

(b) The model based on the development of relations among the various sections of a specific diaspora as well as relations between the diaspora and the home country. This model places special emphasis on the issue of cooperation among Greek diasporas and is promoted by the "national center" in periods of stability when members of the diaspora do not wish to function under the supervision of a remote central administration.

It is worth pointing out, that a rational, long-term view of the diaspora's contribution to the development of the motherland's grand strategy suggests that the "national center" would promote the first model at times of crisis and the second one at times of stability. According to the provisions of the Presidential Decree for the Establishment and Operation of the Council for Greeks Abroad (*Symvoulío Apodimou Ellinismou*) it seems that the "national center" is heading in the right direction, in the sense that the means available for implementing the "Strategy of Hellenism" falls between the two aforementioned models.

In fact, an examination of the two basic institutional bodies responsible for the implementation of the "Strategy of Hellenism," namely the Parliament of Hellenism and the Council of Greeks Abroad, constitute positive signs by indicating Greece's willingness to promote intra-diaspora cooperation as well as to facilitate forwarding messages and proposals from various diasporas to the "national center" (i.e. participation in the process of the motherland's grand strategy) without at the same time depriving the "national center" of the privilege of supervising the contributions of individual diasporas.

The establishment of the Council of Greeks Abroad (SAE) shows that the government wishes for the diaspora to play a continuing role in its grand strategy. What, though, is the nature of its role? The SAE has the hallmarks of a nationally sponsored yet independent organization, that will be allowed to take initiative in promoting Greek policies. However, it lacks the economic wherewithal to independently implement its decisions, an ability possessed by the abolished deputy Ministry of Greeks Abroad. One indeed may ask, to what extent do these seemingly contradictory initiatives auger well for an efficient and productive role for the diaspora in Greece's grand strategy.

Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal": A Response*

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After his "Clash of Civilizations" (*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993) Samuel Huntington is once more in pursuit of a new threat that will replace the Warsaw Pact as a unifying force of the Western world: Latin American and Asian illegal immigrants defying US attempts to keep them out, North Africans, Turks and Orthodox Slavs, violating the borders of Protestant and Catholic Europe. His article is a clarion call for the cultural and political unity of the West which demands control of immigration from non-Western societies and the assimilation of the immigrants who are admitted. Since he considers the market economy a vital element of the civilization he so treasures, Huntington ought to realize that as long as there is demand for youthful laborers willing to do jobs that our declining and aging populations in the West refuse to undertake, the incursion of illegal immigrants will continue, no matter what measures our governments take to prevent the inevitable.

Huntington warns us against sustaining the false hope that the world is becoming increasingly Westernized thanks to the wide circulation of Western consumer goods. We should not be beguiled by appearances and mistake Muslim, Orthodox, or Buddhist youth of having been Westernized simply because they might sport blue jeans and drink Coca-Cola. The essence of Western culture according to Huntington, "is the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac." We are informed that the classical legacy of Western civilization (Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman Law, Latin and Christianity) was "also" shared

* *Foreign Affairs* (Nov.- Dec. 1996) pp. 28-46.

by the "Islamic and Orthodox civilizations but to nowhere near the same degree as the West." Furthermore "there was a well-developed sense of community among Western Christian peoples, one that made them feel distinct from Turks, Moors and Byzantines"

Concerning the other prized attribute of the West, "pluralism," we learn that "for more than a millennium (the West) has had a civil society that distinguished it from other civilizations." Furthermore "Associational pluralism was supplemented by class pluralism" and "the strength of the feudal aristocracy was particularly important in limiting absolutism's ability to take firm root in most European nations."

There is no end to this remarkable rediscovery of history by Huntington but we will limit ourselves to the above mentioned.

If Huntington had pondered on the closest to his attention phenomenon of a cultural transplant in the USA, he might have become less pessimistic about the possibilities of Western civilization to select and accommodate new elements. If the US could absorb an aspect only of Western civilization (certainly not its feudal aristocratic values and the Magna Carta which he considers a hallmark of the West) and transmit a single ideology – Liberal Lockeanism – to a population of many religions and cultures, why should the Japanese fail to do so given their Meiji choice in the nineteenth century?

Concerning his reading of the Medieval "sense of community among Western Christian people," he will have to point out the century and years. Was it during the movement of populations in the early medieval centuries, the total isolation of the central continent in the centuries that followed, the "calamitous" centuries of religious heresies and the abduction of the papal seat, or perhaps during the Renaissance and the subsequent Reformation and Counter-Reformation years? Certainly not during the religious wars. Professor Huntington must be more specific.

Byzantium is where Huntington's historical views are most unorthodox. The true name of the Empire was of course *Eastern Roman* (The Byzantine appellation was coined by scholars of the 18th century) and in terms of creed was part of the Christian *oikoumene* until the schism of 1054 which separated the two churches. Roman Law was in force in the Eastern Roman empire throughout the Dark ages of the West and remained the major repository of the classical legacy until the Renaissance. Incidentally the Catholic and the Orthodox doctrines have far fewer differences between them than there are between the Catholic and the Protestant churches.

