

Eastern Thrace and the Armistice of Mudanya, October 3-11, 1922¹

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Given its considerable influence on the negotiation for the Near East peace settlement at Lausanne (November 20, 1922 - July 24, 1923), which replaced the defunct Ottoman peace treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), the armistice of Mudanya has surprisingly received little attention from scholars. Mudanya was not simply a matter of drawing the military lines between the victor and the vanquished, between Turk and Greek, but primarily a political settlement reflecting the competing interests and objectives of the Great Powers and Turkey. It was also arguably more of an Anglo-Turkish armistice than a Greek-Turkish one. It was as much about British determination to prevent the Turkish military from crossing over into Europe and to refuse to vacate Constantinople [Istanbul] until after peace had been signed (in order to secure the Straits) as it was about Greek military dispositions in Thrace. It also had much to do with Britain's determination to take and hold Mesopotamia (Iraq and oil-rich Mosul). Clearly, British foreign policy on the Straits and in Mesopotamia was inextricably linked with the Greek-Turkish conflict.

Mid-August to mid-October 1922 constituted a period of grave crisis, during which at any moment Britain might have found itself at war once more with Turkey. Indeed, at one point the British government in fact believed that war had actually broken out. In that eventuality Greece would certainly have joined with the Brit-

ish forces for the purpose of holding on to Eastern Thrace. That the spark was not lit that would reignite the conflagration in the Near East is the focus of this study.

Mudanya was of crucial importance to Greece. Its acceptance by Athens would inevitably exact an awesome toll — the extirpation of the three millennia presence of Hellenism in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace and the acceptance of the staggering burden of absorbing over one million destitute refugees into a society ill-prepared to care for them. Indeed, Mudanya was perhaps the last opportunity available to Greece to halt or modify the movement toward a massive population exchange.² A firm stand on the Eastern Thrace question by Greece during the Mudanya armistice talks or, at the least, a refusal to evacuate the region until after the Lausanne peace conference, would have undoubtedly strengthened the Greek position during the peace negotiations. It may have prevented the mass exodus of 300,000 Greeks from the region, whether or not it remained under Greek or Turkish sovereignty. At the very least, it would have allowed for a more orderly and humane transfer of the province's Christian population to Greece. Why this did not happen is also a primary focus of this study.

The Road to Mudanya

Exploiting the recent transfer of Greek troops from Anatolia to Eastern Thrace,³ the long awaited Turkish offensive on the over-extended Greek forces in Anatolia began on August 26, 1922, southwest of Afyonkarahisar, on the most vulnerable point of the Greek front. Hopelessly outnumbered and outflanked, the Greeks were easily overcome and within a few days the Turks succeeded in cutting the rail link to Smyrna (Izmir), occupying Afyonkarahisar and totally disrupting the principal Greek line of communications and supplies. The Greek forces were cut in two and in full retreat. While those in the northern sector skillfully retreated to the Sea of Marmara and embarked for Greece, the larger concentration of forces, in the southern sector, was completely routed. Disoriented and in disarray, the bulk of the army fled to Smyrna and the coast, accompanied or followed by thousands of panic-stricken Christian refugees.⁴ On September 8, the Greek administration and military forces withdrew from Smyrna for Greece.

The sudden and unexpected rout of the Greek army in Anatolia led to the joint intervention of Britain, France and Italy whose own interests were also at risk. Ostensibly their mediation was based on a September 2, 1922 note of the Greek Government asking London to arrange for it an armistice on the basis of an immediate evacuation of Asia Minor, its army no longer being capable of coping with the enemy offensive.⁵ But the Greek request was silent on the question of Eastern Thrace;⁶ and after much discussion in London, on the folly of a premature armistice request and on the possibility of the Greek army halting the Turkish army on the frontier of the Smyrna zone, telegrams were finally dispatched setting in motion a joint Allied appeal to Angora [Ankara] to negotiate an end of the fighting in Anatolia or Asia Minor.⁷ However, the Turkish Nationalists and their leader, Mustapha Kemal [Atatürk], had no intentions of slowing down the momentum of their offensive and would not consent to an armistice as long as the Greek army remained in Anatolia and as long as the armistice conditions did not provide for a clause establishing a line behind which the Greek troops in Thrace must retire.⁸

Turkish military success had shifted the focus of an armistice arrangement from Anatolia to Thrace, Constantinople and the Straits. On September 5, Kemal informed the Allies that Thrace should be restored unconditionally to its frontier of 1914, within two weeks of the armistice; that the Turkish prisoners of war should be returned at once; and that Greece should pay war damages to repair the devastation committed by its army in Anatolia. Two days later the British Cabinet met to discuss the possibility of calling a conference of the signatories of the Sèvres treaty in order to modify it in accordance with the new situation. And that the Paris agreement of March 1922⁹ should guide British policy. It was agreed that Sir Charles Harington, the G.O.C. of the British forces of occupation, should be informed that, in the event of a Turkish attack on the Işmit [Ismid] peninsula, he could if he wished, withdraw his troops to Constantinople. On the other hand any attempt by the Nationalists to cross the Bosphorus was to be prevented at all costs.¹⁰

Finally, with little optimism, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople sent a message off to Kemal to open negotiations for an armistice on September 9, on the basis of the Greek request;

however, the meeting did not materialize.¹¹ On that day, the Turkish army occupied Smyrna¹², from which the battered remnants of the Greek army were earlier evacuated by waiting ships. And by September 19, the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia was complete when the Greek Third Corps in the north, retreating in an orderly fashion to the port of Panderma on the Sea of Marmara, found ships for evacuation, after abandoning its guns and heavy equipment.

The sudden change in the state of affairs created an entirely new situation for the Allies. With the shield of the Greek army smashed, nothing but a few battalions of disunited British, French and Italian troops stood between a victorious Turkish army and its return to Europe. Flushed with victory, Kemal moved his forces north towards the Straits, with the objective of taking Thrace, including Constantinople and Adrianople [Edirne], the frontiers demanded by the National Pact, by force of arms if necessary.¹³ He also claimed British-held Mosul, but renounced any designs on Mesopotamia and declared his willingness to guarantee the security of the Straits.¹⁴ Military victory at once placed the Turks in an advantageous if not dominant bargaining position, not only with Greece but with the Allies as well, whose share of the spoils of the Ottoman peace treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920, had been assured by the presence of the Greek army in Anatolia.¹⁵

Shocked by the magnitude of the Turkish victory and alarmed by the vulnerability of their own interests, the Allies drew together. On September 10, at a meeting of the High Commissioners and Allied Generals, General Harington, warned that the Turks were thinking of occupying the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles and that it was urgent to demonstrate Allied solidarity on the question of the Neutral Zone. Without permission from London and apparently unaware of the policy decided by the Cabinet at its meeting of September 7, Harington asked his French and Italian colleagues if they would send token detachments to reinforce the slender British forces making a front in the Ismir peninsula and at Chanak [Çanakkale] on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles in order that their presence there might impress the Turks with the reality of Allied unity. They willingly agreed to do so; and on the following day the three Allies notified Kemal's representative in

Constantinople that Turkish forces must not transgress the Neutral Zone.¹⁶

Earlier, Harington had sent confusing if not contradictory messages to London stating that British force alone would be inadequate to hold either side of the Dardanelles, although he had previously proposed that it should hold the Chanak or Asiatic side. Finally, he proposed to ask the French and Italians to join in defending Chanak though he appeared to express doubts that they would agree; and suggested that if they should reject his proposal Britain should undertake the defense of Chanak alone.¹⁷ As it turned out, Poincaré was greatly disturbed when news reached him that a token French force, without his authorization, had joined the British at Chanak.¹⁸ It also came as a surprise to Curzon, who believed that instructions were issued to Harington to abandon Chanak and if necessary to pull back to the European shore of the Straits. Unaware of Harington's success with the Allied Generals, London had decided to withdraw its forces from the Asiatic side of the Straits. It informed Harington that while Chanak was valuable, it was not indispensable to hold the Straits, and authorized him to evacuate Chanak at his discretion, it being highly unlikely that the French and Italians would join in its defense. On the other hand, it made clear that any attempt by the Turks to cross over to the European shore would be met by force, with or without Allied support.¹⁹

Upon receiving these instructions and fearful that London might undermine his credibility with the Allies as well as with the Kemalists, Harington pleaded that Chanak was critical as an advance base for the defense of the Gallipoli peninsula. And suggested that to withdraw from Chanak and from the Neutral Zone in the Ismir peninsula after the communication made to the Turks by the Allied High Commissioners would be fatal and would have a deplorable effect on the prestige of the Allied Powers.²⁰ In the end, as a result of his plea and his assessment that as long as the Allies presented a united front in the Neutral Zone that Kemal was not likely to attack, Harington was given permission to hold at Chanak and the Ismir line except in case of serious military risk.²¹ And on the following day, the 14th, at the request of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, French Premier Poincaré asked Kemal on be-

half of the Allies not to violate the zone of the Straits, but softened his request by adding that "such an action would not prejudice the conditions of peace on which our [French pro-Turkish] sentiments are known."²²—meaning French support for the restitution of Eastern Thrace and Constantinople to the Nationalists.

Fortified by this resemblance of Allied cooperation and alerted by reports from Constantinople that if the situation was allowed to drift Kemal was likely to force the issue and attempt to cross the Straits, the British Cabinet met in urgent session on September 15.²³ It decided, *inter alia*, to adopt military measures necessary to restrain the Turks at the Straits until arrangements could be made for a peace conference. It ordered reinforcements to Chanak; and agreed to send telegrams to the Allies, the Dominions and to Balkan states of Greece, Serbia and Rumania warning them that the freedom of the Straits was now in danger and inviting them to join Britain in resisting the danger by force of arms if necessary.²⁴ On the next day, having dispatched these telegrams, Curzon, not feeling well, left for his country home at Hackwood. However, in his absence, Churchill, who until then favored the pro-Turkish group in the Cabinet, emerged for combat. Having decided that something more immediate and dramatic was required, he drew up a statement of the Cabinet's policy on the Turkish question of the previous day and with the Prime Minister Lloyd George's approval publicly announced it. Foreshadowing a possible war with Turkey, the communiqué, the so-called manifesto of September 16, was provocative both in tone and content.²⁵

The British Government [it read] regard the effective and permanent freedom of the Straits as a vital necessity...It would be futile and dangerous, in view of the excited mood and extravagant claims of the Kemalists, to trust simply to diplomatic action. Adequate force must be available to guard the freedom of the Straits and to defend the deep water line between Europe and Asia against a violent and hostile Turkish aggression.

The sensational appeal for the defense of the Straits had a devastating effect on Allied unity. While in accord with the necessity of preserving the freedom of the Straits, France differed on the

proper means to realize it and accused Britain of seriously undermining its efforts to bring the Turks to the peace table. It challenge the Turks to do their worst. Moreover, the French government was profoundly troubled that London did not confer with it before making its grave initiatives public. The French premier on September 18 stated that "the French government has been profoundly surprised at the grave initiatives publicly announced by the British cabinet on the subject of the affairs of the Orient before any *entente* with its allies and particularly with France."²⁶ The Dominions were also upset that they had not been properly consulted before the policy was publicly announced.²⁷ Only New Zealand and Newfoundland offered full support. Australia offered to help but only if conflict broke out; but South Africa wholly demurred and Canada declined any help. Serbia and Rumania pulled back from supporting the British request as a result of French pressure.²⁸

The rupture with France was almost complete. Poincaré dispatched a new telegram to General Pellé, the French High Commissioner, ordering the immediate withdrawal of French forces from Chanak and authorizing him to make contact with Kemal.²⁹ On September 17, Pellé left Constantinople to meet with Kemal, without informing his British and Italian colleagues.³⁰ On the 18th, in Smyrna, he assured Kemal that France did not associate itself with the British manifesto, but asked him to respect the Neutral Zone, in return for promises of support at the peace conference. Kemal's response was that although he was prepared to attend a peace conference, he could not restrain his troops until Eastern Thrace was liberated; and that he must finish the campaign before the onset of winter, even if it meant war with Britain. Delay would be fatal.³¹ Meanwhile, on the following day in Paris, France and Italy in a joint communiqué declared that they would not go to war against Turkey, disassociated themselves from the 'war hysteria' in London and announced, contrary to the wishes of Britain, that they were prepared to concede in advance of the peace conference the territorial terms of the Turkish National Pack, including retrocession of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa frontier with Adrianople [Edirne], and Turkish sovereignty over the Straits when neutralized. They also withdrew their token detachments at Ismit and Chanak, leaving the British troops alone to face the Turk's advance.³²

The Allied Note of 23 September 1922

At this critical point, Curzon, having recently returned to London from his country home and having read with consternation the bellicose manifesto issued by Churchill, hurried to Paris on September 19 to repair the damage and to reproach Poincaré for the desertion of French troops at Chanak. When the conference opened on the morning of September 20, 1922, Curzon went on the offensive forcefully laying down the position of his Government on the Neutral Zone and Eastern Thrace and intimating that France had deserted her ally in her hour of need. Poincaré would have none of it and accused Britain of pursuing a policy of war. After a long and acrimonious dispute at the Quai d'Orsay, due in part to the personal antipathy between Poincaré and Curzon, the conference was resumed, owing largely to the tact of British Ambassador Hardinge and the Italian representative, Count Sforza.³³ The basic disagreement at the conference was, above all, over Eastern Thrace. Poincaré, in support of the Nationalists' demands, wanted to transfer Eastern Thrace immediately to Turkey, including Adrianople. Curzon wished to deal with it in accordance with the Paris, March 1922 proposals at the pending peace conference, while allowing the Allied Generals and Kemal to work out stop lines for the respective military forces. He even suggested that as a compromise Eastern Thrace become an autonomous buffer state under nominal Turkish sovereignty. Finally, despite a considerable effort to hold firm in Eastern Thrace, because of its importance for the defense of the Straits, Curzon reluctantly gave way. Abandoned by its Allies, militarily weak, and subject to domestic pressures and conflicting interests within its global security system Britain retreated on the question of Eastern Thrace to avoid the possibility of a new war with Turkey.³⁴ The British Cabinet had decided that rather than risk war, it would modify its policy sufficiently enough to draw the Allies into issuing a joint invitation to the Turks to attend a conference.³⁵

On September 23, the Allied representatives, in a joint note to the Nationalist Government drafted by Curzon, with the approval of the British Cabinet, and modified by Poincaré, again called for a peace conference on the affairs of the Near East, mainly at the expense of Greece. At the insistence of the French, the joint note indicated *inter alia* that the Turkish desire for the restitution of

Thrace up to the Maritsa [Evros] river including Adrianople, would be "viewed with favour" at the proposed peace conference. And that prior to the opening of the conference the Allies would use their influence to persuade the Greeks to retire to a line fixed by the Allied generals in agreement with both the Greeks and the Turks, provided that the Nationalist would not send troops into the Neutral Zone of the Straits, which would also become Turkish with suitable demilitarization safeguards. The note invited Kemal to attend a meeting at Mudanya, on the Sea of Marmara, to arrange with the Allied Military Chiefs an armistice between Greece and the victorious Turks and lines of demarcation beyond which the Turks should not advance. This was to precede a conference in Venice or elsewhere to decide the condition of peace between the Allies, Greece and Turkey.³⁶ It was important for Britain that the note to Ankara be a joint note of the Allies, thus demonstrating Allied unity.

