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## Eleutherios Venizelos' Commentary on Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*

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THE STUDY OF THUKYDIDES ENTAILS A STUDY OF A VAST amount of secondary scholarship. And although knowledge of this scholarship is necessary for anyone who undertakes to examine Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Pouncey's statement as to the conservatism which is sometimes the result of this scholarship<sup>1</sup> holds true for a lot of the theories pertaining to Thukydides' work. Being aware of the futility of dealing with problems in classical scholarship which remain problems in classical scholarship, I have attempted to present a point of view of Thukydides' *History* which I consider more in tune with the practical purpose which its author had in mind. Thus, I have presented the point of view of a prominent modern Greek politician, Eleutherios Venizelos, who, like Thukydides, had vast experience in political and military undertakings, and who, like Thukydides, decided to work on the history of the Peloponnesian War while in exile.

Eleutherios Venizelos was the main political figure in modern Greek history from 1909 to 1934 and played an important role in European political history during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. From a politician of Venizelos' stature one would have eagerly waited to read his political memoirs. Venizelos, true to the spirit of Thukydides, left us his translation of Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* with an extensive commentary as an indirect political statement, much more powerful than a personal political commentary would have made.

The importance of Venizelos' hand-written commentary — still unpublished — lies in the fact that since it was not written for the purpose of expressing his political points of view, but rather as a philological analysis of Thukydides' text, it has the advantage of presenting the spontaneous reaction of Venizelos the politician to Thukydides' analysis of the events of his time. And because Venizelos' scholarly work was triggered by critical political situations analogous to those

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<sup>1</sup>Peter R. Pouncey, *The Necessities of War* (New York, 1980), p. xiv.



which resulted in Thukydides' undertaking of the composition of his *History*, Venizelos' political comments, few as they appear throughout his philological commentary, may offer insights into Thukydides' political thought.

Under Venizelos' leadership, the small bankrupt Greece of 1897 was tripled in size and the Greek army came the closest it had ever been to Constantinople since the "City" had been taken by the Turks, ten years after the military revolution of 1909 which invited him to power. On the morrow of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres (July 20, 1920) — a product of his hard and ingenious work as a politician which created the Greece of "the five seas and two continents" and revived the centuries-old Greek dream of the reacquisition of lands in Asia Minor — Venizelos survived an assassination attempt at the train station of the city of Lyon, Paris. In the following elections of November 1, 1920, Venizelos was not even elected as a member of the Greek Parliament.

Fearing for his life, Venizelos left Greece. According to his close friends and collaborators who accompanied him to exile, aboard the ship that was taking him away from Greece, Venizelos was reading Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

Venizelos devoted most of his time in exile, a period of almost eight years, to writing a translation in modern Greek of Thukydides' *History*, together with an extensive commentary on it. He never explained in writing his motives for choosing such a large project. The only information on this subject comes from comments of friends and collaborators who knew him well and who, perhaps, could shed some light on what he left untold.

The first source to examine is Stephanos Stephanou. After studying law and economics at the University of Athens as a young man, he became a reporter and writer for one of the most important newspapers in Athens (*Ἐλεύθερον Βῆμα* 1922-1928). He then became Venizelos' personal secretary and director of his private office during his last premiership (1928-1932). In 1938 he became chief editor of an economics journal, *Οἰκονομικός Ταχυδρόμος* (1938-1947), and he served as an executive (studying business and industrial development) of the National Bank of Greece (1933-1960). After Venizelos' death, he devoted his life to the study of the life and work of Venizelos. He is considered one of the most important sources on Eleutherios Venizelos today.

In his eighties when I first met him in 1982, Stephanos Stephanou was still working on his fourth bulky volume of the *Writings of Eleutherios Venizelos*, which was finally published in 1984. This work includes all his speeches, declarations, interviews, etc. from 1910 to the

Metaxas dictatorship in 1956.<sup>2</sup>

I first met Mr. Stephanou in the historic "Lesche ton Phileleutheron," which is today a museum in memory of Eleutherios Venizelos. This museum is directed by Mr. Stephanou who proved to be very helpful to me. He offered precious information on the character, life, and work of Eleutherios Venizelos, and allowed me to examine the statesman's handwritten notes and his unpublished handwritten commentary on Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

When I asked him about the motive behind Venizelos' decision to devote eight years during that crucial period of his life to the study of Thukydides, his response was that Venizelos always admired Thukydides and he believed that a politician could find in his work guidance for many problems which arise in political life. He also said that Venizelos' decision to turn to Thukydides on the morrow of his departure for exile must have been initially a spontaneous reaction, caused by the affinity which Venizelos perceived between the ancient Athenian political behavior, as described by Thukydides, and that of Venizelos' contemporary voters. Venizelos' decision to undertake the cumbersome task of the translation and commentary of Thukydides' *History* in modern Greek may have been Venizelos' effort to educate contemporary Greeks in one area where he felt they needed it the most: in their internal political behavior. Thus, Venizelos was offering his countrymen a lesson from their past on the catastrophic effects of internal dissension and simultaneously was trying himself to understand Thukydides better and find justification and guidance in the ancient politician's experience. At least the evidence from Venizelos' contemporary sources<sup>3</sup> seems to corroborate the above statement. That Venizelos considered Thukydides primarily as a politician becomes evident through his political interpretations in the commentary.

My second source of information is Demetrios Kaklamanos.<sup>4</sup> According to him, Venizelos' literary ability can be equated to his political talent. His speeches and his political writings in general are testimony of his deep knowledge of the Classics, and of his love for Perikles' *Funeral Oration*. Venizelos believed that the ancient Greek literary sources could teach the modern world a true perception of life "not as bitter and cold as modern writers often present it, but on the contrary,

<sup>2</sup>Stephanos Stephanou, *Ἐλευθερίου Βενιζέλου τὰ κείμενα* [Eleutherios Venizelos' Texts], 4 vols. (Athens, 1984).

<sup>3</sup>For a detailed discussion on Venizelos' motives in undertaking his work on Thukydides, see below statements from his contemporary sources.

