
The New Europe and U.S.-Greek Relations*

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AS COMMUNIST REGIMES COLLAPSED LIKE FALLING DOMINOES all across Eastern Europe, a new international order began to take shape, rapidly replacing the bipolar system which came into being in the aftermath of World War II. This is certainly not the new world order promised by President George Bush, and is not likely to be (to use his words) "kinder and gentler" than the harsh realities of the past. Moreover, it is still in flux and is certain to be much less stable and predictable than the Cold War. Nevertheless, since the late 1980s, dramatic events in every East European state have been transforming not only Europe's ideological map but the very character of the entire international community. From Moscow to Tirana, the sudden fall of communist rule has created a political and institutional vacuum which non-communist forces are struggling to fill. In some cases, as in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where ethnic rivalry greatly compounded political and economic problems, the state was doomed to extinction.

The most profound consequence of this revolutionary upheaval is that the states of Eastern Europe, once separated from the West by lethal curtains of electrified wire and concrete, are now actively soliciting western support and influences of every kind. Indeed, the future of these former communist societies will be shaped at least as much by the West's ability to assist and guide them as by the resources and initiatives of their own peoples.

Similarly, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East-Central Europe, combined with political and economic pressures everywhere to drastically reduce military spending, are rendering meaningless old strategic thinking and security arrangements in Europe. Consequently, some are hoping to breathe life into the heretofore moribund Western European Union, while others

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look to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the foundation on which to build a lasting peace and conflict-resolution instruments for the entire continent. The European Community (EC) is also struggling, so far without much success, to develop its own common policy on security and foreign affairs. Meanwhile, NATO's rationale in the post-Cold War Europe is increasingly difficult to define.¹

To be sure, succeeding American administrations and some European governments—including the present Greek government—continue to argue that the Atlantic alliance remains useful and must be preserved not merely as a collective security system but as the most effective *political* link between the United States and Europe. Such a link, they argue, may still prove valuable in the uncertain times ahead. Yet in the forty years of its existence and despite repeated efforts, NATO has failed to broaden its mission beyond that of an essentially US-directed military organization designed to defend Western Europe against possible Soviet military aggression. Now that the former Soviet forces in East-Central Europe are on their way home, a Moscow-directed threat in Europe is all but gone. Under these circumstances, and given French and German views on a new armed force of their own making, there seems to be little hope that NATO can discover a new concrete mission to justify its preservation except perhaps as a paper alliance, a relic of past dangers, and a reminder of unity in the face of a common enemy.

Moreover, for reasons of economy, and as the perception of a Soviet threat subsides, the American congress and public will not support for long the continued presence of significant numbers of American forces in Europe. The current battle over bases to be closed across the United States will, sooner or later, extend once again to existing overseas facilities and troops.² In fact, except for a dwindling number of specialists, Americans have lost their interest in NATO. On the other hand, in certain quarters the view is heard that the United States should now seek to cultivate direct political and economic ties with Eastern Europe, to match those with Western Europe. Such ties would serve as a further guarantee that East-Central Europe will never again be abandoned to Moscow's domination. In this view, NATO, as a symbol of ideological and geographical divisions and as an institution which is now governed by unanimity, is no longer useful and may be a hindrance.

¹ For a particularly useful collection of essays see Richard L. Rubenstein, ed., *The Dissolving Alliance. The United States and the Future of Europe* (Washington, DC, 1987).

² In May 1991 it was announced in Brussels that U.S. forces in Europe would be reduced by at least 50 percent. *The New York Times*, 29 May 1991; 9 June 1991.

The war in the Persian Gulf, the remarkable improvement in US-Soviet relations leading to the Bush-Gorbachev summit in July-August 1991, and the image of the former Soviet Union as a collection of quarreling states on the brink of economic collapse and even disintegration, suggest that the security requirements, priorities, and institutional arrangements once dictated by the Cold War are no longer particularly relevant. Accordingly, American security and foreign policy needs are due for a thorough reexamination.

What do all these developments portend for Greece? What adjustments and reorientation in Greek foreign policy are needed? How will the new realities affect Greece's relations with its Balkan neighbors, the rest of Eastern Europe, the EC, and, in particular, the United States? As the constraints and long-sacred axioms of the Cold War fade into oblivion, the past no longer defines the dangers and opportunities of the future. Specifically, the perceptions and practical politics which once established the United States and NATO as the twin pillars of Greek security and foreign orientation no longer apply. New factors, opportunities, and challenges require that Greece also rethink its international role.