The Chanak Affair

On the same day, to test British resolve, a large detachment of Turkish cavalry entered the Neutral Zone at Erenköy, creating a militarily dangerous and politically delicate situation. By the 27th, Turkish troops had advanced against the British lines at Chanak, with rifles reversed, butts front, as a refutation of hostile intent, and appeared outside the British wired perimeter. Their orders were to dig in but to be friendly and peaceful; although they were clearly in violation of the Neutral Zone. Meanwhile, Kemal's response to the demarche of the Allies to respect the Neutral Zone was to deny knowledge of any such zone and to say that the sole object of his troops was the pursuit of the beaten Greek army.³⁷ He had not replied to the Allied invitation of September 23 for armistice and peace talks.

It looked as if Britain was drifting into another war. To prevent this, Poincaré urged London to withdraw from Chanak. Hardinge from Paris advised that to maintain troops on the Asiatic shore was not worth the risk and danger that it entailed for the peace of Europe. Harington even proposed to ease the tension by allowing the Turks into Eastern Thrace. And within the Cabinet it was argued

that since it was agreed to give up Constantinople, Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, it made no sense to retain troops at Chanak. In any case, even without Chanak, the Turks could still dominate the Dardanelles and mine the Straits in another war. Nevertheless, the Cabinet remained steadfast. There could be no question of a British retreat and additional reinforcements were ordered into Chanak, whose defense had now become primarily a matter of pride and the prestige of a Great Power.³⁸ At the same time, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople continued to urge Angora to accept the invitation to attend armistice talks without further delay.³⁹

The climax at Chanak was reached on September 28 and 29 when telegrams came in from Harington of an alarming nature, warning that the Turks were collecting in considerable numbers around the British perimeter and that the situation was becoming impossible.⁴⁰ On the 29th, the Cabinet reconvened with Curzon and the Chiefs of Staff present. Noting the fact that Kemal had not responded to the Allied invitation to a conference and in view of the disturbing reports from Harington, the Cabinet decided that the time had come to take a stand at Chanak. It authorized Harington to issue an ultimatum to the Turks, "if you do not withdraw from the Neutral Zone around Chanak, you will be fired upon."⁴¹ Curzon opposed the decision and begged for a 24-hour suspension of the ultimatum. He said that the danger was exaggerated⁴² and that he needed the time to once again enlist the cooperation of Poincaré to bring the Turks to the peace table. And that he had encouraging talks with the Nationalist representative in London, Nihad Rechad. His proposal was ignored even though, at the moment, the ultimatum was premature and unessential.⁴³ And for the next two days, the Cabinet, refusing to alter its decision, "waited breathless to know whether the guns had gone off or whether the Turks had withdrawn."⁴⁴

Meanwhile, on September 27, Poincaré had decided to use his personal influence to restrain Kemal by sending to him an "unofficial emissary" in the person of Franklin-Bouillon.⁴⁵ Upon hearing the news, the French High Commissioner in Constantinople, who had been urging the Kemalists to go to the conference table, sent a strong telegram to his government stating that either Franklin-Bouillon was going to assure Kemal of the goodwill of the French Government, in which case his mission was superfluous, or else that he

was bringing with him the promise of further concessions, beyond those of the Allied note of September 23. If so, Pellé asked, what are they? He was immediately assured by Paris that Franklin-Bouillon had no authority to offer additional concessions.⁴⁶

Franklin-Bouillon left for Smyrna aboard a French warship on September 28, pathetically eager to be the hero and to stop all chances of war by yielding to the Turks. According to Poincaré and the French media, it took Franklin-Bouillon two days of hard negotiations to convince Kemal to hold back his troops and send General Ismet [İnönü] to meet with Harington at Mudanya. But they chose to ignore the fact that Franklin-Bouillon had exceeded his authority by assuring Kemal that all of his demands would be met and that Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa would be immediately evacuated by the Greeks and restored to Turkey.⁴⁷ In his anxiety to be seen as a peacemaker, Franklin-Bouillon had offered the Turks more than Britain and perhaps even France were prepared to give.⁴⁸

In fact, Kemal did not need to be convinced by Franklin-Bouillon to accept the September 23 invitation to parley. His military posturing and the delay in agreeing to meet with the Allied generals were largely due to the need to placate the extremists in his own camp who, carried away by their victories, were eager to push into Eastern Thrace and even to recover Western Thrace as far as Serres in Eastern Macedonia. He also wanted to test Allied resolve and to improve his military position before going to Mudanya. In the end Kemal overruled the majority of his generals and ministers who wished to push on into the Balkans because there was nothing to be gained by attacking the British, who were clearly determined to fight even without allies. Moreover, Chanak was not of strategic importance to the Turks and a battle there would have been drawn out and wasteful of supplies and men, only a major military operation could possibly dislodge the British. War or a further delay of armistice talks would also give the Greek army time to reorganize and reinforce its defense of Eastern Thrace. The Greeks had managed to transfer their Northern Army group from Asia Minor to Thrace and it was the presence of this army, consisting of four divisions, that made possible, in part, the British stand at Chanak.⁴⁹ If Kemal really wanted a war, he would have attacked much earlier when British defenses at Chanak were negligible. In any case, why fight a war

that you could lose if you have already been promised Constantinople, Eastern Thrace and the Straits without firing a shot and if you have the assurance of French and Italian support at Mudanya.⁵⁰

In a telegram to Poincaré, dated September 29, Franklin-Bouillon reported that Kemal finally had ordered his troops to stand fast and agreed to meet with the Allied generals at Mudanya on October 3 for armistice talks, but he continued to insist on the immediate restoration of Eastern Thrace to Turkish sovereignty. On October 1, Poincaré sent urgent telegrams to the French Ambassadors in London and Rome and to the French High Commissioner in Constantinople informing them of the contents of the Franklin-Bouillon report. Hardinge also telephoned the news to London on the same day.⁵¹

The Cabinet met on Sunday morning, October 1, still without knowledge of Kemal's agreement to enter into armistice negotiations. However, in the previous 24 hours, it was relieved to learn from Harington and Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, that the situation seemed to be getting better and that the British forces at Chanak were not in danger. Consequently, they had taken it upon themselves to withhold the ultimatum to see if there was a good chance of getting the Turks to Mudanya. The Cabinet was also informed that the Turks had withdrawn from the British barbed wire at Chanak, allowing General Marden, the local commander, to extend his small defense perimeter. With this news, but without the knowledge of Kemal's agreement to negotiate, the Cabinet approved Harington's forbearance and informed him that he need not act on the War Office telegram ordering the delivery of an ultimatum, unless and until he considered it necessary to do so.⁵² Thus, a war at Chanak was averted and with the news from Smyrna that the Nationalists would send delegates to the proposed armistice talks on October 3, all attention was now focused on Mudanya.⁵³

Revolt in Athens

The decision of the Allied Governments in Paris to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey in their September 23 note to Angora was not solely the result of Greece's defeat in Anatolia and the state of dissolution of much of its army. It was also the consequence of the political vacuum in Athens where military defeat brought about

the collapse of the Gounaris/Stratos Government and the inability of King Constantine to find someone to put together an effective ministry.⁵⁴ However, the political void in Greece did not last long and the Allies, in their efforts to reach an understanding with Turkey, were soon to encounter a defiant Greece.

On September 24, the remnants of the Greek army which withdrew to the off-shore islands of Chios and Mytilini revolted. And Colonels Nicholas Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas assumed the leadership of the Revolution which sought to hold on to and defend Eastern Thrace; to remove and punish those responsible for the defeat in Asia Minor, and to deal with a rapidly deteriorating domestic situation that threatened the very integrity of the Greek state. On September 26, the revolution reached Athens forcing King Constantine on the following day to abdicate, for the second time in five years, in favor of his son George. The government resigned and the *vouli* or parliament was dissolved. On September 27, a new government appointed by the Revolutionary Committee was formed under Sotiris Krokidas and on the following day 12,000 troops belonging to the Revolution marched unopposed in an orderly fashion into Athens. On that day, the Revolutionary Committee had definitely assumed authority in the capital. It was represented by a triumvirate consisting of Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras and Captain Phocas of the Navy, who took a much less active part in affairs than the first two.⁵⁵ Initially, the primary goal of the new Greek regime was to reorganize the army and to reinforce its defense of Eastern Thrace. Indeed, the revolution and the expulsion of King Constantine were, in part, precipitated by the Allied invitation to Kemal to negotiate peace on the basis of receiving Eastern Thrace. The new regime no doubt believed, rather naively, that with King Constantine gone, the Allies would favor their holding all of Thrace, especially if Venizelos was brought into the picture.⁵⁶ While this was wishful thinking as far as France and Italy were concerned, it was not necessarily the case with Britain. In fact, the moment Lloyd George read of the news of King Constantine abdication, "he bitterly regretted [Paris] decision as regards Eastern Thrace."⁵⁷ He could not support King Constantine on September 23, but the new Greek Government was another matter. Still, the decision was made and Britain felt bound to it, unless and until it

was modified by a further Allied decision, or by the outbreak of hostilities.⁵⁸ Even the cautious General Mazarakis-Ainian, the head of the Greek delegation at Mudanya, was to comment that at Mudanya, only the British showed compassion for the Greek delegation and that "if only the Revolution had taken place a few days earlier, the British might have been inclined to support us in Eastern Thrace."⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in its confrontations with Kemal, it was no secret that the new Greek factor was crucial in British military planning and had revived hopes of meaningful support from that quarter, even though there was strong feeling in Britain against being tied to Greece and acting against France.⁶⁰ Undoubtedly, it also precipitated Kemal's order to his troops to advance on Chanak by reviving Turkish fears that Lloyd George and Venizelos might again throw the Greeks into the field or at least press for a settlement favorable to Athens.⁶¹

However, the revolutionary regime had now to face the extraordinary problems of the previous regime, both internal and external. As a result of almost a decade of war and of the humiliating defeat in Asia Minor, the demoralized Greek army was in a state of dissolution and the economy on the verge of bankruptcy. To make matters worse, the carnage of Smyrna had heralded the mass exodus of the Greek Christian population from Anatolia. The state apparatus was simply unable to deal with this deluge of humanity.⁶² In a matter of 2-3 weeks in September over 500,000 destitute refugees were dumped like cattle in Greece, despairing and clamoring for immediate assistance simply to survive.⁶³

The conditions of these people upon their arrival in Greece was pitiable beyond description...If ever the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse rode down upon a nation it was when this appalling host appeared upon the shores of Greece, that was trampled by the flying hoofs of their chargers and scourged by the spectral riders of War, Famine, Pestilence, and Death.

The condition and the state of mind of the returning soldiers and of the incoming refugees clearly had the potential for explosive social conflict. The Revolution was also under much internal pressure, particularly from the army, to try and convict those respon-

sible for the Asia Minor debacle, which would further add to the deep schism in Greek politics between royalists and anti-royalists. One of its first acts was to arrest leaders of the previous regime, Gournaris, Theotoky, Goudas, Protopapadakis and Stratos. Others were soon to follow.

In external affairs, the Revolution had to deal with a victorious Turkey, reach an armistice agreement and prepare for the peace negotiations at Lausanne. Kemal was now not only master of Asia Minor but was also threatening to move into Thrace. At this critical juncture in its history, Greece was internationally isolated. Indeed, since December 1920 all Allied help had been withdrawn and official and public opinion in Britain and France had been totally estranged by the restoration of King Constantine, because of his anti-Entente politics during the World War.⁶⁴ Its Revolutionary Government was also not recognized and its erstwhile allies, although clearly divided, were united in reaching a peace agreement with Kemal, mainly at Greek expense, to protect their own interests in the Middle East and at the Straits. As far as they were concerned, Greece had no choice but to follow their dictates, "Greece must bow to the decree of the Powers."⁶⁵

Suffocating under the pressure of events and international isolation, the Revolutionary Government saw that its most immediate critical needs and priorities were to attend to the relief of the refugees and to reorganize its demoralized military forces into an effective instrument in order to obtain some leverage in the forthcoming armistice and peace conference.⁶⁶ Recognizing its own inexperience in foreign affairs, one of its first acts was to send a telegram (September 27) to Venizelos⁶⁷ in Paris asking him to represent Greece abroad and providing him with full powers to deal with foreign policy questions.⁶⁸ Sensing the danger in which Greece found itself, Venizelos responded that he would accept the request but he would not involve himself in internal politics. He immediately entered into contact with the Greek ministers in Paris and London to prepare to best possible position for Greece in the peace negotiations.⁶⁹

The Allied Powers and the Turks at Mudanya

The armistice talks opened on October 3 at Mudanya, a small, mosquito-ridden, entirely open port on the southern shore of the

sea of Marmara which also served as the terminus of the 41 kilometer long railway to Brusa, the administrative capital of the vilayet or province of that name. The talks were held in the former Russian Consulate, a small shabby house with poor lighting and limited space. There was only room at the conference table for the heads of the four delegations, British, French, Italian and Turkish, with interpreters in between them. Moreover, the only lodgings available in the town were some mosquito-ridden hospices, compelling Allied generals to sleep on board their warships off shore.

The negotiations at Mudanya are best characterized as ten tense days of hard bargaining, without much optimism for success. Britain was represented by General Harington, France by General Charpy with Franklin-Bouillon fluttering in the background and Italy by General Mombelli. Turkey was represented by General Ismet [İnönü] with several assistants. The Greek delegates, who arrived late, were General Mazarakis and Colonel Sariyannis. An anomaly of the conference was that the Greek delegation did not participate in the negotiations but was informed of the proceedings at meetings held with the Allied generals aboard a British warship in the harbor of Mudanya.⁷⁰

Although the negotiations were complex, the main issue, not surprisingly, was Eastern Thrace. Curzon had made it clear to the Allied generals and High Commissioners that the sole object of the generals at Mudanya was to fix the line of retirement of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, in accord with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. In return for this Allied intervention, the Kemalists would undertake not to send troops into the neutral zones and not to cross the Straits before and during the final peace conference. The provisional administration in Eastern Thrace was one to be decided by the Allied Governments and not by the generals at Mudanya who were instructed not to make political decisions. In any case the interim administration for Eastern Thrace would be controlled by Allied officers until after the peace conference. And Greek forces would only withdraw to the agreed upon line of retirement when the Turks withdrew entirely from the neutral zones and satisfactory arrangements had been made for the preservation of order and the protection of minorities of whatever nationality in the evacuated areas.⁷¹

However, the program presented by the Allied generals on October 4, within the limits of their instructions, was completely unacceptable to the Turks who, at first, refused to negotiate the question of Thrace and then, with French support, tried to get them to discuss political questions in anticipation of the final peace settlement. Ismet treated any point raised by the Allies which he did not like as being something that had to be referred to Angora; and frequently intimidated that if his demands were not met that he would decide the issue by the force of arms.⁷² The Nationalists, with evident encouragement of the French, were clearly not in the mood for compromise and their reply on October 5 to the Allies, that all of Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople and Karagatch [Karaağaç], on the right or western bank of the Evros, be evacuated within thirty days and restored to complete Turkish sovereignty before the entry into force of the final peace treaty, led to a deadlock. Harington reported that the main difficulties were over four points: (1) Turkish claims to Karagatch on the grounds that forts across the Maritsa in Greek hands would pose a threat to Turkey; (2) Turkish objections to a limitation on the number of their gendarmerie to enter Eastern Thrace; (3) Turkish objections to the principle that Allied Missions should remain in any area evacuated by the Greeks after it had been taken over by the Turkish administration; and (4) Turkish claims to the right to carry out military operations even after the signature of a military convention until after it was ratified by the Governments concerned.⁷³ But the main obstacle in the negotiations was point 3 and the Turkish formula; namely, that the stay of Allied control commissions and of Allied troops in Thrace would be limited to the period of the Greek evacuation of no more than fifteen days. As soon as the evacuation takes place, the territory would be progressively consigned to the Kemalist authorities who would, within fifteen days, take possession, with all of the rights of full sovereignty, of the entire administration of the country, without any intervention by the Allies. The Allied control commissions and troops will retire immediately after the installation of the Turkish administration.

