

“Cousins and Allies:” British and American Misunderstandings over Greece During the Second World War

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...I believe that a vast number of the American people have wholly wrong ideas about the British, i.e. they believe... that the people of the United Kingdom are old-fashioned, class conscious, supercilious, patronizing and imperialistic and look down their noses at honest-to-God Americans. I do not believe in the sentimental approach - common blood, culture, language, 'only the Atlantic divides us' etc. The British and Americans are *different* people and we do not basically understand one another...

So wrote Richard Casey, the British Minister of State in the Middle East, to Winston Churchill on 29 December 1943.² An Australian of the generation that felt more British than the British, Casey undoubtedly reflected a view that was widely shared by the British political elite. But while there has been much discussion of the wider policy differences of the British and their American allies during the Second World War in many of the theaters of conflict, relatively little attention has been focussed on the divergent views of the British and Americans over Greek affairs.

¹ Some of the themes addressed in this paper are discussed at greater length in "Distant cousins: SOE and OSS at odds over Greece" to be published in Richard Clogg, *Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History and Politics* (London 1998).

² Quoted in Matthew Jones, *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44* (London 1996) 13.

The profound entanglement of first the British, and subsequently the Americans, in the internal affairs of Greece during the decade of the 1940s, and in particular of the way in which Britain relinquished her traditional hegemony to the United States in 1947, at the time of the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, has engendered much discussion and, indeed, controversy. But relatively little attention has been paid to the disagreements of the various agencies of the British and US government over Greek matters. These were often significant. In particular, there has been little discussion of the mutual perceptions and misperceptions as to the aims and objectives of each power in Greece.

On the eve of the Second World War, British influence in Greece was approaching its apogee, while the United States had only a marginal interest in the affairs of what Roosevelt had characteristically referred to as "a tiny spot in the Mediterranean."³ But shortly after the end of the War, the United States was to displace Britain as the dominant foreign power in Greece and enjoyed, if that is the right word, a degree of influence over the affairs of the Greek government that had scarcely been equalled when British predominance was at its height. By the end of the 1940s it was Britain that had been marginalized.

These misunderstandings and mutual suspicions reached their height as the liberation of Greece approached in 1944, when the US administration adopted a highly critical line towards the nature and degree of British involvement in Greece. In my view it is wise to avoid expressions such as "Anglo-American policy," for they imply monolithic attitudes and policies on the part of the two powers when in reality there was a considerable degree of dissension and disagreement between them over a whole range of issues, ranging far beyond Greece.

As has been pointed out, the United States was very much on the margin of Greek affairs during the 1930s, despite the presence of a sizeable immigrant community of Greek origin. After her entry into

³ John Iatrides, "American attitudes toward the political system of post-war Greece" in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides, eds., *Greek-American relations: a Critical Review* (New York 1980) 58. See also John Iatrides, "United States" Attitudes Towards Greece during World War II" in Louisa Laourda, ed., *Meletimata sti mnimi Vasileiou Laourda* (Thessaloniki 1975) 599-625.

the war, however, the US had perforce to take a greater interest in this "tiny spot in the Mediterranean" and, in particular, in what the British were up to in the country. For as Sir Orme Sargent, a Deputy Permanent Under-secretary in the Foreign Office, put it in a letter of 20 August 1943 to Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, "Greece is and always has been a vital British interest."⁴

The Foreign Office regarded constitutional monarchy in Greece as affording the best guarantee of political stability in the country, considered that a monarchical regime would be more likely to be favorably disposed towards Britain, and believed that King George II deserved British support on account of the "gallant role" that he had played in the early part of the War. The State Department took a far more skeptical view of the institution of monarchy in Greece. The long-serving US minister in Greece, Lincoln Macveagh, took a jaundiced view of the monarchy, perceiving it as a source of division rather than stability. When, during the war, the British Foreign Office championed the cause of the exiled King George II and sought to enlist American support in its dubious policy of "selling" the King to his own people, the State Department made no effort to conceal its disquiet and distaste. A 1943 State Department memorandum baldly stated that the United States "should not – in fact, cannot – go along with... British policy" in this respect.⁵ President Roosevelt, however, had something of a soft spot for the "nice but stupid" "Georgie," as he called him,⁶ and in late 1943 the President somewhat quixotically encouraged George to stand firm against a British initiative that the King should declare publicly that he would not return to Greece before there had been a plebiscite on the future of the monarchy.

