

tions" an inevitable element of the future? Is history the product of chance and a myriad of events or is it best explained by the decisions of wise statesmen or the omissions and actions of populist politicians? The reader of this fine volume will be helped to form some answers to these and many other difficult questions.

Fridtjof Nansen and the Greek Refugee Crisis, 1922–1924

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Prologue

Why did all of the participants at the Lausanne conference for a Near East peace, 1922–1923, find it necessary to accept the principle of a compulsory rather than a voluntary exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey as a solution to the Greek refugee crisis? Why had all the delegates at Lausanne expressed their deep misgiving and concern over the legitimacy and morality of a forced population exchange but at the same time agreed to its passage? Indeed, their open and unanimous condemnation of the principle of coercion as being unjust and bereft of human dignity must largely explain their denial of any responsibility for its paternity. Yet, at the same time, they all backed the agreement, although none wished to sponsor it openly. Was it yet another case of a constant condition in politics involving the clash between pragmatism and principles, between perceived national interests and the emerging international obligation of humanitarian intervention?

For the first time in human history, the participants at Lausanne were establishing the principle of the involuntary displacement of populations as an international norm. The violation of the basic human right of choice, the uprooting of people from their ancestral homes, with no say in the matter, had to be viewed as a regressive

step in relations between nations. The Greek-Turkish compulsory population exchange agreement could not be justified on legal or moral grounds.

Why, therefore, had the responsible governments at Lausanne consented to the principle of an obligatory exchange of populations, even before the opening of the peace conference on November 21, 1922? Was there an alternative? Why did they depart from the precedent of a voluntary exchange? Why did they go along with the notion that the only way to deal with areas of mixed populations was to "unmix" them? What motivated the interested parties to reach this conclusion? Should we infer their motives for supporting the population exchange from the ultimate benefits it produced for peace and stability in the region? The answers to these and other related questions are a major focus of this study, keeping in mind that in diplomacy, the players have the capacity of holding contradictory opinions and that there is often disharmony between their official pronouncements and actual policies. The researcher must then ask whether or not it is a case of the players obfuscating their real intentions or reconsidering their assumptions and positions due to a swiftly shifting political reality.

Paradoxically, two men in this Greek tragedy, who were least able to alter the course of events, were the ones to receive the most criticism for supporting the obligatory exchange of populations. More fingers were pointed at them than at any one else for suggesting that the exchange be compulsory. They were the famous Norwegian arctic explorer and scholar, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, special envoy of the League of Nations and its first High Commissioner for Refugees; and the veteran Greek statesman and former prime minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos, newly appointed by the Greek Revolutionary Government to represent Greek interests abroad and to act as chief of the Greek delegation at Lausanne. There is near unanimous agreement that the influence of Nansen on the negotiations and terms of reference, which led to a final settlement to the Greek refugee crisis, was decisive, despite the fact that he represented an embryonic League of Nations whose field of action was largely limited by the Great Powers. The imprint of

Venizelos in these proceedings was also deemed pivotal despite the fact that he represented a defeated and impoverished Greece that had to bear the primary burden of the compulsory exchange. Their success can best be explained by their remarkable leadership qualities, by their celebrity status and reputation, and by their skill and considerable experience as negotiators.

This study will also give special attention to the interactions between these two men and their role as central actors in a refugee crisis of massive proportions. It will attempt, in part, to respond to the criticism that Nansen had allowed the Powers to exploit his role as an international civil servant in order to legitimize their solution to the Greek refugee problem.¹ And that Venizelos had a preconceived plan to take advantage of the refugee situation, using the refugees as a pawn to secure financial aid for the economic reconstruction of his country and/or that he championed a compulsory exchange, primarily to secure Greece's northern provinces—as an innovation for peace.²

Shifting Frontiers and Population Exchanges in the Balkans and Anatolia, 1912–1922

Prior to the 20th century, the phrase "population exchange" did not exist in the language of European diplomacy. Goods and prisoners were exchanged but not innocent civilians. Of course, there have always been movements of populations within and beyond a state's borders, voluntary and involuntary, throughout recorded history. Territorial shifts were often accompanied by population shifts. But it was not until after the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century that attempts were made to provide some rules in European public law for the rights of populations living in ceded territories following major wars. Initially, the practice was to impose the nationality of the victor on the inhabitants of the conquered territories. Later, however, at least since the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, it became accepted practice to afford the populations of these territories and keeping their former nationality. But

they were also afforded the right, in theory at least, to freely dispose of their property. This right was to be seen by many as an encouragement to hasten the departure of an unwanted population. But it also recognized in modern parlance that the right to property was a human right. However, those living in multiethnic states, where sovereignty remained unaltered, did not have this right. This was soon to change.³

