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Greece and the Problem of Macedonia

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This essay examines issues relating to the Macedonian problem, particularly as it has evolved since the disintegration of Yugoslavia; provides a brief background of the problem; focuses on Greece, and the relations of Greece with the United States, the European Union and Turkey.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe have revived the cliché of the Balkans as the powder keg of Europe. This most recent round of instability in the Balkans is not the direct result of actions by great powers and their proxies, as it was the case in the first quarter of this century. The threat of regional instability caused by the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the political and economic transitions occurring in Yugoslavia's successor states, have become Greece's primary foreign and defense policy priority overshadowing the priority given to Greek-Turkish relations since 1974.

This is a region tormented by the burden of history. Over a century ago, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, "the sick man of Europe," was intertwined with the struggle for emancipation and unification of states such as Greece, and by nationalistic drives for a "greater Serbia" and a "greater Bulgaria" often with the involvement of one or more great powers. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, the region witnessed the struggle over the region of Macedonia, the Balkan Wars, the tragic experience of World War I, and the

forcible population exchanges that followed the end of that war. Attempts at Balkan cooperation during the inter-war period were shortlived, and short-term achievements were destroyed by Bulgaria's behavior during the occupation of Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia and of sections of Northern Greece in World War II, by the aid and comfort extended to the Greek Communist guerrillas, and the attempt to bring about the secession of the Greek province of Macedonia during the Greek Civil War.

History has also been a source of comfort, continuity, and pride in Greece. In the particular case of Macedonia, Greeks profoundly believe in the Greek heritage of this region for over four thousand years. These claims are based not only on findings of Greek historians and archaeologists, but also on the work of major Western classical historians such as N.G.L. Hammond.¹ Ancient Greek historians such as Thucydides and Herodotus speak of the Hellenic roots of the Macedonians who were part of the Doric tribes that moved into the Greek peninsula around the 2nd millennium B.C.

Archaeological excavations in all sections of Macedonia, including those in today's Bulgaria and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, continue to uncover only Greek art and inscriptions. No evidence of a different cultural heritage has been unearthed in the classical region of Macedonia.

Because the region of Macedonia is located in the strategic corridor leading from the valleys of Central Europe to the Aegean, it has been coveted by all empires that followed that of Alexander. This has included the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire. In the fifteenth century the region of Macedonia came under the control of the Ottoman Empire.

The Slavic and Bulgarian invasions of the Balkans took place between the 6th and the 9th century A.D., that is some 900-1200 years after Alexander the Great. Greece rejects all Slavic claims that the Macedonians were not part of the Hellenic world, as well as all Slavic attempts to appropriate the classical Hellenic heritage of Macedonia, in order to advance political and territorial claims against Greece. For Greece, Macedonia remains the designation of a geographic region, and not that of a national group. Bulgaria agrees with Greece on this point, as it considers the Slavic inhabitants of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be of Bulgarian origin.

The modern origins of the dispute over Macedonia can be traced to the 1870s, the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, the rivalries among the great powers in the region, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and the formation in 1870 of the Bulgarian Exarchate, a schismatic church that broke away from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.² Bulgaria used this ecclesiastical authority to extend its cultural and political influence in the region of Macedonia, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. This task nearly succeeded with the conclusion of the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. This treaty ended the Russo-Turkish war and created a greater Bulgaria, extending its control over all of Macedonia, among other Balkan territories. Bulgaria's protector, Russia, was, therefore, assured access to the Aegean and virtual control over Constantinople. This is why Britain forced the renegotiation of this treaty and restored the region of Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire.³

From 1870 on, the struggle for the loyalty of the inhabitants of Macedonia involved the Bulgarian church, irregular Bulgarian armed bands, and regular armies. Serbia soon followed the Bulgarian example, and at last the Greek government began its own efforts to protect the Greeks of Macedonia from Bulgaria's actions. In Greece this period is known as the era of the "*Makedonikos Agon*." The Macedonian struggle, in which hundreds of Greeks lost their lives protecting their heritage. Among them were many Slavophone persons who considered themselves Greek.⁴

In order to control the Macedonian region of the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria sponsored in 1893 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, known as IMRO. Its leadership included Slav nationalists who desired an autonomous Macedonia within a broader Slavic Balkan federation. They advocated the theory of "Macedonia as the Switzerland of the Balkans," because of its mixed ethnic population.⁵ However, those advocating the Bulgarian character of the Slavs inhabiting in Macedonia prevailed. In 1903, Bulgaria instigated IMRO's Ilinden revolution in the region of Macedonia against Ottoman rule, a revolt that was violently suppressed by the Turks. Following the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, IMRO became a terrorist organization carrying out its activities in Bulgaria and in the Serbian section of Macedonia, often with the support of fascist

Italy. The present day territorial division of the Macedonian region was affirmed by the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) that ended the second Balkan War. Under this peace treaty, Greece received nearly 52% of the region, while Bulgaria received 12%, and Serbia 35% of the region of Macedonia.

Just before World War I, the Greek province of Macedonia, in addition to the majority Greek inhabitants, included Bulgarians, Turks, and a large Jewish community. Population exchanges in the aftermath of World War I; the resettlement of Greek refugees from Asia Minor; the exodus of most Greek Slavophones during the Greek Civil War, and the holocaust, made Greek Macedonia an ethnically homogenous region and this is the case today.⁶

MACEDONIA IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA

Following the establishment of Communist Yugoslavia at the end of World War II its leader, Marshall Tito, took pride in the fact that he had found a formula accommodating in six republics and two autonomous regions, eight national groups, three religions and two alphabets. Tito's model state held together as long as he was its charismatic leader; the standard of living was on the rise; Yugoslavia maintained a high diplomatic profile in the international arena, which enhanced the regime's domestic legitimacy; and none of its national communities felt threatened by the actions of the other partner nationalities.

By 1980, this optimistic picture had changed. Tito died and the Yugoslav economy faced dire consequences from the world wide recession. Ethnic tensions had been on the rise since 1974, with the autonomy demands of the Albanian minority in Kosovo. These tensions increased with the decline of the economy and fears of Serbian economic and political domination. Constituent republics demanded the transformation of Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of sovereign states. Failing to achieve this, Slovenia and Croatia were the first to secede from the federal republic. The violent break up of the former Yugoslav republic continues and its outcome is uncertain. The situation became a major Greek concern following the declaration of independence by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the end of 1991.

