

Terrorism in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Greece 1821-1878

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I. CONCEPTS

A. Definition and Origins

The terrorism phenomenon embodies a special form of political violence in which a lone attacker or a secret society attempts to alter the political circumstances of a state and society through assassination. Some terrorists generalize their attacks in random assaults on lesser leaders, intellectuals, or innocent civilians who in a sense become surrogates for the head of state. This definition focuses primarily upon the military nature of the terrorist attack and the sociological circumstances of the attackers. This article will consider the various aspects of terrorism including the social and psychological factors involved in creating the terrorist, the genesis of secret societies, and the newness of terrorism as a method of revolt in the Ottoman Empire and early modern Greece. Several Ottoman and Greek cases are examined to give insights into the attitudes of terrorists, and to explain the unique Ottoman perceptions of rebels and terrorists as tyrants.

A brief summary of the forces contributing to the emergence of terrorism in the nineteenth century will also shed light on its definition. The immediate predecessors of terrorism in the nineteenth century prove clearly that terrorism must not be considered solely a Middle Eastern phenomenon. It emerged from international trends with roots both in the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The derivational pattern of terrorism in the Ottoman Empire is perceptible in its progression from the vendetta to vigilantism and finally to terrorism. The sources of European influence include European revolutionary movements from

1789 to 1870 and their various sub-movements. The first and most important such movements were the nationalist messianic groups, particularly those in France, Poland, Hungary, and Italy. Nationalist revolutionism had itself fallen under the spell of an earlier, less-clearly defined revolutionism with roots in the medieval past – this revolutionary tradition being composed of secret societies, many having affinities with Freemasonry. A second category of such movements borrowed the secret society formula, developed a more socialistic or communistic orientation, and preyed upon the dissatisfaction of peasants, increasingly obsolete artisans and the poor of the industrial working class. The nationalist type revolutionism exerted the most potent influence on the Ottoman Empire, where popular discontent at the lower levels of society was still expressed by traditional forms of violence or insurrection. Only social classes having direct contact with European trends could have access to the ideas of the European revolutionary tradition, and these individuals mostly understood and identified with nationalist messianism and secret society opposition formulas.

The Ottoman sources of terrorism included the vendetta and its philosophical descendent, vigilantism. The vendetta existed in a world of extended families with rivalries which survived over generations, erupting occasionally into violence and murder. Violence in this category was not terrorism but contributed some elements of itself to the ultimate creation of terrorism. Extended families were not secret societies harboring dangerous political ideologies. The vendetta existed among these families as a purely local form of rivalry, and did not aspire to higher political ambitions. In the absence of a formal and operative penal code and lacking a functional court system, the vendetta grew as one of several custom-based social regulations which endowed this form of violence with strict limitations. All male members of one clan and its affiliates could seek retribution from the traditional enemy clan by occasional murder, permissible by an understanding of all local clans and social groups. When such killings escalated in number, and assumed a fury beyond the control of tradition, vigilantism superseded the vendetta. Like the vendetta, however, vigilantism was based upon extended rural families, or upon some rural association with links to extended families or villages. The brigand band, often consisting of unrelated or distantly-related individuals, fit loosely into the vigilante category, though it could also simply have

been an outgrowth of the traditional society which produced the vendetta. Brigands could be vigilantes when they operated solely on an ethic of violence, even when this ethic was based upon an unwritten code by which brigands, peasants, or pastoralists dealt with one another. In fact, this unwritten code was one of the factors which separated the other forms of violence from terrorism. The vendetta and vigilantism were cognate forms differing from one another. With the breakdown of the rural society ruled by the vendetta, the target of violence was no longer limited to occasional men but extended to large groups including women and children, as customary restraints were abandoned by vigilantes. The vendetta operated within a customary formula, while vigilantism actively worked to disrupt and destroy custom.

Terrorism owed the victim's and perpetrator's sense of insecurity to both the vendetta and vigilantism, while the vigilante's arrogant disdain for all customs and laws contributed immensely to the terrorist's attitudes, though in some cases to make such a point oversimplifies the perpetrator's violent emotionalism. The vigilante's hypervigilant hostility also figures prominently in the terrorist's perception of his mission. While all three forms shared potent emotional, philosophical, and ethical orientations, they differed militarily and constitutionally from one another in quite significant ways. The vendetta constituted very limited warfare in which the state of hostility defined the relationship marked by occasional, single murders. Vigilante actions still comprised what European military thinkers called "Small War" (*der kleine Krieg*, *petit guerre*, etc.). The constraints which limited murders to occasional ambushes disappeared, vigilantes waged a war of active and extensive raids against one another, and killed more indiscriminately. The terrorist was deprived in some way or other of his clan's support either by being physically removed from his extended family's alliances, or through upward or downward social mobility which destroyed the social capacity of the terrorist leaving him (or her) in fearful social circumstances, stripped of all social and cultural associations, and feeling the only escape from the violence of their circumstances was to commit political murder. The terrorist assassin of early modern Greece and the Ottoman Empire was most likely a socially – or philosophically – alienated individual who sought affiliation with like types in secret societies of one type or another. In only one case did the person act on his own initiative without the support of family or secret society (Cherkes Hasan).

The terrorist incidents which occurred in Greece and the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century differed from the political violence perpetrated by palace factions in which one faction attempted to depose another or the ruler through political assassination. Such factional rivalries in the Ottoman court – usually among slave factions – assumed the form of the vendetta, and were often described by chroniclers using the terminology of the vendetta (*intisâb*, or a political relationship based upon consanguinity or household alliance, and *intiqâm* or *intikâm*, retribution, vengeance). While faction fights at court and the rural vendetta differed significantly from one another, they both held in common a sense of limiting the rivalry to traditional enemies, and rarely went beyond those limits, except in times of profound “reform” as in the last half of the seventeenth century and the end of the eighteenth century in the Ottoman ruling elite. Even in these cases, the “reformers” continued to accept and recognize the elite household as the primary focus of political loyalty. Vigilantes originated in, but either lost or destroyed, the clan system which continued to mold their philosophical outlook. Terrorists totally ceased to accept the traditional social forms and the ideas belonging to them, often having no recourse but to do so. Islam, which has moved rapidly into the arena of terrorism since World War II appeared only weakly in the Kulelî Vak’ası, and became central only in the terrorist action of ‘Alî Suâvî. Islam did not invent the organizations or techniques of terrorism, but inherited them from its ideological predecessors, making little or no improvement upon them, and, in fact, introducing an element of amateurish clumsiness into the military aspect of the operation judging primarily from the ‘Alî Suâvî case.

B. Psychological Perspectives

Terrorism may attract individuals with many different psychological orientations, so that the terrorist did not and does not fit any one psychological profile. Two basic mind-sets are apparent, and a number of sub-types. First, some terrorists exhibit a tendency toward possessing a death-wish, or even having an inclination toward suicide.¹ Second

¹ Suicide bombers in the past fifteen years do not always fit this profile, some being blackmailed or intimidated into their suicide attack by the terrorist organization.

almost all terrorists become imbued with a sense of paranoia ranging from simple fear of capture to a full blown paranoid personality disorder expressing itself in various ways from hypervigilant defense of honor and xenophobia to the full-blown personality disorder. Sub-types vary with political movement, culture, and period, and for the Ottoman Empire and Greece at least three sub-types are distinguishable: the honor-defensive, fanatical, and nihilist types. The terrorist imposes his or her psychological state on the victim and the victim’s society so that the psychological disorder of the terrorist functions much like an infectious disease.

Only one of the cases described here exhibited any active tendency toward a death wish, that of Cherkes Hasan in 1876. This category will be examined with the specifics of the case. The incidents described below demonstrated a wide variety of psycho-social circumstances. Every effort will be made to test the hypothesis that terrorism is the product of an extremely paranoid world view, and contributes to the emergence of a powerful personality disorder in those terrorists who survive the incident. Paranoia among terrorists revolves about the specific and intense fears relating to capture and execution, whereas among victims and society paranoid fear becomes generalized, except in potential victims who know they are a mark.

The psychological origin of terrorism, in the Ottoman Empire and the fragment of Greece which made itself independent of the empire, was the hypervigilance associated with both the vendetta and vigilantism. Hypervigilant emotional states grew in intensity from the limited vendetta to the more extensive vigilante wars of the nineteenth century. A person in the grip of hypervigilance will anticipate attacks from a very real enemy living in the next village or province, and will therefore evolve a low-grade paranoid mentality which nonetheless functions on a chronic or pathological continuum of existence. This background became especially important among village migrants who had relocated in cities late in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Among the city-born terrorists described here in the 1859, 1867, and 1878 incidents, hypervigilance born of the circumstances of secret, anti-government activities contributed to the development of paranoia. This hypothesis seems to have become true in most cases. The infectious spread of paranoia appeared most prominently in the actions of the sultans and government leaders, who had been the primary targets of all these attacks. Such a comment was particularly

true of 'Abdülhâmid II, whose autocracy (*istbdâd*) was partly the result of paranoid fear, created by both the empire's disintegration and terrorist plots or other conspiracies which erupted at the beginning of his reign.