The US likewise showed itself to be decidedly cool towards the elaborate and inherently unworkable British schemes that were elaborated for a postwar Balkan Federation which would bring together Greece and Yugoslavia, and possibly also Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, in an attempt to create a counterweight to German influence in the postwar period. The Russians made clear their opposition to such schemes, seeing in them yet another attempt to create an anti-Soviet *cordon sanitaire*. And so, too, did the Americans. Cordell Hull, the

⁴ FO 371/37198, R7742.

⁵ United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, 4 Near East and Africa* (Washington 1964) 1226-7.

US Secretary of State, in a speech to Congress in November 1943, made it abundantly clear that the US saw no need for spheres of influence, alliances, balances of power or what he cryptically referred to as "other special arrangements," thus killing the Federation plans stone dead. It was no surprise then that the following summer, 1944, the State Department showed no enthusiasm for the trade off negotiated by the British Foreign Secretary with the Soviet Ambassador in London, whereby Britain would "play the hand" in Greece in return for Russia being given a free hand in Romania, an arrangement that was formalized in the "percentages agreement" reached in Moscow in October of the same year between Churchill and Stalin. Here again Roosevelt overrode the State Department in agreeing to Churchill's call for American acquiescence in the proposal for a trial three month period.

Nowhere were suspicions as to what the British were up to and planning in Greece stronger than in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the American counterpart to the British Special Operations Executive, the body charged with sustaining resistance in countries occupied by the Axis. Within OSS there were some truly astonishing notions as to the mainsprings of British policy. That such suspicions should have existed is scarcely surprising, given the fact that OSS scarcely had an easy time in establishing itself in the Middle East in the face of British opposition, which the authorities scarcely bothered to hide. As Bickham Sweet-Escott, an influential figure within SOE, has put it "our people [ie SOE] in Cairo frankly wished to keep any similar organization out of the theatre altogether, or if this was not practicable to keep it under strict control ... This attitude was unfortunate because it naturally made the Americans suspicious and eager to conceal their plans from us ..."⁶

This unwelcoming attitude appears to have continued after the liberation of Greece. For W.L. Langer, the head of the head of the Research and Analysis branch of OSS in Washington, wrote on 1 November 1944 to Jay Seeley, at that time acting head of the R and A Branch in OSS Cairo, that "[R.L.] Wolff writes that the British are being extremely reluctant in permitting Americans entry into that country [Greece]."⁷

⁶ Iatrides, "American attitudes," 58

⁷ Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street Irregular* (London 1965) 129.

⁸ OSS Records RG226 Entry I, Box 15

The State Department likewise felt that it had been shut out of Greek affairs. In a memorandum of 15 May 1943 a State Department official, Wallace Murray, wrote:

the British have shown a distinct disposition to regard the Greek political field as their private preserve'. They had not consulted with the Americans before deciding to do what they could to shore up the King's position 'and have not consulted us on other Greek matters.'⁹

SOE did reluctantly allow OSS into the Balkan theatre but sought to hedge about its activities with various restrictions, which the Americans were only gradually were able to rid themselves of. In congratulating in December of 1943 Lt. Commander Turner McBaine of OSS Cairo's S[ecret] I[n]telligence Branch in having freed itself from the conditions which SOE had sought to impose on intelligence gathering in the Balkans, Whitney H. Shepardson, the head of SI in Washington, wrote to say that the State Department had asked OSS to obtain "all the *American* [underlined in the original] intelligence we can for Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, originating with Americans, communicated through American channels, processed by Americans."¹⁰ But despite Secret Intelligence's "Declaration of Independence," the organization continued to experience difficulties at the hands of the British.

An exasperated Rodney Young of OSS wrote in June 1944 to J.L. Caskey in Izmir that "we have been trying to get a mission into Crete for some time and have met an extreme of reluctance on the part of our cousins and allies, who have left no stone unturned to prevent or delay us and have made every possible attempt to find out exactly who our personnel are, where they are going and for what purpose... Force 133 [ie SOE] seems to have got the idea it owns Crete, Pelion and various other parts of the country and that everybody else can

⁹ John T. Malakasses, "The British Diplomacy on Greece 1943-1944. (An analysis based on the American archival sources and diplomatic documents)," *Epistimoniki Epetirida Philosophikis Skholis Panepistimiou Ioanninon*, 10 (1981) 301.