<sup>4</sup>Demetrios Kaklamanos, Greek scholar and diplomat, supervisor of the first edition of Venizelos' translation of Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Oxford, 1940).



a much more beautiful one."<sup>5</sup>

According to Kaklamanos, it is important to note that Eleutherios Venizelos started his work on Thukydides after his defeat in the elections of November 1920. The outcome of these elections, which denied Venizelos even the privilege of being elected as a member of the Parliament, was the reason he left his country and subjected himself to a self-inflicted exile. During that time, "his greatest consolation was the rendering of Thukydides' *History* into Modern Greek."<sup>6</sup>

Kaklamanos informs us that Venizelos started to work on Thukydides in the fall of 1920 and continued it during his stay in Paris and London, as well as his periodic visits to his birthplace, Crete. He worked in a methodical manner, "usually in the mornings, sitting at his desk in his office, for five to six hours daily, among lexicons and translations of Thukydides' *History* in the main European languages, as well as commentaries on the text."<sup>7</sup>

He used to verify with the "conscientious zeal of a professional scholar or a Benedictine monk, names, dates, and places. he would leave nothing to chance. . . . He had told me once that this work of his had become his consoling occupation amongst the obstacles of an extraordinary political life from which political life he was drawing in succession the greatest satisfaction . . . and the most bitter disappointments which the democratic system holds for its protagonists."<sup>8</sup>

Venizelos' translation, copied in a typewritten form, was saved by his widow, Elena Skylitse, from the "old sacks into which it had been thrown by the Athenian police among other manuscripts of Venizelos."<sup>9</sup> Until that time no one knew of Venizelos' commentary, and it came as a great surprise to those who were familiar with Venizelos' work on Thukydides to find among his papers the handwritten dossiers of his Commentary.

The publication of Venizelos' translation was entrusted by his widow to Demetrios Kaklamanos. Despite suggestions from "certain scholarly circles"<sup>10</sup> for a revision of this translation by a committee of professors of Classical studies before its final publication, Kaklamanos decided to present Venizelos' work without changes since he considered him "a teacher of the Modern Greek language."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Eleutherios Venizelos, *Θουκυδίδου Ἱστορίαι* [Thukydides' *History*] (Athens, 1957), p. xxii.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. xxiii.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. xxvi.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. xxvii.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. xxviii.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

Often Kaklamanos expressed his admiration for Venizelos' scholarly accomplishment, and wrote that although, originally, a publication of this commentary — if not in its entirety at least of a selection — had been thought possible, this idea was abandoned for such an undertaking has been considered as an extremely difficult one. Both Demetrios Kaklamanos and Stephanos Stephanou expressed their hope for such an effort to be undertaken in the future, since, besides its scholarly value, the Commentary is the part of Venizelos' work where one can really observe the politician's method of working in an area other than his political actions.<sup>12</sup>

Did Venizelos derive any guidance from his study of Thukydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*? Kaklamanos believes so:

I cannot confirm that Venizelos was guided by Thukydides in such undertakings as the Balkan Alliance and the liberation of the enslaved Christian peoples of the Balkans. I know, however, that he considered the great historian as a solid source of Greek interest. He often repeated that when one studies Thukydides, one obtains a perceptive view on every contemporary event, and that one can use Thukydides' *History* as a guiding star for every important political undertaking . . .<sup>13</sup>

The third source for determining Venizelos' purposes is Andreas Michalopoulos. He was Venizelos' private secretary from 1917 to 1924. His testimony is very important since he was with Eleutherios Venizelos during the years when he started working on his translation and commentary.

According to his testimony, Venizelos' office in Athens contained an extensive collection of Classical works as well as numerous works of well-known Classical scholars, "about six to seven hundred volumes."<sup>14</sup> He often studied these books as attested by his handwritten personal marginalia. At times, when in a good mood, he used to recite excerpts from the Classics in Ancient or Modern Greek, the choral parts of Sophokles' *Antigone* in particular. However, "he always indicated his preference for Thukydides, probably because he had a deep admiration for the political and civilizing genius of Perikles, who so actively imprinted his stamp on Eleutherios Venizelos' genius."<sup>15</sup>

According to Andreas Michalopoulos, Venizelos' work on Thukydides was the culminating point of his services to his country. Venizelos

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. pp. xviii, xxvi.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. xxiii.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. xli.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.



"was saturated in the Greek letters of the Great Era, not as an amateur, but as a scholar who applied this scholarship in the arena of the contemporary political struggle."<sup>16</sup> Andreas Michalopoulos also testifies that, when Venizelos left Greece in 1920, he decided to realize an old dream, a translation of Thukydides' *History* in Modern Greek. When in October of 1921 he went to the United States, he had to interrupt the work for a short period of time, only to resume it as soon as he and his companions reached California. He continued to work on the project during his trips to Cuba and Peru.

For four entire months, Venizelos, always in the morning, would sit at his desk at seven o'clock sharp and would work on the translation until twelve thirty. Sometimes he would add a few hours of work in the afternoon or in the evening. He was carrying with him various texts, publications, and translations in English and in French . . . From time to time he had the courtesy to discuss problems of interpretation with me. I was still fresh from the University where I had acquired some specialization on the subject. So, I had the opportunity to realize how immensely deeper was the comprehension of the experienced politician than the pedantic scrutiny of the scholar.<sup>17</sup>

Andreas Michalopoulos tells us also that Venizelos had to interrupt his work on Thukydides during the time he was in Lausanne (1922-1923) as well as during the time of his brief premiership in Greece (January to March 1924) only to resume it as soon as he returned in Paris. Michalopoulos' testimony ends in December 1924, when he had to leave the service of Venizelos in order to assume the position of the prefect of Kerkyra (Corfu).

#### *The Translation*

The translation was published for the first time in 1940 in Oxford under the supervision of Demetrios Kaklamanos and the direction of Dr. John Johnson. The translation was published in two volumes. A photograph of Sargent's portrait of Eleutherios Venizelos was included in the first volume, and a photograph of a sample of Venizelos' handwriting was included in the second.<sup>18</sup> The translation was reprinted in 1946 and in 1960.