Paranoid personality disorder is defined by the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, fourth edition (*DSM 4*) in the following manner. "The essential feature of Paranoid Personality Disorder is a pattern of distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent."² A paranoid personality assumes that others will exploit, deceive, or harm him or her, and the actions or thoughts of others are minutely examined for signs of hostile intentions. The diagnostic criteria for paranoid personality disorder are 1) deep suspicion of others, 2) obsession with doubts about the loyalty of others, 3) reluctance to confide in others, 4) discovery of hidden, threatening or demeaning meanings in most or all remarks of others, 5) absolute unwillingness to forgive insults, 6) readiness to counterattack all perceived attacks, regardless of the imagined enemy's actual intent, and 7) suspicion of friends, wives or husbands, and close associates even when not justified.³ Paranoid personality disorder develops separately from schizophrenia, and is usually the product of environmental conditions. Other personality disorders caused by environmental factors can also contribute to paranoid personality, including Antisocial Personality Disorder or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Psychological sub-types relative to the particular incidents described here were all relative to the particular circumstances of time, place, and political or social currents of the nineteenth-century eastern Mediterranean. These sub-categories existed specifically inside the Ottoman Empire and early modern Greece, but similar forms might also be perceived elsewhere.

Sub-type A is described here as the honor-defensive form, and appears as an idiosyncrasy since the psychological perspective belonged

² *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition*, Washington, D. C., 1994, p. 634 (hereafter *DSM 4*).

³ *DSM 4*, pp. 637-38. See also: Emil Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, R. Mary Barclay (tr.) (Edinburgh, 1921) pp. 207-77 (hereafter *MDIP*). Most psychological literature does not discuss the interrelationship of delusions of persecution and individuals involved in secret societies whose activities would give them cause to fear actual persecution. In many cases it seems likely that the delusion could be created by the long-term persistence of a definite reality.

primarily to the vendetta or vigilantism, where defense of personal and community honor served as paramount motives in attacks upon enemies or rivals. Some unusual circumstance removed the perpetrator from his community, and placed him in an uncharacteristic environment. The murder of Ioannes Capodistrias by the Mavromichaloi must be associated with this category. These individuals simply extended the feud mentality they maintained among themselves and their rivals from the Mani to their attitudes toward Capodistrias, who never lived in an extended kinship society afflicted by the vendetta. The Cherkes Hasan attack on the ministers of the Ottoman state may have been motivated by this mentality. Cherkes Hasan was raised in the Caucasian world of the feud and vendetta, but transported to Istanbul, and elevated in stature to a kinsman of the Ottoman sultan. He was stripped of the kinship support system which produced the vendetta-vigilante action, but carried the values of that system into his political relations with those whom he attacked. Vigilantism or even the vendetta could easily evolve into terrorism through the commission of murder in unusual circumstances, such as the marking of an unusual political target, or the application of the custom-oriented mentality by an individual removed by space and social relations from village and extended kin. The ethic of this terrorist-type can be defined as one of "primal honor," which was an archaic psycho-social attitude "kept alive by the exigencies of an inhospitable, dangerous world."⁴ This awareness of defending honor

⁴ Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Honor and Violence in the Old South* (Oxford, 1986) p. 27. Even though Wyatt-Brown referred to the antebellum American South, where "masters had to rule in fear," the concept is still valid for a different society, in which individuals and communities were undergoing rapid changes in their social status, felt threatened, and invoked the need to protect their honor through violence in one form or another. Consult also Wyatt-Brown's bibliographical essay at the back of his book which cites other works placing the issue of honor on a comparative scale from Mediterranean societies to Europe to the New World: pp. 249-51. The influence of the vendetta and the associated desire for avenging honor may be seen as an archaic kernel in the formative years of the Georgian revolutionary Djugashvili [Stalin]. Djugashvili, who took the pseudonym Koba during his early years as a revolutionary, read stories of his heroes Koba, Shamil, and others who fought to save friends and family, and waged war against the onslaught of Russia. This traditional sense of honor idealized by the young Djugashvili became an ethic for his revolutionary terrorism in later years. See: Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality* (New York, 1973) pp. 79-82.

in a hostile world produced a chronic low or medium condition of paranoia in all the diagnostic criteria from 1 to 7.

Sub-type B is defined as the fanatical form. A fanatic "believes himself to be in possession of *the* truth, which confers upon him omniscience, omnipotence, and invulnerability – all superhuman conditions." The commentators also reveal that "The feeling of omnipotence is accompanied by a narcissistic thrill at the idea of being among the elect of God or history. This elation could heal the anxiety of individuals injured by life, who have not been given enough security. The paranoid-dichotomic system – true-false, black-white, friend-enemy – engenders a radicalization of thought, channeling aggression toward an enemy."⁵ In this radicalization formulated into diametrically-opposed antipodes, one finds fertile ground for the development of paranoia. Fanatical attitudes expressed through aggressive attacks may thus have roots in paranoid personality disorder. "Aggressiveness against the designated enemy forges unity, but persecution feelings arise in the expectation that the projected aggression will be returned like a boomerang. Thus, paranoia takes root in an increasingly closed world, engendering violence."⁶

The case of ʿAlī Suavī (1878) belongs to this category. The late twentieth-century inclination to equate Islam with terrorism in its fanatical form is not valid for this period at least. While Suavī was a fanatical Muslim, religious fanaticism existed in other environmental circumstances as well which did not result in terrorism. The Wahhabi movements (Arabia, Syria, India), the revolt of the Bāb in Iran, Shāmil's Muridism, anti-colonialist movements in French North Africa, and Sudanese Mahdism exhibited elements of fanaticism or messianism, but violence associated with them did not take the form of terrorism. In some, or even most, of these instances the Islamic law of war was misconstrued or improperly applied, thus converting the action from a legally-sanctioned Small War to an action taken by vigilantes interpreting Islamic law to fit their own circumstances. As long as the groups named did not function as secret societies sending assassins to kill political figures as the sole tactic of confrontation, then

⁵ André Haynal, Miklos Molnar, Gérard de Puymège, *Fanaticism: A Historical and Psychoanalytic Study*, Linda Butler Koseoglu (tr.) (New York, 1983) p. 36 (hereafter *F*). Though not a significant part of this discussion, this statement also points toward racism as a form of paranoid fanaticism.

⁶ *F*, p. 68.

their military actions cannot be described as terrorism. Wahhabism, though compelled by a powerful fanaticism, remained within the confines of an accepted Hanbalī legal tradition with roots in the medieval past.

Nationalist messianism also belonged to the category of fanaticism, and may be seen as a compelling force in some individuals, especially by the outside influences of European nationalism. The model of nationalist messianism could inspire other ideologues with non-nationalist political beliefs, so that the patterns of influence from Europe to the Ottoman Empire proved very complicated indeed. Various movements with messianic or chiliastic overtones which did not have a nationalistic ideology, but formed on the basis of the Masonic-type secret society, also figure into the picture at this point.

Sub-type C constitutes the nihilist form and is exhibited by individuals who lost their social identity through some process of alienation or social mobility. Persons in this group were perhaps the most common plotters and would-be assassins in the nineteenth century. The nihilists might have developed a new ideology or political philosophy to replace what they lost through alienation. Often, these ideologies appeared as artificial composites of borrowed or imitated ideas, but they originated in the very real social and psychological concerns of those alienated persons, who otherwise possessed no other means of expressing their concerns. A person with a nihilistic perspective would not necessarily be motivated toward a paranoid direction, though alienation and the accompanying *anómia* or *anomie* might produce environmental circumstances conducive to paranoia. *Anomie*, or "normlessness," can cause a condition of paranoia in that the person who recognizes no law or societal norm, but creates his or her own new values with only situational applications, is intimidated by the moral force of universal or conventional norms, and fears the retribution of the defenders of those conventional institutions. The nihilist afflicted by *anomie* could thus commit crimes or terrorist acts without feeling the need to justify them by any superior law or norm, but would also keep that crime or its intention secret to the point of paranoia.⁷

⁷ Marco Orrù, *Anomie: History and Meanings*, (Boston, 1987) pp. 14-19; 94-163; Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, Jessie Coulson (tr.) (New York, 1975) pp. 55-56.

II. REVOLUTIONARY SECRET SOCIETIES

A brief comment upon secret societies and their relationship to the Ottoman Empire will assist in the understanding of terrorism as a phenomenon. Secret societies did not exist as part of the natural configuration of the traditional rural community or extended family-clan of the Ottoman Empire. The first secret societies were the mystical orders of the Bektashîs, Mevlevîs, °Alevîs, Hurûfîs, Nakshibendîs, and many others in and outside the Ottoman Empire. None of these secret societies produced terrorism in the period prior to the nineteenth century, but if Kraepelin's hypothesis concerning apocalyptic and messianic visions is correct,⁸ some degree of paranoia might have been associated with the doctrines of these groups, or the messages of their leaders, among which dream visions of this type could be found in plenitude. These mystical orders did not develop as secret political groups having the intention to overthrow the existing order of state or society through political violence. Only in the nineteenth century, when Bektashîism was outlawed, did such orders develop an overt political purpose which might have contributed to political violence.⁹

⁸ MDIP, pp. 215-16.