In fact, since 1974, both the conservative and socialist governments in Athens sought to bring about a certain realignment in Greek foreign policy. They searched for new partners, moved Greece more fully into the EC, and pursued various diplomatic initiatives in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and even Asia and Latin America. While hoping to achieve economic and political gains, they were especially anxious to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the United States and NATO, thereby bringing pressure to bear on Turkey over the festering problems of Cyprus and the Aegean. With this goal in mind, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in particular made much of Greece as a "bridge" linking states of different ideologies and as a mediator in interstate conflicts.³

Thus the question: Can Greece, a member of the EC and of NATO, and an ally of the United States, serve as a link or transmission belt between the Atlantic community on the one hand and the former communist states of Eastern Europe on the other; between the West and the Arab world? Some Greek observers appear convinced that this is possible and is, in fact, already taking place. Following a visit to Washington by Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras, a political analyst in Athens wrote that the Greek diplomat had "conveyed to President

³ John O. Iatrides, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," in Theodore C. Kariotis, ed., *The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989* (New York, 1991); also, "Beneath the Sound and Fury: U.S. Relations with the PASOK Government," in Richard Clogg, ed., *Perspectives of PASOK in Power* (London), in press.

Bush the concerns and thinking of the governments of Syria and Egypt, thus proving that the countries of the Middle East recognized Greece as their only acceptable bridge to the West."⁴ And according to a recent Greek government press release, while thanking Greece for its role in the Gulf crisis, Secretary of State James Baker "made specific reference . . . to the outstanding role which Greece is called upon to play in the application of the procedures of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in relation to the establishment of democracy, stability, and peace in the area of the Balkans."⁵

Does Greece possess the tangible and intangible assets and qualities to become a diplomatic, political, or economic outpost of the West as it had been a military outpost against the Soviet bloc? Can Greece pursue its own domestic and foreign goals in a way that renders it valuable to others, including the United States? In short, would the political transformation of Eastern Europe, the lessening of East-West tensions and the fluid situation in the Middle East improve the international stock of Greece and, in the process, strengthen Greek relations with Western Europe and the United States?

Developments across Europe and the Middle East continue to unfold and it is impossible to predict their course and consequences. Their particular meaning for Greece remains unclear. In its immediate vicinity, the violence in Yugoslavia and Albania is likely to continue, threatening to cripple those states and, perhaps, poison their relations with Greece. And even though there is for now little open turbulence in Bulgaria and Romania, and while their relations with Greece appear to be good, neither state has discovered as yet a way to stable democratic pluralism, and their attitude toward Greece could sour quickly.⁶ Despite endless meetings and formal agreements since the 1970s, Greek economic cooperation with its Balkan neighbors remains less than impressive and all the many regional schemes of recent decades have produced little of substance. On the contrary, the Balkans are increasingly viewed once again as Europe's trouble spot, where ethnic rivalries, interstate conflict, and political instability are producing violence which might affect the rest of Europe.⁷

Obviously, too, after the Gulf crisis, the Middle East is, more than ever, in a state of flux. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been made more complex by new intra-Arab rivalries and realignments, and by the grow-

⁴ *Athena Magazine*, No. 42 (February 1991), 47.

⁵ *Greek Bulletin*, New York Press Office, 4/91 (12 March 1991).

⁶ On Romania, see in particular Edward Behr, *Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite. The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescu* (New York, 1991).

⁷ Daniel Nelson, *Balkan Imbrolio. Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe* (New York, 1991).

ing isolation of Israel. The current round of diplomatic activity, most of it the work of Secretary Baker, is very much in the hands of the traditional power-holders. Even if Moscow decides to play a major role in the international conference, the potential contribution of new and minor diplomatic agents remains uncertain at best. Clearly, if Greece has ambitions to serve as an intermediary and a bridge between the United States and the Arab states, it will have to wait until the climate has become more receptive to diplomatic initiatives from newcomers. And that may take a long while.