The notion of an officially sanctioned exchange of populations as a solution to political tensions had its origins in the Balkans. As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and their aftermath, the first wave of needy Christian and Muslim refugees cascaded across the newly delineated frontiers to seek refuge in their respective “mother-land”. From the times of the Balkan Wars, the vast majority of the refugees were not surprisingly Muslims, some 300,000. They were driven out of Macedonia and Thrace primarily by Serbian or Bulgarian forces. Some 60,000 were pushed out of or left voluntarily Greek Macedonia. In 1914–1915, the vast majority of the refugees, some 200,000 were primarily Ottoman Greeks pushed out of the Ottoman territories of Eastern Thrace and western Anatolia.⁴ These movements further exacerbated nationalist feelings and set in motion population exchange agreements between Bulgaria and Turkey, Greece and Turkey, and following Bulgaria’s defeat in World War I, between Greece and Bulgaria.⁵ These agreements understandably influenced the decision makers at Lausanne.

A protocol between Bulgaria and Turkey following the treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913), which brought to an end the Second Balkan War, was annexed to the Treaty of Constantinople (September 29, 1913) between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.⁶ It not only included the optional clause but was the first interstate treaty in history providing for and using the expression “an exchange of populations.” The optional clause was also inserted in the Treaty of Athens (November 14, 1913) between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman treaty with Bulgaria was implemented by an accord on November 15, 1913, providing for a limited voluntary exchange of Bulgarians and Muslims living in a 15 kilometer zone on each side of their common border in Thrace. But it was basi-

cally recognition of an accomplished fact, since most of the people involved had already fled from these zones during the upheavals of the Balkan Wars. The Ottoman-Bulgarian treaty, however, did allow an effective means of forcing the transfer of the few remaining groups left on the defeated side of the border. The Turkish government was particularly set on expelling its Bulgarian minority whose property was being sequestered by Muslim refugees from Western Thrace. In all, approximately 48,500 Muslims moved from Bulgarian territory to Turkey compared to 46,700 Bulgarians who left, for the most part unwillingly, for Bulgaria from Turkish Thrace.⁷ Thus, the Bulgarian chamber refused to ratify the accord. Although the principle of the optional clause was reaffirmed, it was not a voluntary exchange of population.⁸ The more germane accord, also initiated by Turkey, was that between Greece and Turkey eight months later, although it was never ratified because of Turkey’s entry in World War I on November 1, 1914. Briefly, it was sparked by the systematic persecution, harassment, and forced exodus of the Ottoman Greeks from Eastern Thrace and from the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. The reasons for the expulsions were three-fold: (1) The influx of the Balkan Muslim refugees naturally led to reprisals against the numerous Ottoman Greek communities in Eastern Thrace and western Anatolia. They were being evicted from their homes by the Muslim refugees with the acquiescence and active support of the state; (2) The further implementation of the policy of Turkification by the Young Turks, particularly by the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which directed an organized system of harassment and intimidation to eliminate or clear out the Christian population of all of Thrace and the Turkish Aegean coast and replace them with Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Russian Empire; (3) The decision on February 16, 1914, by the six Powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Britain, Russia, and Italy—to assign to Greece the eastern Aegean islands. These islands had been occupied by Greece during the Balkan Wars. Needless to say, the decision was unacceptable to Turkey for reasons of security.⁹ It refused to recognize Greek sovereignty over the Greek populated islands, particularly Mitylene, Chios, and Samos,

because of their strategic location just of the Anatolian coast, with its large Ottoman Greek population centers.¹⁰ The Ottoman policy of persecution and eviction was designed in part to put pressure on Athens to reach an agreement with the Sultan's Government or the Sublime Porte on the disposition of the islands.

