

indicated were consolidating their hold over Rhodes (Hinsley, Vol. 3, Part 1, 119-120).

⁶⁷ Martin Gilbert, *The Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill 1941-1945* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company, 1986), 497. John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* Vol. 5, Part I (London: HMSO, 1956), 95; Howard (London: 1968), 50-51.

⁶⁸ Gilbert, 532-533.

⁶⁹ At a meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief in Tunis on October 9, 1943, it was decided that there were not sufficient forces available to attack the Germans at Rhodes (Gilbert, 526). Furthermore, the Germans were able to re-capture the islands of Cos on October 3-4 and Leros on November 16-17. The following day, the British withdrew from the Aegean and evacuated the Samos garrison on the night of November 19-20.

⁷⁰ Michael Howard, *Grand Strategy* (London: HMSO, 1972), Vol. IV, 489-490; J. Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* Vol. V, 111.

⁷¹ COS 44, 23, 27, 28; COS 44, 149; CAB 79/1; CAB 80/81. At the Teheran Conference, Churchill explained to Stalin that the objective of the Mediterranean strategy was to relieve the Russian front and support Overlord. To this end, the Yugoslav, Albanian and Greek partisans were tying down 21 German divisions (Gilbert, 564 and 578-579).

⁷² David Stafford, *Churchill and Secret Service* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1997), 266-267.

⁷³ On August 22, 1943, George II had telegraphed Churchill and Roosevelt during their meeting at the Quebec conference.

⁷⁴ Woodhouse, *Something Ventured*, 85, suggests that Churchill abandoned the idea of breaking with EAM-ELAS because of the possibility that an agreement could be reached with Stalin.

⁷⁵ Stafford, 302.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 272.

⁷⁷ In exchange, the Soviets acquired 90% of Romania, while Hungary and Yugoslavia were to be shared evenly and the Russians gained 75% of Bulgaria. In order to allay American fears over the creation of permanent spheres of influence, the Percentages Agreement was to apply only for the duration of the war. See Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), Vol. 6, 196-197; Gilbert, 992-1000.

⁷⁸ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1993), 218 and 234.

⁷⁹ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, 8 December 1944, Cols. 929-30.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 8 December 1944, Cols. 929-30.

The BBC and the Gorgopotamos Sabotage: An Alternative "One-sided Coverage" Thesis

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The purpose of this article is to explore one aspect of the myth that was created in the aftermath of the explosion of the Gorgopotamos bridge in Greece during the Second World War. The bridge was destroyed in 1942 by a team of British saboteurs, parachuted into occupied territory, in cooperation with two, soon-to-be rival, guerrilla bands of the Greek resistance – ELAS (the military arm of EAM) and EDES.¹ The operation was a striking success and was given widespread coverage by the media of the Allied forces:² notable among those was the BBC Greek Service. The importance of this operation is difficult to underestimate. Churchill mentions it in his memoirs as one of the two most important acts of sabotage in occupied Europe.³ Farakos characterizes it as "the first major expression of the united Greek resistance of the Greek people," whilst Borkenau has called it "the most important guerrilla operation in occupied Europe and the entire world."⁴ Nevertheless, heated debates erupted after the operation, certainly the most successful and famed act of resistance in Greece, as to the share of credit that each participant group was given as opposed to that which it was due. As relations between ELAS, on the one hand, and EDES and the British, on the other, progressively worsened, very different versions of the events surrounding the sabotage began to circulate. In the aftermath of the ensuing Civil War, laying

claim to the laurels of this victory became very important for the Greek Left in particular, as its military defeat ensured that for a number of years any mention of ELAS participation in the resistance became taboo.⁵

Media coverage and historical accounts⁶ were, because of Greek political happenstance, one-sided until surprisingly late. On November 25, 1974 the newspaper "Estia," for instance, suggested that it would be a disgrace to the "true" fighters of the resistance if the "red propagandists" were to succeed in persuading the younger generations that EAM-ELAS had anything to do with the Gorgopotamos sabotage and the resistance movement. The truth of the matter, the newspaper proclaimed, was that the guerrillas of ELAS fled from their positions during the battle in order to purposefully throw disorder in the EDES ranks.⁷ Such claims fueled the desire of displaced and discredited resistance fighters of EAM to claim the laurels that they felt they had been unjustly denied. They retorted that ELAS provided the majority of the guerrilla fighters involved⁸ and that its leader Aris Veloukhiotis was decisively brave and cool-headed, as opposed to his EDES counterpart.⁹ It has also been suggested that Aris planned the operation itself, whilst Zervas, a trained army officer, remained silent.¹⁰ As the political climate in Greece stabilized after the collapse of the military junta in 1974, the history of the resistance movement and especially that of Gorgopotamos re-entered the limelight; it has not yet been withdrawn.¹¹

The debate surrounding the operation has been closely related to the issue of credit precisely because the majority of commentaries were written in this context. Over time the issue became centrally important to the mythology of the EAM-ELAS guerrilla movement and consequently the collective conscience of the Greek Left. As late as November 18, 1999 the periodical "E-Istorika," which is distributed by the centre-left newspaper "Eleftherotypia,"¹² chose Gorgopotamos as its subject-matter. The title of this edition was "*it would never have taken place without Zervas and never have succeeded without Aris*," quoting an attempt by Woodhouse to settle the issue of credit once and for all.¹³ This alone is a fine example of the centrality of the issue of credit to the history of the sabotage. Additionally, it is an unwitting illustration of the influ-

ence that political considerations have had on historical writings. It is in fact characteristic of the academic commentary of these events that it focuses on and has been influenced by the political debate that has run in parallel. The influence of mythology and politics on any attempt to chronicle the history of the sabotage adds an extra dimension to the study of Gorgopotamos.

Possibly the most interesting aspect of the Gorgopotamos sabotage is that it is considered to have generated the first source of friction between ELAS and the British. In particular, the claim has been made that when the BBC broadcast news of the sabotage, it only acknowledged the participation of the leader of EDES, Napoleon Zervas. This was interpreted as a reflection of official British policy and was subsequently held to have been the first in a long chain of events that soured relations between the protagonists of the resistance, with the Civil War being the ultimate outcome. The justification that has been offered for such alleged unfair treatment was that the British were ab initio prejudiced against EAM-ELAS given the affiliation of the latter with the Greek Communist Party (KKE). The British had endorsed an overall strategy of reinstating King George II of the Hellenes at the end of the war. This aim found many Greeks, especially communists, vehemently opposed. It has been long established that the BBC, although it included many EAM sympathizers in its ranks, was later forced, as a result of the overall trend in British policy, to ban any mention of EAM in broadcasts.¹⁴ For the collective conscience of the Greek Left, the coverage of the Gorgopotamos sabotage was the first unprovoked and unfair British attack on the reputation of EAM; it was felt that, via the BBC, Britain had intentionally attempted to deny EAM its share of the glory of Gorgopotamos.

This aspect of the Gorgopotamos debate is especially fascinating for three reasons. The first is that despite having become the subject of considerable controversy, this topic has not been adequately explored in its own right.¹⁵ Second, notwithstanding the perceived importance of the relevant news broadcast(s), a cloud of mystery covers much of its contents because the transcripts no longer exist. The available sources disagree on what exactly was said (or could have been said) and even when this/these broadcast(s) occurred. The third is that this subject attracts the full weight of the

politicization of the academic commentary. Given the unavailability of the transcripts, the evidence presented by the Left to support their argument of a one-sided news coverage was primarily based on the testimony of displaced EAM supporters. This testimony was famously espoused and presented in a series of seminal works on the Greek resistance and Civil War,¹⁶ published during the revival of the European Left in the 1970s. The ensuing academic discussion used these obviously politicized writings as a starting point. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of subsequent historical commentaries on this particular aspect of the sabotage are written with a view toward affirming or denying the claim of the Left that the early political bias of the British was instrumental in causing this first source of friction. Few attempts, if any, have been made to distinguish between the factual allegation of a one-sided coverage and subsequent imputations of a motive.

An outline of the discussion in this article

Following a brief discussion of the events leading to the explosion of the bridge, the validity of the factual and political claim made by the writers on the Greek Left will be discussed. The specific argument most usually advanced is that the name of the EDES leader Napoleon Zervas was named by the BBC in its coverage of the sabotage, whilst Aris Velouhiotis – the kapetanios of ELAS – was not.¹⁷ The first question to determine is whether Aris was named in the BBC news broadcasts. Upon careful examination of the available evidence it is possible to conclude that it is highly unlikely that Aris was mentioned at all. This was not the product of political bias: if one examines the information reaching London at the time, it is possible to conclude that Aris participation in the sabotage did not become known in London for some time. The second question is therefore whether the BBC named Zervas; if it did then, at the very least, the factual aspect of the claim concerning the one-sided news coverage of the sabotage is true. Given the general (and very sensible) prohibition on naming the perpetrators of acts of resistance and the availability of evidence that the BBC had specific instructions in this regard, one must inquire whether a policy decision was made to publicize Zervas' role in the operation. It can be

shown that there existed special reasons, including the wishes of Zervas himself, that his name be made public. Nevertheless, these must be primarily examined in the light of the internal politics of the institutions of British government responsible for foreign policy towards Greece. These were the Foreign Office, traditionally responsible for making policy in this area, and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which had been created to orchestrate acts of sabotage and resistance in occupied Europe.¹⁸ In fact, new archival research undertaken by the authors suggests that a policy reversal was indeed effected during the time period under examination in this article. At the very least, Zervas' name was publicized in other forms of Allied-influenced media, although such a conclusion, in turn, suggests that the BBC most probably made a one-sided coverage of the sabotage.