The language used by Venizelos is the Puristic (καθαρεύουσα)

<sup>16</sup>Ibid. p. xli.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. p. xii.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid. p. xxx.

although Venizelos supported the teaching of a "pure Demotic, but with some caution" in elementary schools.<sup>19</sup> Kostas Palamas, in one of his letters to Penelope Delta, written in January 1932, observes: "I suppose that Venizelos does not even realize the poetic emotions that he offers, even in his political speeches and in his speeches of any kind, where he sows, with sentimental naivete and political perspicacity, the pure demoticism, making the language come alive even where you would not have expected it."<sup>20</sup>

It is evident from Venizelos' correspondence with the activists and moving spirits of the Demotic Greek language as well as from relevant articles he published in newspapers that he did not believe in the sudden substitution of the Puristic for the Demotic language as the official language of the state. He was for a gradual coming together of the two languages with the continual simplification of the Puristic.<sup>21</sup>

Venizelos had intended to include in the introduction of his translation of Thukydides' *History* a chapter about the language he had used.<sup>22</sup> However, nothing relevant has been found among his papers. It is possible, however, that all this has been lost or confiscated or deliberately disposed of, since the language controversy had always been considered a highly political subject in Greece.<sup>23</sup>

About the language which Venizelos had used in his translation, Kaklamanos observes that although Venizelos was for the adoption of Demotic Greek, he had considered simple Puristic as a more appropriate language for the rendering of Thukydides' *History* into Modern Greek because of its great similarity in the syntax and the vocabulary.<sup>24</sup>

#### *The Commentary*

Venizelos' extensive scholarly commentary on Thukydides' text is unpublished as yet. It includes, in addition to grammatical and syntactical comments, relevant observations on archaeology, geography, and history.

<sup>19</sup>Proceedings of the Academy of Athens, Meeting of the 23rd of November 1982: "Eleutherios Venizelos and the Demotic Language," (1982), p. 568.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid. p. 563.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid. p. 566.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid. p. 567.

<sup>23</sup>The use of the Puristic has traditionally been associated with the conservative upper classes in Greece, while the use of the Demotic with the leftist working class.

<sup>24</sup>Venizelos' translation is part of the international bibliography on Thukydides and it has been reviewed by Greek and foreign scholarly sources: a) A. Gomme, in *Classical Review* 56 (1942) 29-31, b) Polymnia Laskare, in *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 54 (1941) 285, c) R. J., in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 63 (1943) 13, d) K. A. Papachrestou, in *Paideia Zoe* (March-April, 1952).



This commentary is preserved in handwritten dossiers of approximately one hundred to one hundred and twenty pages each. It was originally believed that these dossiers contained Venizelos' commentary on all eight books of Thukydides' *History*. On examination of the dossiers in the spring of 1983, I discovered that the commentary is incomplete, covering only books 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Thukydides. Moreover, there are no dossiers with commentary on the beginning paragraphs of books 1, 2, 3, and 4.

It is certain that Venizelos completed the commentary on the first four books of Thukydides' *History* because the commentary on each of these books usually starts in the middle of a phrase or a paragraph. And since it is unlikely that Venizelos started his commentary from the middle of a phrase or a paragraph, this is an indication that there originally existed dossiers referring to the beginning chapters of books 1, 2, 3, and 4. There is a strong possibility that he also completed the commentary of the last four books of Thukydides' *History*, because in the existent dossiers there are also references to the various chapters of books 5, 6, 7, and 8. These references are as numerous as the references to the various chapters of the first four books. Besides, his scholia should have logically preceded his translation, and Venizelos translated all eight books of Thukydides' *History*.

It is possible therefore that a number of the dossiers have been lost; or they may lie forgotten in some basement of the security police in Athens, from which the existing ones, now belonging to the collection of the museum in memory of Eleutherios Venizelos in Athens, were retrieved.

It may be, however, that some of these dossiers were deliberately destroyed if they contained comments which were considered politically dangerous for the military regime in power at the time.<sup>25</sup>

If we assume that Venizelos wrote commentary of only the first four books of Thukydides' *History*, approximately seven dossiers must be missing. If we decide that Venizelos completed the commentary on all eight books of Thukydides' *History*, at least twenty-seven dossiers are missing.

The commentary on the first four books of Thukydides' *History* runs as follows:

Dossier No. 1: Thuk. 1.24.7-1.55.1; Dossier No. 2: Thuk. 1.55.1-1.86.1; Dossier No. 3: Thuk. 1.86.1-1.120.3; Dossier No. 4: Thuk. 1.120.3-1.146 which is the end of Thuk. book 1; Dossier No. 5: Thuk. 2.63-2.85.1; Dossier No. 6: Thuk. 2.85.1-2.102

<sup>25</sup>I have already mentioned the fate of Pericles' Funeral Oration in the school curriculum during the times that military regimes were in power in Greece.

which is the end of Thuk. book 2; Dossier No. 7: Thuk. 3.28.2-3.46.5; Dossier No. 8: Thuk. 3.46.5-3.68; Dossier No. 9: Thuk. 3.68.1-3.102.4; Dossier No. 10: Thuk. 3.102.4-3.116 which is the end of Thuk. book 3; and Dossier No. 11: Thuk. 4.95-4.135 which is the end of Thuk. book 4.<sup>26</sup>

## 2

After the end of the First World War, and while deep in his work on Thukydides, Venizelos had expressed himself on the futility of war, which does not result in victors but only in defeated,<sup>27</sup> and about the importance of trust among nations so that they can live in peace.<sup>28</sup> He spoke about the utmost importance of abiding by the truth in one's dealings of any sort, political ones especially,<sup>29</sup> and in the catastrophic effect which the sophistic manipulation of the truth by the demagogues<sup>30</sup> can produce in any political system, especially the democratic one.

He also spoke about the responsibility of a war resting on the shoulders of the instigator, the one who initiates it, the one who refuses to solve existing differences through arbitration.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>26</sup>The ascribing of the numbers from 1 to 11 to Venizelos' handwritten dossiers was done by me, so that the study of the commentary would be facilitated.

<sup>27</sup>"... Every world war has as a result internal dissension. . . .

"War today does not pay. . . .

"Will we be able to undertake successfully the war against the War?"