In response to the protests of the Greek government and its demands for the cessation of hostilities toward the Ottoman Greek population, the Sublime Porte recommended a population exchange of the Greek rural population of Eastern Thrace and the Aydin province or *vilayet*, including the Smyrna district, for the Muslim rural population of Greek Macedonia and Epiros. On May 18, 1914, the Turkish minister in Athens, Ghalib Kemaly [Söylemezoğlu], wrote to the Greek premier, Eleftherios Venizelos: "During our last conversation I brought forward to you as a personal opinion the idea of making an exchange of the Greek rural population of the vilayet of Smyrna with the Muslims of Macedonia. Having submitted this idea for the approval of the Sublime Porte, I have the pleasure of making known to you that it agrees with the idea. I now make the proposal officially in the name of my Government."¹¹ He warned Venizelos on several occasions that only by accepting the population exchange would there be peace in the Orient.¹²

Mindful of Greece's security concern over a revanchist Bulgaria in Macedonia and Turkey's refusal to recognize the status quo in the Aegean, and of the need for time to develop the newly acquired Balkan territories of the past three years,¹³ Venizelos recognized the necessity of calming the turbulence in Greek-Turkish relations. Four days later, he accepted, in principle, the Turkish initiative for a voluntary population exchange, provided that the properties of the emigrants were properly appraised and liquidated. A Mixed Commission for the limited exchange of populations was established in June 1914 at Smyrna [Izmir]. By August the Commission for the valuation and liquidation of the migrants' fixed property started its work by taking dispositions in the Smyrna, Pergamum, and Aydin areas of Asia Minor. But the preliminary work of the Mixed Commission was suspended by the Porte's entry in the World War and the exchange agreement came to naught.¹⁴ In theory at least, the

Greek-Turkish agreement of 1914 seemed to suggest that the peaceful exchange of populations as a preventative measure could improve relations between states and solve some of their problems arising out of the presence of significant ethnic and religious minorities. In practice, however, it is highly doubtful that most people would voluntarily leave their ancestral lands and homes for another country, even one of their fellow kinsmen, without being forced to do so or without a powerful incentive. Yet, it is also true that Athens was not adverse to the idea of a population exchange that would help to reinforce the Greek element in the newly acquired territories and would make up from the loss of one-half million Greeks who migrated to the Americas between 1900 and 1914. Its objection was to the poor correlation of the peaceful and voluntary emigration of Muslims living in Greek Macedonia and Epiros and the violent and forced exodus of more than 150,000 Greeks from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace.¹⁵ If the persecution of the Greek minority then and throughout World War I in Turkey had not occurred, or if the population exchange agreement of 1914 had been peacefully realized, there would have been a major improvement in the direction of Greek-Turkish relations. Undoubtedly, these persecutions were a compelling factor in the subsequent designs of Greece on Greek populated Smyrna and Eastern Thrace.

Finally, following the end of World War I, the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine was signed on November 27, 1919, delimiting Bulgaria's southern frontier and conceding Western Thrace to the Allies for disposition. On the same day, Greece was assured that autonomy for Western Thrace was out of the question and that the territory would go to Greece.¹⁶ At the same time and place, the Convention for the Reciprocal and Voluntary Emigration of Minorities between Greece and Bulgaria was concluded. And shortly thereafter, Western Thrace, which was occupied by Greek forces during the great autumn Allied Balkan offensive of 1918, was ceded to Greece.

The Convention included the right of ethnic and religious minorities to immigrate freely into the territories of their respective motherlands; the freedom to take their goods with them; and the loss of one nationality and the immediate acquisition of the

other upon their departure. Articles 9–13 provided for a Mixed Commission to supervise and facilitate the voluntary emigration referred to in the Convention, including the evaluation and liquidation of immobile property and disputes over property ownership.¹⁷ On April 17, 1920, Venizelos informed the Secretary General of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond, that Greece had ratified the Convention and requested that he place the formation of a Mixed Commission on the agenda of the next meeting of the League Council. Three weeks later, Athens reiterated its wish to the League to put in effect the Convention with Bulgaria as soon as possible.¹⁸ Finally, on November 27, 1920, after much searching, the League Council appointed the two foreign members of the Mixed Commission for the Greek-Bulgarian population exchange, which was also to include one Greek and one Bulgarian. The League's appointees were Lt. Colonel A.C. Corfe of New Zealand and Commandant Marcel de Roover of Belgium. They, along with M. Colban of the League's Secretariat, who also gained much experience in the implementation of the Greek-Bulgarian Convention, were to become valuable members of Dr. Nansen's staff in dealing with the Greek-Turkish refugee question.