In our analysis we will also focus on the arguments of two leading British academic commentators, C.M. Woodhouse and R. Clogg, and their efforts to discredit the argument for a biased BBC coverage as was captured in the recollections of EAM resistance fighters. The approach of Woodhouse differs from that of Clogg; the former argues that the BBC would not have mentioned E.D.E.S. or its leader because Zervas was a *persona non grata* with the Foreign Office. The latter insists that such a mention would have been very unlikely given the standard British broadcasting policy of not naming participants in acts of resistance. Upon examination of the evidence, it may be shown that these arguments do not necessarily invalidate the factual claim put forward by the Left but may coexist with it harmoniously. The preoccupation of these commentators with the political dimension of this particular debate has obscured more "innocent" explanations of the events alleged by EAM supporters.

A definition of key parameters: a "one-sided coverage thesis"

Before one can deal with the substance of this discussion, one must clarify two important issues; the first relates to the time period under consideration and the second to the timing of the first BBC broadcast. As to the time period, it is characteristic of the position adopted initially by the Left and subsequently followed in the academic commentary, that only the very first broadcast(s) are

taken into account. BBC Greek Service bulletins occurred twice daily but a major sabotage operation – such as Gorgopotamos – may have been mentioned in other programs as well. In addition, major news items must have been presented over a period of time. The resistance movement especially, caught the public imagination at the time and was excellent propaganda material. It is possible, therefore, to differentiate between a “one-sided broadcast” and a “one-sided coverage” thesis. The former being based around a single (first) broadcast, whilst the latter being based on the coverage of the Gorgopotamos sabotage over a period of time. One must be cautious about the time period selected for examination. If it is extended for too long, it is possible to find that the British had indeed become biased towards EAM.¹⁹ If it is kept too short one leaves little space for what must have been a cautious first mention to develop into a news story. For these reasons, we shall consider a broadcast period of about a month as our relevant BBC coverage of the event. A period of one month allows for an initial period of uncertainty during which the news was “breaking” and in which reporting would have been cautious. On the other hand, it does not endanger our study by being excessively long. Reports of the political nature of EAM’s agenda and its affiliation with the KKE only began to arrive in Cairo after January 13, 1943²⁰ and then took some time to be transmitted to London. It was only after such reports were received that Zervas began to be viewed favorably, as a possible counter-weight to EAM-ELAS. As the debate has been focused on the implications for policy and not on initial timidity, we shall use the “one-sided coverage” variant.

One further aspect that must be considered is the timing of the initial broadcast. This is useful for a variety of reasons, including the definition of the time period under study, the discounting of certain accounts,²¹ and an approximation of the range of information available in London at the time. Richard Clogg has identified the PWE²² directives which first mention the Gorgopotamos sabotage, as those of the week from December 11 to 18, 1942. This must, presumably, mean that these directives were to be *applied* during that week and that therefore they must have been written and issued shortly before that. This is in accordance with a report of the Greek ambassador in Ankara,²³ dated December 7, which

mentions unconfirmed information transmitted to him that the bridge spanning the Gorgopotamos viaduct has been exploded. Evidently, next to the sentence containing this information, there is a handwritten comment that reads “this news has been announced on the radio as well.” Farakos points out that this “obviously means the news that the BBC transmitted at the time.” One can conclude, consequently, that the broadcast was made after December 7, when the report was written, but not long after it arrived. This report was sent as a telegram so the time lapse between reception and decoding must not have been lengthy. The first broadcast is, therefore, likely to have first been made in the days after December 11.²³

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND DOCUMENTATION (NOVEMBER 1942 TO MARCH 1943)

Sabotage	November 24-5
Wehrmacht press release	November 27
Tsouderos Letter	December 2
Raphael Report	December 7
First BBC Broadcast: STUDY BEGINS (1 MONTH)	December 11-18
First Kapetanidis Report (information ban)	December 15
Harling telegram for Zervas publicity	December 18
Second Kapetanidis Report (lifting ban)	December 25
Myers' radio begins to function	January 13
Miliarexis telegram to Raphael	January 18
Swiss Newspaper Neuchatel: STUDY ENDS	January 28
Woodhouse visit to EAM in Athens	February 2
Zervas telegram accepting Kings' return	March

I. Operation Harling

The Gorgopotamos bridge was one of the three major such constructions servicing the railroad connecting Athens to Thessaloniki. The strategic importance of the sabotage was linked to the war in North Africa. The German Africa Korps, headed by Field Marshal Romel, was at that time launching a fierce drive towards Alexandria and Cairo. The possibility of a German success was, at the time, as frightening as it was real: tales are told of the paper-burning “Great Panic” in Cairo during the summer of 1942 when the skies turned black and a large part of the early documents of the

SOE were destroyed.²⁴ Romel's largest supply route was considered to lie through mainland Greece and Crete. This assumption was based on the information provided by a network of agents based in Athens and known by the code-name "Prometheus II." The network had secretly broadcast information that supply trains were crossing the bridge every twenty minutes from the direction of Thessaloniki towards Athens, clearly an important indication of enemy movement. In reality, however, the railway could not possibly have supported such traffic and Romel was mainly supplied through Italy, as later information has shown.²⁵ On this assumption, nevertheless, these three bridges became immediate Allied targets and an operation to destroy them was conceived and code-named "Harling."

The events which led to the destruction of the Gorgopotamos viaduct on the night of November 25, 1942, were as unpredictable as its lasting side-effects. The nine saboteurs who eventually were parachuted into Greece, arrived in two stages. The first group to arrive and make contact was that of Major C.M. Woodhouse and Colonel "Eddie" Myers. Following a previous unsuccessful sortie when they had been unable to locate the flares marking the drop-zone, the two senior officers had decided that the second time around they would jump into the night regardless. This prospect actually materialized and the first team of saboteurs landed safely, although many on the wrong side of the Pindos mountain range. They spent a cold week on Mount Giona, hoping they would bump into someone who recognized the name "Zervas": the guerrilla leader that they had been told was established in these mountains. They were astonished to discover that the name of Zervas apparently meant nothing to those they first met;²⁶ these were hardened bandits led by a (then) cattle-thief called Karalivanos,²⁷ who could well have murdered the British for the gold sovereigns destined for the Andartes. Finally, they were lucky enough to be put in contact with someone²⁸ who supplied them with information as to the location of the EDES band. Major Woodhouse then crossed the Pindos mountain range on foot and met EDES as it was engaged in fighting an enemy detachment.

The second team of the "Harling" group parachuted into Greece one month later and landed, rather unfortunately, next to a major

road. They were almost arrested by the substantial Italian garrison of Karpenisi, which was able to transport itself quickly to the landing site. The saboteurs managed to narrowly escape, but were forced to abandon much of their equipment, including maps of the projected target areas.²⁹ There they made contact with ELAS and eventually managed to link up with the first team. Whilst fortune had smiled on the "Harling" team, in the sense that none of them had been killed or captured in the initial phases of the operation, but the enemy was fully aware not only of their presence but also of their aim. It is perhaps because of these mishaps that the sabotage effort carried out by the members of the "Harling" Mission, the site of the Gorgopotamos bridge quickly became the stuff of legend.

The British commandos not only found their landing very difficult, but also their orientation after contact with the guerrillas. They had been supplied with very little accurate information, especially in terms of political intelligence. Nevertheless, it seems that a warning had been administered about their primary contact (and leader of E.D.E.S.), Napoleon Zervas. SOE headquarters knew his shady past and his political aspirations,³⁰ even if the members of "Harling" did not. As will be shown, there existed a troubled history between Zervas and the SOE. Nevertheless, the reorganization the latter had just undergone would have pushed the details of such recollection out of the limelight and away from the "Harling" briefing room.³¹ The Foreign Office probably also voiced concerns about the association with Zervas; whether these ever reached the saboteurs' ears, though, is questionable. E.D.E.S. was a group of the Republican faction³² and supporting it could prove dangerous for the Foreign Office's plans to re-instate the monarchy after Greece's liberation.³³ To make matters worse, General Plastiras (who had inspired and led the Venizelist coup of January 5, 1935) had been declared the nominal leader of E.D.E.S. Nevertheless, Zervas was essential for the destruction of the Gorgopotamos viaduct and military considerations were still predominant at this stage of the war.

Zervas was a disreputable character in a variety of ways,³⁴ making him one of that bizarre breed of heroes by necessity. His first noteworthy political move was his participation, as a key player, in a Venizelist-inspired coup in 1933 (allegedly in order to wipe out his gambling debts) and again in the disastrous coup of 1935. He

belonged to the circle of Venizelist officers who were keen to contribute to the resistance as they had been disallowed from participating in the Albanian campaign against Italy. Zervas had consequently been approached by Koutsogiannopoulos, the leading agent of Prometheus II, who promised the newly formed E.D.E.S. funding for armed struggle. The British had sent him money, radio transmitters, and explosives specifically to create a contact point for operations such as "Harling."³⁵ Zervas was more than keen to receive the mountain of gold sovereigns that was heaped upon him but balked before "the mountain." The British became increasingly suspicious at every postponement finally ordering Prometheus II to cease contact with this "dangerous Zervas."³⁶ Nevertheless, Koutsogiannopoulos, who did not want to see his efforts wasted, persisted and after a violent conversation demanded that Zervas take to the mountains or risk a public accusation, through the BBC, of expropriating 12,000 pounds of Allied gold. In the end this convinced "Napoleon of the mountains" to form his small band which was then "armed with a pen knife." The money had, apparently, been spent or gambled away.³⁷

The commandos must have been surprised to hear of another band of guerrillas active in the same region; this was ELAS, the military arm of EAM, whose "Kapetanios" was a cold, calculating, brutal, and effective man called Aris Velouchiotis. Woodhouse tells us that the officers of "Harling" knew nothing about EAM³⁸ and that this organization was not identified as a threat to British policy in the area by the Foreign Office at this time. He characteristically testifies that, despite information obtained from Kanellopoulos (who had recently fled to the Middle East) as to the existence and political outlook of EAM, the "Harling" briefing included no mention of that organization or the KKE. Although Woodhouse informs us that he had been previously aware of the KKE as a force in Greek politics (he had come into contact with them during his brief sojourn in Crete) he seems to have been ignorant of the connection with either EAM or ELAS. It was only upon his visit to Athens and his contact with the Central Committee on February 2, 1943 that he realized the political affiliation; the moment of revelation was when one of the EAM leaders said of his comrades that they had been "outlaws [paranomoi] for years."³⁹

That statement would only have been true of members of the KKE.