⁹ For the attachment of a nineteenth-century Ottoman official to the mystical life, see: Carter V. Findlay, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, 1989) pp. 178-87, who evaluates the case of Ashçî Dede Ibrahim Halil's membership in various *dervîsh* order; idem, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life, as Seen in the Memoirs of Ashçî Dede Halil Ibrahim," *Economie et sociétés dans l'Empire ottoman (fin du XVIIIe-début du XXe siècle)*, Jean-Louis Bacqué-Gammont, Paul Dumont (eds.) (Paris, 1983) 129-44. The Shaykh al-Islâm Ahmed Arif Hikmet Bey Efendi (1786-1854) who was not a secular official, participated in some of the secularizing reforms of the Tanzîmât, and also was affiliated with the Nakshibendî Order. His mystical poetry is published with a commentary by Mahir Aydin, "Sheyhülislâm Ahmed Arif Hikmet Beyefendi," *Belleten*, 54 (1990) 245-60; Irène Mélikoff, "L'ordre des Bektashî après 1826," *Turcica*, 15 (1983) 156 wrote "A partir de 1826, l'ordre des Bektashî sera obligé de rentrer dans la clandestinité." This secrecy was attained by affiliating with the Masonic Lodge under the patronage of the French and British ambassadors. See: Bedi N. Shehsüvaroglu, "Türkiye Masonluk Bir Bakış," in *Türk Yükseltme Cemiyeti Ideal Kolu*, XXV. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Hatıra (Istanbul, 1964); İlhami Soysal, *Türkiye ve Dünyada Masonluk ve Masonlar* (Istanbul, 1978) pp. 168-72. Sherif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, (Princeton, 1962) (hereafter GYOT) p. 116, note 26 cites the membership of certain high

The relationship between freemasonry and Islamic mystical orders in the nineteenth century paralleled a similar development in Europe where freemasons became involved in the formation of revolutionary secret societies. The parallelism was inspired in some degree by limited direct contacts, as in the case of Bektashîism surviving under the protection of the British and French Masonic lodges. The extent to which European ideas penetrated Ottoman society through the medium of these Masonic lodges remains to be studied, but some interrelationship was evident in the Istanbul lodges to which high Ottoman officials belonged. These person were not revolutionaries or terrorists under any definition of that term during the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁰

A revolutionary secret society called the *Philike Hetaireia* [Φιλική Εταιρεία] emerged in Greece and among the Greek Diaspora in

Ottoman officials in the Freemason lodge of Istanbul, including Alî Pasha and Mustafâ Fâzîl Pasha (also pp. 288-89 for Namîk Kemal's early attraction to Bektashi beliefs and ideas). See also Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1994) pp. 33-34. Both Çelik and Mardin cite Ebüziyya Tevfik, "Farmasonluk," *Mecmua-i Ebüziyya*, 18 Cemiazûlahir, 1329/1911, pp. 683-86 as a source.

¹⁰ Freemasonry may be found in the history of many European revolutionary societies in the nineteenth century. The *Carbonari* began as a branch of Italian Freemasonry: Massimo Salvadori, *Cavour and the Unification of Italy* (Princeton, 1961) p. 31. Masonic affiliations also existed among members of the Greek revolutionary society, the *Philike Hetaireia*, according to Ioannes Loukas, *Historía tes Hellenikés Masonías kai Helleniké Historía* (Athens, 1991) pp. 80-89. On the significant issue of freemasonry and revolutionary secret societies in Poland see: Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918* (Seattle, 1974) pp. 82-87 and the associated bibliography; the Anarchist Bakunin became a Freemason in 1845 and again in 1864-67: Paul Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits* (Princeton, 1988) p. 46; Anthony Masters, *Bakunin, The Father of Anarchism* (New York, 1974) p. 161. On the role of Freemasonry in the development of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia see: Marc Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility* (New York, 1966) pp. 159-67; Philip Pomper, *The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia* (Arlington Heights IL, 1970) pp. 15-19; Woodford McClellan, *Revolutionary Exiles: The Russians in the First International and the Paris Commune* (London, 1979) p. 3. See also: Frank L. Klement, *Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War* (Baton Rouge, 1984) p. 1 and passim for the United States.

Russia and Europe under the influence of similar societies in Europe, and perhaps with an eye toward attracting Greek Orthodox pietists. The *Philike Hetaireia* included members with an association to freemasonry.¹¹ *Philike Hetaireia* documents prove that members identified their association as a secret society [μυστική εταιρεία].¹² Those who joined took an oath [ὄρκος] which resembled initiation into a mystery cult. Protopsaltes cited a "Great Oath" in which the initiate promised to guard the secret [φυλάξει μυστικόν] even to the extreme of sacrificing his life in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit [εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος]¹³ as though the oath-swearer were saying a prayer or making a vow in church. The many documents related to the *Philike Hetaireia* also illustrate fully the secret nature of the organization, as in the documents of Protopsaltes¹⁴ or the secret paragraphs attributed to Emmanouil Xanthos.¹⁵ This *Philike Hetaireia* spread throughout Greece, and moved to various levels of Greek society, serving as one of the predisposing factors in the eruption of the 1821 Greek Revolution.¹⁶ While certain military activities in the beginning of the Greek Revolution such as partisan raids or clandestine thefts of military stores

¹¹ C. M. Woodhouse, "Kapodistrias and the *Philike Etairia*, 1814-21," in Richard Clogg (ed.) *The Struggle for Greek Independence, Essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence* (London, 1973) p. 106. "... and the *Philiki Etairia* itself was patterned on ideas of Freemasonry, though with significant differences." Woodhouse based his comment upon P. G. Kritikos, "O Ioannis Kapodistrias tekton Kanonikos," *O Eranistis*, 3 (1965) 136.

¹² The words appear in: "Tetradion astaxoton," in E. G. Protopsaltes (ed.), *He Philike Hetaireia, Anamnestikon Teuxos epi te 150 eteridi* (Athens, 1964) p. 245 and elsewhere.

¹³ "Orkos Megas," in "Tetradion astaxaton," in E. G. Protopsaltes (ed.), *He Philike Hetaireia, Anamnestikon Teuxos epi te 150 eteridi* (Athens, 1964) p. 248.

¹⁴ E. G. Protopsaltes (ed.), *He Philike Hetaireia, Anamnestikon Teuxos epi te 150 eteridi* (Athens, 1964) copy facing p. 134, and p. 245, transliteration.

¹⁵ Emmanouil Xanthos, *Apomnemoneumata peri tes Philikes Etairias* (Athens, 1845) pp. 236-39.

¹⁶ George D. Frangos, "The *Philike Etairia*: A Premature National Coalition," in Richard Clogg (ed.) *The Struggle for Greek Independence, Essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence* (London, 1973) pp. 104-34.

may have been inspired by the *Philike Hetaireia*, terrorism does not seem to have been a factor. The growth of this Greek revolutionary secret society on Ottoman lands nonetheless demonstrates that modern political movements inside the Ottoman Empire could and did assume the form of the secret society.

As for the terrorist incidents described below, three of them, and the Skalieri komitesi possessed some form of secret, underground organization. In the Kuleli and Young Ottoman conspiracies, secret organization was informal, and rudimentary. The division between secular and religious conspirators in the Kuleli conspiracy suggested possibilities for a breakdown into at least two distinct cells, but no evidence exists to suggest that such cells were ever formed. The Young Ottoman conspiracy seems to have been amateur terrorism at best, with conspirators meeting publicly in a picnic, and lacking any security mechanism for preventing the spread of the secret plot to friends and associates of the conspirators. Nonetheless, the very intention of a secretly-planned coup does fit loosely into the category of secret societies.

The Suavi coup was the first of the incidents described below to develop a clandestine political organization subdivided into secret cells. The need to publish messages in code in newspapers suggests that the only means of communication from the leader to all of the associated and exclusive cells was not through a general meeting of all conspirators, but through a communiqué known to each individual group. Therefore, cells rather than an undifferentiated membership existed. The speed and effectiveness with which secret societies and operations moved is illustrated by the Skalieri plot of 1878 which intended to depose 'Abdülhâmid II and reinstate Murâd V. The Greek freemason Cleanthes Skalieres, a wealthy man and a friend of Murâd V with links in the British and French embassies through their masonic lodges, received a message from the disturbed Murâd V asking to be returned to the Chiragan Palace after the Suavi coup. A new coup was designed which involved various Ottoman masons, a Nakshibendî servant of the imperial household, and others. It was ultimately betrayed and foiled.¹⁷

¹⁷ Ismail Hakkî Uzunçarshili, "V. Murad'ı tekrar padishah yapmak isteyen K. Skalieri-Aziz Bey Komitesi," *Belleten*, 8 (1944) 245-328 contains many original documents on this affair.

III. INCIDENTS AND PATTERNS

A. Vigilantism with Implications for Terrorism

Dilessi Murders (1870, Greece) – vigilante act with implications for terrorism. The Dilessi murders clearly belonged to the category of vigilantism or, at the very least, must be called a brigand criminal act. Vlach and Sarakatsan brigands captured a party of Britons and one Italian for ransom as they traveled along the road from Athens to Marathon on April 11, 1870. These tourists had no political significance for the brigands and their political bosses in Athens do not seem to have targeted these British tourists as important political or ideological marks. The women and a six-year old girl were released, while the men were retained. One of the men, Lord Muncaster, was released with a message demanding ransom. He traveled to Athens with a peasant guide, and urgently negotiated on behalf of his captive companions. Frederick Vyner, Edward Lloyd, a Piedmontese noble named Count Alberto de Boyl, and Edward Herbert, secretary of the British legation at Athens, remained hostage. Muncaster and the other hostages had agreed to pay a hefty ransom for their release and Muncaster went to Athens to obtain the money in English pounds. The brigands later added as a condition of release that they should be granted amnesty.