The 1943 decision of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to

recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality determined the evolution of the Macedonian issue, affected the domestic politics of Yugoslavia, and the relations of Yugoslavia with Albania, Bulgaria and Greece.⁷ Yugoslavia claimed the presence of large numbers of Slavo-Macedonians in Greece, and during the Greek Civil War attempted to bring Greek Macedonia into a Slavic Balkan confederation. Yugoslavia supported the Greek communist guerrillas during the Greek Civil War,⁸ but failed to bring about the secession of the Greek province of Macedonia. Belgrade's post-War Macedonia policy went through three stages.⁹

The first was primarily in the two decades following the end of the war. During this period Belgrade undertook a massive campaign of de-Bulgarization of the Slavic speaking inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia in order to make them fit into Yugoslavia's new constitutional scheme. Belgrade recognized the Slavic inhabitants of its section of Macedonia as one of the national groups of Yugoslavia, and proceeded to create for them an officially approved language and alphabet in 1945.¹⁰ The transformation of a local dialect into a Slavic Macedonian language was a necessary step in the development of a "Macedonian" consciousness. The process was directed by the government sponsored Scientific Institute for the National History of the Macedonian People in Skopje, that rewrote history to fit Belgrade's political ends. The process of the nationalization of Macedonia included the creation of an independent Macedonian Orthodox Church. This was an important step in view of the connection of religion and national consciousness in the Balkans. It was also an ironic step considering that a Communist state invested so much energy in the creation of a church in order to serve domestic and international political objectives.

A second and nearly parallel stage in Belgrade's Macedonian policy was to gain acceptance within the Yugoslav federation of the so-called Macedonians as a co-equal nationality to the other seven major national groups. Prior to 1943, the Slavic inhabitants of Yugoslavia's Macedonian region were treated as a low-class Serb group that spoke a South-Serbian dialect. Slavo-Macedonian nationalism was encouraged beyond the limits allowed to other nationalities. Input was also given to Macedonia in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. The third stage in Yugoslavia's Macedonian policy

focused on efforts to gain acceptance of this artificial creation by the international community, and by vulnerable ethnic diaspora communities in Australia, Canada and the United States. After nearly fifty years, this calculated Yugoslav policy succeeded in creating an ethnic identity among the Slavic inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia,¹¹ even though this is not acknowledged either in Greece or Bulgaria.

Having created a Macedonian "nation," Yugoslavia faced a serious dilemma because the issue of Macedonia became a source of tension in its relations with Greece and Bulgaria. Despite propaganda campaigns against Greece on the Macedonian issue, Yugoslavia, following its break from the Cominform in 1948, sought the cooperation of Greece for economic, political and security reasons.¹² Even though Yugoslavia was a Communist but non-aligned country, it favored Greece's membership in NATO and supported Greece's reintegration in NATO's military wing in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Greece provided defense in-depth for Yugoslavia, as well as a resupply route from Salonica. Greece was also a bridge into the European Community, and provided Yugoslavia with a free zone in the port of Salonica. For Greece in turn, good relations with Yugoslavia assured uninterrupted road access for Greek trade with Western Europe, and Yugoslavia's support on the Cyprus problem which was very important because of her leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Consequently, Greece remained neutral in the post-1974 period in the Yugoslav-Albanian dispute over Kosovo, despite the improvement in Greek-Albanian relations after 1971, and in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia, even though Bulgaria and Greece both denied the existence of a Macedonia nation. Thus, Yugoslavia and Greece took steps to reduce the military presence along their common frontier, which in the post-1974 period allowed Greece to redeploy her forces to address the Turkish threat. During the Cold War, official Yugoslav policy towards Greece on the Macedonia issue was of lower intensity compared to Yugoslav policy towards Bulgaria. But domestic reasons did not allow the federal Yugoslav government to dispute or to control the policies and actions of its Federal Republic of Macedonia, especially after 1974. The federal government became the promoter and the defender, at the international level, of Slavomacedonian irredentism against Greece.

The Yugoslav government in an official paper presented at the 1990 Human Dimension Conference of the CSCE in Copenhagen,¹³ explicitly accused the governments of Greece and Bulgaria of violating the rights of their so-called Macedonia minorities. Yugoslavia attempted to reduce the effect of these allegations by stating that it practiced a good neighbor policy, and that it believed in the principles of non-interference and respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of its neighbors. But the Yugoslav government called on the Greek and the Bulgarian governments to find a lasting and principled solution that would serve good relations in the Balkans; stated that it was determined to address the minority issue at bilateral and multilateral fora; and suggested that the CSCE conference could provide a system of national minority protection.¹⁴

The revival of the Macedonian issue took additional dimensions with the involvement of Turkey. The Turkish government representative at the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE, Turkayya Ataov, in an official statement endorsed the positions of the Yugoslav and the Macedonian delegations and accused Greece of violating the rights of its so-called "Macedonian minority."¹⁵ As it will be shown later, Turkey's actions must be evaluated in the context of Greco-Turkish relations and Turkey's attempt to project her influence in the Balkans. However, this development added a new dimension to an already complicated regional problem.

With the beginning of democratization in Yugoslavia, a new political party with an ominous historical past, the VMRO (IMRO), ran in the 1990 election in the Federal Republic of Macedonia on a platform of a free, autonomous, united Macedonia, on the basis of the 1903 Ilinden principles. The party came first with 37 of the 120 seats in the parliament of the republic. The president of this party, Lypce Georgievski, stated that Pirin and Aegean Macedonia are not "greater Macedonia," but Macedonia. "Greater Macedonia" would include Belgrade, Sofia, Thessaly and Avlona! The president of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov, on February 1, 1991, called on all "Macedonia" nationalist parties to "reclaim and redraw" the boundaries of the three states, i.e. Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. Early in April 1993, president

Gligorov repeated a similar claim by questioning the continuing validity of the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest that defined the territorial status quo in the region. Thus, while the Slavo-Macedonian policy positions may sound innocuous enough, they may be a first step in a broader plan. As the Yugoslav communists established in stages an artificial "Macedonian" nation with its own republic in Yugoslavia, the leaders of this former Yugoslav republic may now be following similar gradualist tactics toward their neighbors. The first step to the creation of a strategic minority is the demand for the recognition by Greece and Bulgaria of the existence of a "Macedonian" minority within a defined territory which is entitled to specific rights. The constant references to a federal model as a means of protecting the rights of national minorities sets the stage for the next step which can occur at a more opportune time. That is the union of specific territorial entities in which these minorities live with the former Yugoslav Macedonian Republic.