Despite their different ideological perspectives these two guerrilla bands enjoyed fairly good relations at the time. They were both fairly new to the hardships of the mountain and it appears that the two leaders, although so diametrically opposite in character, were – in typical Greek fashion – cousins. Nevertheless, to the outside observer, the seeds of conflict with EDES may not have been impossible to spot. Eudes very convincingly points out that these two organizations were growing at the same time, in the same region, and depended – at the end of the day – for help, information, food, and recruits⁴⁰ on much the same villages. In addition, one must keep in mind the grave difficulty these bands had in locating weapons⁴¹. They depended on ambushing small (mainly Italian) enemy detachments and arming themselves with the spoils of victory. Two predators in the same small hunting ground can be predicted to eventually have a territorial fight. It was perhaps for reasons such as these that ELAS later adopted a policy of forcibly incorporating other guerrilla groups. Nevertheless, the forces E.D.E.S alone could supply were incapable of overpowering the Italian garrison that protected the Gorgopotamos bridge. Uniting the two bands under British command must have seemed not only a naturally sound strategy but a splendid symbolism for the unity of the Allied cause; a symbolism which would not be wasted on the Andartes⁴² and would provide a good point of contact for future collaboration.

II. The BBC could not have named Aris: the political claim of the Left is dispelled following an examination of the trail of available information.

Typical of the enduring influence of the myth surrounding the BBC's coverage of the Gorgopotamos sabotage on the collective political conscience of the Left is the account provided by Papakongos.⁴³ The entire sabotage is presented therein as a triumph of ELAS bravery and self-sacrifice over EDES cowardice and British failings. The following evening the Antartes, unhappy about "Harling's" refusal to supply them with a permanent liaison officer, gather around the radio for the BBC news. They hear only

praise for Zervas and this is their alleged reaction: "Many found it funny, started laughing, others were angered and someone said [in a strong regional accent] 'If you can't trust a whore how can you trust England?' [another said:] 'The bastards!' [...]. 'No wonder they could not wait to get away.'" This account is obviously completely fictional, as it is almost certain that the BBC broadcast took place in mid-December. In addition, given the lifestyle of the guerrillas, the general unavailability of radio sets, and the lack of electricity in the mountains, it is highly unlikely that broadcasts were listened to in such a manner. Finally, the suggestion that the members of "Harling" were aware of the content of the BBC broadcast and consequently decided on an early exit as nonsense (of course the ELAS guerrillas may have thought differently!). Papakongos, however, is said to have gathered his material, much like Eudes, from interviews with ELAS guerrillas who had fled to the Eastern Block after the Civil War. The significance, therefore, of this 'historical' passage is not the accuracy of the description but the bitterness one can sense in its tone. This sentiment appears not in the form of some specific accusation, the precise text or nature of the broadcast are not even touched upon(!), but as a condemnation: EAM was wronged. The seriousness of the matter for the guerrillas is difficult to miss, especially given the treatment – political illegitimacy and historical invisibility – that EAM received subsequently. The Greek Left can be said to have attached symbolic significance to this broadcast as a turning point in the Antartikon movement. This could be said to be the moment when the British started taking sides and a here-to-fore benevolent ally showed its imperial teeth. A devastating civil war and the military destruction of ELAS was the ultimate conclusion.

This particular accusation of early favoritism can, nevertheless, be rebutted following a careful examination of the chronology of events and the flow of information. It is possible to show that news of the operation reaching London could not have mentioned Aris and EAM's participation in the operation. The British government first officially informed the Greek Prime Minister, Emmanuel Tsouderos, in a letter dated December 2nd, that a group of British saboteurs "had succeeded in coming into contact with a group of Antartes led by Colonel Zervas" and that this group alone "on the

night of the 24th to the 25th of November (sic) [...] successfully destroyed the ninety foot long central arc of the [...] bridge of Gorgopotamos. They also succeeded in derailing an Italian train [...] the leaders of these forces are delighted with their achievement."⁴⁴ The first news that the Greek government received, did not mention Aris at all. More importantly perhaps, given the fact that the Tsouderos note originated from the British government, one can conclude that the story that had circulated in London circles, (including Whitehall, the PWE, and probably the BBC)⁴⁵ would have included a mention of Zervas.

The explanation of the content of the Tsouderos note originates with the SOE in Cairo. The latter could not really have had a clear picture of the mission in its entirety, until Myers' radio began working properly on January 13,⁴⁶ this would have been the date of the first transmission of a detailed field report. It is important to recall that although the SOE and the Foreign Office were essentially ignorant of "Harling's" activities until that date, the Tsouderos note had been delivered on December 2. "Harling," did have some form of very elementary contact with Cairo HQ, either through the "improper working" of Myers' radio or most probably via radio transmitters in Athens (e.g. Prometheus II).⁴⁷ It seems reasonable to presume however that any information relayed to Cairo in this manner would have been sketchy and laconic at best. From Cairo, news of the success of the operation would have traveled to the British Government and from there to the Greek Prime Minister. The information available, therefore, presumably consisted of the operational plans, drawn up in Cairo, and confirmation of a successful outcome. "Harling" had, of course, only been instructed to meet up with Zervas;⁴⁸ it would seem logical that any forwarding of such information would simply mention that the operation involved Zervas alone. Besides, even in the face of more complete information, the SOE would have been happy to point out that their man Zervas had finally come through and that the 12,000 pounds spent on him were not entirely wasted. Thus, the content of the Tsouderos note is explained. It is sensible to assume that it is this version of the story, which circulated amongst British government circles in London at the time.

Given wartime conditions, there obviously existed a problem

with the flow of information. Ambassador Raphael's report to the Royal Greek government in Cairo, first mentioning the rumor of such an operation⁴⁹ heard in Smyrna (where the main British espionage service was based), was dated December 7th. It seems bizarre, however, that Ambassador Raphael's information, dated five days after the Tsouderos note, could not even confirm the attack. This must indicate that Smyrna intelligence was not officially informed of the sabotage until fairly late. The news Raphael transmitted probably stemmed from a laconic Wehrmacht press release in Athens, which Farakos⁵⁰ dates November 27, and which stated that: "a gang of 200 men blew up the Gorgopotamos bridge."⁵¹ This was later supplemented by extensive *reportage* by the Quisling press on the matter with headlines offering an astronomical reward for Zervas' capture,⁵² there was no doubt left as to whom the Quisling press in Athens considered responsible. Several opinions have been offered on why the German-controlled press mentioned only one of the Kapetanioi involved. The simplest is that, in the heat of battle, only Zervas signed the note left behind by the members of "Harling," threatening the Germans with counter-reprisals⁵³ should they take action against local inhabitants. In any event, the rumor that would have reached Smyrna, generated and fueled by the Quisling press, would have involved Zervas alone.

Ironically, in contribution to the mounting frustration of ELAS, even the illegal press in Athens only mentioned Zervas. The two guerrilla leaders had issued a common communiqué immediately after the attack, which extolled both their contributions. But that seemed to have little effect back in the capital. Fleischer sheds some light on this by explaining that the KKE representative in the area, Ilias Maniatis, was a personal adversary of Aris and did not transmit the guerrilla's communiqué to the central committee in Athens. In addition, Farakos and Eudes forcefully point out that direct communication between Aris' ELAS headquarters and the EAM/KKE in Athens was erratic, infrequent, and occasionally tense. The coverage of the sabotage was, in the end, considered by the EAM central committee to have been a disgrace, with Aris being ultimately responsible.⁵⁴ Even Zervas felt awkward about this and wrote to Aris on April 22, 1943: "My dear Aris, it is, allow me the expression, a great lie that is being spoken that upon my return

I tried to create a false impression that the explosion was brought about by my forces alone. Everywhere have I sung praise for Aris and EAM. In Athens only one newspaper is [...] edited by us. And in that newspaper, not only did we not hush up your participation [...] but on the contrary we exhorted this contribution of yours...."⁵⁵ In any event, the consequence was that even the pro-EAM illegal press in Athens could only reproduce the reports glorifying Zervas.

Tying the strings together, all available routes of information that led to London, the SOE, the Quisling and illegal Athenian presses, and in consequence Smyrna intelligence, did not mention Aris or EAM. On the contrary, all of these sources actually mentioned Zervas. The SOE may have had knowledge of EAM's involvement, but the extent of it, as well as the overall importance of the organization, must have been less well-known;⁵⁶ and of course the SOE had a vested interest in promoting Zervas' contribution, which did seem considerable under the circumstances. Any media coverage, it is safe to assume, could only have been based on some amalgam of the information available at the time, which certainly did not include a mention of Aris (or EAM-ELAS). It therefore remains to be examined whether such coverage would have mentioned Zervas.