¹⁰ OSS Records RG 226 Box 15. For a report on McBaine's activities between June 1943 and May 1944 when he was OSS's Chief Intelligence Officer in the Middle East, see his "Report on Field Activities," dated 3 August 1944, RG 226 Box 39.

operate there only under sufferance from them. The sooner Force 133 is disabused of this idea, the better." On the 15 of the same month one "Highram" wrote to Rodney [Young] that "this week stands out as the most seriously anti-British week I have spent."¹¹ There were also suggestions that ISLD, the cover name for the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6 in the Middle East, was deliberately delaying the transmission of OSS SI material. Rodney Young and J.L. Caskey were, of course, like many of their counterparts in SOE, archaeologists and classical scholars who had worked extensively in Greece. Those in OSS with an archaeological background were sometimes referred to, not altogether flatteringly, as "the archaeological captains." One is sometimes tempted to think that the manifest antipathy that existed between some sections of SOE and OSS had its origins in prewar archaeological feuds.

Suspicion of the British penetrated the highest reaches of OSS. Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan, the director of OSS, was regarded, in Whitehall at least, as being pro-British. But in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 26 November 1943 he wrote of the crisis in the Balkans that "the policy of dealing with the situation has been directed by the considered long-range political necessity of the British in the Balkans rather than the immediate and vital military problem here or in relation to overall Allied operations."¹²

Some of the stranger notions as to British objectives in Greece were to be found in the R and A Branch of OSS in Cairo. Since this section was largely staffed by academics, few if any of whom seem to have had first knowledge of the situation in occupied Greece, we should not, perhaps, be too surprised at this. Moses Hadas, for instance, who in civilian life was professor of classics at Columbia University and became head of the R and A Branch of OSS Cairo, was man of forthright opinions as far as Greece was concerned. In September 1944 while on a visit to Washington, he submitted a number of memoranda on Greek affairs to W.L. Langer, the Harvard historian who was the overall head of the R and A Branch in Washington. He claimed to have found disapproval of Britain's policy in Greece among all authorities in Cairo, save in the British Embassy to the Greek

¹¹ R.S. Young, Cairo, to Jack [J.L. Caskey], 1 June 1944. OSS Records RG 226 Box 1.

¹² Malakasses, "The British diplomacy on Greece" 298.

government-in-exile and in the American Embassy where he found, if not support for the Foreign Office line, then indifference. Ambassador MacVeagh's line was apparently "what evidence is there that Americans would run the show better?"

Hadas took a particular dislike to Ellis Waterhouse, a member of the British Embassy to the Greek government-in-exile who in civilian life had been an art historian, finding his conversation "generously interlarded with adulatory comment on various wealthy patrons who had commissioned him to make studies of their art collections."¹³ Waterhouse and Edward Warner, another member of Ambassador Leeper's staff, were in the summer of 1944 involved in the chain of events that led to the disastrous decision to convene, at the direct behest of Churchill, a Court of Inquiry to determine whether Yannis Peltekis, one of SOE's most valuable Greek collaborators, had been channelling funds supplied by SOE to EAM. Waterhouse may well have been the protagonist in a curious *epeisodio* reported by Jay Seeley to Hadas in September 1944. At a dinner party and in the presence of two Greeks a member of Leeper's embassy was alleged to have made remarks to the effect that he was "a) fed up with the Greeks; b) he had no use for them, c) that they could not be trusted; and d) that they were a despicable lot and uncivilized." The next day, Seeley recorded, one of the Greeks who had been present went to the British ambassador to protest. But Rex Leeper would have none of it, not only refusing to consider the protest but also apparently assuring the Greek that "the mishellene official" was to go to Greece at the earliest opportunity. The second Greek, according to Seeley, had taken steps to inform EAM. "Should," he added, "a British official be shot in the near future, this may explain it." The only clue that Seeley gave as to the identity of the offending official, but one that was presumably meaningful to Hadas, was a cryptic reference to his having been Rodney Young's roommate.¹⁴

Hadas was obsessed with the idea that British policy in wartime Greece was heavily influenced by the personal financial interests of those involved in its making. He retailed, for instance, charges that the family firm in Izmir of an employee of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in Cairo had been accused of charging the Greek govern-

¹³ OSS Records RG 226 Entry I Box 5.

¹⁴ OSS Records RG 226 L 45259.

ment "outrageous prices for inferior materials in contracts for food supplies destined for the Aegean islands." Hadas added that "the charge of having economic interests in Greece, which they might be suspected of trying to protect or which might at least affect their political convictions" had been laid against other British officials, and more particularly against Col. C.M. Woodhouse, the commander of the Allied Military Mission in occupied Greece.