On October 5, after heated discussions with Ismet on these essential points, the Allied generals drafted a protocol with significant concessions to Turkey and asked for Ismet's approval. But at

the last minute, Ismet abruptly changed course and demanded that all of Eastern Thrace be turned over to the Nationalist immediately and that Allied officers, missions and contingents in Eastern Thrace be withdrawn at once. He threatened that if his demands were not accepted within 24 hours, his troops would resume the advance and attack Chanak.⁷⁴

While Charpy, under orders from Franklin-Bouillon⁷⁵, was prepared to accept Turkish demands for the immediate cession of Eastern Thrace, Harington and Mombelli were not. Harington was particularly disturbed by the haughty attitude and intransigent position of the Turkish delegation that considered "Eastern Thrace as already theirs and that there should be no foreign interference on this matter. The line they take is that they intent to have Eastern Thrace and that if they don't get it peacefully, and soon, they will continue military operations at once."⁷⁶ Both Rumbold and Harington complained bitterly that Franklin-Bouillon, with his dark suit and a pair of vivid yellow boots, had encouraged the Turkish Nationalists in their pretensions. They resented his efforts to compel the conference to discuss political questions with himself as mediator. Harington described him as a perfect curse and curtly refused his offer to help in the negotiations. Rumbold characterized the French attitude "as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin-Bouillon."⁷⁷

The rupture in the negotiations was largely due to Turkish insistence that the promises made to Kemal by Franklin-Bouillon at Smyrna to get him to stop the advance of his troops and to enter into armistice talks must be honored; whereas Britain and Italy did not consider themselves to be bound by them since they did not authorize him to make such promises.⁷⁸ The impasse prompted Kemal to bitterly complain to the French that "I have already lost 15 days because I had confidence in you, what is there left for us to do."⁷⁹ The Turkish demands were ostensibly also made as a reaction to the vague promises of the Allies, to the continuous British military build-up at Chanak and to the reorganization and expansion of Greek forces in Thrace. They were also Kemal's response to mounting pressure from his officers and the Grand National Assembly to move immediately into Thrace. He felt a particular burdened of a grave responsibility for agreeing to participate in the conference at Mudanya without the consent of the latter.⁸⁰ On balance, however, Kemal's

belligerent threats were clearly part of a calculated strategy of brinkmanship that was to prove highly successful.

Under the threat of the Turkish ultimatum, Harington suggested to his colleagues that the conference at Mudanya should be adjourned until the afternoon of October 7, to give time for consultations with the Allied High Commissioners and perhaps to get new instructions from their Governments. Ismet also announced, after the intervention of the French, that he would not move his troops until 2:30 p.m. of the same day. On October 5, the Allied generals returned to Constantinople where on the same evening they met with the High Commissioners to discuss the deadlock. Appalled at the prospect of war, the French and Italians favored the immediate return of Eastern Thrace to Turkey, whereas the British stood firmly by the proposals of September 23. At the same time, London ordered Harington to make no further concessions, to prepare for the worst, and not to return to Mudanya without prior approval. Yet, all three generals agreed that without some kind of gesture to the Turks on the question of Eastern Thrace, such as securing the immediate evacuation of the Greeks from the region and their replacement by Allied troops, Kemal would not agree to a further delay and would order his troops to advance.⁸¹ Even Rumbold was moved by the threat that Turkey might start a war if it did not get what it wanted. While opposed to Turkish blackmail, he advised Curzon that "we have no alternative but to turn over the administration [but not military occupation] of Eastern Thrace to the Nationalists."⁸²

Meanwhile, having been apprised of the threatening situation and of the division in the Allied camp, Curzon once more crossed the Channel to confront Poincaré. From 11 p.m. on October 6 until the early hours of the morning of October 7, he remained closeted with the French Premier. They both took a hard stance. Curzon insisted that Poincaré stand by his approval of the Paris note of September 23 and by his approval of the instructions sent to Harington at the outset of the armistice talks. Poincaré argued that concessions had to be made in order to avoid war. It appeared that they had reached another deadlock. However, Poincaré mellowed a bit upon the realization that he had not fully understood the full extent of the Turkish claims believing that what General Charpy

had concede was merely a demand to put in place a Turkish civil administration in Eastern Thrace.⁸³

In the end, Curzon secured from Poincaré a face saving concession by which the Greeks would withdraw to the line west of the Maritsa River within fifteen days and Eastern Thrace would be occupied by Allied detachments for thirty days after the Greek withdrawal, instead of the fifteen days Generals Charpy and Mombelli had conceded to Ismet. And this only after Curzon threatened not to send Harington back to Mudanya and to defend the Straits from Turkish incursions, with or without French support.⁸⁴ It was also agreed that the number of Turkish gendarmes in Eastern Thrace would be limited and that the validity of the military convention would depend upon Turkish respect for the Chanak Neutral Zone as defined by a successful Anglo-Turkish agreement, based on a substantial reduction of its size. He made it clear, however, that if France failed to support the inviolability of the Neutral Zone, Britain would wash its hands of the whole business, would withdraw from Ismit and Constantinople, and would leave the French and the Italians to bear the responsibility. On October 7, a general formula for a final military convention was approved and Curzon instructed Harington to resume negotiations but there were to be no further concessions. On this understanding, Poincaré telegraphed Charpy ordering him to support Harington in insisting on the terms of the agreement.⁸⁵

On the same day, the conference at Mudanya reconvened, although the instructions to the Allied delegates did not arrive until the following day. At last, on the evening of October 9, the Allied generals submitted a final draft of their proposals to Ismet, in conformity with the general formula sent to them from Paris. The four page document provided that hostilities between Greece and Turkey cease; Greek troops were to withdraw to the west bank of the Maritsa river within 15 days; Greek civil authority was to be turned over to a Turkish administration within thirty days after the Greek military withdrawal, with an inter-Allied mission to supervise in the interim; and no more than 8,000 Turkish gendarmes were to be stationed in Eastern Thrace before the treaty of peace was signed. Turkish troops were to keep out of the Neutral Zones, including Constantinople and Eastern Thrace until the conclusion of a treaty of peace.⁸⁶

The show of Allied unity apparently was not enough to convince the Turks to adopt a more flexible approach. Without discussion, Ismet asked for an adjournment until 5 p.m. October 10 to study the draft convention. Thus, on the morning of the tenth, the generals returned to Constantinople to discuss along with the High Commissioners what action to take if Ismet refused to sign the protocol. But it was the news that Turkish forces were advancing into the Ismit zone toward Thrace that compelled Harington to prepare an ultimatum of his own.⁸⁷ Time appeared to be running out and a collision course seemed inevitable. But both Pellé and Marquis Garroni, the Italian High Commissioner, while agreeing on behalf of their Governments to support Harington on the draft convention, announced that their Governments could not accept the presentation of an ultimatum to the Turks. Poincaré's orders, said Pellé, were that under no circumstances were French troops to fire on the Turks. Rumbold replied that he took note of this definition of Allied cooperation, but that as far as Britain was concerned Harington's ultimatum stood; and the meeting broke up on that note.⁸⁸

When news reached Prime Minister Lloyd George that the Turks were again violating the Neutral Zone, he thought and perhaps hoped that the Mudanya conference would break down. Enough was enough. With British reinforcements pouring into the area and with a new understanding of the Dominions as well as the improved position of the Greek army in Thrace, he was prepared to call the Turkish bluff; and even allow the Greek army in Thrace to occupy the Chatalja lines, the fortified lines in Eastern Thrace guarding the approaches to Constantinople from the West.⁸⁹

Just before the generals returned to the conference at Mudanya that afternoon, Harington was issued his final instructions and, at the same time, a text of a counter-ultimatum which he was to present to the Turks if there were no agreement. He was ordered to employ all the forces at his command to resist the Turks if they attempted to encroach on British positions on the Asiatic side of the Straits. Needless to say, the news that he was prepared to issue an ultimatum, if necessary, became known to the Turks from French and Italian sources. Nevertheless, when the conference reassembled, Ismet refused to sign the protocol, objecting to most of its provisions. He was particularly opposed to the provision that, until the ratification

of peace, the Nationalists would be required to keep out of or pull back their forces from certain areas of the Neutral Zones (Constantinople, Ismit and Gallipoli but not all of the Chanak region), and to limit the number of their gendarmes in Eastern Thrace.⁹⁰

Ismet was instructed by Kemal to give maximum effort to obtain changes in the text with specific counter proposals; however, when he was convinced that the British would concede no more, he was not to risk a rupture and to sign the armistice document. Try as he may, through out the evening, Ismet could not get the Harington to budge and vented his anger at Charpy and Mombelli, accusing them of going back on their promise to restore Karagatch to Turkey and to limit the turn over period of Eastern Thrace to thirty days. Finally, in the early hours of October 11, Ismet, after pacing up and down in that awfully dark room, relented. Mindful of his instructions and on orders from Kemal, he suddenly agreed to sign the convention, taking effect as from midnight October 14/15, 1922.⁹¹ Harington was clearly surprised and grateful that the ultimatum in his pocket need not be delivered. But he was taking no chances and, despite the objections of his weary colleagues, insisted on signature that very night. And so the conference sat for several more hours, while the convention, with the aid of inexperienced typists, was recorded in five languages. Finally it was completed and signed. The distinct likelihood of a new war, which might have involved most of the protagonists in the previous world struggle, was averted. In the morning the text was handed to the press.⁹² And Harington and Ismet were correctly praised for the success of the conference and for the restraint they showed during critical moments of the negotiations, although it is also true that they helped to create the crises which they were credited with averting.

The Greek Reaction

The September 23 invitation to Kemal for armistice talks at Mudanya was prepared and delivered without consultations with the Greek Government. Yet it was apparent that whatever agreements were reached at Mudanya would require the consent of the new Revolutionary Government in Athens whose leadership had declared that "the Turks had won in Asia Minor but not in Thrace.

If they want it let them come and fight for it."⁹³ With good reason the Turks insisted upon Greek approval of the armistice results and the Allies agreed. On October 1, just four days after the new government was installed in Athens, Curzon telegraphed Lindley, his minister in Athens, that the armistice would take place on October 3 and that "it is desirable to get the Greek Government to send a representative there, since it is not in their interest that the matter should be discussed in their absence."⁹⁴ On the morning of the following day, Colonel Plastiras visited Lindley in his office and asked if it was true that on the next day the Allied generals would be meeting with the Turks at Mudanya. He also informed the British minister that he was going to Thrace to try to reform the army there and that he hoped to field an effective force of 60,000 men in its defense if necessary. In the course of their conversation, Lindley, who had no yet received official confirmation of the armistice talks, advised Plastiras that if Kemal accepted the Allies invitation to a conference, it would be madness for the Greeks to refuse to attend. Greece, he explained, would have need of the Allies after the long war and could not hope for their assistance to put its house in order unless it accepted the decision of the Powers. He added that the lessons of the last two years were that Greece could do nothing in the long run if isolated and that if Greece refused to attend the conference and continued the war with Turkey against the wishes of the Powers, the result could be a real catastrophe. At this point Plastiras admitted the force of Lindley's counsel and declared that Venizelos was the best judge of the situation. "He would do what Venizelos advised in this matter but he must lose no time in getting the army in Thrace in shape." Lindley responded that a disciplined and efficient military force on the Maritsa was indispensable for Greece because one never knew how far Kemal's successes might have gone to his head.⁹⁵

Also on October 2, Venizelos met with Curzon at the Foreign Office and was told that the purpose of Mudanya was to draw a line behind which the Greek army would be asked to withdraw in Thrace and to prepare a plan for an inter-Allied occupation in Eastern Thrace pending the peace conference. Venizelos replied that he realized Eastern Thrace was lost for Greece but declined to consider the possibility of the Greek army being withdrawn until the

peace conference had given its final judgment. He argued passionately for the necessity of the Greek military to remain in occupation of Eastern Thrace, in order to secure the protection of its Greek inhabitants and to give Greece leverage to defend its remaining interests when the peace conference assembled. How otherwise, he asked, would his Government be in a position to retain Western Thrace and to resist Turkish demands for indemnity, which it cannot afford, and thus be forced to surrender to them the Greek fleet. Curzon's response was that Britain would work hard for the retention of Western Thrace by Greece and that indeed by staying in Eastern Thrace, Greece would jeopardize its position in Western Thrace and elsewhere. It would lead to immediate Turkish military action for which Greece was not prepared. He reasoned that by agreeing to withdraw from Eastern Thrace, Greece would have time, before and during the peace conference, to develop its military posture in Western Thrace. Venizelos replied that he was returning to Paris and would then decide the Greek position.⁹⁶ Two days later, he returned to London and informed Curzon that he had advised the Greek Government to accept the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace, provided that there were guarantees for the Christian population in the form of an Allied occupation pending the peace conference.⁹⁷ Time and again, in spite of Greek public opinion, the refugee population, and elements of the military and the political world, Venizelos understood, sooner than most, that the Asia Minor Catastrophe meant the definite end of the *Megali Idea* and that political realism required a fundamental change of direction of Greek foreign policy. An isolated and impoverished Greece had no choice but to follow the British lead.⁹⁸

Meanwhile, late in the evening of October 2, General Mazarakis was appointed Greek representative to the Mudanya conference, with instructions to seek a simple rectification of the line currently held by Greek troops in Thrace in accordance with the last paragraph of the note addressed by the Allies to the Angora Government on September 23, 1922 and that this line would not prejudice the decisions of the final peace settlement. If demands were made for a major pullback, he was to declare a lack of authority on the matter and ask Athens for further instructions. He was to absolutely reject demands that Greece not reinforce its military forces

in Thrace or that Greece undertake a complete evacuation of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river.⁹⁹

On the morning of October 4, just as Mazarakis prepared to sail for Mudanya, the Greek Government received the following dispatch and instructions from Venizelos.¹⁰⁰

The new government ought to know that the catastrophe we have been subjected to is irreparable. We have not only lost Northern Epiros, but even Western Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, from the moment that the three Great Powers, once or formally our allies, have decided to yield themselves to Turkey... We find ourselves in complete military and diplomatic isolation. These losses are not unfortunately the end of a series of misfortunes which threaten us. The Turks will do all they can to expel us from Western Thrace, to obtain from us indemnity for the damage caused by the Greek army in Asia Minor, and that we surrender our fleet to them, which would make it impossible for us to defend the Islands... There remains one crucial question: to save the hundreds of thousands of Greeks, threatened with extermination by the return of the Turks to Europe. For these reasons Greece should be in a prepared state. To defend its vital interests at the peace conference, it is necessary that she occupy [Eastern] Thrace.

If we abandon Thrace, before the conference meets, it would be superfluous to send representatives there... This is why, if the Government is invited to send a representative at Mudanya, it should at all costs refuse to evacuate Thrace before the signature of peace. If the Powers allow Turkey to bring the War into Thrace, we should take every measure on land and sea to defend and secure Thrace effectively. We might still be able to hold on to it... The second eventuality that may permit us to save Thrace is if Kemal goes to war against the British Empire. We should be ready to assist the British. It is urgent that the Government take a political position. However, if its policy includes a resolution to

hold on to Thrace, even against the decision taken by our former allies, I am afraid that I would have to decline the offer of representing my country abroad. If, on the other hand, the Government accepts my views, it will be necessary that you let me know as soon as possible so that I can give the Powers assurances that we will give up or support their decision concerning Eastern Thrace. We can be almost certain that at least Britain will not authorize the Turks a free hand in the Straits and to carry the war into Europe. If it means war we will support Britain as our ally, and in this case the return of the Turks to Europe will be impossible.