"... I am and I have always been a lover of peace. I was willing to make serious sacrifices in order to safeguard a constant peace in the Balkan Peninsula through peaceful settlements, for the creation, if possible, of a Balkan community. . . ." (Newspaper *Ἐλεύθερον Βῆμα*, 1 February, 1933).

<sup>28</sup>"The world does not want war. It is true that human nature and human history prove that war is an evil, hard to be erased. However, habit can become second nature. Man will get used to peace as well. . . .

"Until 1870, it was known that war brought some profit to someone: the victor. After the World War, it became evident that wars do not bring any profit either to the victor or to the defeated. The losses are common, huge for everyone. . . .

"There is also an unchangeable economic law which pressures all nations above their antagonisms, into a closer cooperation in the economic field. Nations cannot survive isolated." (Newspaper, *Ἐλεύθερον Βῆμα*, 22 February, 1930).

<sup>29</sup>"The first duty of the political man is to tell the truth even if it is unpleasant. Compliance with the laws is an unbending rule, even if powerful people are going to be affected, or friends. . . ." (Newspaper, *Ἐλεύθερον Βῆμα*, 23 July, 1928).

<sup>30</sup>"... The democratic government is of course the best kind of government from all the ones which human wisdom has invented. It should be permitted also to be said that democracy is less evil than the other types of government, because man has not yet managed to invent the perfect kind of government.

Democracy, however, has also one great disadvantage: the danger of demagoguery, which seeks to lead the people in wrong directions. . . ." (Newspaper *Ἐλεύθερον Βῆμα*, 13 May, 1930).

<sup>31</sup>"The responsibility for war cannot but fall upon the one who starts this injustice, the one who causes the war, and not to the one who suffers it.

"My long experience in international affairs has taught me that, as high as our ideals



In our times we live in constant fear of the instigator of future war, the one who will refuse to discuss differences in a summit meeting, the one who will "press the button" of nuclear attack. In Venizelos' opinion, the ones who "pressed the button" which set into motion the events leading to the Peloponnesian War were the Corinthians. This is why he devotes so many comments in his commentary, which is mainly grammatical and syntactical in character, in order to indicate that they refused arbitration repeatedly proposed by the Kerkyraians.

In Venizelos' opinion, Greece's worst political activity, both in ancient and modern Greece, was the manipulation of public opinion. This is why he went out of his way in his commentary to demonstrate this disease of Greek politics — and of international politics as well — whenever he perceived it in the speeches that political and military leaders delivered in Thukydides' work.

In Venizelos' opinion, war and demagogy,<sup>32</sup> interrelated and each alternately responsible for the other, were a diseased manifestation of human nature, a deviation from the ideal state of human psyche which should be governed by σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων.<sup>33</sup> And it is under this diseased manifestation of human nature that most atrocities are committed in human political life under the auspices of personal and national expediency. In his Commentary Venizelos could not help but make direct political comments against the atrocities produced by the political intrigue of the time of Thukydides, which he compared to his own contemporary events.

Venizelos' political comments, therefore, dispersed as they were

may be. We must, first of all, be realists. There is at this moment in every country a strong current of public opinion demanding the immediate and complete disarmament of all nations because it believes that this measure, and this alone, is able to safeguard a constant peace. Although I am a believer in peace and I yearn for it as passionately as any man, I completely disagree with the above opinion. It is impossible for me to believe, even for one moment, that disarmament would infallibly provide peace. . . .

"For the assurance of an international peace, I do not believe any more in the methods which depend upon an epigrammatic phrase, as I do not believe in new and instantaneous methods of solving the problem. I believe, however, in the effectiveness and power of international agreements against the possibility of 'the breakers of peace.' If one of those were to face an agreement for a coordinated, sincere and imminent action of the majority of his neighbors, one would examine twice the possibility of an attack. This kind of agreement depends on mutual trust, and trust is not a coin circulating freely in our times. All the same, if it can be obtained it develops and expands, one could say, like a drop of oil." (Newspaper, *Ἐλεύθερον Βῆμα*, October 2, 1934).

<sup>32</sup>It is true that the word: δῆμαγωγός "demagogue" means leader of the people in the fifth century. I believe, however, that Thukydides uses this word with its derogatory meaning, for he uses it only twice, first in reference to Cleon (4.21.3) and second in reference to Alkibiades (8.65.2).

<sup>33</sup>For the use of σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων in Thukydides, see Lowell Edmund's article: "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82.83)," *Harvard Studies of Classical Philology* 81 (1977).

throughout his predominantly scholarly commentary, were mainly concerned with the issues of the responsibility for the war, of the sophistic manipulation of the truth by demagogues and of the atrocities committed against humanity under the influence of war and demagogy. The responsibility for the first incident used as a pretext for the war, as well as the first demonstration of the manipulative effects of demagogy in determining foreign policies, were attributed to the Corinthians. In presenting Venizelos' political comments, one should, also discuss at length his comments referring to the Kerkyraian incident.

From Venizelos' commentary it becomes obvious that he believed that Thukydides described a war born in a bipolar world out of fear and mistrust of one great power towards the other. The Spartans grew progressively worried and afraid of the power of the Athenians, a people of whom they had no real knowledge because of the policy of austere political isolation which they followed. The Athenian character is in essence presented to them by a third power, the Corinthians, who eagerly seek the war against the Athenians out of greed for what they consider their private interests. Thus, the Peloponnesian War is instigated by a third power which, taking advantage of the mistrust between the two superpowers and out for its own interests, manipulates the truth and pushes the reluctant Spartans into the war which alters dramatically the course of Greek history and culture.

Almost all of Venizelos' political comments concern the responsibility for the war and the manipulation of the truth by the sophistic arguments of the demagogues. He is clearly against the war and against the misrepresentation of the truth which is the cause of political disintegration and internal strife and war. In this way, Venizelos' political comments are extremely useful in discerning the intent behind Thukydides' extensive use of the speeches. When one reads the speeches along with Venizelos' comments, the sophistic argumentation of the speakers as well as Thukydides' disapproval of them become obvious. And Venizelos' utmost disapproval of the Corinthian tactics throughout their war with the Kerkyraians over Epidamnos, brings into light Thukydides' own disapproval of the Corinthians and their role as instigators of the Peloponnesian War.