Woodhouse, he described as "an extremely young, affable, athletic, handsome, polished Oxonian, whose genuine charm is irresistible", whose Greek was 'fluent to the point of volubility.' His family was said to possess large interests in Greece. "One cannot take exception to Woodhouse's views because his toryism is congenital and he is not sufficiently mature to have evolved a different attitude."¹⁵ What Hadas found more deplorable was the attitude of Major Gerry Wines of the OSS, whom he termed "a political illiterate with no knowledge of Greek or Greeks, who seems to have followed Col Woodhouse about, flattered by the consideration shown him and uncritically echoing and giving wider currency to all Woodhouse's attitudes."¹⁶

In a further long memorandum, likewise addressed to Langer a few days later, Hadas dropped his earlier qualification and baldly stated that Woodhouse had "considerable financial interests in Greece." In commenting on the nature of Greek communism he made reference to what he himself conceded was a somewhat startling analysis from an unnamed observer, possibly Costas Couvaras, one of OSS's most interesting and enigmatic operatives, who had recently visited Greece: "communists are those who believe in the sanctity of private property, the Church and the family, and the integrity of Greece's boundaries. Conservatives are irresponsibles bound by no traditional concepts of property, the family, or the state."¹⁷

One of OSS Cairo's sources, categorized by the organization as "slightly tendentious," in reporting on a meeting with Georgios Exintaris, the Liberal politician whose arrival in Cairo coincided with the ill-fated visit of the six guerrilla delegates in August 1943, with

¹⁵ C.M. Woodhouse has pointed out that, given that both his father and grandfather had been Liberal politicians, then he can scarcely have been a congenital Tory. He was aged 27 at the time.

¹⁶ OSS Records RG 226 Entry I Box 5.

¹⁷ OSS Records RG 226 Entry I Box 24.

"Lord Glencorn" [read Glenconner], the head of SOE Cairo, described the latter's role as looking after the interests of British capital in the Middle East.¹⁸

Hadas' notion that a key to understanding of British policy in Greece was the purported personal financial interests in the country of C.M. Woodhouse and his ilk is demonstrable nonsense although it does not appear to have been challenged within OSS. It is indeed ironic that the only person on the British side who was involved in Greek affairs and whose family could be said to have had some kind of personal economic stake in the outcome in Greece was, in fact, broadly sympathetic to EAM and strongly critical of British policy. This was Captain Francis Noel-Baker, whose family had held substantial property at Achmetaga on Euboea since the 1830s, and who was associated with SOE in Cairo, working on Greek affairs, although he never visited Greece during the occupation. He was to be elected to parliament in 1945 as a Labor MP.

In January 1944, Noel-Baker submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office on British policy towards Greece. In the ordinary course of events not a great deal of notice would have been taken of the document. But Noel-Baker's mother, the wife of Philip Noel-Baker, a prominent Labor politician, happened to mention to Churchill's wife that her son had submitted such a memorandum. Clementine Churchill, in turn, mentioned its existence to her husband who manifested a sudden interest in it, thereby obliging the Foreign Office to give Noel-Baker's views much more serious consideration than it might otherwise have done. (In parenthesis one might note that Greece is by no means the only society in which having the right *meson* can be highly useful.) The thrust of Noel-Baker's argument was that Greek society during the occupation was divided into two basic groups; the great majority consisting of liberal and progressive elements, the small minority consisting of reactionaries. While EAM might not be co-aeval with the majority, he believed nonetheless that it certainly formed part of it, while he placed EDES in the reactionary minority. British support for this minority, combined with her meddling in Greece's internal affairs, had led to a large scale revulsion against Britain. Noel-Baker believed that since the bulk of the membership of EAM/ELAS were not committed communists, the communist leadership

¹⁸ Report of 16 September 1943, OSS Records RG 226 45749.

would not be able to carry them in any attempt at a post-liberation *coup d'état*. The Foreign Office was not greatly impressed by this reasoning which ran counter to reports from British officers in the field who were largely in agreement that EAM/ELAS was bent on seizing power on liberation. Churchill's reaction to the Noel Baker memorandum is not recorded, although Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, minuted that "the p[rime] m[inister] is most unlikely to be impressed by this."¹⁹

The fact that many of the analysts of the R and A Branch, and indeed, Noel-Baker himself had not actually set foot in occupied Greece would appear to be one reason at least why their estimates of EAM/ELAS's intentions and methods were often at odds with the views of those who did have first hand experience of the country. Those who sought to analyse the complex politics of Greece under occupation from outside the country were more prepared to take at face value EAM's own view as to its immediate and ultimate goals. But even a short visit to free Mountain Greece could result in a radically different estimation