Mazarakis left that morning in a Greek torpedo boat for Mudanya, in the company of the leader of the Revolution, General Plastiras. On the way, they stopped at the Thracian port of Rodosto [Raidesto] to pick up Colonel Sariyannis. Since the Turks would not allow a Greek warship in Mudanya harbor, they were compelled to transfer to a British destroyer in the sea of Marmara for the remainder of the journey to Mudanya. They arrived there late on the evening of October 4, the conference had started without them. A Greek freighter, the *Aegeion*, which had been used to haul animals and military supplies from Anatolia to Greece, also arrived in Mudanya to serve as a hotel and to provide office space for the Greek delegation. It was in pitiful condition.¹⁰¹

It was not until the morning of the next day, October 5, that they had their first meeting with the Allied generals.¹⁰² The meeting took place, in the absence of the Turkish representative, aboard the British cruiser, the *Iron Duke*, where they were told of the decision for the evacuation of Eastern Thrace. On behalf of the Allied generals, Harington welcomed the Greek delegation to Mudanya upon its arrival the previous evening and apologize for the short notice. He stated that the purpose of the talks according to the September 23 note was to set a line in Thrace behind which the Greek army would be invited to withdraw by the Allied Powers. "We have agreed that the Greek troops should be withdrawn from Eastern Thrace, the only line adopted as the frontier should be the one suggested by the Allied note; namely, the Maritsa River." He then went on to say

that "we recognize that this gives you great pain, but we are following the orders of our respective governments to evacuate and handover Eastern Thrace to the Government of the Grand National Assembly, should the Powers in conjunction with your Government decide on this course."¹⁰³

Not surprisingly, Mazarakis, in accordance with his instructions, refused to accept the decision of the Allies, nor to discuss the details of its implementation. He explained that he came to Mudanya to negotiate an armistice and not to surrender Eastern Thrace to the Turks, which was a political matter to be taken up at the forthcoming peace conference. Needless to say, the Allied generals were deeply disturbed by the Greek position. They feared, not without reason, that the Turks would refuse to accept the validity of the conference, if the Athens Government did not immediately adhere to its decisions. Charpy, in particular, strongly condemned the Greek position and asserted that Eastern Thrace will be given to Turkey and that this cession was definite and irrevocable. The Greeks, he declared, "better understand the situation and accept it because they lost the war and had to pay."¹⁰⁴ Harington and Mombelli were more moderate in the tone of their remarks but in principle agreed with their French colleague and urged their Governments to seek assurances from the Greeks of their acceptance of the conditions set for the evacuation of Eastern Thrace.¹⁰⁵ On the following day, October 6, Mazarakis presented a formal letter or first declaration to the Allied generals rejecting their proposals for Thrace.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, General Plastiras left for Thrace where he declared that the area would never again know Turkish dominion.¹⁰⁷

In the meantime, the conference had reached a dangerous impasse over Kemalists' demands for a full and immediate possession of Eastern Thrace by Turkey, obliging the Allied generals to return to Constantinople, under the threat of this severe ultimatum, for discussions with their High Commissioners. Meanwhile, Franklin-Bouillon repeated to his Government Turkish accusations that the Greeks had set fire to 40 Turkish villages and were causing great suffering among the Turks and it was therefore vital that the Allies not delay the return of the Turkish army to Eastern Thrace.¹⁰⁸ Harington was also given this report by Ismet and asked Mazarakis if it were true. The Greek general categorically denied the report

and saw it as an excuse by Turkey to move into Thrace.¹⁰⁹ Pellé later reported that the burning of the 40 villages was greatly exaggerated and that it was raised by the Turks as a pretext to hasten their return to Thrace.¹¹⁰

The crisis also hastened a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Paris, where they were reassured by Venizelos that Greece would withdraw from Eastern Thrace. Thus, the primary task of the foreign ministers was to come to an agreement on what arrangements to make for a provisional administration of the evacuated areas. Curzon reminded his colleagues at the Paris meeting that Venizelos had agreed to the evacuation of the Greek army and administration from Eastern Thrace provided that the area remain under Allied administration, for the protection of the Greek population, mindful of the Turkish atrocities in Asia Minor, would leave under difficult conditions. And in this case, he asked, who would feed and care for them? Poincaré declared that the protection of minorities was of small relative importance and if the Turks advance into Thrace he would do nothing. In any case, while the Turks might get excited in Asia, they would behave in Europe.¹¹¹ He refused to even contemplate an Allied occupation of Eastern Thrace until the end of the peace conference but finally gave in to Curzon's demand to extend from 15 to 30 days Allied control of Eastern Thrace, in which the evacuation of the civilian population that wished to leave for Greece might be peaceably effected. Curzon had argued that if Greece were not given the thirty days, Venizelos might be relieved of his promise and Greece may refuse to withdraw from Eastern Thrace. Finally, Curzon got his thirty days, although he and Venizelos warned that it was not enough to perform the task of making orderly arrangements for the anticipated departure of the Greek civilian population and the installation of the Turkish authorities. Nevertheless, Venizelos made it known to the Allied foreign ministers in Paris that he would recommend their verdict to the Greek Government.¹¹²

Meanwhile, on October 7, Mazarakis received new instructions, suggested to Athens by Venizelos, "allowing for the evacuation of the Greek army from Eastern Thrace on the condition, on humanitarian grounds that the Greek administration and gendarmerie may stay to assure the security of the inhabitants until the peace confer-

ence, and that the Allies co-occupy the region with us, or they occupy it alone."¹¹³ Clearly these instructions were based on Venizelos' advice prior to the Paris meeting of October 6. However, on October 8, Mazarakis' instructions were modified to reflect the results of the Paris conference; and they directed him "to assist in the deliberations of the Allied generals and to accept the decisions which are taken, as long as the representative of Britain is present and agrees."¹¹⁴ But shortly thereafter, the Government sent him a copy of a dispatch by Venizelos which warned that Mazarakis should only accept the line fixed by Bulgaria and Turkey in 1915 for the withdrawal of Greek troops.¹¹⁵ The 1915 line extended two kilometers east of the Maritsa river into Eastern Thrace and not down the medial line of the river itself. Whereas, the Allies and Turkey had agreed that the Greek forces would withdraw to the west of the Maritsa river which would also serve as a natural border or barrier guaranteeing a neutral zone between the forces of Greece and Turkey. Consequently, on October 9, the Greek delegates presented a second declaration¹¹⁶ which formulated some observations on the new Allied text which had been given to them but its main objection was the withdrawal of Greek troops to the west of the Maritsa river. Their note declared that the maximum line of retreat of the Greek troops in Eastern Thrace was the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey fixed in 1915. The region included between the line and that which was proposed in the armistice convention was a part of Bulgaria in 1915 and ceded to Greece by the Great Powers by virtue of the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly. Thus, the Greek delegation could not accept the evacuation, up to the conclusion of the peace treaty, of the forts, railway and city of Karaağaç, situated on the west bank of the Maritsa.¹¹⁷

Surprised by the Greek declaration, the Allies tried to assure Mazarakis that the withdrawal of the Greek forces to the Maritsa would in no way prejudice the final Thracian frontier between Greece and Turkey. They had no knowledge of the 1915 line, and once it was explained to them, refused to recognize it as an appropriate line of demarcation for a troop withdrawal. They noted that they had refused Turkish demands for a Greek withdrawal from the forts, railway and town of Karaağaç on the west bank of the Maritsa which would be occupied by Allied troops without a Greek

with Curzon and Crowe, it was apparent that he was chiefly alarmed at the provision that, contrary to his understanding with Curzon in Paris, Turkish authority was to be restored immediately after the withdrawal of the Greek troops and not 30 days after the completion of the withdrawal. He expressed his misgivings that the Allies had not inserted contingency plans in the convention if it were found impossible to complete the withdrawal of the civil population, or that part of it which wished to withdraw, within the stipulated thirty days. He was fearful that without a contingency plan for the extension of the period of Allied occupation and control, the civil population would be exposed to the danger of either complete annihilation, if it stayed, or of a sudden rout, as was the case in the Smyrna region, where the refugees took to flight, leaving every possession behind them in order to save their lives.¹²⁸ On the following day, having finally received an official copy of the text signed at Mudanya from the Foreign Office, Venizelos dispatched a letter to Curzon expressing his misgivings of the armistice convention and his fears for the safety of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace. Their tragic situation, he wrote, was further increased by the failure of the Allies to compel the Turks to give amnesty to those who, thinking themselves to be Greek subjects for the past two years, either served in the Greek army or collaborated with the Greek administration. They will now be prosecuted for high treason, as has already happened in Smyrna, and will be hanged.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, following the advice of his British mentors, who sought to assure him that one way or another the civil population would be protected, Venizelos cabled Athens that it was in the interest of Greece to sign the convention.¹³⁰

On October 13, a reluctant Greek leadership officially accepted the terms of the armistice. Following the advice of the British for a speedy passage of all measures of its execution, the armistice was to be implemented on October 15, the Greek Government instructed Simopoulos, the High Commissioner of Greece in Constantinople to address a declaration to the Allied High Commissioners and to the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly signifying Greece's acceptance of the Mudanya convention. The text of the declaration read as follows:¹³¹

The Greek Government considers that its declarations made by the Greek delegates at Mudanya should have been taken into consideration, especially regarding guarantees and formulas strictly necessary for the safety of the lives and property of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace. The Greek Government makes a final appeal to the sentiments of humanity of the Allied powers in favor of these populations. Desiring, nevertheless, to conform to the decisions of the Powers, the Greek Government sees itself obliged to submit and declare its adherence to the armistice protocol signed at Mudanya.

At the same time General Harington wrote to Mazarakis: "We feel for you. You had a very difficult task and impressed us all very much by the soldier like way in which you handled it. We will do all we can to see to it that the evacuation is carried out as sympathetically as possible in accordance with my promise to you. I wish to express my sincere sympathy with your present situation."¹³²

The Mudanya Armistice in Perspective

Although the Turkish Nationalists did not achieve their maximum demands, they were, by far, the chief beneficiaries of the armistice. They compelled the Allies to meet on Nationalist-held territory and to treat with them as the only official government of Turkey, signaling the end of the Ottoman Government in Allied-controlled Constantinople. Without war, they pressed the Allies to abandon their hold on Turkey, obtained Eastern Thrace, deemed essential for their return to Constantinople, and secured the eventual orderly Allied withdrawal from that city upon the conclusion of a Near East peace. Moreover, the agreement to vacate Constantinople emboldened the Nationalist within a few days after Mudanya and before the opening of the Lausanne peace conference to undermine, with French and Italian support, the Allied occupation machinery and to force a dual de facto regime in Constantinople – an Allied military regime and a Turkish civil one.¹³³ In addition, at Turkish insistence, the questions of minorities and amnesty were left outside of the scope of the armistice, thus provoking the welcomed mass exodus of the Greek popula-

tion of Eastern Thrace and a sizeable portion of the Greek population of Constantinople, who were viewed as a grave source of danger to the Turkish state. Their success at Mudanya, particularly on the Straits issue, enabled the Turks to become less dependent on the Soviet Union. While they did not succeed in their demand for the immediate military occupation of Eastern Thrace, they were able to violate the military terms of the armistice agreement with impunity, again with the support of France and Italy, by infiltrating the nucleus of an army into Eastern Thrace.¹³⁴

Turkish diplomacy was driven by the deeply held belief that if the Allies did not yield to Turkish demands at Mudanya, they were less likely to do so at the peace conference. The Kemalists were clearly distrustful of the vagueness of Allied promises and wary of Britain's decision to refuse them Constantinople until the final conclusion of peace. They were convinced that even after Mudanya, Britain would strive to maintain its position at the Straits at their expense.¹³⁵ Indeed, two days after the signing of the armistice, in an interview with the Turkish press, Ismet declared: "It is only when they respect all the engagements and promises made that we can say that we have been successful. We do not consider our mission as complete. Our armies are ready in case we do not obtain our rights."¹³⁶

The success of the Nationalists at Mudanya was largely due to their measured but firm diplomatic stance and their willingness, if necessary, to employ their advantageous military position for the achievement of their goals. Success at Mudanya also insured for them the promise of a similar triumph in the forthcoming peace conference at Lausanne. The two major disappointments for them at Mudanya were their inability to extract an Allied pledge to hold a plebiscite in Western Thrace as outlined in the National Pact and the refusal of the Allies to concede to them Karagatch, the Adrianople suburb in Western Thrace.¹³⁷ This failure was attributed to the absence of a Turkish army in Eastern Thrace, to British resolve, and to the growing power of a reorganized Greek army along the western bank of the Maritsa.¹³⁸ Another failure was not to demand in their notes to the Allies of September 29 and October 4, 1922 that the border between Greece and Turkey in Thrace should be that of the 1913 Bulgarian-Turkish frontier.¹³⁹ It is unlikely, how-

ever, that the Allies would have agreed to the 1913 line as a substitute for the Maritsa river. Although not a matter of discussion at Mudanya but clearly tied to its outcome was the British position in Iraq, particularly oil-rich Mosul. Turkey had consistently claimed Mosul only to be rebuffed by the British. Mosul was in fact one of the reasons why Britain retreated from its tough stance on the question of Eastern Thrace and the Straits.

France and Italy also considered their participation at Mudanya a success; and in terms of Great Power rivalry they took some satisfaction in Britain's put-down by the Kemalists. Divergences of policies had produced an astonishing separation between Paris and London. The deep dissension between them over the German question after the armistice and over the division of the spoils in the Near East; and French and Italian efforts to undermine in every possible way the position of Britain in the Levant were arguably the basic cause of British concessions to the Turkish Nationalists. Italy followed the French in the anti-British policy, unhappy with its treatment by the Allies after the war and because of important territorial disputes with Greece. Their support of the Nationalists and outright hostility, to Britain's client, Greece, came as no surprise. Long before Mudanya, from 1921 onward "Italy sold arms to Kemal to fight the Greeks, which were paid out of money supplied from Moscow. France negotiated a secret treaty [the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement] without the knowledge of Britain which enabled Kemal to withdraw all his forces from the Armenian and Syrian front and fling them against the Greeks."¹⁴⁰ The French also kept the Nationalists informed on the secret discussions among the High Commissioners in Constantinople; and provided the Nationalists with weapons, going to far as turning over to them munitions from Turkish stores in Constantinople which were under their guard.¹⁴¹

Paris and Rome had acknowledged the realities of Turkish nationalism and decided to cut their losses in Cilicia and Antalya [Adalia] respectively; provided weapons and aid to the Kemalist in the 1919-1922 Greek-Turkish war and, in return, secured promises of economic concessions. France's pro-Turkish policy, was inspired not only by its differences with Britain, great financial interests in the Ottoman Empire, and the desire for economic concessions from the Angora regime; but also by the urgency to ac-

quire a satisfactory demarcation of the Turkish border with French mandated Syria and to be at liberty to deal with the unruly Arabs in Damascus. By giving up Cilicia, France could mitigate the discontents of Syria. Undoubtedly, its support for the Nationalists also brought it great prestige and promises which were not to be realized. General Charpy must have been impressed when he set foot in Mudanya to find that the streets were all decorated with Turkish flags and the windows with French flags; and to find posters throughout the town welcoming "our French brothers." On the other hand, their experience at Mudanya during the negotiations convinced the French that the Turks "will cease to be our friends they day when the last concession is refused to them."¹⁴² It was this experience which contributed to the mending of fences with Britain at the Lausanne peace conference.