In a series of direct personal comments Venizelos makes it a point to demonstrate that in the dispute over Epidamnos, the Kerkyraians were right and the Corinthians were wrong. His reason for putting the blame on the Corinthians is that the Kerkyraians repeatedly proposed to settle the dispute through arbitration, which the Corinthians repeatedly refused. In addition to this, the Kerkyraians appeared thoroughly sincere with the Corinthians as to the political route they were going to follow should their proposals for settling the dispute through



arbitration be refused. Venizelos also makes it a point to demonstrate that the Corinthian representatives in Athens manipulated the truth when they tried to dissuade the Athenians from helping the Kerkyraians.

The intensity with which Venizelos expresses himself in order to point out that the Kerkyraians' attitude in the dispute was "irreproachable" and that the Corinthians were responsible for the war which followed, as well as his comments on the demagogic character of the Corinthian speech in Athens, is characteristic of the strong position he assumes in favor of the Kerkyraians and against the Corinthians. Moreover, this part of his Commentary was alien to his usual style. In his Commentary he usually restrained himself in syntactical, grammatical, and historical comments expressed in an impersonal and unattached manner. His most characteristic comments referring to the responsibility for the war between Kerkyra and Corinth, in which the Athenians became also involved, are as follows:

1) In Thuk. 1.28.2 we read: "and they [the Kerkyraians] were willing also to submit the matter to the oracle at Delphi."

Venizelos' comment: "It is certain that the Kerkyraians demonstrate through their proposals the sincerity of their intentions so that the war may be avoided and the dispute may be regulated through arbitration."<sup>34</sup>

2) In Thuk. 1.28.4 it is stated: "The Corinthians answered that if the Kerkyraians would withdraw their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnos they would consider the matter. . . ."

Venizelos' comment: "This answer of the Corinthians by its formulation already casts upon them the responsibility for the dispute. They do not indicate at all that if the siege of Epidamnos is lifted they would accept arbitration. They only agree in such a case to discuss the matter!"<sup>35</sup>

In Thuk. 1.28.5 it is stated: "Whereupon the Kerkyraians replied that they would do this if the Corinthians, on their part, would withdraw their forces at Epidamnos."

Venizelos' comment: "The answer of the Kerkyraians proves without the slightest possibility of a doubt, that they sincerely wished for peace, and that they proposed the arbitration under conditions of absolute equality for both parties."<sup>36</sup>

4) In Thuk. 1.28.5 it is stated: "but they were also ready to arbitrate on condition that both parties should remain where they were and that they should make a truce until the decision be made."

<sup>34</sup>Eleutherios Venizelos, *Commentary*, Dossier No. 1, p. 112.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid. p. 113.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid. p. 114.

Venizelos' comment: "And this last proposal of the Kerkyraians completes their absolutely irreproachable behavior and casts on the Corinthians without any doubt the responsibility of the war."<sup>37</sup>

5) In Thuk. 1.31.2-3 it is stated: "The Kerkyraians, on the other hand, were alarmed when they learned of their preparations, and since they were without an ally among the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lakedaimonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, become their ally, and try to procure some aid from them."

Venizelos has two comments on the above statement:

a) "The Kerkyraians considered that the time had already come in order for them to do what they had warned the Corinthians that they were going to in case they had to." b) "According to the truce it was permitted to each one of the Greek city-states to rank itself with either the Athenian or the Peloponnesian confederacy. But the confederacy toward which the petition was made was not bound to accept it." (Note the way Venizelos draws attention to the fact that the Kerkyraians had warned the Corinthians about their plans should arbitration be denied, and that therefore they were absolutely sincere in their political transactions. Note also that he draws attention to the right that the Kerkyraians had to seek the Athenian alliance and the same right that the Athenians had to offer them help without violating the terms of the thirty-year treaty with the Lakedaimonians.)<sup>38</sup>

6) In Thuk. 34.2.2-3 it is stated: "And that they [the Corinthians] are in the wrong is manifest: for when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnos they preferred to prosecute their charges by war rather than by equity."

Venizelos' comment: "The impartial procedure, the opposite to the war route [arbitration]. (Note Venizelos' characterization of arbitration as "the impartial procedure.")<sup>39</sup>

Venizelos' most characteristic comments referring to the sophistic manipulation of the truth on the part of the Corinthians in their speech in Athens are as follows:

1) In Thuk. 1.37.4-5 it is stated: "And meanwhile they [the Kerkyraians] have used as a cloak their policy of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid joining others in wrongdoing, but that they may do wrong all alone; that wherever they have power they may use violence, and wherever they can escape detection they may overreach someone; and if, perchance, they can steal a march on anyone, that

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid. p. 124.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid. p. 137.



they may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were to attack by their neighbors, the more clearly they might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by offering and accepting arbitration."

Venizelos' comment: "... it seems of course strange that although the Kerkyraians proposed the arbitration and the Corinthians refused it, yet the latter are accusing the first as refusing to resort to arbitration for their dispute. The Corinthians, when formulating this accusation, are basing it on the fact that all the treaties of alliance among the independent states in antiquity included as a rule the clause that every dispute among the allies shall be resolved through arbitration. The Corinthians, therefore, based on the previous policy of the Kerkyraians which avoided alliances, the natural result of which alliances would be the resolving of the disputes through arbitration, formulate this accusation against them. Of course, if the tree of sophism had not taken root for the first time in the classical soil of our country, the Corinthians would not have dared to utter such an accusation, at a time when they themselves were absolutely refusing to accept the arbitration proposed by the Kerkyraians. The verb "ἀναισχυντεῖν" [to be shameless] which the Corinthians throw on the face of the Kerkyraians, rather applies to themselves."<sup>40</sup> 2) In Thuk. 1.38.6, it is stated: "But in the insolence and arrogance of wealth they [the Kerkyraians] have wronged us in many ways, and particularly in the case of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim to when it was in distress, but seized by force the moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold."