The Greek-Bulgarian population exchange was quickened unexpectedly with the sudden influx of thousands of Greek refugees from Eastern Thrace into Western Thrace in October 1922. Unfortunately, the exchange was not without a strong element of coercion, its voluntary character being largely ignored. When only a few from the targeted populations elected to leave voluntarily, both countries began strong agitation to force them out. By 1924, the Greek-Bulgarian population exchange was largely completed. Some 50,000 Greeks, mostly from Bulgaria's Black Sea littoral, were exchanged for about 100,000 Bulgarians, largely from Western Thrace and central and eastern Macedonia, although the questions of properties left behind and compensation were to drag on for several years more.¹⁹ Lastly, the draconian but defunct Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, also provided, *inter alia*, for a voluntary and reciprocal exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, as well as the right of refugees to return to their former homes.²⁰

The Setting

The withdrawal of a defeated Greek army from Anatolia in the early September 1922,²¹ and the Greek loss of Eastern Thrace at the Mudanya armistice talks a month later,²² decisively shaped the decision that led to the Greek-Turkish population exchange at Lausanne.²³ Those events precipitated a refugee crisis of mammoth proportions and a humanitarian nightmare, dumping on Greece over a million refugees—the vast majority of whom were traumatized and completely destitute.

As the Greek forces retreated to Smyrna, they were accompanied or followed by some 150,000 impoverished and panic-stricken refugees from the interior. In search of security and sustenance, the refugees camped on the city's quay. In an attempt to calm the city's population, the Allied consuls in Smyrna gave formal assurances to the Greeks and Armenians that they need not fear for their lives, although they were not prepared to take concrete steps to ensure the safety of the city's civilian population. Only the American Consul-General, William Horton, refused to give such false assurances and indeed, on September 4, he cabled the US High Commissioner in Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, "in the interest of humanity and for the sake of American interests to mediate with Mustapha Kemal for an amnesty to permit the orderly withdrawal of Greek forces from Anatolia and possibly avoid the destruction of Smyrna."²⁴ Horton's great concern was who would police the city between the time of the Greek withdrawal and the arrival of the Turkish forces. The response from Washington was simply to send three destroyers to Smyrna for the protection of American lives and property.

On September 8, the Greek army completed its evacuation from Smyrna. The following day, the victorious Turkish forces entered the city and the looting, armed robbery, rape and killings began. The situation worsened when fire broke out on September 13, and after three days, some two-thirds of Smyrna lay blackened and smoldering. The Armenian, Greek and European quarters were almost totally destroyed, and those who survived the holocaust were

compelled to join the ranks of the refugees on the quay. Without food and water, some 300,000 helpless souls were now so pressed together that "one could not lie down without being crushed to death—women gave birth to stillborn babies and sheltered them against their dried-up breasts for lack of a burial place . . . waiting for a momentary pathway to open up for them to lay their burdens in the all-receiving sea."²⁵ In the meantime, the Allied navies (some twenty-one warships—eleven British, five French, two Italian, and three American) congregated in Smyrna harbor and unashamedly declared their strict neutrality. Their sole mission was to protect the property and lives of their nationals and consuls. None wanted to give even the appearance that they were siding with the Greeks. This encouraged the Turks to believe that whatever action they took against the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, there would be no interference from the Great Powers.

By September 24, the situation got completely out of hand as Turkish handbills informed the displaced multitude that those not out of the city within a week's time would be deported to the interior.²⁶ And Nurreddin Pasha, the newly appointed Governor-General of Smyrna, announced that any refugees remaining in the city after September 30 would be massacred.²⁷ The dramatic result of these announcements was a further stampede of thousands of people toward the harbor, desperately seeking passage to safe haven. Shortly thereafter, given the refusal of Allied ships to provide passage for the refugees and in order to hasten their departure from Turkish soil, the Angora [Ankara] authorities gave the American relief workers in Smyrna assurances that Greek ships could come to Smyrna to take the refugees, provided the ships did not fly the Greek colors and did not dock on the quay. The Athens government at first feared to release its transports, concerned that the Turks would seize them and use them for an invasion of the Greek islands, but it finally relented, and on September 24, Greek vessels flying American colors entered Smyrna harbor. Thus, by October 8, while the armistice talks were taking place at Mudanya, the evacuation of the entire Greek and Armenian population of Smyrna was completed.²⁸ A week later, the International Red Cross reported

that a total of one half-million refugees had reached Greece in wretched condition and that more were on their way.²⁹ In the thirty days following the Turkish entry into Smyrna over 50,000 Greek and Armenian civilians lost their lives.³⁰

From 1914 to 1917, while Greece was still neutral, over 500,000 Ottoman Greeks were expelled from their homes and deported to the interior, with much loss of life. And in the three years before the Smyrna disaster, the Kemalists continued the policy of the Young Turks with massive deportations, massacres, expropriations, and other assaults on the Christian population. These atrocities were escalated after the failure of the last Greek offensive in Anatolia in September-October 1921 at the Sakarya river. That failure demonstrated to all that Greece could no longer sustain itself in Anatolia.