Unlike France and Italy, Britain was late in realizing that, in spite of the threat to its prestige, abandoning the pawn constituted by Eastern Thrace was preferable to open hostilities. This was remarkable given the severe restraints on British diplomacy: France and Italy had categorically refused to join in a more forceful policy with regard to Turkey and indeed were prepared to allow the Turks to cross over into Europe; its coalition government was on the verge of collapse and British public opinion as well as Muslim public opinion in the British Empire were clearly opposed to the renewal of hostilities; impoverished by the war, the armed forces were severely reduced and demobilization was in full swing; and finally the reconstitution of the Greek army in Thrace was an uncertain factor. Moreover, Britain found itself with only 16 battalions facing 200,000 Turks. Nevertheless, Britain's achievements at Mudanya were not inconsiderable. It gained the respect of the Nationalists. By its determined stand at Mudanya, Britain also gained a few critical weeks of breathing space before the opening of the peace conference, which allowed it to secure Allied unity and to shape the direction of negotiations at Lausanne. Moreover, its success in maintaining the Allied military presence in Constantinople and in keeping the Turkish army out of Eastern Thrace strengthened the Allied position at Lausanne and prevented the renewal of a Greek-Turkish war. The military struggle for Thrace would have probably initiated a Third Balkan War with all of its deleterious consequences.

Also, Britain's refusal to vacate Constantinople until after the peace conference undoubtedly prevented the mass exodus of its substantial Greek community of some 400,000 in 1922, including Greeks who had recently fled from Anatolia, although in fact many did leave during and particularly immediately after Mudanya.¹⁴³ But in Eastern Thrace it was another story. In spite of British efforts, the Allies at Mudanya failed to guarantee the life and property of the region's Christian population¹⁴⁴ and to extend the period of the Allied control commissions beyond the thirty-day period. The result of this failure was over 300,000 additional refugees for Greece. Mudanya was thus probably the catalyst which obliged the Allies, and particularly Britain, to seek a solution to the awesome refugee problem of Greece, for which they had to feel partly responsible.¹⁴⁵ Although at Mudanya Britain was compelled to retreat from its plan for hegemony of the Straits by conceding Eastern Thrace to the Turks, its stand assured it of at least an acceptable and suitable Straits convention at Lausanne.

Finally, while the Nationalists were busy fighting the Greeks and confronting the Allies at the Straits, the British were able to occupy and hold oil-rich Mosul. British forces in Mesopotamia, made up mostly of local Arab levies, a few armoured cars and elements of the British air force, would not have been a match for a sustained Turkish attack. They could hardly contain rebellious Arab and Kurdish elements. Indeed, when the British Government received news in 1921 of the French and Italian withdrawals from Anatolia, it feared an attack by Turkey in Mesopotamia and agreed that "If Kemal attacks us in Mesopotamia we shall consider ourselves free to arm the Greeks in Smyrna."¹⁴⁶

By the summer of 1922, British authority in Mesopotamia, considerably weakened by a great reduction of military force, was under threat of losing Mosul to the Turkish Nationalists, who claimed it as their own. It had recently been transferred to the British mandate of Iraq by France. The Turks stirred up various Kurdish tribes in Mosul, sent small bodies of troops into the area and created a Turkish Committee at Kirkuk.¹⁴⁷ But in October 1922 Britain was finally able to assert itself in Mosul, for the most part unimpeded but apparently at the price of giving in to the Turks in Eastern Thrace. The Turks had to make a choice, either Constantinople and Eastern

Thrace or Mosul. They could not have both. There is little doubt that the Greek army in Thrace, from Mudanya to Lausanne, was effectively used by Britain to promote its vital interests at the Straits and in Mesopotamia and Mosul; and that for the sake of these vital interests, the interests of Greece in Eastern Thrace were sacrificed.

For Greece, Mudanya simply confirmed its status as a defeated nation and the wreckage of Allied policy. Given its precarious internal situation and the military posture of the Kemalists, the country seemed to have little choice but to accept the sacrifices demanded of it by the Allies. Although its military leadership was prone to take a stand in Eastern Thrace and renew the war with Turkey, Venizelos had at once accepted the burden of defeat to gain the diplomatic support of the Allies at the forthcoming peace conference and their economic assistance in the task of national reconstruction and refugee settlement; or as he put it "we gave up Eastern Thrace to save Western Thrace." The situation naturally would have been different if Greece had a significant military force in Eastern Thrace capable of holding its own against the Turk and his Bulgarian ally or if Britain and Turkey in their acts of brinkmanship fell over the brink.¹⁴⁸ Even Venizelos would have accepted a war with Turkey in Europe which involved the Allies, especially Britain, but not without their support. Yet, a rational calculation might have led Greece to refuse to evacuate Eastern Thrace, at least until after the peace conference in order to ensure the rights and welfare of its Christian population. It is ironic that Hellenism in Eastern Thrace could have been saved by the anti-Venizelist party that returned to power in the general elections of November 1920, on the platform, in part, of opposition to the Asia Minor expedition. It could have given up the Izmir enclave and held on to Eastern Thrace. Instead of proceeding to evacuate Asia Minor at once because of the general understanding of the futility of the situation, it chose to continue the operations in the interior of Anatolia to force the issue with Kemal. That it did so was due in part to its genuine concern and legitimate anxiety for the fate of the Greek population of Asia Minor for whom evacuation would mean either flight or massacre.¹⁴⁹ It is, of course true, that at the time Greek public opinion was not informed about true nature of the futility of the situation in Asia Minor and would not hear of evacuation.

Venizelos, who unwisely got Greece into Asia Minor in 1919 and was therefore ultimately responsible for the loss of Eastern Thrace, performed perhaps one of his finest and most difficult acts of his long and extraordinary political career by refusing to represent the interests of the Greek Revolutionary Government abroad unless it consented to surrender Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river. "In so doing, he deliberately forbore to embarrass the Allies at a moment when any Greek had a right to feel bitter against each and all of them. And resisted the temptation of precipitating... a new Turco-British war, in which Greece might have had a gambler's chance of retrieving... all or a portion of Eastern Thrace."¹⁵⁰ While his policy to surrender Eastern Thrace was ultimately to Greece's interest, it also clearly served the immediate interests of Britain. Yet, one wonders whether or not the welfare of the Greeks of Eastern Thrace would have been better served by Venizelos had he refused to support the armistice convention without a clause for the retention of the Allied control commissions in the area until a peace had been signed or a clause for amnesty provided.

The real victims of Mudanya were the tens of thousands of panic-stricken Christians, who upon hearing that the Turks were coming, abandoned their homes and fields and fled to a refugee burdened Greece. As soon as they saw the Greek troops striking camp, within hours hundreds of villages and towns were deserted. To the first wave of 800,000 pitiful refugees from Anatolia was added a new torrent of wretched, numbed Greeks from Eastern Thrace, "where the shadow of the disaster in Asia Minor fell over the Greek communities."¹⁵¹ Ernest Hemingway, then a young reporter for the *Toronto Daily Star*, described the abject misery of the scene: "...the Christian population... is jamming the roads... The main column crossing the Maritza at Adrianople is twenty miles long. Twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullock and muddy-flanked water buffaloe, with exhausted, staggering men, women and children... walking blindly along the rain beside their worldly goods... they can only keep their places in the ghastly procession... It is a silent procession. Nobody even grunts. It is all they can do to keep moving."¹⁵² Or as Alexander Pallis of the Greek Refugee Commission put it:¹⁵³ "I will never forget the sound of the cart wheels which day and night crossed the bridge from Adrianople to

Karagatch. The tragic caravan went forward slowly, slowly like a snake, coming from the various towns of Eastern Thrace and heading for the bridge at Adrianople. The sound of those wheels of carts with their heavy burdens still haunt me. An entire people are returning to Greece."

Under the circumstances, the loss of Eastern Thrace was probably inescapable, but the sudden flight of its Christian population was not. If the Allies had insisted that the period of Allied control and occupation be prolonged until the conclusion of the peace conference, as they had for Constantinople, a good portion of the Christian population would have remained. Or, at the very least, if the period of Allied control for all of Eastern Thrace had been extended for one month, and not progressively consigned to the Kemalist authorities, the departure of the civilian population would have taken place under more hospitable circumstances. In any case, the failure of the Allies to respond to this humanitarian concern at Mudanya would lead them, on the day the armistice convention took effect, to formally invite the League of Nations to take all possible steps to reach an agreement as soon as possible regarding an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.¹⁵⁴

Mazarakis was opposed to the Mudanya convention precisely because it did not provide adequate security for the civilian population of Eastern Thrace. It can be argued that Greece should have held out for appropriate protection of the Christians of Eastern Thrace before committing itself to the convention. One, of course does not know what the outcome of such an action would have been. Would the Turks risk their gains at Mudanya and continue the war because of an Allied occupation of Eastern Thrace until the forthcoming peace conference? After all they accepted these conditions for the continued Allied occupation and administration of Constantinople. It is ironic that by insisting on the immediate take over of Eastern Thrace as the Greek army withdrew and thus pushing the Christian population of the region into Western Thrace, the Kemalists lost any chance of getting the Allies to agree on a plebiscite in Western Thrace with its substantial Muslim population. Both Curzon and Venizelos were in agreement that by encouraging the Greek population of Eastern Thrace to resettle in Western Thrace, Greece would be assured of demographic domi-

nance in the region, which would serve as a bulwark against Turkish demands and Bulgarian irredentism.¹⁵⁵ A few days later Venizelos wrote to the Greek Foreign Office that "we will never be secure in Western Thrace and Macedonia if those regions are not settled by ethnic Greeks."¹⁵⁶

Thus, Mudanya was the decisive factor which prompted Venizelos to seek a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, on the very day he pleaded with Curzon for the safety of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace and advised Athens to accept the verdict of Mudanya, he sent a telegram to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations High Commissioner for refugees, requesting him to endeavor to arrange an exchange of population between Greece and Turkey before the signature of peace, foreseeing the long diplomatic negotiations at Lausanne.¹⁵⁷ And two days later in response to a note from E. Kanellopoulos, the Greek Foreign Minister asking him "should the Government discourage the Greeks of Eastern Thrace from abandoning their homes and fleeing to Greece?"¹⁵⁸, he replied:¹⁵⁹

I think that the Government would be committing a grave crime if it did not help the population of Eastern Thrace that wished to emigrate. Of course, if it were possible to secure their life and property until the conclusion of peace, we would be in a better position at the peace conference to negotiate a peace, we would be in a better position at the peace conference to negotiate a population exchange... But it is absolutely certain that after 30 days, with the removal of all Allied controls on the Turkish administration in Thrace, the Turks will plunder the movable property of our fellow countrymen and will expel them naked and miserable. Remember what happened on the eve of the Great War. Today, this will be repeated on a much wider scale because of the contempt the Turks have of the Great Powers. For this reason, it is necessary to facilitate in every way the departure of our fellow countrymen, taking with them their movable property before the [Turkish] army comes... Do not deceive yourself! Eastern Thrace is lost forever for Hellenism.

The Turks will not tolerate a compact alien population, especially at the very gates of their capital.

Venizelos then went on to further advise that the Government should make an appeal on his behalf to the Greek population not to destroy their abandoned homes upon their departure from Eastern Thrace. Such an act he told Kanellopoulos would make their resettlement in Greece easier because it would ultimately facilitate the orderly evacuation of the Turkish population from their homes in Greece by providing them with the abandoned Greek homes in Eastern Thrace.¹⁶⁰

APPENDIX A

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CONVENTION MILITAIRE ENTRE LES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES,
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA GRANDE ASSEMBLÉE
NATIONALE DE TURQUIE et LA GRECE.

E 320-1

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E 904-1

Conformément aux termes de la Note adressée au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie par les Puissances Alliées le 23 Septembre 1922, et de la note adressée aux Puissances Alliées par le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie le 29 Septembre 1922, des réunions entre les Généraux Alliés :

le Général HARRINGTON, pour le Grande Bretagne,
le Général LOMBELLI, pour l'Italie,
le Général CHARPY, pour la France,
et le Général ISMET PACHA, pour le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie,
et le Général MAZARAKIS, pour la Grèce,

ont été tenues à Mudania le 3 Octobre 1922 et jours suivants.

Les Gouvernements alliés ayant décidé de remettre au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie la Thrace Orientale y compris Andrinople, le but de cette conférence était :

- 1°. De préciser la ligne au delà de laquelle les forces grecques seront invitées à se retirer de la Thrace Orientale.
- 2°. d'établir les modalités d'évacuation des troupes et de l'administration helléniques et de l'installation de l'administration et de la gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie dans ce territoire.
- 3°. d'assurer le contrôle de cette région pendant la période transitoire en vue de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique.

Les Délégués se sont mis d'accord sur les points suivants:

- 1°. Les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques à la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

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2°. La ligne derrière laquelle les troupes helléniques de Thrace seront invitées à se retirer dès la mise en vigueur de la présente convention est constituée par la rive gauche de la Maritza, de son embouchure dans la Mer Egée jusqu'au point où elle traverse la frontière de Thrace avec la Bulgarie.

3°. Afin d'éviter toutes complications possibles jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, la rive droite de la Maritza (Kara Agatch inclus) sera occupée par des contingents alliés qui seront installés en des points à déterminer par les Alliés.

4°. La portion de voie ferrée longeant la rive droite de la Maritza de Swilengrad (Jiser Mustapha Paoha) à Kuleli-Bourgas sera l'objet d'une surveillance (à régler par une convention spéciale) par une Commission militaire mixte comprenant un Délégué de chacune des trois Puissances alliées, un Délégué de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie et un Délégué de la Grèce, en vue de maintenir intégralement le libre parcours de cette section de voie qui permet l'accès de la région d'Andrinople.

5°. L'évacuation de la Thrace Orientale par les troupes grecques commencera dès la mise en vigueur de cette convention. Elle comprendra les troupes elles-mêmes, les services et formations militaires et leurs moyens de transport divers, ainsi que les approvisionnements stockés en matériel de guerre, munitions, dépôts de vivres.

Cette évacuation sera effectuée dans le délai d'environ 15 jours.

6°. Les autorités civiles helléniques y compris la Gendarmerie, seront retirées aussitôt que possible. Au fur et à mesure que les Autorités helléniques se retireront de chaque région administrative, les pouvoirs civils seront remis aux autorités alliées qui les transmettront autant que possible le jour même aux autorités turques. Pour l'ensemble de la région de Thrace cette remise devra être terminée dans un délai maximum de 30 jours, après la fin de l'évacuation par les troupes grecques.

7°. Les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie seront accompagnés de forces de gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, d'effectif strictement nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité locale, à la surveillance de la frontière et des chemins de fer.

L'effectif total de ces forces ne dépassera pas : 8.000 (Officiers compris).

8°. Les opérations de retrait des troupes grecques et la transmission de l'administration civile s'effectueront sous la direction de missions interalliées qui seront installées dans les principaux centres. Le rôle de ces missions est de s'entretenir pour faciliter les opérations ci-dessus du retrait et de transmission. Elles s'efforceront d'empêcher les excès de toute nature.

9°. En outre de ces missions, des contingents alliés occuperont la Thrace Orientale.

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10°. Le retrait des missions et des contingents alliés aura lieu 30 jours après que l'évacuation des troupes grecques aura été terminée.