Nevertheless, an optimist in Athens might still argue that the prospects for a higher-profile Greek diplomatic, economic, technological, educational, or other involvement in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, with the blessing and perhaps in behalf of the EC, NATO and the United States, remain bright. In all these fields Greece could have something constructive and substantive to offer to would-be clients of the West. The government of Constantine Mitsotakis has been at pains to improve Greece's standing in the Western world, including NATO councils, and the new Defense Cooperation Agreement has removed the more serious irritant in U.S.-Greek relations. The recent Mitsotakis and Samaras visits to Washington had the appearance of success: much talk of traditionally strong ties, mutual admiration, and common purpose. In particular, the Bush administration was rather generous in expressing its appreciation for Greece's stand in the Gulf crisis.⁸

But if diplomatic niceties are carefully observed, and even as Washington is genuinely relieved not to have to deal with PASOK's ideologues in Athens, the appearance of strength in US-Greek relations is deceptive. In particular, those who contemplate a special role for Greece as a bridge and a link between the United States and the non-western world are ignoring harsh realities. There is no evidence that the United States wishes to see Greece assume a new role anywhere. To be sure, American officials profess to be entirely satisfied with the current state of US-Greek relations. This does not mean, however, that a substantive dialogue is underway. For the time being the United States is too preoccupied with other, much more pressing issues to deal with questions that are of special concern to Greece. But there is another reason for the passivity in Washington's attitude towards Athens. When pressed on the matter, American officials concede that the Mitsotakis government is too fragile and uncertain of its strength to engage in serious negotiations in the one area of importance to the United States:

⁸ According to the State Department briefer, "Greece is a valued ally of the United States and one of the pillars of Western defense on NATO's southern flank, a region bordered by states in which the risk of conflict and instability is ever present . . ." *Athena Magazine*, No. 42 (February 1991), 47.

Greek-Turkish relations. And as long as the problems that divide Greece and Turkey remain unresolved, the role of Greece in the international arena will be severely circumscribed.

As in years past, the United States would be pleased to see Greek-Turkish problems resolved in a manner which does not damage Washington's relations with Ankara and Athens. To this end, modest American initiatives can be expected, probably in conjunction with the efforts of the U.N. Secretary General concerning Cyprus. But there is little reason for optimism, particularly since the Washington-Ankara-Athens triangle has been dealt a serious blow by the virtual collapse of the 7-10 ratio in American military assistance to Greece and Turkey following the Persian Gulf war.

Viewed from abroad, Greece appears to be in a state of internal political stalemate and uncertainty, with a stalled economy, a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, and rising labor unrest. Diplomatically it has become isolated and vulnerable most recently over the issue of the official name of the new state created by the declaration of independence of Yugoslav Macedonia. The Mitsotakis government seems to lack the imagination, dynamism, and resolve to address the country's problems. Virtually paralyzed at home, it clearly lacks the vision and self-confidence to engage in new diplomatic ventures and become an important player on the international stage.

The end of the Cold War and the rhetoric and tactics of the PASOK government through most of the 1980s undermined the role of Greece as an outpost of the Atlantic alliance and virtually destroyed its place in American strategic considerations. Such distancing from the US-dominated military bloc may have been both healthy and inevitable. But for all the wishful thinking in certain Greek quarters, Greece has not yet found for itself a credible new role. Beyond struggling to honor its basic obligations to the evolving EC, it appears to have no energy or sense of direction.

Unquestionably, many of the reasons Greece is not in a position to undertake new initiatives at the international level are not of its own making.

Despite the welcoming mat for an endless procession of visiting dignitaries, and beyond sincere if vague expressions of benevolence, the United States has no positive and concrete policy on Eastern Europe—and especially the Balkans—and is not likely to acquire one. Historically the United States never recognized or saw fit to cultivate important interests in that region. After World War II it was Soviet control of the region that attracted Washington's attention and served as an early stimulus for the policy of containment. Despite much rhetoric, especially from the Republicans, no effort was ever made

to free Eastern Europe. And now that Moscow's heavy hand has been lifted, the United States is likely to content itself with a friendly gesture, smiling from afar, while leaving it to the major European states and the EC to look after the region. Thus, if Greece had the capacity to serve as a bridge to the Balkans and beyond, the United States is not anxious to cross over to the other side.