III. The Academic Retort: the claim that Zervas was not named

Among British commentators, the majority of whom deny an unfair treatment of ELAS, C.M. Woodhouse stands out both as an historian and a participant. He insists that the BBC could not possibly have mentioned Zervas by name. He refers to a series of reports from the relevant Minister in Cairo to London, pertaining to the internal situation in Greece. These were primarily written on the basis of information provided by SIS, the secret information service in the Middle East, the Cairo branch of which was known as ISLD. In these reports, spanning from January 21 to February 24, a number of other bands were mentioned but EDES or Zervas are never named. In addition, nearly two months after the Gorgopotamos operation Douglas Howard at the Foreign Office wrote that "the Special Operations Executive have nothing impressive to show in Greece." In fact, a few weeks previously Warner

from Cairo had written to Dixon in London about Zervas, characterizing him as "disreputable."⁵⁷ The argument made by Woodhouse is that Zervas and his political guru Plastiras were *personae non gratae* with the Foreign Office in London whilst they were popular with the SOE in Cairo. Given that the BBC was based in London and linked to the Foreign Office it would have been bizarre that the former mention Zervas. The myth, we can infer, has been superimposed on the history to justify the KKEs' later assertion that the British were antagonistic towards EAM from the very beginning.

One straightforward criticism of the argument expanded above, relates to some of the documents referred to and more specifically their antagonism towards Zervas. These are documents that were not intended for publication and propaganda reasons. If, as Woodhouse asserts, Zervas was considered dangerous and a *persona non grata*, then surely intelligence reports would have been overflowing with information about EDES rather than ignoring it. It is perhaps telling that the information contained in the documents comes from ISLD which, as Woodhouse mentions earlier in his article, was considered an unreliable and "partial" source.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the main body of documentation on the essence of the matter (*i.e.* the attitude to be taken towards Plastiras and his assumed prodigy) in the form of correspondence between the SOE and the Foreign Office during most of September 1942 is still unavailable. Given the political interest of the SOE in Venizelism and Plastiras and the rivalry with the Foreign Office that developed around this very issue,⁵⁹ one must concede that it is these documents which have merited most attention. If one were to risk a guess, it would be possible to argue that whilst the Foreign Office documents would certainly be uncomplimentary, they would not be antagonistic. In any event, the unfavorable comments that are made about Zervas in the documents Woodhouse refers to, merely seem to restate the well-known opinion that this institution had about "Napoleon of the Mountains." One must further examine the available evidence to determine whether the opinion of the Foreign Office was instrumental in determining whether Zervas was to receive any publicity.

The institutional rival of the Foreign Office would have fought hard for credit to be given to Zervas, for political as well as other

reasons. The SOE funds that Zervas received must have forced the former to support the latter as a sound investment, in the face of constant accusations from the Foreign Office that they were wasting money on operations of dubious utility.⁶⁰ SOE could be seen as having a twin motive in supporting Zervas: both the fulfillment of its mission to foster subversive activity in occupied Greece and as part of the institutional power struggle. Adopting this position makes it easier to understand Woodhouse's assertion that Foreign Office reports, dated in the first months of 1943, "never mention EDES except indirectly when they speak of Plastiras, Gonatas, or Zervas, and when they do mention EDES the organization appears mainly as an instrument of SOE in its attempt to undermine the policy of the Foreign Office."⁶¹ The Foreign Office's position was, however, weakened by the fact that at this early stage of the War military objectives were predominant. In addition, the Foreign Office was badly positioned to retaliate against its institutional rival, because it depended on the SOE for information concerning underground activity in Greece. Furthermore, the Foreign Office could give guidelines and assess the military choices of the SOE from a political perspective, but such a voice would only have become powerful after the political agenda of the British Empire reclaimed the limelight: *i.e.* after prospects of overall victory had improved significantly.⁶²

As a consequence, any argument based exclusively on Foreign Office documents is *a priori* condemned to partial conclusions. Furthermore, the fact that the memoranda circulated internally reflected only one aspect of Zervas' personality, which was consistent with the institutional ideology of the Foreign Office, does not mean that this was the version which finally appeared in the media. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the SOE had a say in the decisions of the PWE and still wielded considerable influence at this stage in the war. The Foreign Office's location in London and admitted predominance in decision-making must not blind us to the fact that its institutional opinion was not in any way a final decision. In addition, as will be seen further on, there exists a considerable body of evidence that Zervas was named in Allied-influenced media at an earlier date than that of the internal documents Woodhouse refers to.

Richard Clogg has argued along different lines from Woodhouse.

He characterizes the claim that the BBC lavished praise on Zervas but ignored Aris as a "canard" which "the documents do enable us to dispose [of] fairly, if not absolutely, conclusively."⁶³ The documents Clogg refers to are PWE directives to the BBC Greek service immediately preceding the relevant period. They emphasize that "we must never neglect the question of Greek resistance even when we have no fresh news" but that "no names of places or leaders must be given."⁶⁴ The PWE directives that first explicitly refer to the Gorgopotamos sabotage are those of the week between 11 and 18 December 1942, this presumably being when the first broadcast was made. This document states that "in exceptional cases, such as the blowing up of the Gorgopotamos bridge, on which we have completely reliable evidence, we can give details of acts of resistance, but in no case, unless otherwise advised, should we give the names of guerrilla leaders." This was standard policy, Clogg argues, placing the onus on those supporting a one-sided version of the broadcast to prove that the BBC staff disobeyed the directives issued. It is clear that this had indeed happened before, Clogg mentions such cases himself, but insists that "it is highly unlikely that the BBC, at this particular juncture, would have willfully disregarded such clear directives for the treatment of the Gorgopotamos affair."⁶⁵ This line of argument has also been recently adopted by other commentators⁶⁶ who have attempted to show an even-handed approach on the part of the British.

It is important to bear in mind that Cloggs' claim seems to consist of three elements. The first, is that an overall PWE policy – covering all British Media – of not mentioning details of acts of resistance was in force. The second is that within that broad policy framework, there was, in the case of Gorgopotamos, an explicit directive against using the names of guerrilla leaders "unless otherwise advised." Given the nature of these directives and the absence of evidence of specific orders to mention Zervas' name, Clogg concludes that there are only two possibilities. These are that either the BBC staff mutinied and mentioned such a detail, an unlikely occurrence, or that the recollections of EAM supporters are invalid. Clogg therefore is drawn to the latter conclusion. The third element concerns the time frame of Clogg's inquiry. It must be noted that Clogg's argument only concerns the first news bulletins to mention the sabo-

tage of the Gorgopotamos bridge. This would have been the period when the news was "breaking." He does not deal with a lengthier period during which the news story would have developed more fully and coverage would have been complete. It is worth noting, however, that the argument he is seeking to refute could not in fairness be said to be so limited. The claims of the Greek Left have often been recorded as relating to a single broadcast but in the recollections of guerrilla fighters the particular claim being made is rarely detailed. In order to do justice to the factual claims made by the Left one should allow a broader time frame to be considered in order to conclusively dispel such a version of events.

IV. Evidence supporting the factual claim that Zervas was named

When adjusting the time frame of an inquiry accordingly one can actually find a considerable body of evidence to support claims that Zervas' name became well publicized. This evidence falls short of proving that the medium for such publicity was the BBC. Nevertheless, given the centrality of the BBC in the Allied propaganda mechanism, the conclusion that Zervas was named becomes more attractive than Clogg would suggest. In particular, evidence for the following matters can be adduced to argue for an altogether different version of events:

- a) a reconsideration of the general policy against naming individuals;
- b) a reconsideration of the specific policy concerning the names of guerrilla leaders;
- c) a general assumption that Zervas was the commander-in-chief of the guerrillas in occupied Greece;
- d) evidence that Zervas personally asked for publicity;
- e) intelligence reports which indicate that a reconsideration of policy took place and that some form of credit was given, via a radio broadcast, to the Zervas' group;
- f) Media under Allied influence which, near the relevant dates, mentioned Zervas in particular;

At this juncture it is important to add a *caveat*. The analysis we present does not cover the entire range of possibilities. It is, for

instance, possible that whilst it was finally decided to grant Zervas publicity, the BBC never specifically mentioned his name even though other forms of media did. Allowances must also be made for audience bias; if, as has previously been discussed, the German and illegal presses mentioned Zervas as the guerrilla leader responsible, then the audience may have "read" that statement into the broadcast. A good example can be glimpsed in a report from Ankara to London,⁶⁷ dated Dec 22 1942, which states:

For the explosion of the bridge [of Gorgopotamos] 12 patriots have been executed, amongst whom is Captain Pagouropoulos of the Artillery. [for] Colonel Zervas acting in the periphery of Levadia [there is] a price of 100 million drachmas for his capture.

This could create the impression that Zervas was responsible for the sabotage, especially if two such statements were read close to each other (as they are in the report), *although this is not a necessary consequence* of their conjunction. This could merely be a discussion of conditions in occupied Greece. Especially since radio sets were widely unavailable at the time and listening to Allied broadcasts was punishable by death, it became common practice for news to be written down by members of the resistance and disseminated to the population in written form. It is obvious how such misinterpretations could occur under these circumstances of jamming, danger, and (even subconscious) personal bias. One further explanation, which would subvert the arguments as put forward until now, is that whilst the BBC stuck to its no-names policy, the Greek government named Zervas in the 15-minute period it had at its disposal for broadcasting "angled" news (known as "free time").⁶⁸ PWE directives did not regulate this broadcast and consequently instructions to the BBC, not to mention guerrilla leaders, may still have been in place. This may well explain the perception in Greece that the BBC named Zervas as the guerrilla leader responsible for the attack. Some evidence will be examined below which could be said to support this position: Zervas name appears soon afterwards in the Swiss press following an intervention of the Greek embassy there.

a) *The general policy towards naming individuals*

The claim that a standard policy against naming individuals was in force at the time is correct, although it was clearly being reconsidered, especially as resistance became more open. Overall, such a no-names policy would have been sensible because broadcasting the identity of saboteurs would put them, their families, and the population at large at risk of savage reprisals. This is recognized in an intelligence report dated Jan. 25, 1943.⁶⁹ The report states:

4. Complaints have been made in Athens concerning the indiscretion⁷⁰ of certain people in confidential services [intelligence] in the Middle East, the result of which was that agents of the enemy were informed of the names of factories that assist patriotic organizations in Greece. 5. Complaints were also expressed regarding the indiscretions of the London radio station. Only harm can come for those whose names are mentioned such as, for instance, when the London Radio Station [the BBC] mentioned the names of the survivors of the submarine Triton.