GREECE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Yugoslavia's violent disintegration, and Macedonia's 1991 declaration of independence and quest for recognition by the international community created serious concerns in Athens. It is the view of the Greek government that the quick recognition extended to the former Yugoslav republics by Western European countries and eventually by the United States, enhanced the violent secession process. In the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece expressed additional concerns. Greece did not object to the right of the Slavic population of this former Yugoslav republic to declare their independence within their existing borders. It objected to the international recognition of this state under the denomination of "Republic of Macedonia" because there was no "Macedonian nation." Greece could not acquiesce to the appropriation by a Slavic speaking group of people of a name connected throughout history to the Hellenic cultural heritage. Moreover, the region of Macedonia was shared geographically by three states and contained several ethnic groups. In view of the painful history of the region and the claims extended by Skopje against Greece about the presence of a Macedonian "minority" in Greece, the Greek leadership declared that such a name could not define within Greece any people other

than the Greeks who inhabit the Greek province of Macedonia. The estimated 40,000 speakers of a Slavic dialect in Greece who have remained in Greece since the end of the Civil War have a Greek ethnic identity and do not constitute a "Macedonian minority" in the ethnic or the national sense.

In this unstable regional environment, Greece has numerous advantages. It is politically stable; it is one of the most ethnically homogenous states of Europe; it has no territorial claims against any of its neighbors; it is democratic; it is a member of the European Union, of NATO, and of the Western European Union; it is located in a very strategic location vis a vis the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East. It also has the entrepreneurial know how, as well as the human resources that can make Greece an influential power in the region.

However, Greece is the only Western European country, and the only member of the European Union facing multiple external threats, and having its territorial integrity questioned by neighboring countries.¹⁶ One can actually argue that Greece currently faces the greatest accumulation of foreign policy problems in the last fifty years. Greece's foreign policy problems are compounded by an on going domestic economic crisis, and a mounting external debt. These conditions seriously limit Greece's ability to exert its socio-economic influence in the Balkans, and particularly in countries such as Albania and in the former Yugoslavia where Greece has vital interests.

The political relations of Greece with the European Union had also been burdened by the issues in Greek-Turkish relations and the problem of Cyprus. Since 1991, the European Union found itself embroiled in the debate over the recognition and the denomination of the so-called "Republic of Macedonia."

Capitalizing on the instability in the Balkans, Turkey has seized the opportunity to expand her influence in the region in a variety of ways: First, by supporting the Turkish/Muslim party of Rights and Freedoms in the October 1991 Bulgarian elections. This party holds the balance of power in Bulgarian politics, and can influence the policy of the Bulgarian government. Second, by involving itself in the politics of the Macedonian question. As shown earlier, Turkey, at the 1990 Human Dimension Conference of the CSCE in

Copenhagen, adopted the position of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia regarding the alleged violations of the rights of the phantom "Macedonian minority" in Greece. By doing so, Turkey intended to show that Greece's policy toward its minorities displayed a pattern of discrimination which was also manifested in the case of the Muslims of Western Thrace. Third, Turkey along with Bulgaria became the first two European countries to recognize the so-called "Republic of Macedonia" on February 7, 1992.¹⁷ Even though Turkey knew how sensitive Greece is on the issue of Macedonia, it did recognize this breakaway Yugoslav republic. This is an indication that improving Greek-Turkish relations is not a high priority in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey used this problem to increase the pressure on Greece and focus Greece's attention away from the problems in the Aegean, Thrace and Cyprus.

Fourth, Turkey claims to be the protector of Turkish speaking Muslim communities in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Asian republics. Accounts in the American press regularly promote and rationalize this role, and speak of a probable Turkish involvement in the Balkans. Capitalizing on the crisis in the Balkans, Turkey has found the opportunity to achieve what it failed to attain during World War II.¹⁸ Recent events in the Balkans have created a new political and strategic reality for Greece, because now Greece faces Turkish pressures not only in Cyprus, in Thrace and the Aegean, but along its northern frontier as well.

GREECE, THE U.S. AND THE DISINTERGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

Throughout the Greek Civil War, the United States fully supported the government of Greece and the country's territorial integrity. The disclosure of a December 26, 1994,¹⁹ memorandum by American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius on the subject of Macedonia shows that the U.S. government "...considered talk of Macedonian "nation," a Macedonian "fatherland," or a Macedonian "national consciousness" to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic nor political reality..." These claims were a cover for aggressive actions against Greece.

The Bush administration allowed political expediency to sour its relations with Greece. Reversing decades of American policy, the 1991 Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices

adopted positions advocated by Yugoslavia about the presence of a Macedonian minority in Greece. For the first time ever this report spoke of the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece, and of violations of the rights of that minority. Following strong protests by the Mitsotakis government, the United States issued a clarification of certain aspects of that report in a letter by American Ambassador to Athens Michael Sotirhos.²⁰ The letter concluded that the United States supported the Helsinki statement that belonging to a national minority is a matter of personal choice, and that persons who can ascribe to themselves such a quality have the right to maintain their cultural identity in all its aspects. The implication of that statement was that if Slovoophone Macedonians claim that they constitute a "nation," Greece had to recognize that. Even though Washington was aware of how Tito created his "Macedonian nation," it was willing to accept it as a reality because it had been around for nearly fifty years.

Subsequent Human Rights Reports have taken into account some of the Greek objections. These reports carefully avoid references to the presence of a "Macedonian minority," and only refer to a "...small number of Greek citizens who are descended from speakers of a Slavic dialect and who have the same rights and responsibilities as other citizens. Some of them still speak that dialect, along with the predominant Greek, and a small number of them identify themselves as 'Macedonian.'" These reports estimate that there are between 10,000 and 50,000 persons of Slavic descent in Greece.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia created a major policy dilemma for the United States, as it could become a dangerous precedent for other multiethnic states. This is why Washington originally opposed the break up of Yugoslavia, and supported its peaceful constitutional transformation. The early American policy paralleled that of Greece. Washington saw the Yugoslav problem as a European problem. The European Union assumed the political responsibility of managing the Yugoslav crisis having accepted the reality of Yugoslavia's break up. Late in the Spring of 1992, the United States came to the same conclusion.