Consequently, a month later, Greece agreed to place its fate in Asia Minor in the hands of the Allied Powers. After much delay, the three Allied Foreign Ministers met in Paris on March 22, 1922, to arrange for a peace conference. And following five consecutive days of intense negotiations, in which the British and the French were often antagonists, it finally offered its armistice and peace proposals to an anxious Greece and an indifferent Turkey. It called for *inter alia*, a cessation of hostilities and the peaceful evacuation of Greek forces from Asia Minor in four months. The Greek army would not withdraw until both sides had accepted the preliminary condition for peace.³¹ The beleaguered Greek government immediately accepted the armistice proposals but sought clarification of minority guarantees in the terms for peace. It insisted on firm international guarantees and amnesty for the Greek population of Asia Minor. A decision by Turkey was expected.³²

On April 5, Turkey announced that it would not accept the armistice without a provision for the immediate evacuation of Greek forces from Anatolia and demanded that the evacuation take place concurrently with the armistice talks and not at the conclusion of a peace treaty.³³ Thus negotiations were stalled and time was on the side of the Turks as they prepared for a final and decisive military victory over the increasingly vulnerable Greek forces.³⁴ "Turkey is dragging its feet and delays going to the Conference because it

knows that the Greeks are at the end of their resources. Therefore they want victory to strengthen their hand."³⁵

By the Spring of 1922, the bulk of the Greek population of northern Anatolia (the Pontos), far from the war zone, had been deported into the interior. Along the way, tens of thousands had perished from exposure to the elements, starvation, and disease: typhus, smallpox, dysentery, pneumonia, and influenza were rampant. The dead and half dead were thrown into rivers and ditches.³⁶ In this region alone, between 1914 and 1922, over 300,000 had perished. The appointments to senior administrative posts at the same time, which included Sabit Bey as Vali of Erzerum, Abdul-Halk Bey as Vali of Konia, and Muammer Bey as Mitessarif of Caesarea, told a lot about the temper of the Angora government. All three had been involved in the Armenian genocide. Each had acquired notoriety as a ferocious exponent of the policy of deporting and massacring Christians.³⁷ Yet, it was not until May 1922 that the Allies, under intense pressure from international public opinion, finally agreed to investigate the "alleged" Turkish atrocities by a Commission of Inquiry. However, not surprisingly, it took considerable time and much haggling among the Allies over the composition of the Commission and the payment of its members before it was finally established.³⁸ By then it was over-taken by events, including the refusal of Angora to admit the Commission to the Pontos or Black Sea region, and it came to naught.³⁹

Going through a litany of atrocities is never pleasant. In war, there are always atrocities. But when there is an acknowledged grand system of extermination of a population, such as that in Asia Minor, it has to weigh heavily on the minds of those who must decide the fate of the survivors—the refugees. Another major factor which profoundly influenced the movement toward the population exchange was the armistice of Mudanya, October 3–11, 1922. It set the stage for the Lausanne peace conference and had a direct bearing on the Greek refugee crisis. For the armistice was not simply a matter of a ceasefire and the drawing up of military lines between a defeated Greece and a victorious Turkey but primarily a political settlement reflecting the competing interests and motives of the

Great Powers and Turkey. Its reluctant acceptance by Greece and the refusal of the Allies to insist on amnesty for its majority Greek population of 300,000 was to lead immediately to its expected exodus from Eastern Thrace. Mudanya was the last opportunity available to Greece to halt or modify the movement toward a massive population exchange.⁴⁰ Moreover, there were serious Greek efforts to undo the Mudanya armistice at Lausanne. If they had been successful, the compulsory exchange agreement would have been cancelled or significantly altered.

At the peak of these tragic events, on September 24, the remnants of the Greek army which had withdrawn to the offshore islands of Chios and Mytilene revolted. Two days later, under the leadership of Colonels Nicholas Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas, the Revolution reached Athens and the *vouli* or parliament was dissolved. On the following day, September 27, the revolutionaries forced King Constantine to abdicate and assumed authority to govern Greece. The new government recognized that its immediate priorities were to attend to the relief of hundreds of thousands of destitute refugees and to reorganize its demoralized military forces into an effective instrument in order to obtain some leverage in the armistice negotiations at Mudanya and the Lausanne peace conference. On the same day, the Revolutionary Government appealed to the League of Nations for refugee assistance and, admitting its own inexperience in foreign policy, called upon Eleftherios Venizelos, the internationally respected statesman and the former prime minister of Greece, who had gone into self-imposed exile in Paris after his disastrous electoral defeat in November 1920, to represent Greece abroad. Venizelos was provided with full powers to deal with foreign policy issues, including the refugee question and the status of the Greek minority in a victorious Kemalist Turkey.⁴¹

