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# Raising Aid Efficiency with International Development Aid Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

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**Background:** Since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or more specifically perhaps the Monterrey Consensus, there has been a distinct shift in the conversation around assessing the development effectiveness of international aid programs. Initially, the focus had been on establishing monitoring and evaluation systems that served the needs to bilateral and multilateral donors to demonstrate the effectiveness of their assistance vis-à-vis their own constituencies. Today, there is an increasing recognition that recipient countries should be equally concerned with the effectiveness of donor resources as they are with the use of national resources devoted to development programs.

**Purpose:** This article reveals the current efforts of the sovereign new and traditional donors in establishing and operationalizing the international development assistance (IDA) monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems to raise the efficiency of IDA programs.

**Setting:** N/A

**Intervention:** N/A

**Research Design:** A review of previous studies and international practices of IDA M&E.

**Data Collection and Analysis:** Employing game theory the authors identify the choice of particular IDA M&E system by traditional and new donors and analyze key elements and factors affecting M&E systems operationalization. They elaborate a set of policy recommendations on how to use M&E systems both in donor and recipient countries to raise aid effectiveness.

**Findings:** The authors conclude that in spite of donor and recipient countries having different purposes and approaches in implementing IDA projects, the use of the M&E is usually helpful to bridge their interests and to increase aid effectiveness.

**Keywords:** *monitoring and evaluation (M&E); international development aid; national M&E systems; aid effectiveness; partner countries.*

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## Introduction

Since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or more specifically perhaps the Monterrey Consensus, there has been a distinct shift in the conversation around assessing the development effectiveness of international aid programs. Initially, the focus had been on establishing monitoring and evaluation systems that served the needs to bilateral and multilateral donors to demonstrate the effectiveness of their assistance vis-à-vis their own constituencies. Today, there is an increasing recognition that recipient countries should be equally concerned with the effectiveness of donor resources as they are

Yet there is only limited progress in allowing a true convergence between monitoring and evaluation systems for donor-funded projects, and national monitoring and evaluation systems in recipient countries. One only need look at the core principles of recipient countries and compare those with the DAC principles (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1991) or those of the major international financial institutions.

The DAC principles are a helpful standard and many elements can be found in donor and recipient country monitoring and evaluation (M&E) policies, but there are also significant differences and areas of emphasis (Table 1). This paper attempts to find a common set of rationales for these differences that are rooted in the preferences and national priorities

Table 1

M&E Policy Principles of DAC Members and Recipient Countries (Compiled based on Organization for Economic Co-operation and development [1991]).

The main groupings of principles	OECD DAC countries	Recipient countries
Overarching considerations	Transparency	Utilization of the evaluation results (Uganda, Guyana and South Africa)
	Partnerships creation	
	Capacity development	
Purpose, planning and design	Accountability to stakeholders and progress support	Service delivery and performance (South Africa)
	Stakeholders involvement	Pro-poor orientation (South Africa)
		Impact awareness (South Africa)
Implementation and reporting	Evaluation independence	Credibility and competence of evaluator (Uganda)
	Meeting the time and budget constraints	Cost-effectiveness (Uganda and South Africa)
Follow-up, use and learning	Timeliness, relevance and use of the evaluation	Organizational learning (Uganda)
	Follow-up on recommendations	Fair and balanced account of the findings (South Africa)

with the use of national resources devoted to development programs.

Numerous initiatives have been launched to assistant countries in making better use of scarce development resources, for example the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, or the Centers for Learning on Evaluation and Results.

for donor and recipient countries.

## Approach

The international experience provides a wide range of samples of how international development aid (IDA) monitoring and M&E systems were

established and have evolved over time. In most cases the IDA M&E systems imply solving the problem of aid effectiveness and aid efficiency at both donor and recipient level. Another area of IDA M&E system operationalization is decision-making for aid allocation among donors, and (to varying degrees) steps toward performance-based budgeting among recipients. Donor countries are concerned with identifying IDA projects and programs, or entire country programs, that are consistent with the national interests of donor countries. They are intended to contribute to aid effectiveness at the national level of donor country and the development effectiveness in recipient countries. This process implies taking into consideration both donor and recipient needs they address with IDA programs.

The main purpose of this paper is to reveal the current efforts of the sovereign new and traditional donors in establishing and operationalizing the IDA M&E systems to raise the efficiency of international development cooperation (IDC/IDA) programs. To achieve this goal the main objectives of the paper deal with:

1. Assessing and classifying the national practices of traditional and new (emerging) donors associated with establishing and operationalizing the IDA M&E systems.
2. Finding the connection between game theory and decision-making regarding the choice of particular IDA M&E systems by traditional and new donors.
3. Revealing how IDA M&E systems adapt to a changing development landscape (e.g., in light of the SDGs agenda).
4. Understanding how M&E systems contribute to the aid efficiency agenda in donor and recipient countries and if there is a convergence between the M&E systems of donor and recipient countries.