The change in American policy was manifested in two distinct areas. First in the recognition extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. Second, the United States seized the policy

initiative; pressed the European Union to render its support; and imposed sanctions against Serbia through the United Nations Security Council at the end of May 1992. However, both the Bush and the Clinton administrations and their European Union and NATO partners remain divided on how to stop Serbian expansionism and ethnic cleansing activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Greek government had argued that the early recognition of Yugoslavia's successor states increased the level of conflict and instability in the region. Moreover, such action would give rise to demands for recognition by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which declared its independence in November 1991. In view of the region's past history, Greece was steadfast in its opposition to the use of the name "Macedonia." Recognition under this name would legitimize Slavo-Macedonian claims against Greece and contribute to the destabilization of the region.

The American policy shift had immediate effects on Greece. It raised the issue of the American recognition of the "Republic of Macedonia." It brought about an unrelenting negative media campaign against Greece in the United States, as well as pressures on Greece to compromise on the issue of recognition and to align itself with the other Western countries against Serbia. It promoted the idea that Greece intended to get involved in hostilities in the region, an action that was expected to draw extra-regional powers such as Turkey in the Yugoslav conflict, and thus create a broader threat of war in Southeastern Europe. Finally, Washington, along with Britain, spoke openly about upgrading Turkey's role in Europe as a means of increasing the political pressure on Greece.

Bush administration officials addressing the issue of the recognition of the former Yugoslav "Republic of Macedonia" throughout the Spring of 1992, indicated that the delay in the recognition of this republic was temporary, and was only due to their concern over the fragility of the Greek government, and to the personal appeals to president Bush by the Greek prime minister. These officials expressed continuing support for Greece's territorial integrity and expressed satisfaction with the assurances given by the leadership of the so-called "Republic of Macedonia" that their country harbored no claims against its neighbors. The United States declared its readiness to work with the European Union to "resolve

expeditiously the outstanding issues between Greece and Macedonia, thus enabling the United States to recognize Macedonia as well..." Washington therefore asked Greece to proceed expeditiously to resolve its differences with Skopje, and indicated that the non-recognition of "Macedonia" would not last for long because it did not serve the interests of stability and peace in the Balkans.²¹

The Bush administration gave its lukewarm support to the European Union's June 27, 1992, decision on Macedonia and postponed any further action until after the November 3rd election. The political mobilization of the conservative Greek-American community during the course of 1992 against the American recognition of this former Yugoslav republic, the decline in the polls of president Bush, and the administration's concern about the political stability in Greece influenced this decision. In contrast, Governor Clinton during the campaign gave his full endorsement to the policy of the European Union, reaffirmed Secretary of State Stettinius' position on Macedonia, and recognized Greece's legitimate concerns over the issue of the denomination of this former Yugoslav republic.²²

The diplomatic pressures on Greece were supplemented by an orchestrated media campaign about Greek policy on Macedonia. All major American papers carried accounts and editorials whose main themes reflected the views of the Bush administration.²³ These included, first, the argument that the Greek government was using the issue of Macedonia for domestic reasons. Second, accused Greece of acting like an old Balkan nation, that is motivated by nineteenth century chauvinism, instead of acting like a European Community member. Third, that the United States had given too much deference to "Greek temper tantrums." Fourth, that Greece denied the fundamental right of self determination to a small, weak, emerging democracy. Fifth, that Greece sided with the "aggressor gang," the Serbian "butcher of the Balkans." Sixth, that Greece should work with Mr. Gligorov, who is a moderate and responsible leader. Otherwise, the Greek objections enhanced extremism in Macedonia. And, seventh, that Greece harbored territorial claims against Macedonia, which it hoped to fulfill through joint military action with Serbia. Turkey's propaganda machine repeated the same claims.

The credibility of Greece in Washington was already low before the issue of Macedonia arose. The Bush administration considered that Greece wasted its energy and that of her allies on matters that did not serve European stability and unity.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

In addition to delaying the recognition of Skopje by the United States, Greece actively sought the support of its European Union partners. The European Union, made two important decisions on the issue of the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The first came at the December 17, 1991, meeting of the leaders of the European Community. The Maastricht decision on "Macedonia" included three important points for Greece: (a) that the European Union would not recognize any former Yugoslav republic, unless it received pledges that such a country would not carry out propaganda activities against a neighboring European Union state; (b) that these new countries would not raise territorial claims against a neighboring European Union state, and (c) that the European Union would not recognize a country with a denomination that implied territorial claims against a European Union state.

Despite the Maastricht decision, pressures were exerted on Greece to accept a compromise settlement with Skopje over the issue of the denomination of this former Yugoslav republic. Such pressure was exerted privately within the confines of the European Community and NATO, and publicly in statements by Italian, Danish, Dutch and other Western officials. Moreover, the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia on the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community, ruled on January 11, 1992, that this former Yugoslav republic had met the Maastricht guidelines for recognition. Intensive lobbying by Greece convinced the European Union to uphold its Maastricht decision at its Lisbon meeting on June 27, 1992, and to decide that it would recognize Skopje within its existing borders, if it was willing to name itself with any other name than "Macedonia." The Badinter Arbitration Commission decision of January 11, 1992, was a legal decision in contrast to the European Union's political decision in Lisbon on FYROM's recognition. Recognition in international law is a political act.

However, the dispute over the denomination of this former Yugoslav Republic did not end with these two European Union decisions. These decisions were not final, as the European Union continued to call for a compromise solution acceptable to Athens and Skopje. Italy, Britain, Denmark and others stated that the stalemate over the denomination issue could not continue for long. Having failed to obtain recognition by the European Union, the government of Skopje applied for membership to the United Nations at the end of 1992. Three European Union and Security Council members, France, England and Spain, presented a compromise formula under which Skopje would gain admission to the United Nations under the temporary denomination of "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." The formula provided Greece with an escape window from its public position that this former Yugoslav republic cannot be recognized under the name of Macedonia. It also allowed the other eleven European Union members to advocate a position that did not fully contradict the Maastricht and Lisbon decisions because it was based on the principle of a compromise acceptable to both Athens and Skopje. The Clinton administration supported this compromise formula. The Security Council unanimously adopted, with support from Greece, resolution 817 on April 7, 1993, recommending to the General Assembly the admission to the United Nations of this former Yugoslav republic under the provisional name of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-FYROM pending a negotiated settlement of the denomination issue. Moreover, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, at the request of the U.N. Secretary-General were to use their good offices to resolve this difference and to promote confidence-building measures between Greece and the FYROM.