It is safe to assume that, individually and collectively, the major states of Western Europe, especially Germany but also France and Italy and, of course, the EC as a unit, will become actively involved in Eastern Europe. Such an involvement may ultimately extend southwards to the Balkans, but largely as an afterthought: there is too much to be done in East-Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Resources are limited and the human dimension remains difficult to manage. But the states of Western Europe and the EC need no bridges to the continent's eastern and southeastern sectors. They have the expertise, the tradition, and the dynamism to deal directly with the former communist states without intermediaries. Significantly, Greece has played no special role in Western Europe's efforts to stop the fighting in Yugoslavia.

It can, of course, be argued that, as an established member of the EC, Greece is already the natural link with the Balkans, and perhaps even with the Middle East. But except in a geographic and perhaps a cultural sense, such an argument carries little weight within the EC. Despite massive grants, loans, and other assistance from the Community, the Greek economy remains largely state-controlled, mismanaged, and unproductive. What the former communist states need is technology, credits, investments, and managerial expertise, which Greece is in no position to provide. Thus, one suspects that the last thing the EC might wish to do is offer Greece as a model of efficiency and economic performance to the Community's would-be affiliates or clients.⁹ For the present, therefore, and despite considerable involvement in middle-level institutional planning and development,¹⁰ in the all-important economic sector of the Community's affairs, the role of Greece is anything

⁹ Marlise Simons, "Plodding Economic Cleanup Efforts Cost Greece in Credit and Credibility"; "Club of Europe Is Seething About the Greeks," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1991, 7 April 1991. In the second article Ms. Simons wrote: "No government has said so publicly, but most Community members are now stating privately that it was a mistake to invite Greece into the group. Community officials in Brussels and diplomats in Athens are to be heard complaining that Greece has showed mostly disdain for the codes of the club. They say it has offended diplomatic courtesies, ignored most important Community regulations, and demonstrated neither solidarity nor team spirit. They charge that it has used the community as a cash register, squandering and at times even stealing the European taxpayers' money."

¹⁰ On the Greek role in the institutional development of the EC see in particular Panagiotis K. Ioakimidis, *Η Ευρώπη σε Μεταλλαγή. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα και η Ελλάδα στη Νέα Προοπτική* (Athens, 1990); also his *Για Μία Ελληνική Στρατηγική στη Διαμόρφωση της Νέας Ευρώπης* (Athens, 1990).

but dynamic or exemplary.

This is not simply the view of misguided foreign reporters. In April 1991, accepting an honorary doctorate from the University of Athens, President Constantine Karamanlis posed the question:

Have we, in the past decade, utilized the political and economic opportunities derived from our entry into the European Community? I regret to say that not only did we not take advantage of these opportunities but through our conduct we have weakened our place in the Community. And we already face the danger of finding ourselves in the margins of United Europe, with painful political and economic consequences for our country. It is necessary to avert this danger not merely so as not to lose the advantages I have mentioned, but so that we do not suffer the humiliation of becoming the least important of Europe, whose civilization had its source in Greece.¹¹

It should be added that Greece has done precious little to offer an attractive climate to American business firms. Complex and capricious laws, an imperious and hostile civil service, irresponsible trade unions, and continuous strikes and breakdowns of every kind keep American executives from pursuing opportunities in Greece. To make matters worse, sporadic terrorist activity, much of it directed at Americans, keeps alive the image of Greece as an unsafe place for Americans.

Difficulties with minorities of various kinds constitute yet another reason why Greece is an unlikely link of the West—and of the United States in particular—with the Balkans. The issues are complex, emotions run high, and the source of the irritation more often than not is to be found outside Greece. But the responses of Greek authorities suggest a sense of insecurity and of hypersensitivity that are not the sign of a far-sighted, progressive, and self-confident government. They are also fundamentally inconsistent and open to criticism.

Thus, for years the Greek government had been demanding that the West, including the United States, support Athens on the issue of protecting the fundamental human rights of the Greek minority in Albania. Lately, Greek officials had been encouraging the Orthodox element in Albania—most of which has Greek roots—to expect aid and comfort from Athens. Yet when Albanian refugees started to cross the border in substantial numbers, the Greek authorities appeared to be

¹¹Text of speech of 25 April 1991 supplied by the Greek Press Office, New York. Writing in the weekly *To Vima* (31 March 1991), Professor Th. Loukakis of the National Polytechnic University summarized the problem in one sentence: “Η αβάστακτη προχειρότητα, η αβάστακτη ασχετοσύνη, η αβάστακτη έλλειψη επαγγελματικής συνείδησης και γενικά η αβαστακότητα αποτελούν δυστυχώς συνήθη τρόπο λειτουργίας της κοινωνίας μας.”

totally unprepared to handle the problem efficiently and humanely. Elsewhere, in the early 1950s officials from Athens would travel ahead of a visiting party of high-level Turkish government officials to make certain that the minority in Greek Thrace wore the *fez* and spoke Turkish. Now it has been decreed that these are Moslem Greeks, not Turks.