Negotiations between the brigand chiefs, Christos and Takos Arvanitakes and two other Arvanitakes brothers, and a Greek army officer, Lt. Col. Basil Theagenis, accompanied by Mr. Frank Noel, centered on the issues of ransom and amnesty. When amnesty was refused, the bandits intended to ask for safe passage on a British ship to non-Greek territory where Greek jurisdiction did not reach. Not realizing this last intention, Theagenis became alarmed when the brigands moved their captives without informing him. Troops had been posted in positions surrounding the brigands, and on the road to the Ottoman border. They began to close in upon the brigands and their prize, causing Arvanitakes and his men to panic. They rode rapidly across the Dilessi plain intending to cross the border into Ottoman territory. When their captives could not keep their pace, the brigands murdered them one by one until all were dead. A battle ensued between the troops and the fleeing bandits in which Christos Arvanitakes was killed, Takos was wounded, but escaped, six other brigands died fighting, and six more were taken prisoner. All the others escaped

The six captives were placed on trial and executed, with their severed heads displayed in public and photographed.¹⁸

This incident definitely does not fit into the category of terrorism, and properly speaking was an act of brigandage. Charles Tuckerman, United States ambassador to Greece in 1870, published a pamphlet about the problem of brigandage in Greece, stating that the Klepht had changed from the "defender of his country" to the "mere mountain robber of today."¹⁹ Tuckerman thought that peasants became brigands because "they were forced, or thought themselves forced, by circumstances, to take to the mountains to escape worse trials at home. A family quarrel, a homicide, the result of a drinking-house brawl, escape from arrest for some petty offense, desertion from the army, and similar causes, have induced men, otherwise peaceable and well-disposed, to become brigands."²⁰ Tuckerman observed further that²¹

"The disposition to shed blood is foreign to their purpose; but their prestige is only preserved by taking the life of the captive if the ransom, or an equivalent to it, is not forthcoming. They bind themselves so to do by an acknowledged law, and so well is this understood that the ransom is always paid by the friends of the captive, the amount being decided by negotiation, which, in some cases, requires several months. The exception to this course is most rare, and never in Greece was there such an exception so unforeseen and so bloody in its consequences as that which so lately transpired [the Dilessi murders]. In this case, the brigands believed that they were 'betrayed', and under a sense of disappointment and anger resolved that their prisoners should not be forced from them. The latter were warned that their lives depended upon their physical

¹⁸ Crosby Stevens (ed.), *Ransom and Murder in Greece: Lord Muncaster's Journal, 1870* (Cambridge, 1989) (hereafter *RMG*); Romilly Jenkins, *The Dilessi Murders* (London, 1961) pp. 22-74, 124-25 (hereafter *DM*).

¹⁹ Charles Tuckerman, "Brigandage in Greece, A Paper Addressed by Mr. Chas. Tuckerman, United States Minister at Athens, to Mr. Fish," *RMG*, p. 129 (hereafter "BIG").

²⁰ "BIG," p. 129.

²¹ "BIG," p. 130.

ability to keep pace with them in their flight, and had it been possible for them to do so they would have been alive to-day."

The brigands acted merely according to their customary procedure and the code of the mountains, as it were, when they killed hostages who could not keep pace. Consequently, this killing did not have a political purpose, was not supported by a secret society, and did not use the tactical techniques of terrorist strikes.

In spite of the relegation of this act to brigandage pure and simple, several facts show that the Dilessi murders prefigured terrorism. First, brigands in Greece operated under the protection of a political boss in Athens, who used them to coerce the electorate during elections or to achieve some other political purpose, since 1844. In this case, the minister of war, Skarlatos Soutzos, was considered the culprit, since he was "Notorious for connections with brigands."²² Ottoman generals were likewise known for their use of brigands in assisting them to gain control of the countryside.²³ Such an association between politician and brigand could easily evolve into an affiliation between politician and terrorist when removed from the peasant culture of the countryside, and transplanted to an uprooted social class [of workers or artisans]. Second, the victims in this case were quite unusual. They were Europeans, and two of them served in foreign legations based in Athens. Such targets could easily have been altered into political symbols by their captors or their captors' backers. Third, the outcry against brigandage in Greece which appeared in the British, French, and German press in 1870 provoked a nationalist apologetic among middle class Greeks embarrassed by the incident. The elevation of the event into a frenzied journalistic debate [the twentieth century would call it

²² *RMG*, p. 187. Ponsonby to Gladstone, Osbourne, 28 April, 1870, *RMG*, p. 147. An anonymous report published in *The Observer*, Athens, June 11, 1870, pp. 132-33, claimed a duel had occurred between the Baron de Baude and General Soutzos, but later retracted this claim, nonetheless asserting that Baude did insult Soutzos for his involvement in the affair of the brigands. John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912* (Oxford, 1987) p. 183; *DM*, p. 7.

²³ Hobart Pasha, "Letter to the Editor of *The Times*, 24 April, 1870," *RMG*, p. 122, and Stevens' comment on p. 121.

a media event] proved most reminiscent of the ideological struggles spawned by acts of terrorism.²⁴

B. Terrorist Acts 1821-1878.

Introduction.

Two social and psychological questions will be examined in this portion of the article. First, what role did anomía play in the emergence of terrorism as a method of tactical confrontation? Second, to what extent did paranoia cause or result from the terrorist acts themselves? Most of these events have been described elsewhere at length. The role of this paper is to demonstrate just how much these acts of violence belonged to the category of terrorism, and the extent to which they exhibited the social and psychological factors described above.

Space does not permit an examination of the interrelationship of these events with European trends at the same time. This issue will be discussed at greater length in a forthcoming book. A short note to illustrate the connection in at least one of the incidents will suffice for the present. The revolutions of 1848 exerted the strongest influence upon the Ottoman Empire, not only because there were disturbances in the Principalities, but also because many political refugees who played a role in the 1848 movements found asylum in the Ottoman army. Polish and Hungarian expatriates in particular took high rank in the Ottoman Empire, with a sprinkling of other nationalities. The Crimean War (1853-56) brought even more European soldiers-of-fortune, some of whom had been revolutionaries, into the Ottoman army. In addition, British officers assumed *de facto* positions of control in the Ottoman army, and defied the corrupt pashas who had allowed the Anatolian army to endure hardships due to lack of supplies, and who had led these armies to defeat. At least one of the Kuleli conspirators came under the influence of both Polish/Hungarian revolutionary exiles and British officers defying the army high command. Direct European influences are more difficult to demonstrate in other instances, even in the case of 'Alî Suâvî who lived in exile in Europe for a number of years. The only other example of direct European influence

²⁴ Ioannes Gennadios, "Extracts from *Notes on the Recent Murders by Brigands in Greece*," *RMG*, pp. 154-66.

might be found in the case of Cléanthes Skaliéres, who belonged to Masonic lodges in Istanbul with European connections.

Analysis

Assassination of Kapodistrias (1831, Greece). The assassination of the first President of Greece, Ioánnes Kapodístrias, by members of the Mavromichalis family, must be considered a terrorist act based upon a vendetta mentality. The reason it belongs to the category of terrorism is its unusual nature. The Mavromichaloi were not involved in a feud with a rival clan, or an internal family vendetta. They attacked the official head of the Greek government. Therefore, even though their motives originated in the protection of their family, as in the vendetta, they did not wage a minor war with the Kapodistrias family. They simply attacked the president in order to release their relative Petro Bey from prison.

Petro Bey, head of the Mavromichalis clan, held the office of senator in the fledgling Greek assembly. Members of his clan in Mani waged a vigilante war with rival clans in defiance of the Greek government. When Petro Bey agitated to receive payment of the clan's claims for its role in the Greek war of independence, Kapodistrias used the claim and the vigilante war as an excuse for incarcerating Petro Bey. Petro Bey's brother Konstantinos and his young son Giorgios were permitted to go freely about Nauplion, but remained under guard. Full details of the family's plottings have been discussed elsewhere, but it seems that the two relatives discussed the attack with Petro Bey through the window of his cell. Konstantinos and Giorgios attacked Kapodistrias on Sunday morning, October 9, 1831 as he exited the church of Saint Spyridon. The son stabbed Kapodistrias in the stomach, and the father, Konstantinos shot the president in the head. Konstantinos the father was hanged immediately by those present, while Giorgios was captured only after a chase, tried, and executed.²⁵

²⁵ Theódoros Kolokotrónes, *Diegesis Symbanton tes Hellenikes Phyles Apomnemoneúmata* (Athen, n.d.) pp. 272-74 (hereafter *DSHP*); Konstantinos Metaxás, *Historiká Apomnemoneúmata ek tes Hellenikés Epanastaseós*, Emmanouel Protpsantes (ed.), *Apomnemoneúmata Agoniston tou 21*, 6 (Athens, 1956) pp. 190-91; Anagnóstes Kontákes, *Apomnemoneúmata Emmanouel Protpsantes (ed.) Apomnemoneúmata Agoniston tou 21*, 11 (Athens, 1957) p. 72; C. M. Woodhouse, *Kapodistria: The Founder of Greek Independence*

Even though this assassination did not fit into the concept of the vendetta – Kapodistrias was not killed in retribution for the murder or killing of the assassin's relative – some commentators viewed the act as such.²⁶

Τότε αὐτοὺς τοὺς καταφρόνεσε πολὺ ὁ κυβερνήτης καὶ τὰ ἀδελφία του, ἀνθρώπους μὲ μεγάλους ἀγῶνες θυσίες στὴν πατρίδα. Ἀποφάσισαν νὰ σκοτώσουνε τὸν κυβερνήτη νὰ πεθάνουν.

"Then the ruler and his brothers scorned them, men who fought and sacrificed much for their fatherland. They decided to kill the ruler and die [themselves]."

