprus question is in fact likely to lead to a change in the international environment which will be unfavorable to them. Moreover, they are dismayed by the presence of the settlers' political party in the government of the TRNC. So there is now some evidence in Nikosia of a willingness to discuss exactly what the three freedoms might mean in practice. Freedom of movement, for example, may present few difficulties since the Turkish Cypriots only have a relatively short "blacklist" of Greek Cypriots who they would wish to keep out of the north. Property rights have a reciprocal element — sauce for the Greek Cypriot goose is sauce for the Turkish Cypriot gander — and international funds could ease the problem. Indeed, the United States has given a clear indication that substantial funds will be made available. The trickiest right is that of settlement, for here the threat to the viability of the Turkish Cypriot partner is most evident. It is, therefore, in the long term interest of Greek Cypriots that Turkish Cypriots feel physically, socially, and culturally secure in the island at a price that Greek Cypriots feel they can pay. Such a price needs to be seen in terms of the long term alternatives which Greek Cypriots insist are gloomy — that Turkey will take over the island. They would appear, therefore, to have nothing to lose in taking "risks" now which might give rise to a positive outcome later, failing which they might only fall prey to the inevitable as they themselves see it. However, they have clearly decided not to take that risk and to stick with the rather comfortable devil they know — an outcome that might not be altogether displeasing to Mr. Denktash.

Federation is not, for the time being, possible in a form acceptable

to both parties. Cyprus is in the effective control of two separate administrations. Mr. Perez de Cuellar might now, therefore, be thinking of a formula which recognizes reality — confederation. Historically, confederations, as in the case of the USA and Switzerland, have been temporary in that such units have either moved closer together into a federation or fallen completely apart, but not necessarily in an antagonistic manner. At the present moment, it appears that Cypriots must be separate before they can contemplate being together. But there is no reason why the existing elements of functional cooperation cannot be strengthened and, indeed, extended. Moreover, elements of other political formulae such as condominium, “dual monarchy,” and consociation, as well as referenda on a range of issues, might be considered. The starting point is evident, that Cypriots cannot be brought together before they feel secure separately. This will require a certain degree of legal ingenuity neither to deny the formal claims of the Republic of Cyprus nor the reality of a Turkish Cypriot entity. Each must be protected against its fears of unacceptable interference from the other. A confederation of sorts may do this or simply an informal understanding to diminish the offensive elements of the present *status quo* to the satisfaction of both partners and then not to alter the new situation in a manner deemed unfavorable by the other party. Again the fictions in Berlin spring to mind as an analogy. But there are practical questions that can also ease the situation. For example, if the Turkish Cypriot side was to implement its proposed territorial adjustments, perhaps with UN control of those areas, in return for comparable adjustments on the economic blockade of the north, all parties might gain. The refugee issue in the south would be eased; the economic situation in the north ameliorated to the satisfaction of Turkish Cypriots and Mr. Ozal, the Turkish Prime Minister, who read the riot act to the Turkish Cypriots for their poor economic performance when he visited them in the summer of 1986; the way smoothed for implementing the customs union of Cyprus with the EC; and, perhaps, a new climate would develop between the communities. But is it realistic to suggest some sort of confederal solution when the Greek Cypriot leadership is unwilling to accept Mr. Perez de Cuellar’s ideas on federation and when their ideas on federation favor a strong central body? Paradoxically, the answer is not so outlandish as it might at first sight appear when viewed in the context of the European Community.

It is clear that Cypriots can get on together. Greek and Turkish Cypriot politicians spent a week together in London in December, 1986 at the invitation of Friends of Cyprus. They reached a substantial measure of agreement on an important range of topics. That they could not agree to the publication of a joint *communique* which reflected a

consensus should not be taken too seriously. It was a case of rushing the political and diplomatic fences (perhaps for short term political advantage), fences which might, otherwise, with due preparation, be taken in their stride. Such political discussions need to be renewed on a regular basis, with care being taken to ensure that they reflect a broad spectrum of political opinion, for the hard liners have to agree since they have a veto. Those who participate need to rotate so that the process of “enlightenment” spreads. Moreover, third parties can play a role in a supportive manner with information and as a facilitator in the process of communication.⁵ The role of the third party is not to judge, to advocate a solution, or to coerce, but merely to facilitate. Such a process as that initiated by the Friends of Cyprus can be parallel to the Secretary-General’s efforts at a more formal level and be supplemented by meetings of other groups such as the Friends of Cyprus and others have also sponsored. However, the options are already being affected by the premature opening of the Presidential election campaign in the Republic. The election will not be held until February, 1988 but campaigning began at least a year prior to that with the “traditional” parties and personalities jockeying for position and looking for allies. A new independent candidate has come forward, George Vassiliou, who, as well as being a much respected economist in the Near and Middle East regionally, is exceptionally well informed about grass-roots opinions in the south through the surveys his research organization has conducted over the years. Perhaps this will enable him to break the sterility of the debate within the Greek Cypriot community with a new vigor, new ideas, and new information so that the Greek Cypriots can match their astonishing economic enterprise and fecundity in the inter-communal and international domain.