First, a research literature review was conducted and theoretical basis of research is identified. At the second stage data and methods for research were described. At the third stage different IDA M&E systems in developed and developing countries were identified and categorized. For classification some factors were identified which would characterize these systems. The data (quantitative and qualitative) on IDA M&E systems in different countries were pooled in a database. This helped to explain the role of M&E systems in both donor and recipient countries and to establish if there is a connection between these systems.

And at the last (fourth) step it was reviewed how M&E systems contribute to aid effectiveness in new and traditional donor countries, as well as in recipient states. Recommendations were made on how to establish IDA M&E systems to raise aid effectiveness.

### *Literature Review*

Several attempts were undertaken to analyze the existing forms of IDA M&E systems in different countries. The primary source of the analysis was a set of World Bank publications on building policies through M&E systems (Lopez-Acevedo & Krause, 2012), creating result-based monitoring and evaluation systems (Kusek & Rist, 2004), and capacity development for M&E systems creation (Görgens & Kusek, 2009). Moreover, great progress has been made with respect to analysis of impact evaluation of donors' practices associated with aid provision (Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2011). In spite of this literature there is still a lack of theoretical analysis revealing the link between the IDA M&E systems and theoretical concepts used in humanitarian studies. To this end we suggest adapting game theory with respect to choice of particular IDA M&E systems by sovereign donors, which was firstly applied by neoclassical economists, such as John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.

The choice of a particular IDA M&E system exercised by the national governments usually depends on several factors, which identify particular traits of the national IDA M&E system. These factors vary among the countries and have different degrees of impact on the final decision. Game theory could serve as a methodological approach to identify these factors affecting a set of choices that largely determine the form of the IDA M&E system.

To reveal the connection between the choice of particular IDA M&E system and game theory some parameters describing the game and employed by the theory should be identified. First, the players are primarily associated with donors and recipients. Second, the interaction between the donor and the recipient always implies a game situation, which repeats on a regular basis. In this case the game deals with simultaneous decision-making by donors and recipients on resources allocation, which is always a subject of their preferences varying in time. These changing preferences depend on the national priorities, the aid effectiveness approach, as well as bilateral political agenda between the parties.

The theoretical approach helps to understand and even predict the strategic behavior of the national decision-makers with respect to choosing a particular model of M&E of their IDA projects in a specific economic context according to their own interests. The instrument helps to interpret the insights, notions and motivations in a logically consistent way as well as to identify the assumptions/factors which can be cross-checked against different national contexts suggested by various institutional environments of the countries. What is more, it helps to explain past decisions by tracing back from observations to underlying assumptions and factors. These factors are usually associated with the particulars of a given political system, institutional framework, or the role of development partners and other external stakeholders, etc.

Neoclassical game theory suggests few preconditions, which have to be considered in further analysis. First, actors representing heterogeneous stakeholders have bounded rationality. The information asymmetry and uncertainty with respect to aid flows and development cooperation policy in general induce agents to copy the strategies from others based on observable payoffs. The payoffs can be identified by the actors themselves depending on the timeframe, as well as on their own priorities. For short period of time the payoffs can result in aid budget increase, while in long run payoffs could be associated with particular development outcomes. However, positive development outcomes can support aid budget increase. This can result in a gradual phasing out of donor assistance.

Second, it is difficult to maintain the equilibrium in short and even in the long run. Multiple equilibria require Nash refinements. Not every game with pure strategies has a Nash equilibrium. That is why reality could deal with scenarios that have no equilibrium, and can specify stability with more precision. This partially could explain why the IDA M&E systems evolve with time and donors and recipients choose mixed strategies. Moreover, the existence of a stable equilibrium is certainly not self-evident, and perhaps can actually be seen as the driver behind changing donor priorities and M&E systems.

Third, the game should be considered as a dynamic process to form a dynamic system with observable tipping, cycling, etc.

Game theory in this context would be applied to donor and recipient countries in a different way. The recipients would be associated with price-takers, who accept the rules of the game while donors are considered as price setters for a given

demand and supply curves of the development resources. The donors and recipients as rational actors must worry about the actions of others as far as they are mutually interdependent. However, development agencies responsible for M&E in donor countries could also often be associated with price-takers if they are more vulnerable and depend heavily on the actions of different stakeholders acting in the country.

The decision-making process could be associated mainly with three stages, such as extensive, strategic, and coalitional forms. The extensive-form model assumes stakeholders, action choices available to stakeholders, sequences of stakeholders' actions, players' information conditions and preferences. The strategic level considers stakeholders' strategies and their preferences over the final outcomes.

The coalitional level of analysis considers coalitions of stakeholders and the values of these coalitions. The IDA M&E institutional systems are usually associated with the binding conditions as a result of stakeholders' multiple perspectives and interests. All the mentioned levels of decision-making could be reflected on the final model of IDA M&E system employed by the sovereign donors and will be discussed in further sections.