Makrygiánnes wrote as though the Mavromichaloi and Kapodistrias clashed as a consequence of vendetta entanglements. Petro Bey wrote in his testament of 1842 as if his family acted to protect his honor.²⁷

"I suffered unreasonable insults and unjust imprisonment with stoic calm. But what afflicted and still afflicts my heart, and what I cannot pass over in silence, is the reply John Kapodistria made to me when I was talking to him about various matters. 'You and a couple of dozen others are the ruin of Greece!' he said – meaning the leaders in power and in action, who fought for the freedom of the nation and led the struggle for seven whole years. 'But, Your Excellency', I replied with a bitter smile, 'all the Greeks followed these destroyers of the nation, and fought against the tyrants and threw off their yoke.'"

(London, 1973) pp. 498-503 (hereafter *CFG*) gives a full account of the circumstances. See also: G. Daphnes, *Ioánnes A. Kapodístrias, He Génese tou Hellenikou Krátous* (Athens, 1975) pp. 579-607 which discusses the events leading to the assassination and the event itself; Dionysios A. Mantzoulínos, *Ioánnes Kapodístrias (1776-1831)* (Athens, 1990) B, pp. 891-921, which is less well documented.

²⁶ Makrygiánnes, *Apomnemoneumata*, Speros Asdraxas (ed.) (Athens, n.d.) p. 311.

²⁷ *CFG*, p. 503, citing D. Gatopoulos, *Ioánnis Kapodístrias*, (Athens, 1932) p. 219.

Petro Bey's statement also went beyond the honor-defensive mentality, and ascribed his family's actions to a spirit of proto-nationalistic patriotism. Men who had sacrificed family members in the war against the alien conqueror and tyrant now came under the governance of one [Kapodistrias] who had lived outside Greece at the time of the war, and had never fired a shot or shed blood during the conflict.²⁸

These actions displayed a degree of paranoia, but not a complete normlessness. The fighters in the revolutionary war viewed Kapodistrias as an alien to some extent, and in this attitude existed [paranoid] xenophobia, which might have had a psychological connection to the war against the Ottoman army and state. Petro Bey's testament thus clearly demonstrates that an interrelationship between the war of independence, the rejection of foreigners, and the targeting of Kapodistrias could be determined. Xenophobic paranoia originates in a social condition, notably in a circumstance of tight-knit provincial communities unwilling or unable to accept foreign influences of any type. Social paranoia could result, but such a society could still maintain norms and customs, and, in fact, might elevate certain norms to a position of rigid and inflexible importance to the exclusion of any new influences.

Kuleli Vak'ası (1859, Ottoman Empire). The Kuleli conspiracy originated as a secret society intending to depose or assassinate the sultan. This plot was based upon and linked to the 1848 Revolutions in Europe (Hungary and Poland) as well as Islam. Forty persons belonged to the secret society which plotted the overthrow of 'Abdülmejid.²⁹ A document relating to the conspiracy portrayed the plot in traditional terms. "*Bazı eshasın saltanatı seniyye aleyhinde ikai fitne ve fesat kasdiyle bir ittifaki hafi teshkil etmiş ildukları*."³⁰ ["Some persons with the intention of stirring rebellion against the exalted sultanate,

²⁸ See also Kolokotrónes' comment on the Mavromichaloi in *DSHP*, p. 270 who says: Ἀὕτῃ ἡ φαμελιά ὅπου ἔχυσε πολὺ αἷμα διὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μας – "This family is a family which shed much blood for our liberty."

²⁹ *Ceride-i Havâdis*, No. 953, (24 Safer, 1276/1859), p. 1 used the term *cemiyet* ["society"] cited in Ulug Igdemir (ed.) *Kuleli Vak'ası: Hakkında bir Arashtırma*, (Ankara, 1937) p. 4 (hereafter KV). The documents associated with the affair used various terms including *cemiyet*, *ittifâk*, and *ittihâd*: KV, pp. 46 [*cemiyeti ittifak* and *cemiyet*], 43, 44 respectively.

³⁰ KV, p. 43, pl. I, line 1 of the main text.

formed a secret society"]. The inadequacy of Ottoman explanations concerning events of new types is quite apparent in these documents. The archaic and archetypal terminology of the chronicle tradition was used to explain events which pre-modern chroniclers could never have described accurately under the constraints of archaic vocabulary. Ottoman chroniclers employed the phrase *fitne ve fesâd* to describe a rebel who destroyed the balance of the cosmic world order. *Fitne* denoted "rebellion," while *fesâd* meant "seditious depravity," a spiritual trait given to sinners and representatives of Satan.³¹

The groups and individuals who joined the plot did not belong to traditional social categories devoted to rebels. The army officers and secular officials in this fledgling secret society did not belong to any of the traditional palace factions as far as can be ascertained. They belonged neither to the sultan's family nor to any network of powerful slave households. These military men and officials did not lead provincial revolts as rural or traditional urban notables. If Janissary officers revolted in the past, they still belonged officially to the system associated with the sultan's household, and their revolt assumed the identity of a palace coup on most occasions. The role of the Muslim segment in the conspiracy also seems new. If Muslim leaders had created factional disturbances in Istanbul in the past, they did not seek alliances with individuals who represented non-Islamic, secular interests, and rarely did these Muslim factions seek to enter into the politics of the imperial household. Indeed, the newness of such an underground society so influenced the conspirators themselves that they seem to have joined together in a highly idiosyncratic society comprised of political factions aiming for two very different goals – reform and anti-[westernizing] reform.

One of the chief military conspirators – the major-general [*ferik*] Cherkes Hüseyin Dâim Pasha – received inspiration to conspire against the sultan through his connection with both 1848 revolutionary exiles and the British officers who organized the Ottoman army of Kars in 1855, and who in the process deposed two Ottoman *mushîrs* or field-m Marshals. Disillusionment with the Ottoman government and army appeared great at the time of Kars' surrender to the Russians. Many

³¹ KV, pp. 43 [*fitne ve fesat*], 44 [*efkari fesadiyede ittihat ederek, cemiyeti fesadiye*] 47-48 [*cemiyeti fesadiyenin*] 54, 61 [*fesadi isyani*] 62 [*bir ittifaki fesadi*] 63, 65.

Ottoman officers and soldiers blamed the Ottoman government and army high command for failing to relieve the Kars garrison from its long ordeal of war and starvation, even though the means for doing so had been available. Dr. Humphry Sandwith, garrison surgeon during the siege at Kars, recorded this scene at the surrender:³²

"Nov. 28 [1855] – Early this morning the sounds of musketry are heard in all parts of the camp. The soldiers are emptying their muskets and piling arms. The people and the army have now learned that they are to capitulate; the word *teslim* (capitulation) is in every mouth, and what a scene is this! The poor staggering soldiers obey their orders mechanically, but some there are who dash their muskets to pieces against the rocks, exclaiming, 'Thus perish our pashas, and the curse of God be with them! May their mothers be outraged!' Some of the officers break their swords, and caring not who hears them, heap curses on the Sultan, and the whole government of the empire – awful words, which I had never heard even whispered before."

Sandwith's reference to officers must have included Hüseyin Pasha, who served as second-in-command to the ex-Hungarian revolutionary general, Jerzy Kmety [Ismâ'il Pasha] who, together with Hüseyin, had fought so courageously in defeating the massive Russian assault on Kars on September 29, 1855.³³ In addition to these

³² Humphry Sandwith, *A Narrative of the Siege of Kars*, (London, 1856) p. 305. See also Colonel Atwell Lake, *Narrative of the Defence of Kars, Historical and Military*, London: Richard Bentley, 1857, pp. 304-05, noting a sense of betrayal and depression among the Ottoman troops. Lake was not only an eyewitness but a key officer in the defense of Kars.

³³ Much information exists on Hüseyin Pasha: William Fenwick Williams to the Earl of Clarendon, Kars, October 3, 1855, Captain Sayer (comp), *Despatches and Papers Relative to the Campaigns in Turkey, Asia Minor, and the Crimea* (London, 1857) No. 139, p. 339, notes Hüseyin ably assisted in the defense of Tahmâsp Tâbya on September 29; Anonymous [probably General Kmety] *Kars and Its Defenders, The Campaign of Asia Minor* (London, 1857) (hereafter *KD*) p. 42, describes Kmety's role in the same battle; Humphry Sandwith, *A Narrative of the Siege of Kars* (London, 1856) pp. 271-72, 282; Colonel Atwell Lake, "Letter," in Atwell Lake, *Kars and Our Captivity in Russia*, (London, 1856) (hereafter *KOCR*) 3, p. 212; General William Fenwick Williams, "Letter, Kars, 10.3.55," *KOCR*, pp. 22-23.

stirring examples of revolutionary conspiracy and defiance of authority within the circle of Hüseyin's military colleagues, there was the model of General William Fenwick Williams, British Commissioner to the army of Kars in 1854-1855, who investigated Zarfî Mustafa Pasha's corrupt practices, and almost single-handedly had the *mushîr* deposed and brought before a military court-martial in which the Ottoman general and some of his colleagues were convicted.³⁴ Cherkes Hüseyin Dâim Pasha had been accepted by the European officers of the Kars garrison as one of the few able Ottoman generals, had demonstrated courage and ability during the siege of Kars, and must have participated in the anti-government sentiment encouraged by the European officers, and fostered by the Kars garrison's needless starvation during the autumn months of 1855.