Ce retrait pourra avoir lieu à une date plus rapprochée pourvu que les Gouvernements alliés soient d'accord pour considérer que des mesures suffisantes ont été prises pour le maintien de l'ordre et la protection des populations non turques. C'est ainsi que lorsque l'administration et la gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie fonctionneront régulièrement dans une division administrative, les missions et contingents alliés pourront être retirés de cette division administrative avant l'expiration du délai de 30 jours prévu.

11°. En Asie, les troupes du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'arrêteront sur les lignes suivantes qui ne devront pas être dépassées jusqu'à l'ouverture et pendant la conférence de la paix : -

Région de Chanak :

Une ligne à une distance d'environ 15 kil. de la côte asiatique des Dardanelles ayant pour origine Koum Bournou au Sud et rejoignant Boz Bournou (Nord de Lampasak) au Nord.

Péninsule d'Ismid :

Une ligne allant de Daridjé sur le Golfe d'Ismid, à Chilé sur la Mer Noire en passant par Guebzé. Ces localités incluses au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie.

La route allant de Daridjé à Chilé pourra être utilisée en commun par les troupes alliées et celles du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie.

Les lignes ci-dessus seront délimitées par des commissions mixtes composées d'un Officier de chacune des armées alliées et d'un Officier de l'armée du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie.

Les Gouvernements alliés et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, tout en prenant les précautions nécessaires pour prévenir tout incident, s'engagent à ne pas augmenter les effectifs de leurs troupes et à ne pas entreprendre de fortifications ou travaux militaires dans les régions ci-dessus :

Région de Chanak : à partir des Dardanelles jusqu'à une distance de 15 kil. à l'Est de la ligne Boz Bournou - Koum Bournou.

Péninsule d'Ismid : à partir du Bosphore jusqu'à une distance de 40 kil. à l'Est de la ligne Daridjé - Chilé.

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'engage à ne pas placer d'artillerie à moins de 15 kil. de la côte entre Boz Bournou (Nord de Lampasak) et Kara Bournou (Nord de Kara Bigha) inclus.

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12°. La présence des troupes alliées sera maintenue sur les territoires où elles sont stationnées actuellement, territoires que le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'engage à respecter jusqu'à décision de la conférence de la paix :

Savoir :

Péninsule de Constantinople :

Toute la partie de la Péninsule située à l'Est de la ligne marquée par un point de la Mer Noire à 7 kil. nord Ouest de Podima, Istrandja, Kichtaghi, Sinekli, Kara-Sinan-Tchiflik, Kadi-Kouy, Yénidjé, Fladina-Tchiflik, Calicratia, tous ces points inclus.

Péninsule de Gallipoli :

Toute la partie de la Péninsule de Gallipoli au Sud de la ligne : Sakla - Bournou (Cap Xéros), Boulair, embouchure du Soghluak, tous ces points inclus.

13°. Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'engage à ne pas transporter de troupes ni à lever ou entretenir une armée en Thrace Orientale jusqu'à ratification du traité de paix.

14°. La présente convention entrera en vigueur 3 jours après sa signature, c'est-à-dire à minuit le 14/15 (quatorze/quinze) Octobre 1922. (N.S.)

Faite en quatre feuillets à MOUDANIA (en français),
ce onze Octobre , mil neuf cent vingt deux. (N.S.)

Pour la Grande Bretagne : - *J. N. Harcourt* *Le General*
Pour l'Italie : - *M. M. M.*
Pour la France : - *Ch. Charpy*
Pour le Gouvernement de
la Grande Assemblée
Nationale de Turquie. : - *K. Tzoules*
Pour la Grèce : -

APPENDIX B

PREMIERE DECLARATION

DES DELEGUES MILITAIRES HELLENES DEVANT LA REUNION
DES GENERAUX ALLIES.

La délégation hellénique a déjà exposé devant la réunion des Généraux Alliés qu'elle considère la proposition qui lui a été faite concernant le retrait des troupes grecques à l'Ouest de la Maritza, comme une solution politique et non comme une mesure d'ordre purement militaire.

Cette proposition, en effet, préjuge les décisions de la future conférence de la Paix et leur acceptation par le Gouvernement hellénique, les pouvoirs et les attributions des délégués militaires grecs ne leur permettant pas d'envisager des décisions politiques et de les discuter.

C'est sous ces réserves que les délégués ont pris connaissance du projet qui leur a été remis. Ils ne peuvent pas en discuter les détails étant donné que pour les raisons précitées, il leur est impossible d'en accepter le fond.

Moudania.

6 Octobre 1922

APPENDIX C

DEUXIEME DECLARATION

DE LA DELEGATION HELLENIQUE DEVANT LA REUNION DES
GENERAUX ALLIES A MOUDANIA

Les délégués hellènes invités à prendre part à la réunion des Généraux Alliés prévue par la Note du 10/23 Septembre, se sont trouvés à leur arrivée à Moudania devant des décisions radicales déjà prises qui leur ont été communiquées et à l'élaboration desquelles leur avis n'avait pas été demandé.

Ils ont déclaré qu'ils n'étaient pas autorisés à accepter des décisions tellement importantes et à en discuter les détails de l'exécution.

Se trouvant aujourd'hui devant des décisions définitives des Grandes Puissances Alliées, décisions qui en réalité sont imposées au Gouvernement hellénique, ils se voient obligés, malgré leur profonde douleur, de s'incliner, et, autorisés par leur Gouvernement de déclarer en son nom:

1. Ils n'acceptent comme ligne maxima de retrait des troupes helléniques de

la Thrace Orientale (Art. 2 du projet) que la ligne frontière entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie fixée en 1915, étant donné que la région comprise entre cette ligne et celle proposée dans le projet de convention appartenait à la Bulgarie à partir de 1915, qu'elle fut cédée par celle-ci aux Grandes Puissances Alliées en vertu du Traité de Neuilly, et qu'à leur tour elles en firent cession à la Grèce. Les délégués hellènes ne peuvent, par conséquent, pas accepter l'évacuation jusqu'à la conclusion du Traité de Paix de la partie de la forteresse d'Andrinople sise sur le rive droite de la Maritza et comprenant les forts, la gare et la ville de Karaagatch, comme située dans la région précitée.

Ils acceptant la surveillance du tronçon de la voie ferrée entre Kuleli-Bourgas et Svilengrad par une commission mixte interalliée, turque et hellénique.

2. Ils acceptent la clause (Art. 1 du projet) d'après laquelle les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques à la date de l'entrée en vigueur de la convention.

3. Ils acceptent (Art. 5 du projet) l'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes helléniques avec leurs services, formations, dépôts, etc. Mais, considérant que toutes les opérations qui d'ailleurs coïncideraient avec le départ des populations chrétiennes indigènes, exigent un délai plus long pour être effectuées en ordre et sans confusion, les délégués insistent pour que le délai de quinze jours soit porté au moins à un mois.

4. Quant à la transmission des pouvoirs civils (Art. 6 du projet) ils doivent attirer toute l'attention des Généraux Alliés sur les conséquences graves que pourrait avoir en remise trop hâte de l'administration et de la gendarmerie aux mains des Turcs. Si l'on pense aux certaines de milliers d'habitants qui voudront quitter le pays avec tout ce qu'ils peuvent emporter de leur fortune, on comprendra que c'est un minimum d'humanité à accorder à ces populations malheureuses, déracinées pour la deuxième fois de leurs pays natal dans l'espace de quelques années, que de leur fournir tout le temps et toutes les facilités nécessaires.

Les délégués hellènes estiment que le seul moyen efficace serait la remise de l'administration aux troupes alliées qui la maintiendraient au moins pendant un mois jusqu'à ce que ces populations soient évacuées en ordre et des autorités alliées.

5. Les délégués hellènes estiment que pour effectuer l'évacuation sans désordre et pour la sécurité des populations les missions et les contingents alliés prévus par le projet (Art. 8 et 9) sont insuffisants. Il faudrait prévoir non seulement des excès possibles de la part de l'élément ou des autorités turques contre les populations chrétiennes mais aussi l'irruption de bandes d'irrégulières, turque et bulgares, qui pourraient profiter de l'occasion pour se livrer au brigandage et à des sévices contre ces populations.

Sur les questions essentielles indiquées dans les paragraphes 2 et 5 les délégués hellènes insistent non seulement au nom de leur Gouvernement, mais au nom de la conscience de tout homme vraiment civilisé

Dans le même ordre d'idées les délégués demandent qu'avant l'installation des autorités turques une amnistie générale soit accordée aux populations afin qu'elles soient mises à l'abri de toute poursuite motivée par leurs actes ou opinions de caractère politique.

Moudania.

26/9 Octobre 1922.

APPENDIX D

TROISIEME DECLARATION

DES DELEGUES HELLENES DEVANT LA REUNION DES GENERAUX ALLIES A MOUDANIA


La délégation hellénique constate qu'aucune des remarques qu'elle a formulées dans ses déclarations précédentes n'a été prise en considération dans la rédaction du texte définitif de la convention militaire.

Notamment sur la question primordiale de la ligne de retrait des troupes grecques, qu'elle a déjà déclaré ne pas pouvoir accepter, elle n'a reçu aucune satisfaction.

Dans ces conditions la délégation hellénique ne se croit pas autorisée à signer le texte de la convention militaire.

Moudania.

le 28/11 Octobre 1922.



NOTES

¹ This study is a much enlarged and revised version of the article "Thrace and the Armistice of Mudanya, October 3-11, 1922" which appeared in the *Bulletin of the Centre for Asian Minor Studies*, Vol. XII (Athens 1997-1998), 213-255.

² Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 334.

³ In June-July 1922, the Greeks, in an act of desperation, strengthened their forces in Thrace in order to march on to Constantinople and thereby reduce the pressure on their forces in Anatolia, where since September 1921 (The battle of Sakarya) they believed that they were fighting a losing cause. However, the Allies made it clear that any attack on Constantinople from either Greeks or Turks would be firmly resisted by force. Sir Nevile Henderson, *Water under the Bridges*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1945), 106; and Stephen W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets* Vol. II, 1919-1931 (London: Collins, 1972), 282-283.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 284-311; Alexander Mazarakis-Ainian, *Mémoires* (Thessaloniki, 1979), 273-275; and A.A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After* (London, 1937).

⁵ Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, First Series, Vol. XVII: *Greece and Turkey*, January 1, 1921 - September 2, 1922. Edited by W.N. Medlicott, Douglass Dakin and M.E. Lambert. (London: HMSO, 1970). Doc. 754-756. Bentinck (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 2, 1922. Hereafter cited as *DBFP*. London agreed to accept the Greek request, it being understood that she would work with her allies - France and Italy.

⁶ While prepared to evacuate Asia Minor, Greece was not prepared to give up Eastern Thrace which at that time had a Greek majority or near majority population and where militarily it enjoyed a strategic advantage. Greek forces had occupied much of Eastern Thrace in 1919. The Allies awarded the region to Greece, along with the Smyrna district, on August 19, 1920 (Treaty of Sèvres). See Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase* (Thessaloniki, 1968) 39-41, 45-46. See also Cmd 564 (1920);

a. In February-March 1921 at a conference in London, the Allies failed to reach an agreement with the Turkish Nationalists on the modification of the Sèvres treaty. While the Greeks agreed to the Allied proposal that Greece accept administrative control over a reduced Smyrna zone under Turkish sovereignty, the Turks gave no reply — which was taken as a rejection. Greece let it be known that it would not abate its claim on Eastern Thrace.

The Turkish intransigence was due, in part, to the recent truce concluded with France in Cilicia (Southeast Anatolia) enabling the Nationalists to reinforce their forces on the Smyrna front and to enjoy French diplomatic support. The 'Proposals of the Allies' are in C.P. 2695 and 2699 (11 March, 1921). The minutes of the London Conference of 21 February - 14 March 1921 are in Cab. 29/91. See also Stephen W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, Vol. II, 1919-1931 (London: Collins, 1972), 222-223;

b. A year later when it was absolutely clear that Greece could not hold on to the gains provided by the Sèvres treaty without Allied support, the three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs met in Paris (March 1922) with the view of ending the Greek-Turkish war in Anatolia and of revising the Sèvres treaty in Turkey's favor. They proposed that Greece evacuate Anatolia, restoring it to complete Turkish sovereignty; that the navigation of the Straits be placed under the control of an international commission under a Turkish president; that all of Eastern Thrace be demilitarized; and that a portion of Eastern Thrace be returned by Greece to Turkey to provide a sufficient distance from Constantinople to assuage Turkish fears for the security of the city. Adrianople [Edirne] was to remain Greek. The Greek Government signified its acceptance of the proposals pending clarification of minority guarantees. See Great Britain, Foreign Office, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1922), *Pronouncement by the three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs respecting the Near East Situation*, Paris, March 27, 1922 in Cmd. 1641 (London: HMSO, 1922);

c. At this juncture, the Turkish Nationalists were not interested in making peace with an enemy it believed it could defeat by force of arms. The Allied proposals were therefore unacceptable. To give sufficient time for military preparations to overcome the increasingly vulnerable Greek forces, delaying tactics were employed. Kemal sent his trusted friend Fethi Okyar on a mission to London in August 1922 whose objective was, in part, "to deceive the British and the Greeks into thinking that we are still trying to reach an agreement with them." On August 16, Kemal told Okyar to stay in London and to continue to gain time for the counter-offensive. See Osman Okyar, "Turco-British Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Mission to London" in William Hale and Ali Ihsan Bagis, editors, *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations, Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs* (North Humberside, 1984), 62-79.

⁷ *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII: *Greece and Turkey*, September 3, 1922 - July 24, 1923. Edited by W.N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M.E. Lambert (London: HMSO, 1972). Doc. 4. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 4, 1922; Doc. 5. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Bentick (Athens), September 4, 1922; Doc. 6 and 7. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 4 and 5, 1922; Doc.

9. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 5, 1922; and Doc. 19. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 9, 1922. Also Briton Cooper Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1976), 341-342.

⁸ *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 16. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 8, 1922 and Doc. 20. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 10, 1922.

⁹ See note 6b.

¹⁰ CAB. 23/31, C48, 22, Cabinet Meeting, September 7, 1922.

¹¹ Kemal Atatürk, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, October 1927* (Leipzig, 1929), 567. Hereafter cited as *The Speech*. Rumbold had reported that the Allied Generals in Constantinople believed that the Nationalists would not agree to an armistice which did not call for the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace. *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 16. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 8, 1922.

¹² As more and more Turkish troops entered the undefended city, terror spread among its Greek and Armenian population. For days the streets were hideous with screams, murder, rape and pillage. The situation worsened when on September 13 fire broke out, within days two-thirds of the city, primarily its Christian quarters, lay blackened and smoldering. This tragic story has been told many times. See Marjorie Housepian, *Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City* (London, 1972); George Horton, *The Blight of Asia...with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna* (Indianapolis, 1926); Melville Chater, "History's Greatest Trek," *The National Geographic Magazine*, XLVIII, 5 (November, 1925); Smith, *op.cit.*, Ch. XIII; Lord Kinross, *Atatürk* (London, 1966), Ch. Forty; and Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Foreign Office memorandum on Smyrna Events*, October 10, 1922, FO 371/7955/E11040.

¹³ FO/7887/E9154 Report of a conversation between the British Ambassador in Rome and Osman Nizami Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador designate, October 9, 1922, quoted in Salahi Ramsden Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923* (London, 1975), 173; and H.C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf* (New York, 1961), 169-170. The Turkish National Pact or *Misak-i Milli* was the Turkish "Declaration of Independence" declared on January 28, 1920. It called for *inter alia* the retrocession of Eastern Thrace to Turkey and for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, which would determine the region's political future. For the events leading to the Turkish National Pact see Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne" in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (ed) *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (Princeton, 1953), 172-181. For the complete text see Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), Doc. 18. See also *The New York Times*, October 1, 1922.