One of the most compelling testimonies that I am aware of as to EAM/ELAS's propensity to resort to terror comes not from the reports of British or American liaison officers, who may or may not have had a political axe to grind, but from an OSS debriefing of two US airmen shot down over Greece, and who had spent several weeks in the Peloponnese before being evacuated. Interrogated at the beginning of February 1944, they were described as "typical American boys, intelligent, resourceful but with practically virgin minds as far as Modern or Ancient Greece were concerned." They are reported as looking on EAM "with scarcely less aversion than they did the Germans." ELAS had taken good care of them before handing them over to the British Military Mission in the Peloponnese but "A" had been shocked at the kicking to death of a German prisoner following interrogation, while "B" had witnessed an ELAS guerrilla, while requisitioning a mule, striking a peasant "viciously and repeatedly across the face with a whip."²⁰

Although there were some pretty eccentric views as to what the British were up to in Greece circulating within OSS and, in particular, within the R and A Branch, there was also some very acute politi-

¹⁹ 25 March 1944. FO 371/43681, R3713/G.

²⁰ OSS Records RG 226 Box 33.

cal reporting. A case in point is a letter written as early as December 1943 by Charles Edson, in civilian life a professor of Ancient History at the University of Wisconsin, a specialist on Ancient Macedonia and a member of the R and A Branch in Cairo, to Robert Wolff, the distinguished Byzantinist and Balkanologist, who was head of the Balkan Section of R and A in Washington. Edson was of the view that the British had "tragically mismanaged the Greek situation" and was of the opinion that "the Englishmen in the [Middle East] theater are Empire-builders... brave honorable men devoted to the Empire and to what they conceive to be the Empire's interests." But after these ritual incantations he went on to give a highly intelligent analysis of the situation in Greece. He recognized that, inside Greece, EAM/ELAS was by far the most dominant single factor but demonstrated agnosticism in seeking to analyze its import. "But just what is it?" he wrote, "I do wish I knew. Its enemies, only a few of whom can justly be called Fascists or Metaxists (many of them are in fact liberal democrats), accuse it of out and out planning for the establishment of a Communist regime in Greece. Other persons, free themselves of any Leftist taint, hold that EAM is just what it says it is – a popular front coalition aimed at ameliorating the lot of the conquered Greeks and opposing the Germans – it aims merely to assure the establishment of a postwar regime in accordance with the wishes of the Greek people." In Edson's view both views were oversimplifications, particularly the latter.

EAM/ELAS, Edson believed, had made and was making 'a calculated and determined effort to take over, nullify or destroy' all other guerrilla groups and there seemed little doubt that ELAS, when it wanted to, could wipe Zervas' non-Communist resistance group out. Given that there was no such thing as a royalist, let alone Metaxist, band, then it followed that EAM/ELAS could not claim to be countering "a possible Royalist or Fascist threat." "It may be said that EAM feared that the republican guerrilla groups would accept the King if the Allies insist. That this attitude *now* exists is true, but it is directly due to the EAM/ELAS operations against the other bands." Edson regarded it as established, although there were informed people who might not agree, that EAM brought great ("up to now *usually* moral pressure") to get individuals to "join, cooperate with or acquiesce." It did not tolerate hostile or unfriendly criticism: "it does not in

fact approve of free speech. Persons, even those of demonstrated democratic views, who criticize EAM tend to be denounced as Fascists and quislings." He believed that an aspect of EAM's success that had been underestimated was the relief work carried out through its subsidiary the *Ethniki Allilengyi* [National Solidarity], its relief organisation, which had gained it "appreciative admirers and supporters," although here again pressure could be exerted on those in need of relief

It was quite clear to Edson that EAM/ELAS was dominated by the Communist Party. While he had little knowledge of the precise ideology of the Greek Communist Party and had little time for "hairsplitting metaphysical discussions concerning how Communist is a Greek Communist," the fact remained that the KKE was the farthest left of any party inside Greece and that it controlled "by far the largest underground movement and practically the only really important guerilla army." That said, however, he had not encountered any real evidence of contact between EAM and Russia although, without being able to prove it, he felt a "moral certainty" that there was some kind of contact. In conclusion, he wrote that nothing that he had seen or learned of the British since he had been in Cairo had caused him to believe that "we would be wise, or that it would be to our interest, to follow blindly their southeast European policy (if they have one)."²¹ To give them a blank check would mean sooner or later accepting responsibility for that policy and "one cannot anticipate how large and how serious that responsibility may be."²²