The Islamic component of this conspiracy had its center in the *medrese*, or Islamic university, attached to the Sultân Bâyezîd mosque in Istanbul. A teacher and Muslim scholar from this *medrese* named Shaikh Ahmed had preached against the Ottoman reform decrees of 1839 and 1856. He urged upon his pupils and followers the course of restoring the Islamic religious law, the *sharî'at*, as the constitutional form of the Ottoman state and Ottoman society. This component of the conspiracy proved unusual as well, since the Islamic rebels in this case did not ostensibly belong to a heterodox Islamic group and, in fact, constituted members of the intelligentsia who were disenchanted with the Ottoman government, and the sultan in particular.³⁵

The Kulelî conspiracy was thwarted before the conspirators were able to depose the sultan and its members subjected to summary trials. Even though no terrorist incident occurred the plot was orchestrated by a secret society which did not, however, formulate the elaborate organization into a hierarchy of clandestine cells, the members of which knew only their comrades in their own cell. Both groups of conspirators represent the effects of alienation which one would

³⁴ "Report of the Military Board to the Seraskier on the Corps d'Armée of Kars in September and October, 1854," Inclosure 3 in No. 119, *Papers Relative to the Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and the Defence and Capitulation of Kars* (London, 1856) article 30, p. 116; William Fenwick Williams, "Letter, December 16, 1854," in *KOCR*, pp. 149-50; Kmety [?] *KD*, pp. 10-11; 45-47, argued for the general's innocence.

³⁵ KV, p. 44; Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton, 1963) p. 101 (hereafter *ROE*).

expect to find in a social condition of *anomia*, and a consequent nihilistic outlook. The very combination of contradictory forces – pro-reform secularist officers with anti-reform religious scholars and pupils – demonstrates the depth to which nihilistic pessimism had taken both groups. Did paranoia appear among these conspirators? The answer of “yes” must remain qualified. Certainly, the anti-government reaction which followed upon the collapse of resistance at Kars in 1855 had left seeds of terrible doubt and suspicion in the minds of officers who had participated in the siege, and had felt keen disappointment with the government. Even if this disaffection was justified, the leader of the conspirators, and some of the other officers as well, developed a pattern of mistrust which they justified on its own grounds, and which the government fed with other unacceptable deeds of its own. Individuals who live under the rule of a state which they mistrust for various well-known deeds can develop a paranoid pathology which feeds itself, finds ample reinforcement from government actions, and which ultimately attains a self-sustaining momentum producing both secret society and political conspiracy. Both the elements of *anomia* and paranoia were at work in this instance.³⁶

Cherkes Hasan Vak'ası (1876, Ottoman Empire). This incident belongs to the category of terrorism because a single individual attacked a meeting of government ministers wielding six revolvers [*tabanja* or *ruvelver*] and a *kama* [Caucasian poignard or short sword]. Cherkes Hasan, an army officer and a relative of Sultan ‘Abdül ‘Azîz appears to have acted individually, without the assistance of any co-conspirators, and if there were any associates he did not betray them in his all-too brief trial. He stormed into the mansion of Midhat Pasha, shot Hüseyin Avnî Pasha, minister of war, and Râşid Pasha, another minister, killing them, and killing or wounding some attendants [*hizmetçiler*]. He shot his way out of the grand salon of the mansion or *konak* and, beset by gendarmes and several companies of regular

³⁶ The Young Ottoman plot of 1867 rightfully belongs to a discussion of terrorism, but space does not permit its inclusion here. In spirit, this plot was closest to the Kulelî conspiracy, though with significant differences. The Young Ottoman plot was formed by an undifferentiated secret society with the intention of deposing the sultan ‘Abdül ‘Azîz. A discussion of the affair is in *ROE*, pp. 187-212.

army infantry, fought a battle with his new adversaries, killing three, and wounding others until he was captured at the point of the bayonet [*siingü*]. After a three-day trial, Cherkes Hasan was executed.³⁷

Cherkes Hasan's sister was one of ‘Abdül ‘Azîz's wives, and the dethronement and apparent suicide of the deposed sultan under suspicious circumstances created suspicion in Cherkes Hasan. Another factor of paramount importance in this officer's armed assault was his Circassian background, having been raised in the Caucasus with the idea of the vendetta, and the raid against the Russian enemy, firmly implanted within him.³⁸ His act was terrorist because he did not ride with a band of irregular cavalry on a raid to attack these ministers or Ottoman troops, and he attacked a political target unintentionally causing irreversible change in the political constellation of the period. His

³⁷ Original documents may be found in Ismail Hakkî Uzunçarşılı, “Çerkes Hasan Vak'ası,” *Belleten*, 9 (1945), 89-133 (hereafter “CHV”) including records of interrogations. Mahmûd Celâleddin Pasha (1838-1899), *Mir'ât-i Hakikat, Tarihi Hakikatların Aynası*, Ismet Miroglu (ed.), Istanbul: Berekât Yayınevi, 1983, pp. 128-131 (hereafter *MH*) lived during these events; Midhat Pasha, *Midhat Pasha: Hayat-i siyasiyesi, hidmatî, menfa hayatî*, Ali Haydar Midhat (ed.) part I, *Tabsira-i ibret*, Istanbul: n. p., 1325/1907-8, pp. 183-186; Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, *The Life of Midhat Pasha*, (New York, 1973) [Repr. of the 1903 ed.] pp. 92-93 based his account on memoranda written by his father, Midhat Pasha; Nelidow, “Souvenirs d'avant et d'après la guerre de 1877-1878,” *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 6th period, 27 (15 May, 1915), 328-30. A number of important primary sources are summarized by Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963) p. 346, notes 165-66. In addition to those cited above, Davison also states that Mehmed Memduh, Armand Freiherr von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, and the Foreign Office correspondence of the British ambassador were based upon eyewitness accounts. Haluk Y. Shehsuvaroglu, *Sultan Aziz: hususî, siyasi, hayatî, devri ve ölümü*, (Istanbul, 1949) pp. 153-58 was a popular account based upon documents, including the statement of Cherkes Hasan, none of which is supported by bibliographical documentation. Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, VII, *Islahat Fermani Devri, 1861-1876*, 2. Baskı, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1977, pp. 360-61 gives no bibliographic references, though suggests that government and military documents exist with relation to the incident. See also: Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1961) p. 162; Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic, The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, (Cambridge, 1977) p. 164.

³⁸ “CHV,” 112 Hasan stated at his deposition that he left “Çerkesistan” in [12]81, that is, ca. 1864-65.

motive, however, places him in the honor/defensive category of terrorism since he acted in vengeance for his sister and brother-in-law, °Abdül °Azîz. Mahmûd Jelâleddin characterized his attack as one seeking vengeance, or *intikam*.³⁹ Evidence of a broader political conspiracy, especially among Circassians in Ottoman service, could easily alter this conclusion. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the result of his act was terror in the victims, since Midhat Pasha, who narrowly escaped death himself, was said by Mahmûd Jelâleddin Pasha to have responded with terror [*dehshet*] when the assassin grabbed him by the arm and nearly killed him with the *kama*.⁴⁰

Mahmûd Celâleddin Pasha called Hasan "*O kan dökücü zâlim . . .*" ["that tyrannical shedder of blood . . ."],⁴¹ and in so doing demonstrated an attachment to archaic Ottoman ideas of rebels, who were called "tyrants" by medieval chroniclers because in medieval belief rebels were thought to spread the evil domination of Satan into God's worldly creation. According to this archaizing perspective, the rebel or terrorist, not the oppressive sultan, was a tyrant because he introduced disorder and rebellion [*ikhtilâl*] into a world order deemed to have been decreed by God's divine decree and bestowed upon the sultan and his representatives.⁴² Such an archaic perspective continued

³⁹ *MH*, p. 130. In an answer to one of the questions, Cherkes Hasan stated he took the *kama* because it was a customary Circassian weapon, and this answer shows that he used the *kama* as political symbol of his Circassian honor. Custom [*adet*] and ideology have been interwoven together in an unusual fashion in Cherkes Hasan's statements. "CHV," 113. Everything he stated in his interrogation suggests that he had vengeance as a motive. "CHV," 112-117.

⁴⁰ *MH*, p. 129.

⁴¹ *MH*, p. 130. See also *MH*, p. 86 where a similar usage appears.

⁴² A sixteenth-century Ottoman perception of tyranny [*zulm*] in this form may be seen in the text of Mustafâ 'âlî, who considered *zulm* to be the product of upward social mobility in persons who had assumed the status of the ruler's agents when, in fact, they should have remained in a lower social status. See: Mustafâ 'âlî, *Mustafâ 'âlî's Counsel for Sultans*, A. Tietze (ed. and tr.), Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1979, pp. 66-67, 163-64. A similar perspective is evident in the book of advice written by Sarî Mehmed Pasha in 1131/1719 admonishing rulers to treat subjects without oppression, but also to prevent the entry of the *reâyâ* into the military class, which would be the origins of rebellion [*ikhtilâl*]. In his view, the tyrant was one who went outside his normally prescribed social space and caused such revolutions, whether it was a ruler oppressing those he should not, or a subject seeking to

to influence the Ottoman and later the Turkish Republican concept of terrorism. By this means, anyone who protested the established order decreed by the state was considered a tyrant and, with the introduction of the concept of terrorism in the twentieth century, came to be denoted as a terrorist [equals tyrant in the old Ottoman sense], even when terrorism was not a factor.

There can be no doubt, however, that Cherkes Hasan was a terrorist when his act is judged by the simple military definition of a terrorist act. Ostensibly operating on his own initiative, he sought to put an end to the functioning of certain government ministers simply because he wished to do so. Such an act was vigilantism influenced by Caucasian Circassian vendetta custom. Anyone not knowing his background might be tempted to compare him with the French Anarchist bomber Ravachol who terrorized Paris in 1892. Hasan differed from Ravachol in many ways from political ideology to social background, but notably, Hasan was similar to Ravachol in the nihilist *anomia* which afflicted them both. Çerkes Hasan's *anomia* originated in the fact that he was a Circassian removed from his original culture, elevated in status, and attempting to adapt himself to Ottoman elite culture. The conflict between background and present circumstances was not easy to resolve, with the result that Hasan behaved as a Circassian in Ottoman urban and elite society where such behavior was inappropriate.