As well as confirming the validity of Clogg's argument at an abstract level, this report may be seen as simultaneously subverting the factual aspect of that claim. It demonstrates that the BBC occasionally made use of names, though this was not always thought of as being a good idea.

b) *The specific policy towards naming guerrillas*

Even before the names of the survivors of the submarine Triton had been broadcast, on October 8 and then again on the 13th, the Times⁷¹ published two releases based on the information obtained from the agent, known as Prometheus, about the resistance in Athens. The names of six *Kapetanioi*, leaders of guerrilla groups, appeared – two or three of which later were affiliated with ELAS, although the organization was not mentioned by name. This serves as an illustration that the Allied media, either because of blunder or design, was not entirely averse to mentioning the names of guerrilla leaders. Especially as resistance became more open and guer-

rilla activity became a popular media topic, the names of leaders would have served to make them heroes, reinforcing the myth which Allied propaganda, no doubt, sought to promote. Nevertheless, if one concedes that the names of lesser *Kapetanioi* could be mentioned, then it seems logical to expect that the name of the commander-in-chief of the guerrillas, provided that one existed and that his identity was known to the Axis, could be used for propaganda purposes.

c) Zervas mentioned specifically as guerrilla leader-in-chief

The intelligence report of January 25, 1943, cited above, goes on to mention Zervas' name as overall guerrilla leader- a rumor that was popular at that time. As if to soften the blow, however, the report states that the informant on whose input this part is based, is of the opinion that:

the acts of sabotage have unfortunate repercussions on the land and the inhabitants, relative to the savage reprisals of the Axis [...] Zervas and his guerrilla bands are considered to be national heroes whilst in reality they are responsible for the destruction of dozens of villages, the looting of the countryside, and the execution of hundreds of innocent victims.⁷²

Nevertheless, this was not a criticism of Zervas that survived beyond the strict confines of the times. His popularity was further enhanced, somewhat morbidly, by reports that because his name had become known in conjunction with the resistance, the Nazis had executed his brother.⁷³ It therefore became difficult to accuse Zervas of being immune to the consequences of his own actions.

d) Proof of Zervas desire for Allied publicity

A further clue in this trail of evidence is given by a "Harling" telegram dated 18/12/1942. It is possible to attribute the brevity of the text to the "improper" working of Myers' radio; in the alternative, the message came from a transmitter, such as that of "Prometheus" in Athens. This telegram is contained in the Woodhouse papers⁷⁴ and states that:

The quisling press has put a bounty of 100 million drachmas on his head. Zervas is very enthusiastic. The general hopes you will provide maximum coverage.

Zervas was already an obvious outlaw and the German bounty offered for his capture was a reward in more ways than one. It meant recognition by the population in Greece and could facilitate relations with British HQ in the Middle East. We are unfortunately unaware of the SOE's response to this request. Nevertheless, this document leaves no doubt as to Zerva's true feelings on the matter of his notoriety. It also seems to provide the SOE with a motive for advertising its own achievement and an argument for convincing a skeptical audience in the Foreign Office and the PWE that such praise would be in the best interests of the guerrilla movement. Certainly, had the SOE decided to follow such a course and air the contents of this telegram, one could assume that the BBC may well have been "otherwise advised" about the ban on the use of names.

e) Intelligence Reports

1) Evidence of a change in the policy of information dissemination

On the subject of Zervas, the position of the Greek government must have been uncomfortable, not to say somewhat embarrassing. Zervas had been disallowed from participating in the Albanian campaign because of his aforementioned background in politics. He was a staunch opponent of both the Metaxas government and the monarchy, which pretty much meant the entire Greek government-in-exile. Even prime minister Tsouderos, a former Venizelist, had declared that support of the monarchy was a *sine qua non* of participation in the exiled cabinet. The EDES charter, on the other hand, referred to the King as 'the crowned idiot' and stated that part of the organizations' mission was to make Glücksbourgs' "treason" known to all. The Greek government was at this time undergoing an internal crisis, one of many,⁷⁵ and the presentation of Zervas as a popular hero must have added insult to injury.

This background would probably explain the content of a report of Dec. 15, 1942 from Kapetanidis of the Greek consulate in Istanbul

to Raphael of the embassy in Ankara.⁷⁶ The report mentions:

I have the honor to inform you that in strict observation of your recommendations, I have studiously avoided in the last ten days to provide the foreign correspondents here or Turkish journalists with any information concerning the intensifying guerrilla activity in Greece. [...] I do however consider it my duty to report that the guerrilla movement in Greece is today one of the most interesting [issues...] that concern the foreign correspondents here who [...] are instructed] to transmit every bit of information concerning the action of guerrilla forces in Greece.

The consul was concerned whether the information ban was going to encourage the spread of misinformation as he believed that the journalists were likely to begin inventing their stories or would fall prey to rumors. First, it is important to acknowledge that the timing of this report makes it obvious that the "intensifying guerrilla activity" refers to the explosion of the Gorgopotamos bridge. If we consider the date of this report and subtract the ten days mentioned therein, it further becomes apparent that this information ban would have come into place around Dec. 4. This is two days after the Greek prime minister had been notified that the sabotage was carried out by the members of "Harling" and Zervas' guerrillas. The information ban may, on the one hand, be seen as the product of small-minded political considerations. On the other hand, it would also accord with a more sensitive approach to forwarding information about the perpetrators of such a brave act of resistance. In either scenario, the information ban must have had as a primary target the aim of keeping the name(s) of the perpetrator(s) of the sabotage away from media and public attention. It is extremely difficult to appreciate what other information the Greek government may have had that it would have been sensitive about publicizing.

The official policy, however, seems to have changed around or just before December 28. In a report⁷⁷ of that date Kapetanidis wrote to Raphael:

I have the honor to inform you that according to the

most recent indications and information [concerning] Greece from the Royal Consulate in Izmir, I have begun again to transmit information to foreign correspondents here [about the guerrillas in Greece].

Clearly, something changed between these two dates, affecting the policy of information dissemination. It is interesting to recall Clogg's assertion that the first BBC broadcast occurred between December 11 and 18. Only ten days later the Greek governments' policy on providing information about guerrilla groups was turned on its head. As we shall see further on, Zervas' name appears one month later in Allied-influenced media. The conclusion that the Greek government reversed its policy, including the policy on naming Zervas, is impossible to resist. In this context, it is worth asking whether the Greek government, depended as it was on British patronage,⁷⁸ would have acted independently on a matter of such sensitivity. If it can be presumed that the British government had sanctioned such a change, the dates of the commencement of the BBC's coverage of the sabotage become increasingly important. For it is hard to resist the conclusion that such a change of British policy would not have been reflected in the broadcasts of their most important news vehicle.

2) Evidence that some form of credit was given to Zervas by means of a radio transmission.

Documents from the Greek embassy in Ankara shed some further light on the matter. A telegram⁷⁹ from Miliarexis (intelligence officer) in Izmir to Raphael in Ankara, dated January 18, 1943, states:

From discussions with those who have passed [refugees from Greece] in the last trimester I have realized that the guerrilla movement has deeply touched the people of Greece. [...] The communiqués of the Andartes are read with the greatest interest. The relevant London radio transmissions and those of other Middle East stations are urgently awaited [...] In Greece popular opinion is very flattered seeing that the Greek government ensures that the acts of freedom fighters are praised and is satis-

fied in observing that their leaders properly appreciate the struggles and sacrifices of the enslaved people. It is recognized that only a government representing the country abroad and embodying the ideals of fighting Greece can successfully guide the realization of the country's guerrilla movement and to contribute so as full co-operation of all guerrilla groups may occur. Zervas' movement is serious. The reward lately advertised in the towns and villages for his capture by the Germans and Italians, the persecution of his family, and the action of the bands have drawn the attention of masses.

This is definitely an interesting telegram; it shares the failings that Woodhouse identifies in ISLD sources, in the sense that it is both biased and misinformed.⁸⁰ One must wonder what precisely is meant by the statement that the "Greek government ensures that the acts of freedom fighters are praised" and "the leaders properly appreciate the struggles and sacrifices of the enslaved people." Surely, this is an indication that some form of credit was given to the acts of the Andartes. The argument in the report must be that the Greek government was correct in recognizing – or at least not suppressing – the guerrillas' achievements, for this enhanced its own popularity as well. Given that refugees from Greece knew this, the medium for such an announcement cannot have been other than a radio transmission. Furthermore, it seems fair to infer from the structure of the text that Zervas must personally have been considered the recipient of such praise, even though he was considered a political adversary. This alone would explain the inclusion of the sentence "Zervas' movement is serious" at that particular juncture. Finally, one must recall the version of events that the Greek prime minister had been made aware of on December 2. Had it been decided to praise the guerrillas, the name of the Greek responsible for the success of the operation would have been clear in the mind of the government-in-exile.

f) Zervas mentioned specifically as guerrilla leader in other Allied media

A final and convincing piece of evidence, constituting proof

that Zervas name was specifically mentioned by Allied-influenced media, comes from a surprising source. On January 28, 1943 a Swiss newspaper, "Curieux" of Neuchâtel, reported on the growing guerrilla movement in Greece:

we learn notably that in the north of Greece the Italian garrisons have been submitted to ferocious attacks on the part of organized rebels who operate under the command of the Greek generals Zervas and Ketseas.⁸¹

The Greek delegation in Switzerland forwarded this article to Cairo with a covering letter containing the following information:

[the article] is attributable to our friend in Neuchâtel and compiled in part on the basis of information provided by us.