Earlier, on September 19, apprised of the pitiable condition of the Greek refugees, the General Assembly of the League had directed Fridtjof Nansen to utilize the services of his organization (as High Commissioner for Russian refugees) to assist in the relief of Near East refugees, with such resources as the government of the members of the League of Nations might place at his disposal. Nan-

sen left Geneva for Constantinople on September 30 and arrived there in the first week of October, during the Mudanya armistice talks, expecting to deal with a simple refugee crisis. Instead, he soon found himself playing a leading role in an affair whose scale and implications were far beyond his expectations.

Notes

¹Roland Huntford, *Nansen: The Explorer as Hero* (London: Abacus, 1977), p. 530.

²John A. Petropoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations: Greek-Turkish Peace-making, 1922–1930," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 2 (1976): p. 137.

³For a detailed discussion of the origins of international accords relating to the exchange of populations see Stelios Seferiades, *L'échange des populations* (Paris: Hachette, 1929), pp. 44–64.

⁴A.J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London: Constable and Co., 1922), p. 38; A.A. Pallis, "Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912–1924," *Geographical Journal* 66 no. 4 (October 1925), and his "The Exchange of Populations in the Balkans," *The Nineteenth Century and After* 47 (March 1925): 1–8; and the *Historical Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (hereafter cited as AYE), 1914: A.A.K. 17 & 26. In 1912 there were approximately 2 million Ottoman Greeks in Eastern Thrace, Constantinople, the Pontos and Asia Minor, some 8–9 million Ottoman Muslims/Turks and at least 1.7 million Ottoman Armenians.

⁵C 186 (1922), League of Nations Archives, Nansen Papers, Vol. IV. Commission Mixte d'Emigration Greco-Bulgare. Procès-Verbaux de la Commission 1921–1922. Annex, 61st Session, 21 Septembre 1921. Première Partie. *Historique sommaire de déplacements successifs de frontières et de migration de populations entre l'Empire Ottoman, la Grèce et la Bulgarie depuis 1900*.

⁶Great Britain, Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers*, 107, pp. 713–714.

⁷Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase. A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), p. 55.

⁸Seferiades, *L'échange de populations*, p. 48.

⁹These Greek populated islands were occupied by Greece during the first Balkan War, which was terminated by the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913.

¹⁰Djemeal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919* (London: Hutchinson, 1924), p. 55.

¹¹AYE, 1914: A. A. K. 28.

¹²As told in a brochure by Ghalib Kemaly published in Rome in 1919 and found in *Venizelos Papers*, 24. Coromilas (Rome) to Venizelos (Paris), November 23, 1919.; Three years later in an interview with a Turkish journalist, Ghalib Kemaly insisted that it was Venizelos who in 1914 first suggested the idea of a population exchange as a solution to the Greek-Turkish problem. Alaeddine Haidar, "Le problème de l'échange des populations," *Aurore* (Paris) (October 30, 1922); and Calib Kemali Söylemenzoğlu, *Hatırlar [Memoirs]* (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 102–103.

¹³The acquisition of southern Epirus, a large chunk of Macedonia—including the port of Thessaloniki, Crete and the eastern Aegean islands as a result of the Balkan Wars nearly doubled the size of Greek territory and population. Greece's territory increased from 25,014 square miles to 41,933 square miles, and its population rose from 2,666,000 to 4,363,000.

¹⁴Psomiades, *The Eastern Question*, p. 55; Sephan P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: MacMillan, 1932), pp. 21–22; and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi [History of the Turkish reform]*, 2:3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1951), pp. 251–252.

¹⁵AYE, 1914: A. A. K. 17. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Sublime Porte, September 30, 1914.

¹⁶*Venizelos Papers*, 24. Kanellopoulos (Paris) to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 27, 1919.

¹⁷For the text of the Convention, see AYE, 1922: 105 (2) 2, 1. For details of its implementation, see Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, Chapter 3; and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact upon Greece* (Paris and the Hague: Mouton, 1962), pp. 67–75.

¹⁸AYE, 1920: 53 (2). Caclamano (London) to Drummond (London), April 17, 1920, and May 8, 1920.