Venizelos' comment: "The Corinthians are abusing the truth. Epidamnus was a colony of the Kerkyraians, and only the founder, according to the old custom, had been invited from Corinth, Corinth being the metropolis of Kerkyra."<sup>41</sup>

3) In Thuk. 1.40.4-6, it is stated: "... and not to establish the precedent of admitting into your alliance those who revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, we on our part did not vote against you; on the contrary, we openly maintained that each one should discipline his own allies without interference."

Venizelos' comment: "In the year 440 or 439, the Samians revolted (see Thuk. 1.115). The Corinthians, invoking this precedent, seem to forget that the Samians, according to the thirty-years treaty, belonged

<sup>40</sup>Ibid. p. 152.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid. p. 155.

to the alliance of the Athenians from whom they revolted, while the Kerkyraians were a completely independent state which was not bound with Corinth by any political ties, except for the moral bond only, because Kerkyra had been founded by Corinth."<sup>42</sup>

4) In Thuk. 1.42.2 it is stated: "And do not think that this course is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that another course is advantageous if you come to war. For advantage is most likely to result when one errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which the Kerkyraians would frighten you into wrongdoing, is still uncertain."

Venizelos' comment: "... The Corinthians answer both arguments of the Kerkyraians δίκαιον — συμφέρον [justice — advantage] but it is certain that on both these points their argumentation is weaker than that of the Kerkyraians."<sup>43</sup>

5) In Thuk. 1.43.1 it is stated: "But we, since events have brought us under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now claim from you in return the same treatment — that you who were then aided by our vote should not injure us by yours."

Venizelos' comment: "The Corinthians continue always to base their arguments on the unfounded assertion that Kerkyra is their ally."<sup>44</sup>

The comments presented above seem to indicate clearly Venizelos' belief that in the dispute between Kerkyra and Corinth the Kerkyraians were "sincere" and "irreproachable" because they did everything possible in order to submit the dispute to arbitration instead of going to war. The Corinthians, on the other hand, were "abusing the truth," and they were "shameless" in the manipulative arguments they had used in front of the Athenian assembly, and they solely were "responsible for the war." From Venizelos' comments one gets the feeling that the Corinthians had already made their decision to fight against the Kerkyraians and this is why they refused every proposal for arbitration offered by the latter, and this is why their speech which was delivered in Athens is full of sophistic arguments and this is why they manipulate and "abuse the truth" — because they are wrong.

The above comments made by Venizelos clearly demonstrate his position on the Kerkyraian incident. Do they offer an insight into Thukydides' own position on the subject? What are Thukydides' beliefs on the war, its instigators and the party which refuses arbitration? And what are his beliefs about the Kerkyraian incident and the Kerkyraians and the Corinthians in particular?

<sup>42</sup>Ibid. p. 161.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid. p. 165.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid. pp. 170-71.



In Thuk. 1.81.5, Archidamos is presented as saying to the Lakedaimonians, in order to dissuade them from undertaking the war: "And, if it comes to that [if we get the worst of the war], we can no longer even conclude an honorable peace, especially if it is believed that we, rather than they, began the quarrel." It appears from this statement that starting a war is held against the party responsible. Also in Thuk. 1.85.2 it is plainly stated that: "The chief reason for this [for conducting negotiations] is that they [the Athenians] are ready to submit to arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith against one who offers arbitration as though against a wrongdoer."

The most explicit statement, however, of how much importance the Greeks of the time of Thukydides placed on the responsibility of the party which started the war is found in Thuk. 7.18.2: "But most important of all was the fact that a degree of confidence had come to the Lakedaimonians, because they believed that the Athenians, once they had on their hands a twofold war — with themselves and the Sicilians — would be more easily overthrown, and because they regarded the Athenians as having been the first to break the treaty. In the former war they felt that the transgression had been rather on their own part; for the Thebans had entered Plataea in a time of truce, and, although it had been stipulated in the former agreements that neither party was to resort to arms if the other were willing to submit the question to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to respond to the summons when the Athenians invited them to arbitrate. On this account they considered that they deserved their misfortune, having in mind both the disaster at Pylos and any other that had befallen them."

The above passages indicate a strong belief in seeking arbitration before resorting to arms. Different behavior is considered an act deserving severe punishment. In his commentary, Venizelos placed tremendous importance on that particular belief which was also his own.

Is this Thukydides' own belief, and does he offer any indication of disapproval of the Corinthian behavior and of approval of the Kerkyraian efforts to seek arbitration and avoid the war?

In Thuk. 1.24.1, Thukydides introduces the dispute between the Kerkyraians and the Corinthians in a truly epic manner, as Venizelos very astutely observes quoting Croiset. The epic beginning of the narration already forms a dramatic introduction for the fatal results which the choosing of war over arbitration would produce in the future. The dispute between Kerkyra and Corinth over Epidamnus could have been considered a minor quarrel between two Greek city-states over their private interests. And yet, the non-negotiable attitude adopted by Corinth marked the beginning and the pretext for the fatal dispute which devastated Greece at the end of the fifth century B.C.

In Thuk. 1.25.3 the reason for the Corinthian decision to undertake the task of sending aid to the Epidamnians is presented as follows: "The Corinthians undertook the task partly on the ground of right, because they considered that the colony belonged to them quite as much as to the Kerkyraians, partly also through hatred of the Kerkyraians. . . ." It is characteristic that Thukydides presents hatred, an expression of passion, as one of the two reasons for the Corinthians' decision to involve themselves in the Epidamnian dispute. And it is evident from the study of Thukydides' work, especially from his exposition of the change in human nature from times of prosperity and peace to times of war and internal dissension, that he particularly despises any demonstration of passionate behavior.

This demonstration of passion on the part of the Corinthians would be evident throughout their whole dispute with the Kerkyraians over Epidamnus. This is the other reason why the Corinthians did not want to solve the dispute through arbitration, the first reason being greed for personal gain. They hated the Kerkyraians and they wanted to go to war against them in order to quench their passion by punishing them. Their passionate attitude regarding the whole matter was best demonstrated at the final sea battle against the Kerkyraians and the Athenians, where the Corinthians, instead of taking in tow as was the custom, "turned their attention to the men cruising up and down and killing them in preference to taking them alive; and they unwittingly slew their own friends. . . ." <sup>45</sup> The whole description is indicative of the intensity of the Corinthian passion against their enemies whom they made every effort to kill when defeated "in preference to taking them alive," <sup>46</sup> with a persistent thoroughness "cruising up and down." <sup>47</sup> And the tragic result which their passionate behavior produced was that "they unwittingly slew their own friends. . . ." <sup>48</sup>

This is the first introduction of passion in the exposition of the events which led to the Peloponnesian War. As the war started, it became a prevalent factor in the disputes among the two big confederacies and even within each confederacy and within each city, with bloody civil strifes and retaliations that followed.