The UN Secretary-General is doubtless cogitating on the recent soundings taken in Cyprus by some of his senior officials. But the UN is not the only organization with a prominent role to play in the near future — so has the European Community (EC). The negotiations for a Customs Union between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus led to the initialling of a protocol in Brussels on May 22, 1987 which will, if ratified in time, come into force in January, 1988 and lead to a Customs Union in two stages over a fifteen-year period. The EC’s position is that it recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as the sole government of Cyprus, and not the TRNC, but at the same time,

⁵Techniques of facilitation and the like are discussed in J. W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication* (London, 1969), C. R. Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant’s Role* (Farnborough, 1981), Michael Banks (ed.), *Conflict in World Society* (Brighton, 1984), and Edward A. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution* (Sussex, 1986).

it is at pains to ensure that the Turkish Cypriot people are included on an equitable basis in any agreement made between the EC and the Republic of Cyprus. The EC has some leverage, given the importance of the EC market to Cyprus, and it might bear contemplating the sort of "deal" suggested earlier of territory for a relaxation of the economic blockade. The EC could use its resources to facilitate such an agreement in its economic aspects by compensation and other payments for lost property rights, lost access to property, or lost utilization of the fruits of property which could maintain the idea of a Cyprus economy, slow down the absorption of the northern economy into that of Turkey, reduce the economic burden on Turkey, and ease the practical and conceptual difficulties for the Community of a Customs Union with a country of which the government it recognizes institutes an economic blockade against part of the territory it claims. Can the EC include the Turkish Cypriot people if the Republic of Cyprus does not do so from the economic point of view? So far all parties have acceded to the wisdom of a *modus vivendi*, but the economic blockade is a self-defeating strategy and the new arrangements with the Community are an occasion to get the Republic government off the hook. At the moment, the Turkish Cypriots certainly feel the effectiveness of the economic restrictions against them but it is sometimes claimed in the south that the government has exercised a degree of restraint in not making the economic restrictions more effective. Such restraint as there may be does not have any political effect since it is at the margin in a coercive situation and thus discounted in the prevailing hostile stereotypes.

A Customs Union between Cyprus and the EC can be seen clearly as a prelude to full membership of the Community. With Greek membership, Turkish association, and their recent application for membership as well as the membership of Cyprus in the Council of Europe, there appears to be no objection in principle. The difficulties are economic and political. Economically, membership of Cyprus after the Customs Union would not have a great impact. Cyprus has a standard of living more than comparable to that of some parts of the Community, and its exports are already directed to the Community and are unlikely to cause market disruption, since its potatoes and fruit come on the market earlier than those from other Mediterranean areas and Israel is the more likely loser. Cyprus is efficient, flexible, and small and there is not likely to be a great influx of new migrant labor into other parts of the EC — it has already migrated with London having a Cypriot population from both communities equal to that of Nikosia. The problem, then, in its essence, is political.

Greece, Portugal, and Spain had to wait until it was evident that parliamentary democracy was firmly established (and in the case of

Spain that the blockade of Gibraltar was lifted). Since Ireland is neutral, the agreed non-aligned status of Cyprus is unlikely to be an impediment, especially if there is no questioning of the British Sovereign Base Areas and treaty facilities. Both communities operate on Western democratic lines so that the principal impediment for Cyprus is the inter-communal conflict itself. A Cyprus that was together but separate in the form of some sort of confederation, and which was amicably so, might meet the fundamental requirements, but the political difficulties do not end there.

There exists a sort of double veto in the context of the Greco-Turkish relationship with the EC. Greece and Turkey started off their relationship with the EC on an equal footing in the early 1960s with an interim associate status. Despite the freezing of the relationship during the colonels' regime, Greece finally achieved full membership roughly in the originally conceived time frame. Parliamentary democracy had taken root again and the Greek economy was of such a level, and sufficiently small, to be absorbed into the Community. The question of Turkey remains. At the present time, it is clear that the Turkish economy is not yet in a position to support the rigors of the Community, nor is the restoration of parliamentary democracy complete in Turkey, although progress is being made in the right direction on both counts. In principle, the Community can have no objection to full Turkish membership. That is the import of the association agreement from which Greece, too, benefited, and Turkey is already a member of the Council of Europe. However, in practice, Turkey is a very different cup of tea from Greece. Its economy is much bigger, and difficult, because it will require greater adjustment on the part of the Community to absorb it. Of particular concern to the more prosperous members of the Community, and Greece, is the impact on their economic and social situation of free movement of labor after Turkey's full membership. They are likely to require a long period of adjustment after membership or to deny membership until such time as the Turkish economy has developed sufficiently to hold its labor force at home.