The issue of a “Slav-speaking minority” in Greece is also delicate. It is a purely domestic problem that properly concerns only the Greek authorities: a “Macedonian Question” between Balkan states no longer exists and Balkan frontiers are recognized by all parties as permanent and unassailable. A Slavic “Republic of Macedonia” would be too small, weak, and ethnically divided to be a threat to its neighbors. And for all the propaganda emanating from Skopje, the last thing Slav-speakers in Greece want is to live under Skopje’s (or Sofia’s) authority. What they do want is to be free to speak their language and preserve their customs without fear of official persecution. Given their small number and Orthodox faith, they do not threaten Greek security or culture. If they are provided with educational and economic opportunities they would be fully assimilated and the issue would eventually resolve itself. In the meantime, to deny their distinct cultural identity flies in the face of reality. And if the matter is not handled carefully, it will hurt Greece’s standing in the international community, which is becoming increasingly sensitive on the issue of minorities of all kinds. In this connection, Greece suffers more harm from a State Department report that is mildly critical of Greece’s treatment of a “Muslim (primarily Turkish)” and a “Slavic-speaking (‘Macedonian’)” minority than from all the propaganda that comes out of Ankara or Skopje.¹² That report was not a matter of oversight, carelessness, or error; it was the considered position of the responsible officials in Washington who refuse to accept the Greek official position on these matters.

Turning to a much more intractable issue, the potential role of Greece as a “bridge” is virtually negated by the country’s single dominant external problem: Turkish policy over Cyprus and the Aegean. Unless resolved, Greece will remain too distracted and defensive to be able to engage in new diplomatic ventures in any other direction. However, given the weakness of the present government in Athens, and the opposition’s eagerness to attack and embarrass any and all initiatives of Prime Minister Mitsotakis, this is hardly a propitious time for Greece to be negotiating with its adversary across the Aegean.

¹²Department of State, Annual Report on Human Rights, February 1991, pp. 1166-1175. The report was much more critical of the Turkish government. For a penetrating re-examination of the “Macedonian Question” by an American see Robert D. Kaplan, “History’s Cauldron,” in *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1991, pp. 93-104.

This is clearly Turgut Ozal's moment of glory and he can be expected to exploit it fully. The Turkish President now boasts of having become President Bush's personal friend, confidant and adviser.¹³ During the first half of 1991, President Bush is said to have spoken on the telephone more frequently (more than 40 times by April 2) with President Ozal than with any other foreign head of government. At the same time, Ozal's comment to a Greek journalist that President Inonu had made a mistake in allowing the Greek islands in the Aegean to be given to Greece after World War I¹⁴ is indicative of a revisionist and expansionist mentality which, when combined with real power, spells trouble for Greece. And there can be no doubt that, in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, Ozal's influence and tangible power have increased substantially. In addition to his standing with the Bush administration, he has received significant quantities of modern weapons which NATO left behind in Turkey after the Gulf war. The value of the German weapons alone is said to be about \$1 billion. In addition, Turkey expects to double its F-16 fighter planes to 320—which would be a major blow to Greece—and the 10 to 7 ratio of U.S. military aid to Turkey and Greece appears to have vanished from official Washington's thinking. One might add that while the Greek economy remained virtually stagnant, the Turkish economy grew by almost 13 percent in 1990.¹⁵

In contrast to Turkey's rising star and despite sporadic efforts since 1974, Greek diplomatic and economic assets in the Middle East are less than impressive. The courting of Syria's Assad, Libya's Quaddafi and the PLO's Arafat during the 1980s may have satisfied Prime Minister Papandreou's ideological proclivities but did nothing to increase Greece's influence in the region. And despite the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel, the view in Jerusalem remains that Greece—or the EC for that matter—has nothing to say on the substance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, of all the actors in the Middle East, only the PLO might have welcomed Greece in any regional negotiations. But in the aftermath of the Gulf war the PLO leaders have been watching developments in the Middle East from the side-lines, much like the Greek government.