We cannot know whether specifically the name of Zervas was mentioned by the Greek staff; if it had not been, of course, the conclusion that the Allies had given widespread publicity to Zervas' name would be unavoidable. But even if it had been mentioned, one must ask how the Greek delegation in Switzerland would have been aware of the fact that Zervas, a *persona non grata* both with the Greek government and the Foreign Office, was a guerrilla leader. The German-controlled press could be counted on not to have reproduced news of Greek resistance. Such information, it seems, would not have been published in the Swiss press at all, had it not been decided by either the Greek government or the Allies to publicize Zervas' achievements. It also makes it more difficult to argue that a BBC mutiny would have been the only way in which Zervas would have been mentioned in a broadcast.

This does not, however, prove that the BBC coverage under examination mentioned Zervas as the guerrilla leader responsible for the sabotage. What can be demonstrated is that by January 28, 1943 the name of Zervas was well known within Greece and Greek government circles, as well as internationally. It is also clear that his fame was connected to the guerrilla movement at the time when the sabotage became known and that he was identified as (at the

very least) a very important guerrilla leader who was involved with the Gorgopotamos sabotage. It also appears highly probable that a policy decision was made to publicize Zervas' name in the media of the time. We have examined evidence that this decision was made by the Greek government-in-exile. Given the very close relationship of the latter to the British government, it would seem reasonable to assume that a similar British decision had been made in the relevant time period. Should this have been the case, it becomes very difficult to deny the claim that the BBC must have been involved in disseminating this information. Whilst these arguments cannot in fairness be described as conclusive, the evidence available suggests that at the very least such claims are hardly "canards."

Finally, the possibility that the BBC did mention Zervas as a consequence of a mutiny must be discussed. This is the *caveat* that Clogg allows for,⁸² but which he doubts in view of the relevant PWE directives and the surrounding circumstances. Such a mutiny was clearly a possibility because the BBC Greek staff did have an excellent motive for promoting Zervas' contribution to the armed resistance struggle. It is possible to make a strong case that the politics within the BBC made a recognition of Zervas desirable. The BBC Greeks, notoriously anti-royalist,⁸³ would have known the importance of a specific mention of Zervas⁸⁴ both for the Antartikon movement and the Royal Greek government. This very same government had vigorously persecuted the Greek staff, constantly questioned their loyalty, and demanded to feature prominently in their broadcasts. Activism, either as a cause or an effect of such interference, was not unknown in the BBC Greek Service, especially in matters relating to the monarch.⁸⁵ It could then be inferred that the BBC Greeks, in an attempt to promote Zervas and Plastiras over the Tsouderos government and the monarch, unwittingly interfered in an altogether different argument that they were unaware of. This is certainly an interesting scenario, but it is unlikely. Had such a mutiny occurred, then it almost certainly would have been extensively recorded in BBC memoranda, foreign office correspondence, and the archives of the Greek government-in-exile. Yet no such references appear to be in existence in internal memoranda. Furthermore, the Kapetanidis reports seem to in-

dicate that for the Greek government the issue of an information ban on details of acts of the resistance became obsolete after December 28. Whilst a "mutiny" is an interesting possibility it must nevertheless be discounted on the available evidence.

CONCLUSION

One cannot rush to a conclusion about what was actually broadcast by the BBC. Accounts differ widely and for obvious reasons they must not always be taken at face value. We do believe that it is possible, however, to draw a number of tentative conclusions from the above study which may point us in the right direction. First, it has been shown that all the surrounding circumstances necessary for a "one-sided coverage" were present. News of EAM's involvement in the sabotage could not have filtered through to London; it was unknown even in Athens for a time period exceeding that selected for the study. Second, several documents, especially the note sent to Prime Minister Tsouderos on December 2, confirm that London circles were fully aware of Zervas' participation in the sabotage. They considered him to be the leader of the guerrilla group(s) in occupied Greece. In addition, it must be remembered that since radio transmissions from "Harling" had difficulty in reaching SOE HQ in the Middle East, it was logical (and convenient) for the latter to assume that the original plan had been adhered to overall. The operation, it will be recalled, had been planned to include co-operation with Zervas' guerrillas alone. *The first conclusion* one may reach is that *the version of events circulating in London at the time supports the "one-sided coverage" thesis*. Ironically, this was not for the reasons generally presumed by the Left (animosity against EAM) but because of the vagaries of wartime communications. When deciding to broadcast details of this immensely successful act of sabotage, the PWE would have been faced with only one dilemma: whether to name Napoleon Zervas. The PWE directives for that week restate what we know to have been the official policy of not naming guerrilla leaders unless "otherwise advised." A certain body of evidence, detailed above, exists for suggesting that, in the end, different directions were given.

One must then test the rationale offered for the argument that

such a "one-sided coverage" did *not* take place. One explanation offered for not mentioning Zervas' name is that of Woodhouse; namely that Zervas was a *persona non grata* with the Foreign Office. Yet there are convincing arguments for accepting that the information provided by these documents is not complete. During this period the most important feature of British policy towards occupied Greece, until the outbreak of conflict between EAM and EDES, was the rivalry between the SOE and the Foreign Office. Military and political objectives conflicted in the case of Greece: it seemed impossible to encourage subversive activity in Greece without simultaneously undermining the Foreign Office's policy of eventually reinstating King George, since EAM and EDES had based their founding charters on the abolition of the monarchy. Conversely, the SOE had few alternatives given the King's vast unpopularity and the traditional bourgeoisie's overall refusal to get actively involved in resistance. The institutional rivalry, however, was also closely linked to politics; the SOE was considered to have Venizelist sympathies whilst the Foreign Office was staunchly royalist. These observations largely explain the negative commentary about Zervas' in many of the Foreign Office documents. The "one-sided coverage" thesis can, nevertheless, co-exist peacefully with this documentary evidence. If a discussion took place in the PWE about whether to publicize Zervas' name we can assume that different views were heard. The Foreign Office's view, as captured in these documents, may have been aired; it is not a necessary conclusion that it predominated. One must place this on a scale against the institutional interests of the SOE and examine the surrounding circumstances in order to hazard a guess at which argument predominated. The new evidence presented in this article strongly suggests that, in the end, the argument was won by the SOE. *The second conclusion* one can reach, therefore, is that Woodhouse's objection to the "one-sided coverage" thesis does not in any way invalidate it, but on the contrary could be said to be an enriching element within such an argument.

Clogg offers a different insight on why such a broadcast could not have taken place. He bases his argument on the standard policy of not mentioning the names of participants in the resistance. Furthermore, he specifically cites the PWE directives for the week

from December 11 to 18, which repeats the fact that this policy is to remain in force in the case of the Gorgopotamos coverage. It remains to determine whether the restatement of this general policy would have been followed throughout the coverage period under study. As the directives themselves allow for different advice to be given on this matter, it is imperative to examine the new evidence available in order to determine whether strong reasons existed for such a turnaround to be sanctioned. It is possible to show that British broadcasting policy concerning the mention of the names of members of the Greek resistance was in the process of changing. One can also show that there did exist strong reasons, for example Zervas' own wishes, for reversing such a policy. The bounty placed on his head emboldened Zervas, whose name was all over the illegal and German-controlled press, and who became keen for acknowledgment by the Allied media. The Kapetanidis reports also strongly corroborate the possibility that a policy reversal was effected. Finally, there exists some evidence that Zervas was specifically mentioned in the media at a time period within that under examination.

If the name of a guerrilla leader is mentioned in the Swiss press and the indication is that it has been provided by the staff of the Greek embassy there, it is only reasonable to assume that this was the product of a policy decision to give "Harling" wide-spread publicity. It is also reasonable to assume that the Allied media and especially the most relevant one in this instance, namely the BBC, would have transmitted such information before more obscure forms of publicity, e.g. the Swiss media, were used. Finally, it is difficult to conceive of an argument that would differentiate, with the exception of a period when the news was still "breaking," between coverage of the sabotage in mid-December and mid-January. As Woodhouse informs us, official British policy towards Zervas only began to change after his letter of March 1943⁸⁶ in which he stated that he would support any decision the British made regarding the monarch, though he suggested a referendum. Until then, there seems to have existed no reason why the Foreign Office should have viewed Zervas any differently; in fact, the heart of Woodhouse's argument is that it did not. One must therefore question whether any factor differentiated the two instances. *The third conclusion*

one may reach is that the "one-sided coverage" thesis cannot simply be dismissed as nonsensical or an imaginary extraction from sour grapes. The focus of academic commentators such as Clogg and Woodhouse was clearly on the political aspect of this debate: they appear to have been primarily interested in dismissing any claim of an early political bias against EAM. But without such a presumption of bias and having considered the new evidence available, it is possible to arrive at a more complex version of events. In this version politics are involved, but are of a very different nature. This is a credible version of the events of the aftermath of Gorgopotamos and a matter on which debate must be re-opened and research resumed, in order to reach a final conclusion.

The question of the "one-sided coverage" thesis comes down then to a matter of probability. In some way, this is an inevitable consequence of the effort to reconstruct the past. In this article we have not conclusively proven this thesis. There still remain certain areas of doubt and uncertainty. A matter that remains to be settled is really one of methodology. We are faced with a series of interviews and memoirs of former resistance fighters affiliated with EAM who testify that a one-sided broadcast occurred. Their counterparts in EDES have generally chosen to remain silent on the matter. On the other hand, the academic arguments are inconclusive whilst archival research has not been extensive enough. The question which then remains is what weight one is willing to give to the participants' testimony, even though one can be sure that some of it, at least, is exaggerated or inaccurate. To this, a variety of answers can be given; this is not a matter that can be settled here. We would, however, like to highlight the benefits of adopting a position into which it is possible to incorporate such testimony, in addition to a coherent and sensible version of events that is supported by the evidence available.