¹⁴ Kinross, *op.cit.*, 331.

¹⁵ Psomiades, *op.cit.*, 29-31. The Allied occupation of Constantinople undertaken on March 18, 1920, proved to be a turning point in the Nationalists struggle led by Kemal. Among other events it led to the closure of the Ottoman parliament in Constantinople and the setting up of the Grand National Assembly in Angora, a prolonged period of civil strife, the diminution of the Sultan's authority, and to the strengthening of the Nationalist forces and their ultimate triumph.

¹⁶ Busch, *op.cit.*, 343; Sir Neville Henderson, *op.cit.*, 109; Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, Vol. 5 (London, 1929), 422; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 20. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 10, 1922; F.O. 371/7889. No. 801. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office) September 12, 1922; and The Times (London), September 12, 1922. The Neutral Zone was the Allied ring around Constantinople from the lines of Chataldja in the west to the Ismit peninsula in the east, from the Black Sea in the north to the Straits of the Dardanelles in the south.

¹⁷ Busch, *op.cit.*, 343-344; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 21, note 1. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 11, 1922. The lack of unity had characterized allied relations during the previous months—Britain supporting the Greeks and the French and Italians the Turks.

¹⁸ Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 1913-1925* (Paris: Hachette, 1957), 160.

¹⁹ Doc. 21, note 1. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 11, 1922. The misunderstanding had occurred because Curzon's telegram of September 11, 1922 had crossed that of Rumbold of September 10, 1922, in which he reported that the Allied High Commissioners were united in their determination to preserve the neutrality of the Neutral Zone. See also A. L. Macfie, "The Chanak Affair," *Balkan Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2 (Thessaloniki, 1979), 314-315.

²⁰ Doc. 23. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 13, 1922.

²¹ Doc. 26. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 13, 1922; Churchill, *op.cit.*, 430; and Busch, *op.cit.*, 345. Thus, upon Harington falls much of the responsibility for staying at Chanak and for the subsequent confrontation with the Kemalists.

²² Laroche, *op.cit.*, 159; General Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Siyasî hatîralarî [Political Memoirs]* (Istanbul, 1957), 74-75; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 41. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, September 20, 1922; and Harold Nicholson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925* (London, 1934), 271.

²³ Cab. 23/31, C49, 22, Cabinet meeting, September 15, 1922; and Doc. 27. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 15, 1922.

²⁴ *Ibid*; Doc. 32. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 16, 1922; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 271; and Stephen W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, Vol. II 1919-1931 (London, 1972), 283-284. Hankey was Secretary of the Cabinet. His diary is extensively used in Roskill's study.

²⁵ For the complete text see Churchill, *op.cit.*, 426-427; Nicholson *op.cit.*, 271-272; and Roskill, *op.cit.*, 284-285. See also Macfie, *op.cit.*, 316-317.

²⁶ Quoted in Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923* (New York, 1966), 269.

²⁷ The telegrams sent to the Dominions were overtaken by the press communiqué which had reached the Canadian and Australian newspapers before the responsible Ministers had received the official request from London.

²⁸ While Greece welcomed the British manifesto, its support alone would create serious problems for Britain both at home and abroad. There was strong feeling against being tied to Greece and acting against France. See Roskill, *op.cit.*, 289.

²⁹ Laroche, *op.cit.*, 160.

³⁰ Doc 36. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 19, 1922, note 9.

³¹ *The Speech*, 528; and Doc 41. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, held at the Quai d'Orsay*, 11 a.m., Wednesday, September 20, 1922. Also on the 18th, the Angora [Ankara] agent in Paris, Dr. Nihad Rechad, had informed the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Kemal would not recognize any neutral zone on the Asiatic side or any place as neutral which had been previously occupied by Greek troops, and mentioned Chanak in particular. (Doc 35. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 19, 1922). The Turkish response to the manifesto of September 16 was to reconfirm Russian support in the event of war and to strive for an understanding with Bulgaria for joint action in Thrace. They also sought to encourage the Serbs to make common cause with them and to seize Thessaloniki. (Sonyel, *op.cit.*, 174-175).

³² Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. 3 (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1929), 302-305; Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 198-197; Busch, *op.cit.*, 346-348; Doc. 35. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon

(Foreign Office), September 19, 1922; and Laroche, *op.cit.*, 160.

³³ Henderson, *op.cit.*, 109; Lord Riddell, *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After* (London, 1933), 389; Lord [Charles] Hardinge, *Old Diplomacy* (London, 1947), 272-73; Laroche, *op.cit.*, 161; The French position was supported by Count Sforza, who had joined the afternoon session of the conference. According to Ambassador Hardinge, Poincaré insisted on the Italian Ambassador being invited to be present with the hope of being two to one against Curzon (Hardinge, 272).

³⁴ Thanassis Bravos, "The Allied Note of 23rd September 1922 and Great Britain's Retreat on the Question of Eastern Thrace," in *Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies*, Vol. 13 (Athens, 1999-2000), 179-208; D. Dakin, "The Greek Army in Thrace and the Conference of Lausanne," in *Greece and Great Britain during World War I*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies), 211-214; and Spiros Markezinis, *Politiki Istoria tis Neoteris Ellados [Political History of Modern Greece]* Vol. 2 (Athens, 1973), 84-102.

³⁵ CAB. 23/31, C30, 22, Cabinet meeting, September 23, 1923.

³⁶ *The Speech*, 569; Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, 75-76; Busch, *op.cit.*, 350-351; *Times* (London), September 25, 1922; *British Secretary's Notes for a Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, Doc 42, September 20, 1922, Doc. 48, September 22, 1923; and Doc. 50-51, September 23, 1922; and F.O. 371/7894, Paris Conference, September 23, 1922, annex. See also *L'Europe nouvelle*, V, No. 39 (September 30, 1922), 1241 and (September 23, 1922), 1231.

³⁷ Doc. 62. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 27, 1922; Riddle, *op.cit.*, 387; Busch, *op.cit.*, 353-355; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 273-274; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, 431. In terms of legal exactitude, there was a difference of opinion between the British and the Kemalists as to what constituted the Neutral Zone. See Busch, *op.cit.*, 353.

³⁸ Doc. 57 and 58, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 26, 1922; Riddle, *op.cit.*, 387-388; Busch, *op.cit.*, 352, and Churchill, *op.cit.*, 431-432. For a detailed account of the Chanak crisis see D. Walker, *The Chanak Affair* (London, 1969), 198-280. See also D. Dakin, "Lord Curzon's Policy Toward Greece," in *Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas* (Thessaloniki, 1975), 549-550.

³⁹ Doc. 64 and 65, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 27, 1922.

⁴⁰ Churchill, *op.cit.*, 435; Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290; and Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 275.

⁴¹ CAB. 23/31. C52, 22, Cabinet meeting, September 30, 1922, appendix 5 and Doc 78. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Hardinge (Paris), September 30, 1922. According to Hankey, the militants in the Cabinet, includ-

ing Lloyd George and Churchill, dreaded that Kemal would accept the September 23 invitation to the armistice conference because it would compel Britain to implement the condition of handing over Eastern Thrace to the Turks. Thus, Britain would lose its credit with the Greeks without gaining that of the Turks as France and Italy will claim that they forced Britain to it. Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290.

⁴² Harington had also reported that the British position at Chanak was "strong, well-wired and well sited." And even Churchill acknowledged that by September 28, Chanak had been well reinforced and that it enjoyed superior fire power, air supremacy and total command of the sea. "There was never any danger to British forces at Chanak." Churchill, *op.cit.*, 433, 435.

⁴³ F.O. E10399/27/44, Conference of Ministers, September 29, 1922; Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290; Nicholson, *op.cit.*, 275; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, 435-436. Curzon was also undoubtedly encouraged by the moderate tone of an interview with Kemal reprinted in the *Daily Telegraph*, September 27, 1922. The only unacceptable point to the British was his claim to oil rich Mosul in Iraq.

⁴⁴ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290.

⁴⁵ Franklin-Bouillon was the ranking member of the French Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The ubiquitous Frenchman and avid Turcophile was instrumental in concluding for France an important agreement with Turkey on October 20, 1921, commonly known as the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. He was sent to Ankara by Briand to safeguard Lebanon and Syria, which had been recently placed under French Mandate, by negotiating the return of Cilicia to the Turks. The treaty provided *inter alia* for the evacuation of the French army from Cilicia or southeast Anatolia in return for certain economic concessions. It enabled Kemal to withdraw his forces from the Armenian and Syrian fronts and fling them against the Greeks. The treaty was negotiated in secret without the knowledge of France's ally Britain and created much bitterness between them. It marked a definite line of cleavage in their policies in the Levant. It was the first treaty signed between the provisional Turkish Nationalist Government and a western power. Davidson, *op.cit.*, 192-193; and Laroche, *op.cit.*, 159. For the text of the treaty see *LNOJ*, Vol. 54 (1926-1927), 177-193. For a detailed account see the excellent study of Ioannis G. Mourellos, "The French-Turkish Rapprochement: The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement and the Evacuation of Cilicia," in *Deltio* (Center for Asia Minor Studies), Vol. 4 (1983), 211-269. (In Greek)

⁴⁶ Reported in Doc 64. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (London), September 27, 1922.

⁴⁷ The British did not appreciate Poincaré's bargaining with Kemal

behind their backs and came thoroughly to dislike his intrusive emissary who preached that peace was only possible by giving in to the Turks. Henderson, *op.cit.*, 109.

⁴⁸ Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922; Tefik Biyiklioglu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele [The National Struggle in Thrace]*, Vol. I (Ankara, 1955), 470; *The Speech*, 569-570; Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri [Collected Speeches]*, Vol. II (Ankara, 1945), 466-467; Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa* (Istanbul, 1943), 8-9; Sonyel, *op.cit.*, 176; Busch, *op.cit.*, 356; and *Oriente Moderno*, II:5 (October 15, 1922), 278-281.

⁴⁹ After the Greek defeat in Anatolia, the presence of Greek forces in Thrace assumed great importance for both Greece and Britain. The British believed that the fear of the occupation of Constantinople by Greek forces would be an important card in future negotiations with the Nationalists. If the Turks should threaten Allied positions, Greek support of Allied troops in Constantinople and the Straits "might also not be a negligible factor." Doc. 20 Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 10, 1922; and Dakin, *The Greek Army in Thrace and the Conference of Lausanne*, 212-213.

⁵⁰ Armstrong, *op.cit.*, 171-172; Churchill, *op.cit.*, 431-433; Kinross, *op.cit.*, 336; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 243; Sonyel, *op.cit.*, 175; Doc. 7. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 5, 1922; Doc. 15 Graham (Rome) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 8, 1922; and Doc. 77. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 30, 1922.

⁵¹ France, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Series "E", 1919-1929, *Levant: Turquie*, Vol. 60. Tel. 304. Poincaré (Paris) to French Ambassadors in London and Rome and to the French High Commissioner in Constantinople, October 1, 1922 and Tel. 1347. Pellé (Constantinople) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Paris), October 1, 1922. See also FO 3897/E10276, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 1, 1922.

⁵² CAB. 23/31, C55, 22, Cabinet meeting, October 1, 1922.

⁵³ Sir Charles Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, (London, 1941), 113-116; Doc. 77 and 79. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 30, 1922; Busch, *op.cit.*, 356; Churchill, *op.cit.*, 436; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 275-275; Ronaldshay, *op.cit.*, 307-309; D.I. Shuttleworth, Turkey, from the Armistice to Peace," in *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, XI:I (1924), 60-62; Macfie, *op.cit.*, 332-333; and Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290-291. It should also be stressed that Harington, while showing much wisdom in withholding the ultimatum, was in fact very much responsible for it. His efforts kept the British at Chanak and his

previous reports of the seriousness of the situation activated the ultimatum. It led Hankey to write in his diary that "What the Cabinet, Churchill and others were angry about was that after Harington's telegrams about the seriousness of the situation, we had been spoofed." Roskill, *op.cit.*, 291.

⁵⁴ Even at this critical hour, King Constantine refused the advice of several of his key advisors, including his former P.M. Nicholas Kalogeropoulos, that Venizelos be recalled from exile and given the responsibility for defending Greek interests abroad. There was even attempted to form a new party of national unity to include moderate Constantinists and Venizelists. There was also clamour that General Ioannis Metaxas be asked to form a new Government. Instead, on September 10 the king dismissed his Government and entrusted the Government to Nicholas Triandafillakos, former Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople, who proved unsuitable to the task, although he also recommended the recall of Venizelos from exile. Stefanos I. Stefanou, *Eleftherios Venizelos* (Athens, 1979), 187-188.

⁵⁵ F.O. E10037/27/44, Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 27, 1922. The principal ministers were: Alexander Zaïmis (Prime Minister), Sotiris Kokridas (Minister of the Interior and *ad interim* Prime Minister), Nicolas Politis (Minister of National Economy and *ad interim* Minister for Foreign Affairs. Zaïmis had still not accepted the premiership when the government resigned on November 23, 1922. The Revolutionary Committee remained in being and was the real power in the country.

⁵⁶ Doc. 85. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 1, 1922.

⁵⁷ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 289.

⁵⁸ Doc. 86. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 2, 1922, note 4. See also S.I. Stefanos, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, 2nd printing (Athens, 1979), 188-189.

⁵⁹ Mazarakis-Ainian Papers, A, 13, October 14, 1922.

⁶⁰ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 289-290.

⁶¹ Kimross, *op.cit.*, 333; and Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 273-274.

⁶² Dimitra Giannuli, "Strangers at Home," in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (October, 1995), 271-287.

⁶³ Henry Morgenthau, *An International Drama* (London, 1929), 52.

⁶⁴ For the politics of Greece in 1919-1922 see A.A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After* (London, 1937) and Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision, Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (London, 1973).

⁶⁵ Doc 55. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 25, 1922.

⁶⁶ To supplement the five divisions in Thrace the Revolutionary Government retained four classes of conscripts, 1919-1922, confirmed the summons already given to the 1923 class and recalled two more of classes older than 1919; planned to regroup 2-3 divisions and send them to Thrace with an independent division. This would give them eight to nine divisions in Thrace or approximately 100,000 men. But it would take several weeks for the plan to be fully implemented. This information concerning the military posture of Greece was requested by the British Prime Minister at a Cabinet meeting held on September 27 in the event the outbreak of an Anglo-Turkish war. Doc 72. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 29, 1922.

⁶⁷ Eleftherios Venizelos (1864-1936) was Prime Minister of Greece during most of the period 1910-1920. Under the leadership of the great Cretan statesman Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) doubled in size. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, he acquired for Greece Thrace and the Smyrna district. The cost of his nationalist policy in Asia Minor was war with Kemal's Turkey. He went into exile after disastrous electoral defeat in November 1920.

⁶⁸ "The Revolution declares its absolute confidence and trust in you to deal with the conduct of foreign matters and asks for your immediate help." Quoted in Yiannis Kordatos, *Megali isoria tis Ellados [The Great History of Greece]*, Vol. 13 (1900-1924), 2nd edition (Athens: 20os Aionas, 1948), 600. See also A. Mazarakis-Ainian, *Mémoires* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1979), 278. The memoirs first appeared in Greek (Athens, 1948).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* The collapse of Asia Minor front found Venizelos in San Moritz, Switzerland with his family, having returned a few months earlier from the United States. During the entire period of his exile he followed with great concern the reversal of Greek fortunes, periodically sending advice to friends in Greece and speaking with British and French statesmen and politicians on behalf of Greek national interests, even though he had no official position. For example, on his return from America, he had arranged a meeting with Poincaré to elicit French support for Greece. For the Venizelos-Poincaré dialogue see Stefanos I. Stefanou, *op.cit.*, 190-191.