Çerkes Hasan's paranoia belonged to the honor-defensive sub-type. A chief element in his delusional makeup was his persistent identification with weapons – notably the Circassian *kama*.⁴³ The weapon gave the man an intense sense of power and control over the life and death of his victims. Such a violent fantasy using the archaic symbol of his long-lost Circassian past suggests that his obsession with weapons became identified with a paranoid fear concerning the political environment in which he found himself – a xenophobia in reverse,

achieve higher or a different social status. Social change thus produced *zulm*. Sarî Mehmed, *Ottoman Statecraft, The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors*, Walter L. Wright, Jr. (ed. and tr.) (Princeton, 1935) [Reprinted 1971] pp. 116-20, folios 36r-38v.

⁴³ James J. Reid, Social and Psychological Factors in the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire, ca. 1780-1918," *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, 10 (1993), 154-55.

with Hasan fearing the evil influence of Ottoman ministers on the sultan's family, to which Hasan belonged. In short, despite some of this case's unusual aspects, Cherkas Hasan fit all the criteria required for being a terrorist, and exhibited both the traits of *anomia* and *paranoia*.

°*Alî Suâvî Vak'asî* (1878) – *secret society headed by an Islamic ideologue and demagogue intending to depose the sultan*. °*Alî Suâvî* must be considered the first Muslim ideologue in the Ottoman Empire anywhere to take the route of terrorism as a means of obtaining his political goals. Any argument which suggested that Islam was a terrorist doctrine, or, which sought to seek sanction for terrorist acts in the Islamic law of war, simply would not be able to make its case. Terrorism as an Islamic phenomenon has existed only six score years, and has followed the basic patterns of terrorism in the secular movements of Europe. °*Alî Suâvî* intended to combine elements of Islamic doctrine and western secularism, and the influence of secret societies as a mode of operation under an oppressive regime did not originate in Islam but in the environment in which Suâvî moved, in Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

An armed mob of Balkan refugees headed by °*Alî Suâvî* descended upon Chirâghân Palace on 17 Cemaziyel-evvel, 1295/20 May 1878 where the deposed Sultan, Murâd V, resided. They intended to depose °*Abdülhâmid II* and reinstate Murâd V. In the pitched battle which ensued, the "mad" ex-Sultan was removed from his apartments and armed by the insurgents. Ottoman guard troops surrounded the invaders, however, and fought a very violent battle with them until all were killed or captured. Suâvî himself died fighting, gun in hand, and deprived posterity any chance to examine his motives.⁴⁴

This attack almost seems more like a raid undertaken by irregular soldiers than it does a terrorist incident, however, several factors distinguished it from the vigilante behavior of irregular soldiers and marked it as terrorism. The social composition of the group was quite diverse, and the position and background of the leader, °*Alî Suâvî*, alone make this attack more of an ideological movement than a raid by soldiers having only plunder or local group rivalry in mind. These

⁴⁴ Ismail Hakkî Uzunçarşılı, "°*Alî Suâvî ve Çiragan Sarayı Vak'asî*," *Belleter* 8 (1944), 78-82 (hereafter "ASCS").

Balkan refugees behaved more like a revolutionary secret society than they did a band of brigands. Certainly, their target – the sultan – showed that their assault intended to alter the political process by direct military action. In the same manner, this attack must be distinguished from a traditional *coup d'état*. Selîm I's deposition of Bâyezîd II, his father, was hardly a terrorist incident. The Janissary revolt which led to Os mân II's assassination in 1622, as turbulent as it was, constituted more a shift of regime inside the Ottoman state than it did a terrorist act on the part of the soldiers. The Janissaries did not form into revolutionary secret societies with political ideologies such as nationalism or Islamism. They simply intended to remove a sultan who sought independence from the dominance of his slaves, and replaced him with a more pliable sultan. Even if Suâvî aimed to achieve the same political change of one sultan for another, he had fashioned an Islamic ideology and system of operation which proved quite different than any previous constitutional form existing within the Ottoman state.

As an exile in France and England, Suâvî had maintained tenuous ties with the Young Ottomans at first, but ultimately came into open conflict with them. He could be considered an Islamic modernist, who combined Islamic ideas with western political and philosophical trends of the nineteenth century. In this association between Islam and new philosophies, Islam gradually asserted itself in the primary position, but the joining of such different philosophies created significant ambiguity for Suâvî. He resolved this philosophical tension by developing an increasingly fixed and assertive Islamic ideology which nonetheless cannot be classified as either traditionalist literalism or so-called fundamentalism. He and his followers nonetheless tended toward a strict observance of Islam.⁴⁵ While Suâvî used *Hadîth* to explain the resort to military action against the sultan, there is no particular Islamic phenomenon or tradition which can be used to explain °*Alî Suâvî*. The same dilemma has confronted any Islamic zealot seeking to use armed attack down to the present. Terrorism is either the product of certain given historical circumstances, or came into use under the influence of various European movements from France to Poland. The evidence suggests that Suâvî the demagogue appropriated terrorist

⁴⁵ Space does not permit a full discussion of his thought. For further information, see: *GYOT*, 360-84, and Hüseyin Çelik, *°*Alî Suâvî ve Dönemi** (Istanbul, 1994).

tactics from a non-Islamic cultural environment, and attempted to explain them by means of Islamic traditions. Terrorism has never been reconciled with Islamic religious doctrines, which is an ideological ambiguity that might cause similar Islamic movements in the present to ultimately fail.⁴⁶

Suâvî's first trait as a terrorist was his paranoia, which is a basic psychological condition contributing to fanaticism and zeal in his case. A key element in his ideological program was the concern for public security [*emniyet-i âmmeye*]. In the sense of alarm reacting to pan-Slavist irredentism in the Balkans and Greek irredentism among Ottoman Greeks, Balkan Muslims – the chief supporters of Suâvî's attack on the sultan – had developed a hypervigilant xenophobia which had gone to extremes beyond even vigilantism. The vigilante expanded his war on his neighbors as a consequence of this psychological factor of increased vigilance and fear of rivals or strangers [hence, xenophobia]. Public security and hypervigilant xenophobia seem inexorably linked in the following cryptic message published by Suâvî in the newspaper *Bâsiret* for 7 May 1878.⁴⁷

"Herkes, ve hep evrak-i havâdis hal-î hazîrîn tehlikesinden bahsetmektedir. Hakk-î âcizânemde mevcut olan emniyet-i âmmeye mebni söyliyecem sheyi herkesin dinleyeceğine şüphem yoktur.

Müşkilât-î hâzîra pek büyüktür, lâkin çaresi pek kolaydır..."

"Everyone, [subjects] to be discussed: all the news documents from the present dangerous state of affairs. In my humble truth is present, I have no doubt, something to

⁴⁶ Suâvî's discussion of a *Hadith* relating to armed resistance against the Caliph 'Umar by companions of the Prophet served as the basis of his legal sanction for an attack against any Ottoman leader. Ali Suâvî, "İstanbuldan fi 17 Teshrin-i Sani," *Muhbir*, November 28, 1867, p. 3 and idem., "İstanbuldan Tahrirat fi 15 Ramazan," *Muhbir*, January 27, 1868, p. 3; translated and quoted in *GYOT*, p. 378.

⁴⁷ "ASCS," 79. See also: Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1994) pp. 381-82 and Midhat Cemal Kuntay, *Sarikli İhtilâlcî Ali Suavi* (Istanbul, 1946) p. 165.

which everyone will listen that I will explain with regard to public security.

The present difficulties are very great, but the remedy is easy . . ."

The most significant indicator or paranoia is to be found in the phrase *hal-î hazîrîn tehlikesinden* ["from the present dangerous state of affairs"] which clearly shows fear of attack by enemies – a factor in paranoia. Even though the dangers were real, Suâvî's secret society engaged in displaced aggression against an authority which for good or bad resisted those dangers. Tactically-speaking, it was illogical to attack an ally in the face of an enemy threat. Psychologically-speaking, it was a sign of paranoia that the ally – the sultan – was converted into an enemy. Instead of mobilizing to oppose the advancing Russian army, or the Bulgarian and other military forces associated with the Russians, 'Alî Suâvî and his followers attacked the sultan, which could only be taken by the opponents of the Ottoman Empire as a sign of internal disarray and weakness in the Ottoman Empire. Paranoid fear caused not only xenophobia but a phobic distrust of government authorities and a variety of social groups within the empire. Only those cherishing certain values could thus arrive at a stabilizing solution to the 1878 crisis in Suâvî's thought, and in this paranoid attitude can be observed an aspect of his fanaticism. Paranoid fears led to the rejection of most solutions to the problem, and the elevation of "the solution" idealized by Suâvî to the centerpiece of his political program.