Should the main arguments and rational presented herein prove to be valid⁸⁷ then an interesting characteristic of our perception of historical events in general can be pointed out. We very often think about social and historical phenomena (especially those that are politically charged) in a linear way, seeking to discern motives behind past actions by examining what we consider to have been rational choices in view of later outcomes. We then often presume

that we can explain a certain instance of behavior. In this case the BBC may well have mentioned Zervas by name, yet were this to have been the case – it would have been done for a host of other reasons than those considered by the Greek Left. The reasons would possibly include poor wartime communications, the institutional rivalry between the SOE and the Foreign Office, and a political debate between Venizelists and Royalists which was mostly irrelevant to mainland Greece. The impression that emerges therefore is that the factual assertion made by the supporters of EAM is correct but the political rationalization behind it is not. For the Left, however, there was no question as to what the BBC broadcast meant about British policy: as Eudes put it "the British had chosen." The BBC was therefore seen as having made the first step in a continuum of denial and silence concerning EAM's participation in Gorgopotamos and as having accidentally sparked the first source of friction between the British and EAM. In the chaotic system of historical events, such a broadcast, ironically and despite its authors' intentions, would have become a herald of events to come.

NOTES

¹ EDES had a military wing, called E.O.E.A., but the distinction between the two has not survived in the same way that it has in the case of EAM and ELAS. We will therefore refer to this organization as EDES though in essence we are describing activity of the armed band.

² Extensive publicity was not only fair but immensely convenient for the Special Operations Executive (SOE), as it facilitated the cover-up of the embarrassing failure of the more important operation, running concurrently in occupied Greece, code-named Midas 614. Midas was entrusted to a Greek officer, major Tsigantes, whose mission was to coordinate armed resistance with the ultimate aim of destroying the Corinth Isthmos. Tsigantes' code-name stemmed from the funds he was provided with and the almost unlimited credit he was promised. The Major, however, showed little flair for conspiracy and was eventually betrayed to the Italians, apparently by a disgruntled member of his entourage of lovers.

³ Sited by Charitopoulos D., *Aris leader of the irregulars* (Athens: 1997), 200.

⁴ Quoted in Charitopoulos D., *ibid.*

⁵ An interesting example of the continuing relevance of civil war poli-

tics in Greece, is the fact that the Papandreou government of PASOK in the early eighties made it one of their first priorities to include former guerrillas of EAM-ELAS in an older scheme of "resistance pensions" from which they had been previously excluded.

⁶One should, in this context, not forget that even in 1976 Woodhouse insisted on calling Zervas the victor of Gorgopotamos. See Woodhouse C.M., *The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949* (London: 1976), 49 and 148. This observation has been made by Fleischer H., *Stemma kai Swastika*, vol. I (Athens: 1995), 247. Charitopoulos (*op. cit.*) makes the interesting (though questionable) suggestion that the KKE itself was responsible for downplaying EAM's role in Gorgopotamos because of the participation of Aris Veloukhiotis; c.f. Farakos, *E Istorika*, vol. 5, "Gorgopotamos," 18 Nov. 1999, 39.

⁷Dimitriou D., *Gorgopotamos : ta fovera documenta* (Athens: 1975), 219-220.

⁸Although this is much disputed; for a brief discussion of the range of numbers mentioned in this context, see Woodhouse C.M., *Early British contacts with the Greek Resistance in 1942*, *Balkan Studies*, volume 12, 1971, number 2, 361. (Hereafter *Early Contacts*) Cf. Fleischer, *op. cit.*, 246.

⁹E.g. Charitopoulos D., *op. cit.*, 97-8.

¹⁰Dimitriou D., *op. cit.*, 147. Eudes D., *Oi Kapetanioi* (Athens: 1975), 34.

¹¹A most interesting example is the recent legal action, given widespread publicity in the Greek press, involving the minister of Justice, Mr. Giannopoulos, and the nomarch of Greater Attika, Mr. Katrivanos, initiated by the claim of the latter that Mr. Giannopoulos had never really been involved in the resistance, but was – allegedly – a member of the 'Quisling' security battalions.

¹²Eleftherotypia, "E Istorika," vol. 5, "Gorgopotamos," 18 Nov. 1999. (Hereafter "Istorika")

¹³Woodhouse C.M., *Early Contacts*, 360.

¹⁴BBC archives E1/816/1; a memorandum circulated within the BBC outlining the nature of the ban. A similar ban came into force during the Lebanon conference: see Papastratis P., *British Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War* (Cambridge: 1984), 178. For an in depth discussion see Kolia I., unpublished thesis.

¹⁵To our knowledge there has been no attempt to deal with this topic exclusively, although many, if not most, notable participants and academic commentators have contributed to this debate in their treatment of a broader subject.

¹⁶Kedros A., *La Resistance Grecque, 1940-1944* (Paris: 1966); Eudes

D., *Les Kapetanios* (Paris: 1970); Richter H., 1936-1946: *Dio Epanastaseis kai Antepanastaseis stin Ellada* (Athens: 1977). For a later attempt at an intellectually rigorous sympathetic treatment of EAM, see Fleischer *op. cit.*

¹⁷Given the evidence available and the apparent British preference for names of individuals rather than organizations it is only this argument that shall be examined. See Woodhouse C.M., *To EAM kai h sxesi tou me tin Megali Vretania*, in Iatrides J., ed. *H Ellada sti Dekateta 1940-1950: Ena Ethnos se Krisi* (Athens: 1984), 150. (Hereafter *EAM*)

¹⁸These twin pillars of British foreign policy, the former diplomatic and the latter military in nature, were engaged in a surprisingly bitter rivalry at this time. The Foreign Office had grave concerns about any association with Zervas for political reasons whilst, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) – which had organized the sabotage – had strong institutional reasons of its own for ensuring that Zervas was given some form of credit. The respective positions on Zervas were a product of the sympathies of these two institutions in a different and older political debate: that between republican Venizelists and anti-Venizelist royalists.

¹⁹By March 1943 Zervas had made significant concessions on the matter of the Greek kings' post-war return to Greece; see Papastratis P., *op. cit.*, 222.

²⁰Woodhouse C.M., *EAM*, 150; Myers E.C.W., *The Greek Entanglement* (London: 1955), 102.

²¹Namely those of Papakongos, discussed further on, as well as part of Farakos' rationale behind the sequence of events that he provides.

²²The Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was the central authority created to coordinate the dissemination of British propaganda during the War and to ensure that it conformed to the political and military goals of the war effort. PWE directives were issued weekly and were observed by the BBC as well as other forms of the British media, especially the press.

²³This report is quoted in Farakos G., *Aris Veloukhiotis: the lost records – unknown documents* (Athens: 1997), 224-225, as having been found in the PAKIS archives. Farakos also mentions this document in a short article in "Istorika," *op. cit.*. Bizarrely, Farakos does not seem to notice a contradiction in his two accounts of the timing of events. In this version, given the unconfirmed nature of the information and the date of the report (Dec 7, 1942) one would assume that the BBC broadcast cannot have occurred before that date. Farakos himself confirms such a hypothesis earlier at p 42 of *Aris*. In "Istorika," however, he seems to support that the broadcast inspired a Wehrmacht press release which he dates November 27. It is possible that what Farakos intended to say in the latter contribution was that the broadcast inspired the reward later offered for

Zervas' capture.

²⁴ This day became known as Ash Wednesday due to the truly massive burning of documents which took place – Clogg R., *H Ypiresia Eidikon Epixeiriseon (SOE) stin Ellada*, in Iatrides J., ed, *op. cit.*, at 178. (Hereafter SOE)

²⁵ H.F. Meyer, "Istorika" 18 Nov. 1999, 15. As Fleischer cogently pointed out, in 10 of the same edition, the operation was not only "mis-guided" in this sense but it was also very late (by about two months). Romel launched his attack in July of 1942, whilst the 12 British saboteurs landed in Giona in September and only managed to realize their mission in November. Meanwhile the decisive battle of the British counter-attack had been fought at El Alamein (22-28/10/1942) and Montgomery had forced the Germans out of Egypt.

²⁶ Meyer, *op. cit.*, 15.

²⁷ Later to join the ranks of ELAS, participate in the Gorgopotamos operation and to cleanse himself of the stigma of banditry: see Woodhouse *Early contacts*, 357. For a more favourable treatment of Karalivanos see Dimitriou, *op. cit.*, 58-63.

²⁸ H.F. Meyer, *op. cit.* 15, gives the name of this "saviour" as Νίκος Μπέης from Λιθοχώρι.

²⁹ Woodhouse, *Early contacts*, 359.

³⁰ Woodhouse, *EAM*, pg. 147.

³¹ Auty Ph. and Clogg R., *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece* (London: 1975), 171. The references to this book are from chapter 7 (Clogg R.), entitled: "Pearls from Swine": *the Foreign Office papers, SOE and the Greek Resistance*. (Hereafter *Pearls from Swine*)

³² Eudes, *op. cit.*, 32, discusses the socialist spirit of the EDES charter.

³³ One of the stated goals of EDES was to support a democratic regime in Greece, of 'socialist form' and to expose by any means the 'treason' perpetrated by the King. See Fleischer, *op. cit.*, 150.

³⁴ Fleisher, *op. cit.*, 149: his personal interests included "gambling, women, [...and his] participation, from 1916 onwards, in a multitude of coups and conspiracies."

³⁵ *Ibid.* at p. 240; the order was dated 3/3/1942.

³⁶ *Ibid.* at 242, quoting a letter by Koutsogiannopoulos himself.

³⁷ *Ibid.* at p. 243.

³⁸ Woodhouse, *Early contacts*, 354-5.

³⁹ Woodhouse, *Early contacts*, 362.

⁴⁰ An agreement had been reached whereby the Acheloos river was the frontier across which the bands would not operate. Yet almost immediately after the Gorgopotamos sabotage, a group of ELAS guerrillas de-

fectured to Zervas after failing to take Aris prisoner. The latter then crossed the Acheloos, for the first time, at the head of a large detachment in order to settle the score. See also Fleischer, *op. cit.*, 247-8.