On May 26, 1993, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the Council on the work of the Co-Chairmen who after intensive negotiations with both sides appeared successful in arriving at a mutually acceptable treaty for the confirmation of the existing borders, and another outlining confidence-building measures and cooperative relations among the two countries. The ne-

gotiations deadlocked on the denomination issue. The Greek side stated that the FYROM could not use a name, in its international relations, that included the word Macedonia. It indicated, however, a willingness to accept the name "Slavomakedonija" which pragmatically reflected the prevailing situation in the FYROM. The FYROM in turn insisted on the denomination used in its constitution, i.e. "The Republic of Macedonia." The suggested compromise by the Co-Chairmen "The Republic of Nova Makedonija" was unacceptable to both sides. However, both sides agreed to continue negotiations under the good offices of the Co-Chairmen. This was acceptable to the Security Council which has asked for regular reports on the progress of the negotiations.

The issue of the recognition and admission of this former Yugoslav republic to the United Nations attained a sense of urgency because of the deepening crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This crisis created fears in the West that hostilities could expand into Kosovo and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which could bring about the involvement of countries such as Turkey, Albania and Greece. Following an evaluation of the military options in former Yugoslavia, early in July 1993, the United States dispatched 300 soldiers to complement the U.N. observer group in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is deployed along its borders with Serbia and Albania. This trip wire deployment was intended as a warning to the Serbian government; as a response to the reluctant Europeans to engage in military actions in former Yugoslavia; and as a response to the pressures exerted on the U.S. to take a more decisive stand on the Yugoslav crisis. Many commentators however expressed skepticism over this deployment.²⁴

This deployment created a policy dilemma for Greece not only because it was announced by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher during his June 1993 visit to Athens, but also because it coincided with the Vance/Owen negotiating effort. The Greek government rationalized the American decision on the grounds that the American contingent would serve under the command of the United Nations. Greece was concerned that this deployment could force the issue of the American recognition of the FYROM because, at the time, the United States had not yet recognized that

state. Greece also feared that such a military presence was likely to raise demands for the use of Greek facilities for the support of the American contingent, which would go against the stated Greek policy of non-involvement in the Yugoslav crisis.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THREAT PERCEPTION IN GREECE

Earlier, I referred to the negative international reaction toward the Greek policy on the issue of the denomination of this former Yugoslav republic. The international community, including Greece's allies, never fully understood or accepted the Greek concerns over the denomination issue. Moreover, the apparent contradiction between the public uncompromising position advocated by the Greek government that it could not accept any name which included the term "Macedonia," and its private acceptance, since the spring of 1992, of compromise formulas²⁵ on the denomination issue did not enhance the credibility of Greek policy at home or abroad.

In Greece, the Mitsotakis government found itself boxed into a corner. The government's uncompromising declaratory policy was supported by a mobilized public that, in the preceding three decades, had been largely oblivious of the Macedonian issue. The Socialist parliamentary opposition also endorsed the no compromise position. Mitsotakis' ambivalent foreign policy brought the downfall of his government which controlled parliament by a one vote margin and the support of an independent deputy. The defection of a small number of New Democracy members to the Political Spring Party of the former New Democracy foreign minister Antonis Samaras sealed the fate of the Mitsotakis government. In the ensuing elections in the fall of 1993, Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement was returned to power. Its strong nationalistic foreign policy platform, publicly at least, excluded any compromise on the denomination issue.

Throughout the debate on FYROM's denomination successive Greek governments spoke of a threat created for Greece if Skopje was recognized under the name of Macedonia. How valid are the Greek claims? At the outset it ought to be stated that no one in Greece believes that Skopje has the military capability to threaten directly Greece's territorial integrity, whether it is recognized by international community or not. A security threat to Greece exists

if other countries, including Turkey, Bulgaria, or Albania involve themselves in hostilities in a decaying Macedonian republic or in Kosovo.

Nearly fifty years ago, Tito created his Macedonian myth. He systematically promoted this myth at home and abroad, and won converts in the international community whether for philosophical or realpolitik reasons. By creating a strategic but phantom minority in Greece, the FYROM will continue its claims against Greece in international fora, because of the sensitivity of the international community over issues of human rights. These claims are likely to raise long term demands for autonomy and for the eventual unification of regions inhabited by this phantom minority. Even though Greece is one of the most ethnically homogeneous states of Europe and the Balkans in particular,²⁶ it is not immune from such orchestrated pressures. The burden of history, and especially the events of the Greek Civil War, cannot be erased as easily from the Greek mind as it may be in the case of other Western powers. Moreover, propaganda claims, maps, and the use of Greek national symbols at recent meetings of Slavo-Macedonian organizations in the United States, Canada, and the FYROM are not a source of comfort or assurance to Greece. International recognition of the "Republic of Macedonia" will legitimize these claims. This is why so much money has been invested by Slavo-Macedonians from Canada in New York public relations firms, in order to gain the prized recognition of the United States. The risk of regional instability is compounded by the fact that a weak and ethnically diverse republic in Skopje²⁷ may turn to irredentist actions against its neighbors in order to divert attention from domestic problems. Finally, the threat of a Bulgaro-Macedonian confederation and the involvement of Turkey in its affairs cannot be underestimated by Greece.

As the Macedonian question evolved since 1991, despite partisan rhetoric, the major Greek political parties initially agreed on a common policy on the issue of the denomination of this former Yugoslav republic. The Greek political leadership is in full agreement that Greece will not participate in military action in any part of former Yugoslavia and its successor states. There is also consensus over the support for the enforcement of U.N. sanctions and the Greece should continue its active peace-making role in the cri-

sis in former Yugoslavia.²⁸ Finally, all Greek political parties are united against any potential threat to Greek security, on the fact that Greece respects the territorial status quo as defined by international agreement at the turn of the century, and that the early recognition of Yugoslavia's successor states has contributed to the present level of violence in former Yugoslavia.