¹⁹Between 1912 and 1920 alone, over 435,000 refugees in Greece received state assistance, including 200,000 from Thrace and 190,000 from Asia Minor. AYE, 1923:13 (2) 2, 1. Refugee File. Many had returned to their homes after the end of the war only to become refugees again less than three years later. The developments and experience of a cadre to deal with refugees and populations exchanges in the decade prior to its defeat in Asia Minor enabled the Greek government to attend to its 1922–1924 massive refugee problem with far greater efficiency than would normally have been the case.

²⁰Psomiades, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 29–30; and Great Britain, Treaty Series no. 12 (1920). *Tripartite Agreement between the British Empire, France and Italy respecting Anatolia*. . . , Cmd 963, London 1920.

²¹The long awaited Turkish offensive began August 26, 1922, southwest of Afyonkarahisar, at the most vulnerable point on the Greek front. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Greeks were overcome and within a few days the Turks succeeded

in cutting the rail link to Smyrna, occupying Afyonkarahisar and totally disrupting the principal Greek route of communications and supplies. Soon, the Greek forces were cut in two and in full retreat. While those in the northern sector, some three divisions, skillfully retreated to the Sea of Marmara and embarked for Greece, the larger concentration of forces, in the southern sector, was completely routed. Disoriented and in disarray, it fled to Smyrna and the coast.

²²The Mudanya armistice talks, October 3–11, 1922, took place at Mudanya, a small port town on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara. For the Mudanya armistice convention on October 11, 1922, see Appendix I.

²³Following the armistice of Mudros (October 20, 1918) Greek forces, at the invitation of the Allies, occupied Smyrna (Izmir) in May 1919 and shortly thereafter Eastern Thrace. The long delayed and fateful Near East peace treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), awarded, *inter alia*, to Greece Eastern Thrace and provided a zone of Greek influence in the Smyrna region that could eventually lead to its annexation by Greece. Among other factors, the Allied occupation of Constantinople in March 1920 and the subsequent onerous Sèvres treaty, allowing for only a truncated Turkey in the middle of Asia Minor with Constantinople as its capital, precipitated a successful Turkish nationalist revival and resistance under Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk]. For a fine treatment of the Greek-Turkish wars of 1919–1922, see Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision, Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922* (London: A. Lane, 1973).

²⁴Louis P. Kasimatis, *The American Influence in Greece, 1917–1929* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1988), p. 11; Marjorie Housepian, *The Smyrna Affair* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966), pp. 94–96; and George Horton, *The Blight of Asia* (New York: Bobbs, Merrill, 1926).

²⁵Melville Chater, "History's Greatest Trek," *The National Geographic Magazine* 48, no. 5 (November 1925): 539.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 539–540, and Edward Hale Bierstadt, *The Great Betrayal* (New York: R.M. McBride, 1924), pp. 56–57.

²⁷Report of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in DBFP, XVIII, Document 48. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at Quai d'Orsay, September 22, 1922.*

²⁸"Charter," "History's Greatest Trek," pp. 535–540; Smith, *Ionian Vision*, pp. 306–311; Housepian, *The Smyrna Affair*, pp. 175–185; and William T. Allis, "Jennings of Smyrna," *Scribner's* (August 1928): 230–235.

²⁹*Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24380/24357, October 17, 1922.

³⁰Harry J. Psomiades, "The American Near East Relief (NER) and the Megali Catastrophe in 1922," *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 19 (2001): 137. The American Consul General of Smyrna, George Horton, estimated the figure closer to 100,000. See Housepian, *Smyrna Affair*, pp. 258–259.

³¹The Paris proposals required Greece and Turkey to announce their acceptance not only of the armistice but also their acceptance, in principle, of the Allied peace plans. Only then would they invoke a final peace conference to work out the details. These terms obliged Greece to cede to Turkey a portion of Eastern Thrace providing a sufficient distance from Constantinople to assuage Turkish fears for the security of the city and to withdraw from Smyrna, whose Christian population would be placed under the supervision of the League of Nations, which was to draw up a mechanism for the protection of minorities. Allied troops would be withdrawn from Constantinople after the ratification of the future Treaty of Peace. The Straits would be placed under the supervision of a League of Nations Commission, with a Turkish president. The League of Nations would also seek to obtain a national home in Cilicia for the Armenians. There were also proposals concerning the size of the armed forces, conscription, and economic, fiscal, and judicial matters with emphasis on the capitulatory system that granted special privileges to foreigners. See Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1641 (1922). "Pronouncements of the Three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs Respecting the Near East Situation, March 17, 1922." Also DBFP, XVII, Chapter 4.