⁴¹ Eudes D., *op. cit.*, 33, 38-9, 40.

⁴² The Antartes themselves must have been eager to comply; for both the bands participation would translate into recognition and material support from HQ in the middle East. In view of EAM's strategy and needs at the time, we agree with Fleischer (*op. cit.*, 245) that Aris had direct orders to assist in the sabotage effort.

⁴³ Papakongos K., *Kapetan Aris* (Athens: 1976). Papakongos has on various occasions been seen as the embodiment of this conscience as he was also the writer to whom the erstwhile military chief of ELAS during the Civil War proper, M. Vafiadis, entrusted the compilation of his "Memoirs."

⁴⁴ Tsouderos archive, Volume2, 338. Sighted by Farakos G., former general secretary of the KKE, in "Istorika," *op. cit.*, 40.

⁴⁵ See for instance the PWE directive Clogg sites, discussing Gorgopotamos. The directive mentions this sabotage as one about 'we have completely reliable evidence' and in which 'we can give details of acts of resistance'. Clearly, the authors of this text felt very sure about having a complete story; the directive against mentioning the names of any guerrilla leaders, obviously indicates the extent to which the 'story' was complete: the name of at least one guerrilla leader was known. Certainly the authors must have heard the 'complete story', but there could be said to exist a strong probability that the employees this report was intended to direct, knew as well (if it there was not at least a fair chance that this was the case, then the warning would have been pointless).

⁴⁶ According to SOE Records, sighted in Woodhouse, *EAM*, 152, "Even though we were in Greece for the entire final trimester of 1942, we only managed to restore regular radio contact in mid-January 1943." The specific date of January 13 is mentioned later on 158.

⁴⁷ For an example of previous communication with Cairo H.Q. by means of couriers sent to Athens see Woodhouse, *Early contacts*, 360.

⁴⁸ Woodhouse, *EAM*, 147 "I have explained elsewhere that the officers of the first British mission of paratroopers in Greece (Operation 'Harling'), at the end of September of 1942, had no instructions concerning EAM...."

⁴⁹ The ambassador does not sound convinced: "I, nonetheless, know that the great railroad bridges in the surroundings of Lamia (site of a major German garrison) are, due to their great importance, heavily guarded by armed forces, something which makes me skeptical as to the absolute accuracy of such information." This report is quoted in Farakos G., in "Istorika," *op. cit.*, at 39-40.

⁵⁰ "Istorika," *op. cit.*, 40.

⁵¹ For the full text see Andréas Hillgruber, *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, vol. II, (Frankfurt-am-Main 1963), 1030.

⁵² Dimitriou, *op. cit.*, 197.

⁵³ Fleischer endorses a different version of events in which Zervas left a note of his own, assuming full responsibility for the sabotage. As Fleischer put it, "he was always concerned about his *ysterofimia* (a rough translation in Greek would be *reputation, how one will be remembered after death*)." Fleischer, *pers. com.*

⁵⁴ Eudes, *op. cit.*, 41 insists that the rejection of Aris by the BBC was never forgiven and that his ever-worsening relationship with the party began at this point. This is certainly the feeling within the KKE and the way the history has been recorded in the party conscience: witness Farakos' article in "Istorika," 39 containing, amongst other things, an apology to Aris.

⁵⁵ Dimitriou D., *op. cit.*, 205-6.

⁵⁶ As late as April 1943 the two bands were dismissed by the Foreign Office, upon reception of Myers' political intelligence, as "one or two self-interested groups of guerrillas in Greece who cannot possibly claim to represent the general feelings of the Greek people." Quoted in Clogg, R., *Greek Government in Exile*, International History Review, vol. 1, 1979, 392. (Hereafter *Greek Government*)

⁵⁷ Sighted and discussed in Woodhouse C.M., *EAM*, 155.

⁵⁸ Woodhouse bases his opinion on Foreign Office records, especially Public Record Office, 371/29888, R 10898, 31 Dec. 1941, which he quotes in his article. This document speaks of the "terrible distrust which rules amongst the Greek and the British organizations in the Middle East" and the "incredible degree of partiality" and "lack of clear judgment" which plagues the information services.

⁵⁹ FO 371/37201, R 2050, March 7, 1943, sighted in Woodhouse C.M., *EAM*, 155: "[The SOE] insisted especially ... that we support General Plastiras." Clogg, *Pearls from Swine*, 173 describes the relationship between the SOE and the Foreign Office as "war."

⁶⁰ For instance, a joke going around the Foreign Office at the time related to the tendency of the SOE to recruit solicitors from a legal firm called Slaughter & May: the comment being that the SOE was all May and no slaughter; see Clogg, *SOE*, 201, note 12.

⁶¹ Woodhouse C.M., *EAM*, 155.

⁶² Clogg, *SOE*, 197

⁶³ Clogg, *Pearls from Swine*, 172

⁶⁴ These directives date from 30 October to 5 November and 20 November to 27 November.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 173

⁶⁶ Vardiambasis N., "Istorika," 5: "The success of the united Greek Antartes elicited the respect of occupied Europe, as the BBC transmitted the news worldwide, without mentioning, according to standard British practice, its authors ELAS and EDES."

⁶⁷ Historical Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece (Hereafter *Archives*), Ankara Embassy 1943, 17, 5, 1.

⁶⁸ See Kolia I., unpublished thesis.

⁶⁹ *Archives*. Ankara Embassy 1943, 14, 3.

⁷⁰ In Greek the word used is 'ἀκρομυθίας' which means to disclose a secret because of sloppiness. See «Λεξικό της Δημοτικής» (Modern Greek Dictionary), Athens: 1977.

⁷¹ Woodhouse C.M., *EAM*, 150.

⁷² This was for a long time to be the standard Greek government policy towards the development of armed bands in Greece and acts of sabotage. This was also a particularly favorite line with Ambassador Raphael as can be seen from later reports of his.

⁷³ Amongst many other reports see: *Archives*, Ankara Embassy 1943, 17, 5, 1. Telegram dated Dec. 14, 1942: "I am informed that Col. Zervas is fighting with the guerrillas in the Greek mountains. Germans and Italians executed his brother." Relayed from Ismyr to Ankara and from there to London on the following day by Raphael.

⁷⁴ Fleischer H., *op. cit.*, 247 sites this particular source as being found in the Woodhouse Papers: 18/18.12.42.

⁷⁵ For an in depth discussion see Clogg R., *Greek Government*. The March 1943 crisis is discussed initially 392.

⁷⁶ *Archives*, Ankara Embassy 1943 17, 4, 2.

⁷⁷ *Archives*, *ibid.*

⁷⁸ See Clogg, *Greek Government*, at 388-90 for a discussion of the great extent of such patronage.

⁷⁹ *Archives*. Ankara Embassy 1943, 17, 5, 1.

⁸⁰ Besides the blatant untruths concerning the popularity of the government, further on the text proceeds to assert that Zervas refuses to co-operate with the communist-controlled EAM, lest he be considered a communist sympathizer.

⁸¹ *Archives*. Cairo Government 1943 A/1 17 A/1/aa.

⁸² Clogg R., *Pearls from Swine*, 173 noting that Dilys Powell of PWE was considering resignation because she was "consumed in internecine warfare, owing to the refusal of the BBC Greek section personnel to accept PWE guidance."

⁸³ One of the newscasters, G.N. Soteriades, is described as a "Venizelist stalwart" by Clogg in *Greek Government*, 392.

⁸⁴ By mid-1942 the BBC was fully aware of its attraction and influence within occupied Greece, where death was often risked in exchange for the evening news. BBC archives, E9/20, April 25, 1940: the BBC broadcast "is listened to at present in a spirit approaching religious devotion." See also T. Lean, *Voices in the Darkness* (London: 1943), 56: "everybody listens to the BBC."

⁸⁵ Note Lockhart B., *Comes the Reckoning* (London: 1944) 333. Lockhart, once the director of the PWE, mentions that during the events of December 1944 in Athens (i.e. a highly charged, almost explosive, situation where the utmost discipline would be called for) the BBC announcers, although some were known "sympathizers with the insurgents" acted in a way "akin to mutiny." Following the positive vote of confidence in the House of Commons on the governments' Greek policy, the Greek section of the BBC had added the statement: "The vote of confidence is not the end for Greece. The people of England will express their real will at the next election." See also Clogg, *Greek Government*, 392.

⁸⁶ Woodhouse, *EAM*, 167.

⁸⁷ Proving or disproving the thesis under examination is still possible. Radio transmissions at this time were being monitored and the main items of news (as well as the slant placed upon them) recorded by the intelligence services of the various belligerents. The Greek intelligence service (Δ.Ε.Υ.Π.) followed such transmission during the relevant period. Were such documents to be made available it is possible that a solution to this mystery could be found despite the missing transcripts of the BBC itself.

"Taking The Lead" – The *Dekemvriana*, British Foreign Policy And Yalta, 1944-1945*

WENDY WONG

December 3 1944, marked the beginning of the quelling by British and government troops of an uprising in Athens led by the Communist-dominated resistance organization, the National Liberation Front (EAM). Fighting had broken out among the various resistance factions in 1943, and on that fateful December day, EAM had been protesting the Papandreou Government's order to disband all resistance and guerrilla groups which had been mobilized against the Germans during World War II.¹ Following the initial confusion and tragedy of the late morning which had claimed fifteen casualties, further violence broke out between EAM's military wing, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), and British troops. This wave of fighting lasted until January 1945, when the British finally restored the authority of the Papandreou government. On February 12, 1945, the Varkiza Agreement was signed in order to make, *inter alia*, provisions for the disarming and disbandment of the Greek resistance. Furthermore, it was hoped that

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