⁷⁰ An early case of shuttle diplomacy with a difference; namely, that the Greek delegation was compelled to accept whatever the Allied generals offered. Greek participation at Mudanya will be discussed separately.

⁷¹ Doc. 81. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), October 1, 1922.

⁷² In Harington's own words "They adjourn on every point they don't like and telephone Angora" in Harington's report of October 4 to the War

Office found in Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922. See also Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922.

⁷³ *Ibid.*; and Doc. 92. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

⁷⁴ Tel. 14100-1413 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 8, 1922; Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922; and Doc. 106. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, and British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 6, 1922.

⁷⁵ Tel. 223-4-4 [E 304-1]. Charpy (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 6, 1922; and for Pellé's report on the negotiations at Chanak see Tel. 297-304-1 [E304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 14, 1922. Throughout the negotiations Franklin-Bouillon flitted between Ismet and Charpy urging the former to resist and the later to surrender.

⁷⁶ Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922; and Tel. 297-304-1 [E304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 14, 1922. Charpy accepted the Turkish demands on October 5 and Mombelli on October 7, leaving Britain once again alone.

⁷⁷ Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922; and Henderson, *op.cit.*, 109.

⁷⁸ Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922

⁷⁹ Conversation of Kemal with Mougin, the French representative in Angora, in Tel. 317 [E 304-1]. Mougin (Angora) to Poincaré (Paris), October 6, 1922, which was included in Tel. 1422 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 8, 1922.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*; Harington, *op.cit.* 116-117; Doc. 97 and 99. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, 436-437.

⁸² Doc 93. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

⁸³ F.O. E10667/27/44. Hardinge (Paris) to the Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.

⁸⁴ Doc. 106-108. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting..., October 6, 1922, October 7, 1922 and October 7, 1922, respectively; Smith, *op.cit.*, 318; and A.F. Frangulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1926), 456-459.

⁸⁵ Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 275-276.

⁸⁶ *Military Convention between the Allied Powers, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Greece* in E 320-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 10, 1922 and Turkey, No. 1 (1922), Cmd. 1570.

⁸⁷ Busch, *op.cit.*, 351; Tel. 459-50. Rumbold (Constantinople) telegraph to the Foreign Office, October 10, 1922; and No. 297, E 304-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 14, 1922. See also his earlier telegrams 1437, E 320-1, October 9 and telegram 1473, E 320-1, October 10.

⁸⁸ Henderson, *op.cit.*, 110-111; and Walder, *op.cit.*, Ch. XVII.

⁸⁹ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 295. Pellé reported that the Turkish advance on Ismit exasperated the British who viewed it as treachery. He wrote that "the supporters of the Turks will excuse them without doubt by saying that the advance was in response to the reinforcement of British forces; There is a great difference. The English, unlike the Turks, had not made or undertaken an engagement not to reinforce their positions, whereas the Turks had formally promised to maintain their troops in place until the end of the Conference. They are playing a game of brinkmanship." Tel. 1461-1468. E 304-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 10, 1922.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*; and Busch, *op.cit.*, 357.

⁹¹ Doc. 119. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 11, 1922; Biyiklioglu, *op.cit.*, 450-454; *The Speech*, 568-570; Harington, *op.cit.*, 117-118; Henderson, *op.cit.*, 111; Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, 83-101; Yusuf Hikmet Bayer, *Türkiye devletinin dis siyasi [The Foreign Policy of the Turkish State] (Istanbul, 1942)*, 117-118; Amedeo Giannini, *I documenti diplomatici della pace orientale* (Rome, 1922), 251-253; Sonyel, *op.cit.*, 180-182; *Oriente Moderno*, II:6 (November 15, 1922), 338-339; No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 14, 1922; Eliot G. Mears, *op.cit.*, 658-659; and Turkey, No. 1 (1922); Cmd 1570.

⁹² Harington, *op.cit.* 118; and Kinross, *op.cit.*, 338. For a copy of the original and official French text with signatures see Appendix A.

⁹³ Gregory Daphnis, *I Ellas metaxi dio polemon, 1923-1940 [Greece Between Two World Wars, 1923-1940]*. Vol. 1 (Athens, 1955); 26; I. A. Peponis, *Nicholas Plastiras, 1909-1945*, Vol. 1 (Athens, 1947), 275; and Stylianos Gonatas, *Apomnimonevmata, 1897-1957 [Memoires, 1897-1957]* (Athens, 1958), 250.

⁹⁴ Doc. 80. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Lindley (Athens), October 1, 1922.

⁹⁵ Doc. 86. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Officer), October 2, 1922.

⁹⁶ Doc. 89. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Lindley (Athens), October 3,

1922; and *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Venizelos (London) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 2, 1922.

⁹⁷ Doc. 106. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting..., October 6, 1922.

⁹⁸ *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Venizelos (Paris) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 1, 1922 and Venizelos (London) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 2, 1922. These papers are currently housed in the Penelope Delta Museum, Kifisia, Greece.

⁹⁹ *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, A, 3, Greek War Office to Mazarakis-Ainian (Athens), October 2, 1922. (These papers are to be found in the National Historical Museum of the Historical and Ethnological Foundation of Greece, Athens); and Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 279.

¹⁰⁰ *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Venizelos (Paris) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 1, 1922; Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 282-283; and Ioannis Kordatos, *op.cit.*, 600-601.

¹⁰¹ Markezinis, *op.cit.*, 116.

¹⁰² The Greek delegation did not participate directly in the talks at Mudanya and consequently did not confront the Turkish delegation. Mudanya was perhaps the first or an early example of "proximity talks", except that the Greek delegation had essentially no say in the talks. All decisions were made by the Allied generals, who expected Greek acquiescence.

¹⁰³ *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, B, 4, Speech of Harington on behalf of the Allied Powers to the Greek Representatives, October 4, 1922. (Misplaced should be in Folder A).

¹⁰⁴ Kordatos, *op.cit.*, 602; Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 283-284; and Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

¹⁰⁵ Tel. 1382 [E304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 5, 1922. For a summary of the talks at Mudanya, prepared by Mazarakis-Ainian, see "Report of the Fate of the Greek Delegation at the Mudanya Conference," in *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, A, 13, October 14, 1922.

¹⁰⁶ Appendix B, First Declaration.

¹⁰⁷ Kordatos, *op.cit.*, 602; and Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 284.

¹⁰⁸ E, 304-1, Rocca (Paris) to Pellé (Constantinople), October 5, 1922.

¹⁰⁹ *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, A, 13, October 14, 1922.

¹¹⁰ No. 297, 304-1, Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), *Report on the Negotiations at Mudania*, October 14, 1922.

¹¹¹ Doc. 106. British Secretary's Note of a Meeting..., October 6, 1922.

¹¹² Doc. 107-108. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting..., October 7, 1922. See also Venizelos' message to the Greek legation in London in Doc. 109. Crowe (Foreign Office) to Hardinge (Paris), October 7, 1922.

While in Paris, Venizelos informed Athens that his entire effort was directed at providing some kind of security for the Greek population of the lost province of Eastern Thrace. "you know [he wrote] that all of the guarantees which the armistice may provide and which the Turks would accept provide no real security for the Christians." *Venizelos Papers*, 29, No. 2768, Venizelos (Paris) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.

¹¹³ Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 287; and *Venizelos Papers*, 29, No. 10023, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (Paris), October 6, 1922.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 288.

¹¹⁵ *Venizelos Papers*, 29, No. 31, Venizelos (Paris) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.

¹¹⁶ Appendix C, Second Declaration.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 290-292; and Tel. 1483-84 [E320-1] Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 11, 1922. The Turkish note to the Allies of September 29 and October 4 had called for a Greek withdrawal to the west bank of the Maritsa and the Allies agreed. They referred to it as the 1914 line. But there was only two officially recognized boundaries: that of 1913 whereby Turkey regained from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War much of Thrace extending several kilometers into the region on the west bank of the Maritsa; and that of 1915 when Turkey in order to entice the Bulgarians to enter WWI on the side of the Central Powers ceded to Bulgaria a strip of territory on both side of the Maritsa, thus providing Bulgaria with a potential port and outlet to the Aegean. The Greeks insisted, in part, on the official 1915 line for fear that if they did not do so, they would be pushed back to the 1913 line which included all of the region of Didimotocho, on the right bank of the Maritsa. They also, on principle, did not want to give up territory which was theirs by virtue of the Treaty of Neuilly, an internationally recognized instrument. Several weeks later, during the Lausanne conference, the Turks expressed their regrets that they did not demand the 1913 line during the Mudanya talks. By being on the west bank of the Maritsa they believed that they could have exerted greater pressure to force a plebiscite in Western Thrace and deprive Greece of a military advantage by denying it the high ground on the west bank of the Maritsa. Indeed, at Lausanne the Turks claimed the Thracian frontier of the 1913 treaty of Constantinople but the Allies only offered a small enclave between the 1915 boundary and the Maritsa. In part, this had been Greece's reward for accepting the terms of Mudanya.

¹¹⁸ Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 293-295.

¹¹⁹ D. Dakin, *op.cit.*, 216-217.

¹²⁰ *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, A, 13, October 14, 1922.

¹²¹ Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 296; and *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, A, 13, October 14, 1922.

¹²² Te. 1483-884 [E 320-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 11, 1922.

¹²³ Appendix D, Third Declaration; Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 296-297; and Doc. 119. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 11, 1922. As a result of Mazarakis' refusal to sign, there is no Greek signature on the official armistice convention signed at Mudanya, although it does contain a Greek signature block and, off course, the signatures of the other participants. See also A. Türkgeldi, *Moudros ve Mudanya Mütarekeleri Tarihi*, [History of the Mudros and Mudanya Armistice] (Ankara, 1948), 158-92.

¹²⁴ *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, B, tel. 10271, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Mazarakis, October 11, 1922.

¹²⁵ Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 298-299; and *Mazarakis-Ainian Papers*, A, 13. October 14, 1922. Mazarakis' explanation may have been an excuse not to affix his name to a document which he considered humiliating and grossly unfair to Greece. When he was first asked to accept the assignment to Mudanya, he had refused on the grounds that "It was very difficult for me to present myself as a defeated party at a place where I had been a victorious party. In my opinion, it was more just to have a royalist officer go there." *Ibid.*, 278.

¹²⁶ *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 12, 1922.

¹²⁷ *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Simopoulos (Constantinople) to Venizelos (London), October 11, 1922.

¹²⁸ Doc. 122. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922; See also *Venizelos Archives*, 29, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 12, 1922. It should be noted that both Poincaré and Curzon claimed that Venizelos had accepted the 30-day limit in Paris, although Venizelos denied it. Lord Curzon minuted on October 12: "As it was M. Venizelos himself who suggested the month to the French he must have been either very rash or very shortsighted." In note 6 to Doc. 122. Also the discussions of October 12 were based on newspaper reports of the armistice convention. The official text, for some inexplicable reason, had been delayed in reaching the Foreign Office.

¹²⁹ Doc. 122. note 7; *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Venizelos to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 13, 1922.

¹³⁰ *Venizelos Archives*, 29, Venizelos (London) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 13, 1922.

¹³¹ Doc. 124. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office). October 13, 1922; See also Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 299; Tel. 1499 [E340-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 12, 1922; and *Venizelos*

Papers, 29, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 14, 1922.

¹³² Mazarakis-Ainian Papers, A, 4.

¹³³ Alexis Alexandris, *op.cit.*, 79; and Nur Bilge Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 140-155.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*; Doc. 136, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 27, 1922; *Rumbold Papers*, No. 66-68, November 16, 1922; and Konstantinos A. Vakalopoulos, *I Thraki Exodos, 1918-1922 [The Thracian Exodus, 1918-1922]*, (Athens: Herodotos, 1999), 393-407.

¹³⁵ Biyiklioglu, *op.cit.*, 438, 440-441; Gonatas, *op.cit.*, 250-251; and Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, 89ff.

¹³⁶ Interview in Tewhid-I-Efkari, October 13, 1922, reported in No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 14, 1922.

¹³⁷ During the second phase of the Lausanne Conference, in the spring of 1923, Venizelos conceded Karagatch, along with a small triangle between the Maritsa and Arda rivers, in return for the renunciation by Turkey of its claim to war reparations or indemnity from Greece.

¹³⁸ Biyiklioglu, *op.cit.*, 470, 472...

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 485-486.

¹⁴⁰ David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, 2 (London, 1938), 1349.

¹⁴¹ Psomiades, *op.cit.*, 18-20, 25-27, Bravos, *op.cit.*, 182-196.

¹⁴² No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Poincaré (Paris), October 14, 1922.

¹⁴³ Alexis Alexandris, *op.cit.*, 82. From October to December some 50,000 Christians fled the city. Some 15,000 alone during October, 1922. See also Criss, *op.cit.*, 140-155.

¹⁴⁴ Vakalopoulos, *op.cit.*, Chapter IX.

¹⁴⁵ Doc. 126. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office). October 16, 1922; and Doc. 122. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.

¹⁴⁶ Hankey, *op.cit.*, 223.

¹⁴⁷ Geographical Handbook, Naval Intelligence Division, *Iraq and the Persian Gulf*, (London, 1922), 307-312; The vilayet of Mosul was in Ottoman-Turkish hands at the end of World War I when the armistice of Mudros was signed on October 27, 1918. Coveting the oil resources of the region, Britain proceeded to occupy it a few days later. The Turkish Nationalists refused to accept the loss of territory taken from it after the armistice was concluded and accordingly in 1920 they included the Mosul-Kirkuk region within the country's borders as defined by the National Pact, even though the territory was overwhelmingly Kurdish in population. The area thus remained a bone of contention until June 5, 1926 when

Turkey concluded a treaty with Britain relinquishing its claims to Mosul.

¹⁴⁸ British brinkmanship just before and during Mudanya was largely responsible for the downfall of Lloyd George's wartime coalition government of October 19, 1922; whereas Turkish brinkmanship contributed to the consolidation of power of the Kemal [Atatürk] regime.

¹⁴⁹ A.A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture...*, 69.

¹⁵⁰ Arnold J. Tyonbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 2nd edition (New York, 1970) xix-xx. Venizelos' acceptance of the Mudanya terms also gained Allied support for Greece in Western Thrace at Lausanne.

¹⁵¹ M.L. Smith, *op.cit.*, 319.

¹⁵² Ernest Hemingway, *Toronto Daily Star*, October 22, 1922.

¹⁵³ A.A. Pallis Papers, A copy of his article "The Refugee Question in Retrospect" published in the *Asia Minor Chronicles*, Vol. IA (Athens, 1963), 27.

¹⁵⁴ *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24318/24318. League of Nations, Report of Dr. Nansen, Part 1, *Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities between Greece and Turkey* (Geneva), November 15, 1922.

¹⁵⁵ Doc. 122, *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.

¹⁵⁶ *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Venizelos (London) to Kanellopoulos (Athens), October 17, 1922.

¹⁵⁷ *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24318/24318. Venizelos (London) to Nansen (Constantinople), October 13, 1922. Interestingly, Venizelos' telegram was dispatched before the arrival of Nansen's letter of October 10 which independently recommended the settlement of the refugees on vacant lands in Greek Macedonia and Thrace with the help of foreign loans and international relief organizations and vaguely suggested a Greek-Turkish population exchange.

¹⁵⁸ *Venizelos Archives*, 30, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 15, 1922.

¹⁵⁹ *Venizelos Archives*, 30, Venizelos (London) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 16, 1922.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*