Following the fall 1993 Greek elections, the new Greek prime minister, Andreas Papandreou, was confronted with the escalating crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, international calls to stop the Bosnian civil war and avoid its spread into Kosovo and in the FYROM, and pressures to bring Greek policy in line with that of the European Union. The Clinton administration, under pressure from domestic and foreign constituencies, expanded its involvement in the FYROM by recognizing that state on February 9, 1994. Following protests by the Greek government and by the Greek-American community, president Clinton temporarily withheld the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FYROM and appointed Ambassador Matthew Nimetz as special coordinator to work with the U.N. mediator, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to seek a solution of the Macedonian problem. The White House announcement on FYROM's recognition set out conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries that essentially reflect the basic positions advocated by the Greek government in the United Nations sponsored negotiations.

The lack of progress in the U.N. mediation effort and the unwillingness of the Gligorov regime in Skopje to publicly endorse confidence building measures, such as those recommended in May 1993 by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and the willingness of many of Greece's allies to close the book on Macedonia without taking into account Greece's concerns led the Papandreou government to impose countermeasures against the FYROM. The closing of the Greek frontier to all but humanitarian assistance, food and medications for the FYROM was a unilateral self-defense action that brought strong criticism by Greece's European Union allies who questioned both the political wisdom and the legality of the Greek action. The unwillingness of Greece to lift these measures caused the European Commission to bring a case against Greece in the European Court, earlier in 1994, turned down the Commission's

request for the immediate lifting of the Greek countermeasures. The judicial case against Greece is pending, while the Vance-Nimetz mediation effort has yet to produce a formula acceptable to both sides at the time of this writing.

Even though debate is a foundation of democracy, Greece at this critical juncture cannot appear divided by partisan motives over a critical foreign policy issue such as that of Macedonia. The Greek political leaders must weigh in calm and rational ways the costs and benefits presented by the limited options they face on the issue of Macedonia. While public opinion support enhances the credibility of a nation's government, mass hysteria does not create a calm environment for policy deliberation. All sides must avoid turning the Macedonian issue into a domestic schism. The issue has already exhausted Greece's credibility abroad. The United Nations initiative, supplemented with appropriate safeguards such as those proposed by Cyrus Vance and Matthew Nimetz, can provide a solution that at a minimum will control the damage suffered by Greece in the international arena. Even though such a solution does not meet the maximum positions advocated by mobilized publics in Greece and abroad, it can provide an opportunity for Greece to use its assets to advance an active Balkan policy that will protect its interests in the region and in the European Union. The political costs of the present policy are clear: Greece has been isolated from its allies; it has opened the door for Turkey's involvement in the region; has strengthened Bulgaria's future role in Skopje; and has given international prominence to a former Yugoslav Communist Party operative, FYROM's president Kiro Gligorov.

Even if Greece has succeeded in its original goal of forcing Skopje to adopt a denomination that would not include the name of Macedonia, there was no realistic safeguards that a new government in Skopje would not in the future change the name of the republic. Moreover, there are no realistic safeguards that will keep individual political movements within this republic, such as the VMRO and its splinter parties, or organization such as the MPO in the United States, from carrying out propaganda activities against Greece in international fora, such as the CSCE, over alleged violations of the rights of the so-called Macedonian minority in Greece.

For any compromise formula to succeed the government and

the political parties in the FYROM must agree to confidence building measures in view of the painful past of this region. There is no room for irredentist statements, for claims regarding phantom minorities, and for the use by the FYROM of symbols from Greece's historical past, such as the White Tower of Salonica or the star of Vergina. Confidence-building measures such as those proposed by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen include accords guaranteeing the inviolability of the frontiers, for abstaining from hostile propaganda, and amending article 49 of the Skopje constitution that claims the right of Skopje to protect Macedonian minority populations in neighboring countries. These measures and the conditions set by the European Union in its Maastricht decision, are a necessary part of any honorable and lasting solution.

Peacekeeping and peacemaking by universal and regional organization has been ineffective in addressing the concerns of either Greece or of its allies and partners in the Balkan crisis. The inadequacy of both processes may have intensified the conflict potential in the region given the interests and priorities of the parties involved in the various disputes.

The forces of nationalism that have resurfaced following the end of the Cold War have created new sources of instability that the international community was unprepared to address either by unilateral or by multilateral methods. Rivalries among old allies, such as those between the United States, the members of the European Union and Germany in particular; pressures to "do something" about crises that seemed to belong to another era; uncertainty as to what responses could adequately address these problems; the burden of history and the quest for security, have affected the evolution of the post-Cold War phase of the Macedonian problem as well as the international response to this problem.

Greece, as a member of the European Union, the United Nations and other relevant regional organizations, raised the issue of Macedonia in these organizations. It also relied on the support of its traditional allies, such as the United States. However, Greece's political and security concerns were not fully shared by her partners. Thus, Greek policy on Macedonia, if not also on the broader Yugoslav crisis, diverged from that of her partners. Greece remains committed to European integration. Like other states of the con-

temporary international system Greece is not prepared to subordinate its vital interests to those of collective organizations whose policies, for whatever reasons, appear to contradict these interests.

Greece is not unique in that respect. As one of the weaker members of the emerging European system, Greece found itself embroiled in a dispute it could not control, but whose outcome could affect its vital interests. In the process, Greek policy has been criticized as contributing to regional instability while, as viewed from Athens, opportunistic policies of influential actors are a cause of instability that threatens Greek vital interests. Meanwhile, other small state actors, such as the FYROM, are capitalizing on these conditions to promote their own political agenda. With no apparent change visible in the policies of those involved in this dispute, peacemaking by the United Nations, the American Special Coordinator and the European Union is not likely to produce any results. Meanwhile, peacekeeping along the borders of the FYROM with Serbia may even contribute to greater instability in the region, if Albania and FYROM's significant Albanian minority see the American/U.N. peacekeeping presence as a green light in the FYROM and Kosovo.

Greece will resist any and all temptation to engage in regional hostilities whether in Albania, Kosovo, or FYROM. Greece will protect its borders, but will not look beyond its borders to satisfy its national pride.

A new territorial allocation in the region disturbing the 1913 boundaries would prove catastrophic for Greece in view of Turkey's claims in Thrace and the Aegean, and even Bulgaria's Aegean interests. The Greek government has frequently stated that it respects the territorial status quo in the region, and that it has no territorial claims against any of its neighbors.