Nor has the Gulf war changed for the better Greece's stature as perceived by the Bush administration and the American congress. The

¹³A recent (18 April 1991) *New York Times* analysis of the reasons which prompted the United States to assume some responsibility for the plight of the Kurds in Iraq after the Gulf War gave Ozal principal credit for persuading Bush to act in the matter.

¹⁴Interview with Anna Panagiotarea. Text supplied by New York Press Office, 8 May 1991.

¹⁵*The New York Times*, 13 March 1991.

Athens government's handling of its obligations to the U.N.-sanctioned coalition against Iraq was a masterful exercise in doing as little as possible, at the slowest possible pace. The Greek parliament debated at length which navy vessel should be sent to the Gulf, at what speed it should travel to the Suez Canal, and by what route, when it might enter the war zone and what role it might play once there. This may have been good domestic politics and probably kept the Mitsotakis government from collapsing. But it was hardly the picture of a government capable of acting decisively and of earning the respect and good will of others. The contrast to Ozal's performance could not have been more striking. Defying domestic opposition and against the advice of his military, he created an image of resolute boldness and deliberate risk-taking that dazzled Washington and earned him more air time and print space in American media than the other coalition leaders combined.

Finally, for a government to play a constructive role as an independent international actor or "bridge," there must be an informed, articulate and dynamic foreign policy establishment to provide ideas, careful scrutiny, public debate and, above all, independent assessment of national interests and international developments beyond the narrow partisan needs and shallow opportunism of the moment. Despite the presence of very capable career diplomats and experts in the academic, business and intellectual community, Greece has not acquired such a foreign policy establishment. The human resource, although plentiful, remains largely unutilized, isolated, or ignored. Incoming governments tend to treat foreign policy issues as little more than a continuation of domestic campaign politics, to be entrusted to the party's faithful and colorful amateurs. A clash between career officers and political appointees is, of course, common in all democracies, and this is a complaint one hears routinely in the United States. But in Greece there is hardly a clash at all! Particularly during the years of PASOK government, ideological zeal and party loyalty overshadowed all else.

Greece may yet become an important international actor and a valued link between the West and Eastern Europe or the Arab world. But it will do so only if it first demonstrates creative dynamism, discipline and forward movement in its domestic realm. Only when things begin to work well at home will a Greek government become a credible international actor on which others may wish to rely for their own self-interest. Specifically as concerns the United States, now that the role of Greece as an outpost against the Soviet Union has become obsolete and earns little credit, the Athens government needs to establish itself as a useful and trustworthy partner in new directions, beyond the hosting of a few military bases. Current developments in Athens give

one little reason to believe that Greece will soon have the internal discipline, realistic outlook, and the vision to earn for itself a significant place in the post-Cold War international arena.

Guerrillas at Bay
The Rise and Fall of the Greek Democratic Army:
The Military Dimension
Civil War in Greece: 1946-1949

AMIKAM NACHMANI

AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, WHEN A DEVASTATED Europe was hoping to raise itself out of the ashes, the Greek people took up arms again, this time against each other. The Greek civil war was a bitter and costly internal struggle between two ideologically irreconcilable camps, the Communists and the nationalists. How bitter can be seen even in the nomenclature. The central government and its allies referred to the Communist guerrillas as "bandits," whereas the guerrillas referred to the nationalists as "monarcho-fascists."

The Greek Communists failed and practically destroyed the country in the process. While their ultimate failure was speeded up by the Truman Doctrine, the weakness of the guerrillas was inherent in the situation itself, in the structure, tactics, and strategy of the Greek Democratic Army, GDA, and their dependence on open borders with their Balkan neighbors.

The roots of the civil war in Greece are not the subject of this paper. Suffice it to say that they extend far back in time, beyond the German occupation during the war, the enormous physical devastation of the country and the subsequent spoils-of-war "percentages agreements" of 1944, which gave Britain 90 percent control of Greece. For most of the twentieth century until then, Greece had been racked by political instability, intra feuds between royalists, republicans, and Communists, glaring economic and social inequality, and insufferable corruption. Internal disaffection was so great that two rounds of the civil war were