Another element of paranoia in this message is the cryptogram formula which it assumed. Fear of capture by authorities before the plot could be executed required the utmost secrecy, and a coded form of communication known only to those initiated in the secret of the secret society. Even if a person were not paranoid before joining a revolutionary secret society, he or she would be subjected to a paranoid fear of the outside world when ensconced in the cells of such a secret movement. Terrified at the thought of capture, a member would undergo a traumatizing emotional change which would warp the personality by length of time in the secret society and the degree of violence committed or intended by the secret movement. This message published by Suâvî on the surface promised rather innocuously to discuss the various aspects of the then current crisis, but in reality

was a secret call to Suâvî's followers to assemble the next day for an attack on the sultan. Fear of capture required cryptic communication, which in its turn demonstrated a paranoid state of mind. That such a cryptogram was published in a public newspaper also suggests that Suâvî operated as the head of a secret society organized into cells among which there was no direct communication. Any secret society must function on the basis of paranoid fear of capture by the oppressive authority, and this codified call to arms serves as a prime example of this state of mind.⁴⁸

Suâvî's fanaticism appeared most prominently in his views on authoritarian rule. He rejected pluralistic society and polity in favor of a monolithic theocracy in which the sultan should rule subject to the opinions [*fetvas*] of the religious scholars. His authoritarian Islam which limited political rulings to a few religious leaders must be considered, within the context of the discussion with the Young Ottomans over liberty [*serbestlik*], as fanaticism. Like other fanatics, Suâvî the fanatic believed he possessed the ultimate truth, which gave him the superhuman conditions of omniscience and omnipotence.⁴⁹ As he noted in one of his many writings, the European concept of liberty was merely wasted effort.⁵⁰

"it is thus clear that freedom (which means that everyone low or highly placed is limited by the law) is a fine thing. But European nations have tried various methods to obtain it and in none of these have they been able to find the middle way. Europeans desire that this justice come from

⁴⁸ The cryptogram method used by Suâvî merely fed the paranoid suspicions of the Ottoman government and its censors that anything written and published in public could merely be a mask and an allegorical double-talk for a revolutionary underground. For this reason, censorship became especially severe in the reign of Abdülhâmid II. For the relationship between paranoid fear and the functioning of revolutionary secret societies, see: Anthony Storr, "Sadism and Paranoia," Marius Livingston et al (eds.) *Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (Westport, 1978) p. 237.

⁴⁹ André Haynal, Miklos Molnar, Gérard de Puymège, *Fanaticism: A Historical and Psychoanalytic Study*, Linda Butler Koseoglu (tr.) (New York, 1983) p. 36. See above, p. 64. Though not a significant part of this discussion, this statement also points toward racism as a form of paranoid fanaticism.

⁵⁰ Alî Suâvî, "Serbestlik," *Muhbir*, 27 Shevâl, 1283/April 4, 1868, p. 2, cited in *GYOT*, p. 380.

below upward. This is why debates take place in assemblies and finally trickle down to the rabble and cause the troubles that we all see. Too bad. Justice, on the contrary, should come from the top downward. For justice is like an enormous stone which when pushed from above by one single person will fall in motion, while to push it up-grade requires a great many forces. It is reported by Secistani that even Homer who lived three thousand years ago said the equivalent of the Arabic: '*lâ harîfî kesret el-ru'asâ*' which means in simple Turkish that too many cooks spoil the sauce."

In this statement can be seen intermingled with one another the dual aspects of fanaticism – affairs are best run by a few knowledgeable possessors of the law – and paranoid fear – urges toward liberty and democracy inspired among the common people could only cause chaos and would interrupt the mission of the [religious] law's defenders and maintainers. Both these elements of paranoia and fanaticism propelled Suâvî and his band of followers into terrorist action during the acute crises of 1878. Had there been no crisis of war and imperial collapse, it is doubtful that a terrorist plot would have occurred.

Armenian and Greek Terrorism Against Ottoman Targets. Space does not permit a full discussion of this issue. Evidence shows, however, that if Armenian⁵¹ and Greek secret societies existed in some number in the Ottoman Empire, no Armenians or Greeks with an appropriate nationalist or other ideology attempted a violent action against an Ottoman official in office during the nineteenth century.

IV. CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has attempted to focus upon the primary socio-psychological factors at work in the emergence of terrorism in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and Greece. Each of the incidents discussed has been examined fully by one or another author,

⁵¹ On Armenian secret societies in the Ottoman Empire, see: Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1967) pp. 78-89.

and no effort has been made to recapitulate their work. Rather, the author has concentrated upon placing all these events into some overall perspective. The results suggest that terrorism as a phenomenon can exist in a wide array of political, social, and cultural conditions. What existed at the heart of each of these incidents which rendered it similar to the other incidents may be summarized as follows. An individual or a group could not engage in political or military conflict according to the traditional rules of confrontation, and therefore resorted to political assassination as another alternative. Accompanying this decision to assassinate any given political leader was the perception that the attacker could not deploy large military forces to attack his target, and that clandestine means needed to be discovered by which the attacker could circumvent the target's army and guards. Each of the figures involved in assassination attempts or attacks upon civilians acted in some unusual capacity. They could not influence the political process through standard procedures and therefore "took the law into their own hands," as if they were vigilantes, and committed murder with the ambition of altering or removing completely the political institution or factional perspective of the targeted leader.

These early terrorists also had in common with twentieth-century terrorists the socio-psychological factors described above. Some form of paranoid fear accompanied by any one of the three sub-types may be found in twentieth-century terrorists as well as in these progenitors, though other sub-types might be distinguished for more recent forms of terrorism. Paranoia in these instances may either have been a pre-existing psychological condition, or a state of mind created in the individual after he functioned in a secret society or plotted to kill a political leader. The perpetrator in each of these cases was without any record of criminal activity with the exception of the Dilessi murders, which, in any case, has been described as an act of brigandage with extenuating circumstances making it a forerunner of terrorism. The influence of anarchist terrorism, therefore, was minimal at best notably in the area of the perpetrators' criminal records [Ravachol had been a professional criminal – a murderer and a thief – whereas each of the perpetrators in this study definitely did not belong to the so-called criminal class]. The Mavromichaloi belonged to an elite clan of Mani. The Kuleli conspirators were Muslim leaders or educators and army officers. The Young Ottoman plotters came from the class of bureaucratic officials or bourgeois intelligentsia. Cherkes Hasan,

Circassian army officer, had high social contacts with the Ottoman royal family. 'Alî Suâvî came from the petty traders and merchants of the Istanbul bazaar, and, with an Islamic education from an Istanbul *rüşdîye*, he effectively taught himself various modernist subjects and became an Islamic intellectual. Criminality was thus not a factor in the background of any of these individuals, and cannot be used as an explanation of their behavior.

The various terrorists described here functioned according to a specific set of psychological criteria summarized by the following chart.

name	I	h-d	f	n	paranoia
Mavromichaloi	no	x			clan rivalry xenophobia
Hüseyin Dâim Pasha	yes			x	social alienation secret society
Young Ottoman plot	yes			x	social alienation secret society
Cherkes Hasan	?	x		x	social alienation
'Alî Suâvî	yes		x	x	xenophobia social alienation secret society crisis

abbreviations:

I = ideological element
h-d = honor-defensive sub-type
f = fanatical sub-type
n = nihilist sub-type

A similar chart depicting terrorists from a later period would show fewer individuals in the honor-defensive category, and more individuals in the nihilist and especially fanatical categories. It is difficult to prove any preexisting paranoid condition in any of the subjects discussed since no commentators were observing these individuals with this trait in mind. If this trait could be found in any of the individuals before they entered the political scene, it would be likely to have been found in those belonging to the honor-defensive category [Mavromichaloi, Cherkes Hasan], who lived in vendetta-type societies prior

to the commission of their acts. Even these individuals, however, responded to a standard social condition encouraging paranoia, and did not develop an unreasonable paranoid fear where none was necessary. There can be no doubt, however, that the experiences of plotting assassination or involvement in a secret revolutionary society, created a paranoid condition in the plotters, often with lasting psychological effects. Exceptions to the rule were men like Namik Kemal, who avoided the worst effects of paranoia as a consequence of his intellectual and literary pursuits which minimized any phobia. Paranoia is the Achilles' Heel of the terrorist, and the means by which his ultimate defeat can be achieved.

To what extent can this data be considered correct or incorrect? Like any scientific investigation, there must always exist a margin of error in describing results. No exact computation or percentage of error can be given here. The primary deficiency in analysis rests with the fact that none of the above personalities were studied using techniques of scientific psychology. One aspect of the investigation is quite clear and beyond doubt. These incidents have more than a superficial resemblance to one another, and they can all be classified according to some socio-psychological criteria based upon perspectives observable in nineteenth-century Greek and Ottoman sources themselves. Another factor is also apparent. Modern Turkish analyses of terrorism have a powerful xenophobic element in them which is partly derived from traditional Ottoman understandings of the social rebel as tyrant, and partly from twentieth-century political analysis. Through this unlikely combination, the stereotype of "tyrannical rebels" has been replaced by the new stereotype of "*teröristler*," who are understood as a social category attempting inappropriately to seek justice as a group by pushing the boulder of justice upward. Such efforts at upward social mobility by groups are defined as terrorism. The Turkish perception of terrorism is thus based upon a serious misunderstanding of the issues and problems associated with terrorist activities.

The significance of this historical study for the understanding of modern terrorism cannot be fully explained in the confines of this article. Any attempt to do so would merely minimize the significance of this study and any conclusions about the modern period. Suffice it to say that the emotional and psychological continuum discussed here is also to be found among twentieth-century terrorists in some form or other. To understand the influence of paranoia and other associated

psychological phenomena will help in understanding many terrorists of recent times. Even in cases where terrorism has been promoted by politically-enfranchised groups or polities, paranoid elements have found their way into the institutional or social operation of that group or polity. In some cases, terrorists became heads of state – witness Hitler and Stalin not to mention other less-known figures – and imposed paranoia and terror as functional elements of the state. But, at this point the comparison must halt.