Again, however, the question is also political. Greece is unlikely to accept Turkish membership until the Cyprus issue is resolved to its satisfaction, not to mention the question of the Aegean. But if Greece may try to exert a veto over Turkish membership, Turkey, likewise, may try to exert a similar hold over Cyprus' membership. Economically, politically, and militarily, Turkey is important to Europe (and also to NATO), therefore the Community is unlikely to accept Cyprus fully into its fold over the objections of either the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey. Hence, there are elements of a double veto. Any membership for Cyprus will be possible only if Greece and Cyprus agree not to object in principle

to Turkish membership when the economic and domestic political conditions in Turkey are ripe. The full membership of Cyprus will therefore require one additional political condition to that of parliamentary democracy and imply another — the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus and, by implication, of that between Greece and Turkey. Since Cyprus is likely, thereby, to have a long wait in the ante room, it is important to make the conditions as comfortable as possible for all Cypriots in the form of the Customs Union. But the Republic of Cyprus could help itself by showing a political ingenuity to match its undoubted economic skill and prowess. Perhaps there could be an upgrading of the common interest of all the parties if a confederal (interim) procedure was adopted. In Canada, Quebec has been recognized as a "distinct society" and this, like the previous idea of "sovereignty-association," might be a formula of some relevance in Cyprus for the TRNC, that is, an ambiguous situation of "statehood" without international recognition but with *de facto* administrative independence. All of Cyprus could then join the EC and eventually apply the Treaty of Rome which would in effect give Greek Cypriots their three freedoms while not denying Turkish Cypriots their fundamental needs of identity and security. The application of the three freedoms would be gradual with freedom of movement immediately, except for those on the TRNC "blacklist," but a twenty-year period for adjustment in other regards. The economic blockade of the north would be lifted and international funds available to ease the refugee property question along with a reduction in the geographical size of the TRNC along lines previously agreed. The Association of Turkey with the EC (now including Cyprus) might make special provision anticipating full membership by applying the "three freedoms" of the Treaty of Rome between Turkey and the TRNC during the period of association. As for the EC, it will also have an eye to the Greco-Turkish relationship.

Greece clearly has a political advantage in the context of the Greco-Turk-EC relationship in being a member of the Community, but that does not mean that it can count on the Community's automatic support vis-a-vis Turkey. Prime Minister Papandreu has been successful in getting economic support from the Community for Greece, which his electorate duly acknowledged. Many of his gestures in international relations have the merit of calling attention to the knee-jerk reactions of some Community members to current issues, thereby engendering a more serious and open-minded consideration of such issues. Despite the irritation this causes, Greece is acknowledged to be a good member of the EC. However, it cannot call upon unconditional EC support against Turkey.

The EC as a whole, and the present British and West German

governments in particular, has a good deal of sympathy for Turkey and its strategic importance and pro-European outlook is acknowledged. Turkey is a major regional Power, as well as a stalwart member of the Western alliance. Moreover, it is a long term economic partner which, with appropriate conditions of political and economic well-being, could become a full member of the EC. However, the economic, social, and political inconveniences make such a membership a question not for the immediate future. Turkish sources mention the year 2000 AD. But in the long term, the future of Turkey is an important question. If Turkey is not offered a congenial relationship with the EC, and the West more generally, this may prove a powerful fillip to the Islamic current in Turkish politics and society. While at present the secular Atatürk tradition is not under any real threat, it is in the interests of Greece, Turkey, and above all Cyprus, as well as the EC, to ensure that this remains so. While the Turkish leadership may use the possibility of Islamic fundamentalism to frighten the West, they, too, may be frightened by it. A *modus vivendi* in Cyprus has, therefore, to be seen in this context. While Cypriots have demonstrated that they cannot at present find a means to be together and that their fears require a degree of separation for their assuagement, the business of the UN Secretary-General, the EC, individual governments, and groups such as Friends of Cyprus is, in everyone's interest, to enable them better to be separate but to facilitate a degree of "togetherness" that neither finds threatening. For example, the establishment of a university of international standing in the island would be such a project and meet a regional need to boot. Referring to the German *bund*, Metternich coined the phrase *Einigkeit ohne Einheit*, concord without union — a not unrealistic goal for the present in Cyprus.