Greece remains committed to the rule of law in the region and in its relations with all of its neighbors. Greece, the United States and the members of the European Union agree that further instability will not serve their interests, or those of any other state in Southeastern Europe. This is why it is necessary that the issue of the denomination of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia be resolved on the basis of the rule of law and not on political expediency.

POSTSCRIPT

The above essay originally was written late in the fall of 1994. A number of international and regional developments since then have affected this latest phase of the "Macedonian Question" as well as Greece's role in the Balkans.

The "countermeasures" imposed by Greece against FYROM may have placated large serments of Greek public opinion unhappy with the stand taken by the United States and the E.U. on the Yugoslav crisis. However, these "countermeasures" were seen as an "embargo" against FYROM by the rest of the international community, and even by some in Greece whose economic interests were negatively affected by this action. Consequently, Greece's actions were seen as subverting a struggling new democracy in the Balkans. Needless to say that this international outcry against Greece enhanced Gligorov's standing in FYROM and among its Western allies. It also influenced the lukewarm international response to the fate of the oppressed Greek minority in Albania. While from the political standpoint these "countermeasures" proved to be a Greek policy miscalculation, from the legal standpoint the European Court in 1994 rejected the European Commission's request for temporary measures against Greece and, later on in the same year, upheld the substance of the Greek actions. This aspect of Greece's action was lost in the flurry of political rhetoric in Europe and in the U.S.

Despite the "embargo," the United States continued its diplomatic efforts to restore stability to this region. Fresh from its August 1995 success in Dayton where the U.S., with NATO and European support, imposed a settlement of the Bosnian crisis, U.S. diplomacy sought a settlement of the FYROM issue as well. The United States helped negotiate a seven year interim accord which was signed in September 1995 between Greece and the FYROM. Greece recognized Skopje under the provisional denomination of FYROM, while leaving the final denomination to be determined by future negotiations. The accord provided for the establishment of "liaison offices" (staffed by ambassadors) in both capitals; it provided for the lifting of the Greek "embargo" against FYROM; it called for the removal of irredentist symbols from FYROM's flag and of irredentist clauses from its constitution, and set the stage for the establishment of normal economic relations.

Since then, the denomination talks have continued intermittently in New York. Towards the end of Andreas Papandreou's premiership, late in 1995, and the assumption of the Greek government by K. Simitis in January 1996, the two governments appeared close to a compromise based on a composite name which included the term "Macedonia." However, the January 1996 Greco-Turkish crisis over the Imia islets derailed the agreement. The new Simitis government, facing serious domestic criticism over the handling of its first foreign and security policy crisis, could not afford politically another compromise over FYROM's denomination.

Successive post-Cold War Greek governments were trapped by the pressures of domestic public opinion and by the country's broader foreign and security policy needs and priorities. These democratic governments discovered the practical political limits of their policy making institutions. Mobilized public opinion at home and among the Greek diaspora provided support for the country's early response to the Yugoslav crisis. It also became a trap for these governments because it limited their policy options and exposed Greece to cross-pressure from the E.U., NATO, and the United States.²⁹

Successive Greek governments could have made a credible case on FYROM based on sovereignty and security issues. Instead, they focused on the denomination issue in a manner reflecting Greece's historical and psychological experiences. In the early post-Cold War euphoria this approach not only proved to be meaningless to the rest of the international community, but it also created the impression that Greece harbored revisionist objectives in southeastern Europe. The negotiations over FYROM's denomination remained deadlocked despite intermittent meetings at the ambassadorial level in New York and frequent visits exchanged by cabinet level officials of each country. In view of the burdened state of Greco-Turkish relations, it appears unlikely that in the short term any Greek government will be prepared to bear the political cost of a composite denomination that includes the name "Macedonia." Similarly, tensions in the Balkans and nationalist pressures within FYROM negate any possibility that a FYROM government may accept a denomination other than its constitutional one.

Meanwhile, since the 1995 interim agreement, Greece and FYROM have expanded their economic and political ties. The

Greek private sector now holds the first place among foreign investors in the FYROM, while trade with Greece accounts for 15% of FYROM's GNP. Greece, along with FYROM and other southeastern European states, is involved in U.S. and E.U. inspired regional cooperative activities (SECI, Rauyomont, et al.). Current Greek policies show clearly that Greece is FYROM's best partner in the region. It is a source of trade, investments, and economic assistance; it provides an important outlet to the Mediterranean; it is FYROM's link to the E.U. and NATO; and, in contrast to FYROM's neighbors, it has no territorial claims against it. This is very important for FYROM considering the state of affairs in Bosnia, the civil war in Kosovo, and China's veto that will likely remove the UN peacekeeping presence in FYROM.

The improvement in the state of the Greek economy has placed Greece on track for joining the E.M.U. by the year 2002. Greece, under Simitis' leadership, has refocused Greek foreign policy in the Balkans. Today, Greece is a source of stability in southeastern Europe and is assuming a leadership role³⁰ in the political, economic and security affairs of the region both at the bilateral and the multilateral levels. Greece stands ready to face the challenges and opportunities that have opened up in the Balkans, especially in the latter half of the last decade of this century and beyond. Greece, like the other members of the international community, was caught unprepared with the rapid disintegration of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia, with the revival of nationalism in the region, and the tensions created by the rapid, simultaneous and troubled economic and political transitions occurring in the former communist countries of the Balkans. Early responses to these changes and challenges based on emotional and historical fears have now been replaced by rational technocratic actions promoting once more Greece's role as a leader and as a stabilizing force in an unstable region.

¹ *The Macedonian States: The Origins, Institutions and History*, New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1990. Also, *A History of Greece to 332 BC*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959. M.B. Sakellariou (ed), *Macedonia-4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization*, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1983. Some recent historians have questioned these views. See Eugene Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus-The Emergence of Macedon*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

² Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia, Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p.7.

³ J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, 3rd rev. Ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp.309-541.

⁴ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966.

⁵ For the Bulgarian view of events see Christ Anastasoff, *The Tragic Peninsula: A History of the Macedonian Movement for Independence Since 1878*, St. Louis: Blackwell Wielander, 1938, and *The Case for an Autonomous Macedonia*, Indianapolis: Macedonian Patriotic Organization, 1945. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (ed.), *Macedonia: Documents and Materials*, Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Science, 1978. Ivan Mihailov, *Macedonia: Switerland of the Balkans*, St. Louis: Pearlstone Publishing Co., 1950, and *Macedonia's Rise for Freedom, 1903 The Great Insurrection*, Indianapolis: no publisher, 1953.