³²Greece's acceptance of the armistice is dated March 22, 1922. AYE, 1922: 6 (5) 1.

³³AYE, 1922: 6 (5) 1. Triantafillakos (Constantinople) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Athens), April 5, 1922, and *Ibid.*: 88 (2) 1, 1, April 23, 1922.

³⁴At this juncture, the Turkish Nationalists were not interested in making peace with an enemy it believed it could defeat by force of arms; they employed delaying tactics to gain sufficient time for military preparations. They were convinced that with the defeat of Greek forces they could extract better armistice and peace proposals from the Allied Powers. See Osman Okyar, "Turco-British Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Mission to London," in William Hale and Ali Ihsan Bagis, editors, *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations, Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs* (North Humberstone: Eothen, 1984), pp. 62–79.

³⁵DBFP, XVII, Doc. 348. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (London). August 14, 1922.

³⁶PRO, FO 331/7886. E 3148/19/44. Turkey. Memorandum of Mr. Rendel on the Turkish Massacres and Persecution of Minorities since the Armistice. March 20, 1922. Written at the request of Lord Curzon by Mr. Rendel of the Eastern Department. For an extensive file on the deportations and death marches see also AYE (1923): 18 (5) 1.1. Most of the reports in this file are from eyewitness accounts of American relief workers. They all saw the deportations as a method of extermination. For example, on June 14, 1922, they reported on the deportations that "... many never reach their destination and the method of slow starvation is another method in accomplishing their extermination." For further discussions on the

deportations, see also *DBFP*, XVII, Doc. 517. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Lord Hardinge (Paris), February 2, 1922, and Doc. 508. Conversations between Curzon and Pioncaré at the Quai d'Orsay, January 16, 1922, in which they express the belief that the "old Turkish plan of massacre and deportation to get rid of minorities was still in operation." Even Ankara's ally, the Soviet Union, complained bitterly about the "brutally killed Greeks—old men, children and women." S. I. Aralov, *Vospominaniya Sovetskovo Diplomata, 1922–1923* [Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat, 1922–1923] (Moscow, 1960), p. 43. Also by the same author "In the Turkey of Atatürk" *International Affairs* [Moscow] 8 (August, 1960): 81–87. Aralov was the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara in 1922–1923. See John Nicolopoulos, "The Testimony of Michail Vassilievich Frunze Concerning the Tragedy of Pontic Hellenism," *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, No. 4 (1987): 37–53. Frunze's diary was written in part during his trip to Turkey as ambassador extraordinary of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic for the purpose of concluding a treaty with Turkey.

³⁷*BFSP*, XVII, Doc. 605. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), April 24, 1922. Each was arrested after the armistice, and all three were in due course deported to Malta. From there, they made their way to join the Nationalists and were never punished for major atrocities. The list of suspected war criminals who joined the Nationalists and were given high posts in the Ankara government also included Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras, later appointed foreign minister, Sükrü Kaya, Mustapha Abdühalik Renda, Abdulahad Nuri, and Arif Fevzi Pirinççizade. See Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*. (New York: Metropolitan, 2006), pp. 360–363. Abdulahad Nuri, the brother of Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, the foreign minister of the Ankara government in 1921–1922, was briefly held by the Ottoman government as war criminal in 1920. Tengirsenk sent a warning to Istanbul in the summer of 1922 that if his brother were executed, he would kill a least two or three thousand Armenians. Soon thereafter Nuri was released. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

³⁸France. Ministère des Relations Extérieures, 1919–1929. *Levant. Turquie*. Series 304–1. *Commission d'enquête en Anatolie et en Thrace, May–Août 1922*; and *DBFP*, XVII, Doc. 628. Curzon (London) to Rumbold (Constantinople), May 12, 1922. See also Doc. 633, 649, 673 and 735.

³⁹*DBFP*, XVIII. Doc. 45. Sir E. Crowe (Foreign Office) to London (Geneva), September 21, 1922. See also the report of the International Red Cross, *RICR*, Vol. LIII, No. 239, July 15, 1922, p. 617.

⁴⁰Smith, *Ionian Vision*, p. 334. For a detailed study of the Mudanya talks and the events leading up to them, see Harry J. Psomiades, "Eastern Thrace and the Armistice of Mudanya, October 3–11, 1922," *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, 17–18 (Winter 2000–2001): 1–67.

⁴¹For the enormity of the domestic and international issues confronting the Revolutionary Government and for the details of the revolt, see Psomiades, "Eastern Thrace and the Armistice of Mudanya," pp. 12–15.

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