In Thuk. 1.26.5 the Kerkyraians are presented as offering the "foreigners" whom the Corinthians had sent into the city of Epidamnus, and to those Epidamnians who wished to do so, the chance to leave; "otherwise they would treat them as enemies." The word which

<sup>45</sup>Thuk. 1.50.1-2.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Thuk. 1.50.2.



Thukydides uses for this Kerkyraian warning is "προεῖπον" "they said in advance" (before treating them as enemies). The Kerkyraians are presented here offering the opposition a fair chance before they resort to drastic measures against them.

Thuk. 128 is an exposition of the sincere efforts of the Kerkyraians to solve their dispute with the Corinthians through arbitration before even attempting to seek other allies — the Athenians — "other than the ones they [the Kerkyraians] had now, in order to secure assistance."<sup>49</sup> The Kerkyraians are presented as thoroughly sincere as far as their future political plans are concerned.

After the exposition of the straightforward political behavior of the Kerkyraians, Thukydides presents the Corinthian response: "Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον."<sup>50</sup> "The Corinthians, however, would listen to nothing." The brevity of the above statement dramatically demonstrates the relentless attitude which the Corinthians would follow throughout the dispute in contrast to the continuous efforts for arbitration demonstrated by the Kerkyraians until the last moment.

In Thuk. 1.29.3 the Kerkyraians are again presented as trying to avoid the sea battle between themselves and the Corinthians at the last moment when both fleets are ready to fight. The Corinthian is again "οὐδὲν εἰρηναῖον,"<sup>51</sup> "nothing peaceful." The brevity of the expression is again characteristic of the dramatic effect sought by Thukydides when he is presenting events which he considers extremely important or tragic. One cannot help but remember the dramatic conclusion of book 7, where the tragic end of the Sicilian expedition is presented with the same brevity, and the characteristic repetition of the same word, "οὐδὲν" "nothing," "κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν λίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες, πανωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεδὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὃ, τι οὐκ ἀπώλετο."<sup>52</sup> Besides the characteristic repetition of the word "οὐδὲν," the dramatic effect is reinforced and the tragic reaches its peak in the last sentence which summarizes the catastrophe that the Athenians had suffered in Sicily: "καὶ οὐδὲν ὃ, τι οὐκ ἀπώλετο" "and there was nothing which did not perish."

In Thuk. 1.31.1 there is another mention of demonstration of passion on the part of the Corinthians: "During the whole year after the sea battle and the next year, the Corinthians, being angrily indignant about their war with the Kerkyraians, kept building ships and preparing

<sup>49</sup>Thuk. 1.23.3-4.

<sup>50</sup>Thuk. 1.29.1.

<sup>51</sup>Thuk. 1.29.4.

<sup>52</sup>Thuk. 7.87.66.

a naval armament with all their might. . . ." The expressions: "during the whole year" "τὸν δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν ἅπαντα," and "with their all their might," "τὰ κράτιστα" are characteristic of the intensity with which the Corinthians were being prepared for the future war against the Kerkyraians. And the reason for this tremendous effort they had undertaken was their hatred for the Kerkyraians: "being angrily indignant" "ὀργή φέροντες."

In Thuk. 1.38.3 the future war — the Peloponnesian War — is presented as a certainty by the Kerkyraian speaker. The Lakedaimonians are presented as ready to undertake this war because of fear, "φόβῳ," of the Athenian power, while the Corinthians are presented as the instigators of the war through their enmity, "ἐχθροὺς ὄντας," towards the Athenians. Again the demonstration of passion on the part of the Corinthians is emphasized.

In both Thuk. 1.31.2 and 1.35.1-2 it is clearly stated that the Kerkyraians did not belong to either confederacy, "οὐδενὸς Ἑλληνῶν ἐνσπονδοι, μηδετέρων ὄντας συμμάχους," and that, therefore, they had the right to acquire any alliance they wished. The Corinthian persistence on the opposite hand, therefore, i.e. their insistence in considering the Kerkyraians as their allies who had revolted from them just as the Samians had previously revolted from the Athenians, and their insinuations that the acceptance of the Kerkyraians in the Athenian confederacy would be an act of breaking the treaty and causing a major war, all these assumptions and accusations are presented through Thukydides' narrative as unfounded.

In Thuk. 1.38.5 even the Corinthians themselves are presented as examining the possibility of being wrong in their dispute against the Kerkyraians. But in that case, they argue, the Kerkyraians ought to yield to their wrath, "ὀργή": "And even if we were at fault, the honorable course for them [the Kerkyraians] would have been to make allowance for our temper, "ὀργή." The fact that the Corinthians are presented as facing the possibility of being wrong is one more indication offered by Thukydides for the Corinthian responsibility for the dispute. The use of the word "ὀργή" "wrath," is characteristic of the Corinthian attitude throughout the dispute.

In Thuk. 1.40.1 the Corinthians call the Kerkyraians: "βίαιοι καὶ πλεονέκται," "violent and greedy." The strong language that they use (unlike the Kerkyraian speakers), and the accusation "βίαιοι" and "πλεονέκται," are an indication of their own ways of political expression, and the whole statement, true to Thukydides' sarcasm, characterizes themselves rather the Kerkyraians.