⁶ Christopher Christides, *The Macedonian Camouflage in Light of Facts and Figures*, Athens: The Hellenic Publishing Company, 1949. The author had served on the League of Nations population exchange commission. Richard Clogg, "Greece and the Balkans in the 1990's", in Harry J. Psomiades and Stavrosb. Thomadakis (eds.), *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*, (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1993), p.433.

⁷ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, and Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. Of Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

⁸ Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964. For a traditional Cold War interpretation of the Greek Civil War and the actions of the various parties see Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe-The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944-1949*, New Rochelle: Caratzas Publishers, 1978. For a Yugoslav view of the Soviet reaction to Tito's aims in the Balkans see Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1962. Valuable is also the work by Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*

⁹ Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press/Archon Books, 1971), pp. 153-174

¹⁰ Nikolaos Andriotis, *The Federative Republic of Skopje and its Language*, Athens: no publisher, 1966. Those living in the Northern portion of Yugoslav Macedonia spoke a Slavic dialect closer to Serbian, while those in the South and East spoke a dialect akin to Bulgarian.

¹¹ In addition to the political debate on ethnicity, for a theoretical dis-

cussion on the subject see: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities-Reflections on the Origins and Spread of nationalism*, New York: Routledge, 1991. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Eric Hobsbaum (ed.) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. P.M. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds.), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, (London and Athens: SAGE/ELIAMEP, 1990), pp. 23-66, and Evangelos Kofos, "National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Macedonia", in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 103-142.

¹² In 1954 Yugoslavia joined Greece and Turkey in the Balkan Pact, a short lived tripartite political and military alliance which eventually fell apart following the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement, Yugoslavia's assumption of a leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. John O. Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle-Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries*, The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1968. Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia improved as tensions with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria increased. Similar was the case following the proclamation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

¹³ Delegation of the S.R. of Yugoslavia, Memorandum Relating to the Macedonian Minority, dated June 22, 1990.

¹⁴ Evangelos Kofos, Greece's pre-eminent expert on Macedonia, estimates that some 100,000 Slavo-Macedonian refugees from the Greek Civil War now reside in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. While part of the Yugoslav federation this group exerted strong pressures on the Yugoslav government to raise the Macedonian issue in international fora. See his Greece and the Balkans in the '70s and '80s" in *Yearbook 1990*, (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy/ELIAMEP, 1991), p.203. Typical of their propaganda is the paper circulated at the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen meeting by the "Association of Children Refugees from Aegean Macedonia" and other similar groups. The 1991 U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices estimated the number of Greek Slavophones in the Greek province of Macedonia to be between 10 and 50,000. The presence of such a "minority" is also acknowledged by some anthropologists. Anastasia Karakasidou, "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, May 1993, pp.1-28.

¹⁵ After the session of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Professor Ataov was decorated by the government of the republic. See his paper of June 14, 1990, "The Macedonian Minority in Greece".

¹⁶ Following the 1974 crisis on Cyprus, Turkey has raised issues relating to the Greek Aegean islands, the Aegean continental shelf, the Aegean airspace and territorial waters, and the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. Recent questions by the leadership of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia about the continuing validity of these treaties that defined the territorial status quo in the Balkans in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, and the publication of revisionist maps in Skopje questioning Greek sovereignty over the Greek province of Macedonia, are examples of the concerns of Greece.

¹⁷ Bulgaria recognized the "Republic of Macedonia" as an independent state. However, Bulgaria stated that it does not recognize Macedonians as a separate Slavic nation.

¹⁸ Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979. This book is based on German and British diplomatic archives. Turkey discussed the possibility of abandoning her neutrality in the war with both sides. Turkey's interests included the Balkans.

¹⁹ Circular Airgram 868.014/26 December 1994, to various U.S. Embassies.

²⁰ The letter of February 18, 1991, was addressed to Greek foreign minister Antonis Samaras. For the text see *Proini* (New York), February 19, 1991, p.3. The letter indicated that the reports on human rights practices did not legitimize any expansionist aims against Greece's territorial integrity. Greek Slavophones were part of the Greek nation enjoying the rights and obligations of all Greek citizens.

²¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President of U.S. Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on Developments in Europe, by Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 23 June 1992.

²² Clinton/Gore National Campaign Headquarters, "Statement by Governor Clinton on Issues of Special Concern to the Greek-American Community", October 2, 1992, Little Rock.

²³ Typical is the *New York Times* editorial of April 5, 1992.

²⁴ See the editorial in the *San Francisco Examiner*, "To Macedonia Without a Clue", June 13, 1993.

²⁵ Under pressure from its allies and European Community partners, Greece considered various alternatives on the denomination issue. One was the use of the term Macedonia only for internal administration purposes in the FYROM. Others included various combination names that minimized the connection of Slavic Macedonia to Greek Macedonia and its ancient heritage, and thus lessened the possible political exploitation of this issue by Skopje nationalists.

²⁶ With minorities amounting to under 3%, in a population estimated at slightly over ten million.

²⁷ The FYROM has a population of slightly over two million. An estimated 30-35% of the population is of Albanian origin. Other minorities make up at least an additional 5% of its population.

²⁸ Prime minister Mitsotakis, late in the Spring of 1993, hosted a meeting in Athens of the parties involved in the Bosnian crisis in an attempt to gain acceptance of the Vance/Owen plan. Because of its ties to Serbia, Greece remains the credible West European communication channel with the Serbian leadership. On July 13, 1993, Greece was also asked by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg to mediate with the Serbian leadership for the passage of relief convoys to Sarajevo.

²⁹ A plethora of books representing the views of various participants in these negotiations have been published. Several of these attempts to rationalize the role of these individuals. For characteristic work see: Michalis Papakonstantinou, *To Imerologio Enos Politikou-He Empliki ton Skopion*, Athina: n.p., 1994; Thodoros Skylakakis, *Sto Onoma tis Makedonias*, Athina: Euroekdotiki, 1995 (promoting the views of former Prime Minister Mitsotakis); Alexandros Tarkas, *Athina-Skopia: Piso Apo tis Kleistes Portes*, Athina: n.p., 1995 (promoting the views of former Foreign Minister Samaras).

³⁰ See Van Coufoudakis, Harry Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.) *Greece and the New Balkans - Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1999 (March).