If Professor Huntington believes that civil society in the West commenced as early as the ninth century, we would certainly like to know how he made this discovery which places civil society at least five centuries before any previously established view on the matter. Pluralism, we believe is, a manifestation of tolerance for a diversity of creeds and ideologies, rather than the mere presence of social classes. If Professor Huntington believes that social classes are a unique European feature and that they signify pluralism, he will have a hard time proving both assertions. In most history books "absolutism" is associated with forces curtailing the privileges and power of the aristocracy and conferring civil status to all citizens. That feudal rights promoted any form of democracy amounts to reading history backwards.

In his "The West Unique, not Universal" Samuel Huntington spends the bulk of his intellectual ammunition – incidentally charging through wide open gates, to prove a self-evident proposition that each of the world's major cultural-linguistic-religious traditions contains strong elements of uniqueness.

He credits the West with exclusive possession of the value of individualism and scolds *all* non-Western societies (regardless of levels of economic and political development-especially in the case of Japan) for subordinating individual liberties to collectivist values.

Few will argue with Huntington's assertion that the Western civilization shares the values of the Classical (Greco-Roman) legacy, Christianity, European Languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, rule of Law, social pluralism and civil society, representative systems of government and – above all – individualism.

Few, also, will take exception with his agile dispatch of two conveniently constructed straw-men (Coca-colonization and modernization) which he argues convincingly are perceived as seeking to impersonate Westernization. Finally, few will disagree with Huntington's plea for Western societies to maintain ties of political and economic interdependence and multilateral institutionalization within the bounds of the Atlantic (Euro-American) Community.

Huntington rightfully chastises ill-fated attempts at promoting Western "universalist pretensions." He reminds his readers of "Western" hypocrisy and double standards where "[d]emocracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; non-proliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq, but not for Israel; free trade is the

elixir of economic growth, but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue with China, but not with Saudi Arabia; aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is repulsed with massive force, but not so aggression against oil-less Bosnians."

There is, however, a fundamental flaw in this latest avatar of Huntington's assembly line of post-Cold War systemic prognoses. Exhuming Lin Biao's division of the world into the "cities" vs. the "countryside," Huntington circles the wagons around a neo-isolationist "West." For some time, according to Huntington, the West can gain respite from inter-civilizational conflicts that will be erupting across the "fault-lines" separating continent-sized, non-Western cultural entities. But, ultimately, it will be the "West versus the Rest."

His whole reasoning, unfortunately, overlooks a large body of statistical evidence which indicates that most of the globe's deadly quarrels over the centuries have been *intra*-cultural rather than *inter*cultural in nature. For example, it does not help Huntington's case to dismiss World Wars I and II (with over 100 million deaths) as Western "civil wars" and to disregard much of the post-Cold War carnage in the less developed regions of the globe which is inter-ethnic and inter-tribal rather than inter-civilizational.

Huntington implicitly questions analyses arguing for globalization, North-South convergence, interdependence and UN peacekeeping? and asserts that "democracy tends to make a society more parochial, not more cosmopolitan." For the West, therefore, while there is still time, the lesson is to build good fences, prevent immigration and mount an intra-Western strategy to assimilate non-Western elements (e.g. Arabs in Europe and Americans of African, Iberian and Asian roots) into the mainstream of Western (Christian/Protestant/Catholic) culture.

Huntingtonian garrison-state mentality and assumptions of cultural incompatibility can be best challenged by resorting to the work of the late Wolfgang Friedmann.¹ This scholar, one of the finest legal minds of contemporary times, has offered definitive and balanced responses to the cultural distance question. He reviewed representative

¹ See Wolfgang Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). For a view closer to Huntington's thesis see Adda Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World* (Princeton N.J. Princeton University Press, 1971)

cultural and legal systems, such as those of the ancient Chinese, the ancient Indians, the Muslims, Marxist-Leninist socialists? and the systems of Third World countries. He found a surprisingly high degree of symmetry in all these settings. For example, each of these societies or regions seems to have been operating simultaneously at two distinct legal tiers. The *higher tier* encompasses abstract principles. The *lower tier* concerns practices that are empirically observable and pragmatically motivated. In all these diverse societies, one discerns consistently that the higher principles oppose violence and favor justice, altruism and kindness. In practice, however, at the lower tier, one finds that general principles are normally sacrificed on the altar of tangible national, factional and personal interests.

Friedmann concluded that we should *not* be targeting cultural heterogeneity as the obstacle to the creation of global law. Rather, we should be blaming the incompatibility of national *interests*. Interests, according to Friedmann, reflect the economic status, level of development (modernization for Huntington) and the objectives of nation-states. Thus, Friedmann asserted, the strongest affinity among legal positions can be found within the circle of rich, industrialized states and within clusters of poor, developing nation-states respectively. The greatest difficulty, therefore, is to harmonize the legal interests between the rich and the poor of the world regardless of language, color, creed or religion.

To have the "West" isolate itself from the "Rest," as Huntington recommends, while ignoring the growing gap between the privileged North and the suffering South, is to court with global disaster in the 21st century given the trends in chemical, biological, and nuclear-proliferation that Huntington himself so carefully alerts us against.

Professor Huntington's "Big Mac" interpretation of history and his projections of momentous intercultural conflicts constitute proof of how even a pop-version of Western culture can still unify the scholarly world in argument.