In Thuk. 1.41.2-3 there is another indication of the irrational behavior deriving from the passionate confrontation of political



disputes — which is war — voiced through the speech of the Corinthian representatives and, therefore, characteristic of the Corinthian attitude during such disputes. The Corinthians refer to the incident of the revolt of Samians from the Athenian confederacy, when the Corinthians dissuaded the Lakedaimonians from offering the Samians the help which they had asked because, as they maintain, they believed that “each one should discipline his own allies without interference.”<sup>53</sup> The relevant passage in Thukydides is as follows: “Both incidents [the Athenians prevailing over the Aeginetans and chastising the Samians] happened, too, at a critical time when men, engaged in assailing their enemies, are most indifferent to every consideration except victory, regarding anyone who assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy before, and anyone who stands in their way as an enemy, even if it happened to be a friend; for they mismanage their own interests in the eager rivalry of the moment.” This attitude of blind rivalry which disregards all the accepted values and loyalties that exist during times of peace, besides characterizing the Corinthians — by whom the statement is made — is also an introduction to what Thukydides will describe in detail when dealing with the worst moments of the Peloponnesian War. The Plataea incident, the internal dissension in Kerkyra, the incidents in Athens at the time of the plague, the Melian incident, are but few examples of the state into which human behavior can be reduced by what the Corinthians consider “critical times” in their speech.

In the chapters that follow and until the final confrontation between the Kerkyraians and the Athenians on the one hand and the Corinthians on the other, Thukydides repeatedly mentions that the Athenians took every precaution so as not to violate the thirty-year treaty: “They [the Athenians] decided not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive alliance with them [the Kerkyraians], for in that case, if the Kerkyraians then asked them to join in an expedition against Corinth, they would have to break, on their own responsibility, the treaty with the Lakedaimonians, but they made a defense alliance, namely to aid one another in case anyone should attack Kerkyra or Athens or the ally of either.”<sup>54</sup> “Orders were given to them [the Athenian generals in command of the fleet sent to help the Kerkyraians] not to engage with the Corinthians unless they [the Corinthians] should sail against Kerkyra and attempt to land there or some place belonging to the Kerkyraians; but in that case they were to thwart them if possible. The object of these orders was to avoid breaking the treaty.”<sup>55</sup> “The Attic ships, if

<sup>53</sup>Thuk. 1.40.5-6.

<sup>54</sup>Thuk. 1.44.1.

<sup>55</sup>Thuk. 1.45.3.

they saw the Kerkyraians pressed at any point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to disobey the instructions of the Athenians.”<sup>56</sup>

Time and again Thukydides indicates that the Athenians tried to avoid the confrontation with the Corinthians because they did not wish to break the thirty-year treaty. And when they finally had to confront them in the sea fight, they did it because of necessity: “Matters had come to such a pass that the Corinthians and the Athenians of necessity had to attack one another.”<sup>57</sup>

The Athenians, therefore, are repeatedly presented by Thukydides as trying to avoid the war, just as the Kerkyraians are. This will become more obvious later on when they urge arbitration — just as the Kerkyraians had done before them — in order that the Peloponnesian War be avoided. And their petition for arbitration will be denied, with the Corinthians being the main advocates for this denial and for the war that follows.

Why then did the Athenians form this alliance with Kerkyra which offered the Peloponnesians one of the pretexts for undertaking the war against them? Thukydides indicates that the Athenians did so because forming an alliance with Kerkyra was not against the thirty-year treaty (a fact which comes up repeatedly throughout the speech of the Kerkyraians). All the more so, since this alliance was only a defense alliance with Kerkyra. But the Athenians wished this alliance because they could foresee the Peloponnesian War coming: “For they [the Athenians] believed that in any event the war with the Peloponnesians would have to be faced, and they did not wish to give up Kerkyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians. . . .”<sup>58</sup>

That Thukydides presents the Peloponnesian War as a very strong possibility is obvious from the fact that even the Corinthian speakers in Athens are presented not completely denying it: “and the contingency of war, with which the Kerkyraians would frighten you into wrongdoing, is still uncertain.”<sup>59</sup>

The Peloponnesian War, therefore, appeared to be a strong possibility. Why? Because of the “φόβος,” “fear,” of the Lakedaimonians instigated by the “ἔχθρα,” “animosity, hatred,” of the Corinthians. The passionate confrontation of political disputes, which will be the main characteristic of the most violent incidents of the Peloponnesian War, is a trait which appears to characterize the Corinthians through

<sup>56</sup>Thuk. 1.49.4-5.

<sup>57</sup>Thuk. 1.49.7.

<sup>58</sup>Thuk. 1.44.2.

<sup>59</sup>Thuk. 1.47.2.



Thukydides' narrative. The Corinthians are also presented as responsible for the fact that their dispute with Kerkyra over Epidamnos resulted in war, and war is presented as an undesirable state of affairs reducing human nature to its passionate and irrational character. Therefore war should be avoided and political disputes should be solved through arbitration which appeals to the rational nature of man since it consists of discussion.

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## Postwar Liberation in Greece and Italy: Some Preliminary Comparisons

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ALEXANDER KITROEFF

A NUMBER OF ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS have been studying the countries of Southern Europe as a homogeneous, regional unit. Can Southern Europe be studied in such a way from a historical perspective? This is an as yet unexplored question and it cannot be answered here. There are several common historical experiences that have been shared by two or more Southern European countries since the turn of the century. One of them is the post-liberation crisis that both Greece and Italy went through at the end of World War II.

Italy's post-liberation experience is examined in an excellent article by Gianfranco Pasquino within the context of the "transitions from authoritarian rule" debate which has led political scientists to contemplate upon the common characteristics of political developments of Southern European countries.<sup>1</sup> The article on Greece in the same volume that the article on Italy is published deals with Greece after the collapse of the military junta in 1974.<sup>2</sup> From a historical point of view, it is more interesting to compare Italy and Greece during the same period, the 1940s. This is what this article proposes to do, and it will concentrate not so much on the policies of the political actors involved, as the Pasquino article does, but will focus on the historical background that weighed upon the events that took place after both countries emerged from the war. The object of the exercise is to venture several reasons why the Right-Left conflict was played out through the democratic process in Italy while that in Greece was resolved only through civil war.

In examining the relevant events, the external factors, namely the policies of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are

<sup>1</sup>Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Demise of the First Fascist Regime and Italy's Transition to Democracy: 1943-1948," Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 45-70.

<sup>2</sup>P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983," *ibid.*, pp. 138-64.