The gulf between British and American policies was nowhere greater than at the time of the *Dekemvriana*, when the US administration adopted an attitude of ostentatious neutrality with regard to the

²¹ A J(oint) I(ntelligence) C(ommittee) A(rmy) M(iddle) E(ast) report from the Summer of 1944 on Greek attitudes towards the Balkan policy of the United States frankly conceded that there was in effect no such policy: "...the most cynical feel that we have stood by and let them be sold down the river. The majority protest against what they call the 'rubber stamp' policy. The most considerate have come to the conclusion that we are neither the 'second' great power nor 'His Master's Voice' but a people who have worries and vast commitments of our own, to whom the Balkans are by and large a far away and troublesome place. That we have no Balkan policy is patent...", 17 July 1944, OSS Records RG 226 L 41688.

²² OSS Records RG 226 Entry 48 Box 2.

conflict. American public opinion had been aroused by the leaking of Churchill's notorious telegram of 5 December 1944 urging General Scobie, the British commander, to treat Athens like a conquered city. Whereas the British government was not under any kind of pressure from a domestic Greek lobby this was not the case in the US where Greek-Americans were by and large Democratic in terms of American politics and republican in terms of Greek politics. Although it would be anachronistic to speak of a "Greek lobby" of the kind that demonstrated its muscle in the 1970s, Roosevelt was nonetheless conscious of Greek-American concerns, for, like any street-wise Democratic politician he was a paid-up member of AHEPA, the main Greek-American community organization. He could not afford to ignore Greek-American concerns in the light of the November 1944 presidential elections. At the time of the *Dekemvriana*, Admiral King even went so far as to forbid the use of American landing-craft to transport British troops.

Although much research remains on the complex relations between the State Department and the Foreign Office and between SOE and OSS in respect of their policies towards, and their activities in, Greece, the general outlines are clear. Within both the State Department and OSS there was a generally critical attitude to British policy in Greece. A good number of State Department and OSS criticisms of official British policy had substance, even if some eccentric views existed as to the mainsprings of British policy. That relations between SOE and OSS in Cairo should have been strained is scarcely surprising, given the level of friction that beset the various intelligence, diplomatic and military authorities of each country. OSS's operatives shared in large measure the ingrained suspicions at the time of much of official America, including, of course, the State Department, of what they regarded as the sinister and imperialistic designs of the British for the postwar period. Moreover the Americans were continually confronted with evidence that neither the Foreign Office nor SOE welcomed the activities of their American "cousins" not only in Greece but in the Balkans in general. The irony inherent in the somewhat sanctimonious attitudes adopted by the Americans in 1943 and 1944 vis-a-vis the British entanglement in Greece when contrasted with the way in which the Americans themselves became mired in Greek affairs in 1947, after the London had handed its traditional hegemony to Wash-

ington, calls for no emphasis. After all Moses Hadas as late as the summer of 1944 had been arguing that "of all the Allied powers America alone seems disinterested in the internal political concerns of Greece..."²³

²³ Moses Hadas memorandum ("Not to be shown to the British") on "Greek attitudes to the British," 5 June 1944, OSS Records RG226 XL 991.

The 1956 Reshaping Of Greek Foreign Policy: The Balkans And The Beginning Of The "Detachment" Policy

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By the late 1940s, the experience of civil war, the Cold War climate, the unfortunate legacy of conflict in the history of South-eastern Europe, the desperate – and inseparable – needs for security and economic development created among Greek policy makers an atmosphere of constant anxiety. Still, the country's efforts were successful: within some years, the problem of security was to a large extent ameliorated, mainly thanks to NATO membership, while Greece experienced a spectacular economic take-off, which enabled it to attain association in 1961, and later full membership in the European Communities.

In the early post-war years, Greek foreign policy may be seen as passing through two stages: the search for security, from 1949 to 1953; and the search for a long term perspective, namely political and economic – not only military – integration in the western world, from 1956 onwards. The first period ends with the country's entry in the Atlantic Alliance in 1952 and the conclusion of the 1953 defense agreement with the US, according to which US bases were installed on Greek soil. The country did not stop facing great security problems after that; but it certainly felt more free to promote what could easily be described as a "new look" of foreign policy, the main characteristic of which was the policy of "detachment" of Greece from its Balkan

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