### *Data and Methods*

Data indicating IDA M&E systems elements were compiled by the authors from official national sources (see Annex A) for the purpose of this article. The data contain special characteristics of the national IDA M&E systems in different countries.

The database covers such countries as DAC OECD members (split by such country groupings as traditional core DAC members (Germany, Netherlands, UK, USA), Scandinavian group (Norway, Finland, Sweden), new DAC members (Korea, Slovenia, Slovakia), countries with emerging IDA M&E practices (China, Russia) and other donors (Brazil, South Africa). Country-specific data was gained as a result of official document review, provided by the national governments of donor and recipient states, as well as by the international organizations, such as OECD and the World Bank.

With respect to key elements of the national M&E systems the following features were analyzed. The first set of elements covered institutional characteristics, such as institutional framework (institutional body responsible for evaluation), planning approach (assuming timing, coverage and selection, consultation and review, staffing,

outsourcing, ensuring quality). The second set of elements covered methodological issues, such as methodology (methods and approaches, supplementary evaluation tools), evaluation principles (DAC OECD criteria/ other overarching considerations), number of evaluations per year. The last set of elements included reporting and follow up activities, such as quality control (external evaluations, internal peer review, reference groups, self-evaluations, advisory boards, communication and feedback), financial control (as part of M&E or separate process). Key features of the national M&E systems expenditures and political system were also considered. The national policy directives determined by political system, and the nature of national management rules (especially budget rules) determine the core incentives for countries to implement IDA M&E.

## Findings

The research has revealed three main types of national IDA M&E system. The first is associated with an independent external body which ensures transparency, social oversight and accountability. This form assumes cooperation with external stakeholders, as well as non-participation to influence policy-making. The examples are associated with the national IDA M&E systems in Mexico and Columbia.

The second group is centralized government-owned IDA M&E systems. This system is effective for management and budget control and provides the ability to pursue standard practices, best practices, and quality methods and to reduce duplication. The examples of centralized systems are Australian, Chilean, Canadian and Dutch M&E national systems.

In Canada (somewhat like in Australia in 1987–97), the central government sets the rules and provides advice, while the line departments are required to carry out the evaluations, with some degree of liberty as to how they organize them. South Africa aspires to a somewhat similar arrangement.

The last type of the national IDA M&E systems is decentralized government-owned M&E system with full ownership by agencies. Its main advantage is heterogeneous quality and rigor in M&E products and better access to data and disclosure. However, the main disadvantage is associated with fewer opportunities for best practice sharing. The examples of this system are associated with Germany, USA, and the UK.

For instance, the institutional framework of IDA M&E in Germany is based on the Evaluation of Development Cooperation and Audit Division, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The Division has the mandate for the evaluation system of German development cooperation and is responsible for providing guidance and quality assurance of evaluation systems of implementing agencies, such as KfW Entwicklungsbank (KfW) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). The German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) has been established as an independent stakeholder with the BMZ to provide guidance and consistency in Germany's development assistance evaluation.

The choice and embedding of any particular national M&E system in each case depended on particular national circumstances, political system, division of labor as well as the distribution of power among the governmental bodies and financial funds available for M&E procedures. The key elements is that it is feasible within the available structures of a country, allows for a gradual building up of the available capacity, and serves the key country-specific purposes. These key elements are mostly associated with the mode of planning, financial funds availability, methodology and indicators selection.

The international experience shows that as one of the first steps, a standard methodology of evaluation is elaborated and applied for the ongoing IDA projects. This helps to assess the results at the general level. In most of the OECD and even non-OECD countries the DAC evaluation guidelines for development assistance are used along with the donor's specific considerations to provide sufficient guidance for the effective implementation of the donor's development assistance program.

The further steps deal with cooperation with sectorial bodies and stakeholders to develop sectorial IDA indicators and to elaborate a shared IDA M&E methodology. The success of this stage deals with the indicators' measurability at different levels, reflecting different interests of stakeholders. They help to evaluate themselves and to provide the information at the general level.

Unlike in many traditional donors, basing their M&E methodologies on DAC principles, some new donors (such as Brazil, South Africa) use evaluation principles inherited from institutional evaluators working in the countries on IDA projects. For instance, in Brazil the M&E methodology is based on those used by the international organizations such as FAO and UNDP.

Regarding planning IDA M&E activities, most M&E systems are focused on avoiding planning too many tasks. To achieve this goal most countries prefer to pay more attention to strengthening monitoring in terms of data production and data use. Initially, the main emphasis of the system is on monitoring information rather than evaluation. However, traditional donors have made more substantial progress in developing evaluation components, having introduced complex indicator systems, as well as sector and country specific impact evaluation practices (such as Germany and USA). New donors' M&E plans focus more on particular critical areas rather than complicated indicators.

The grasp of IDA M&E systems and the number of projects subject to evaluation depend on financial funds available for IDA M&E procedures. The country experience shows that if there is a lack of financial resources, there is no need for an assessment of all national IDA projects. Sophisticated evaluations are made for those projects which have significant impact and lead to even marginal improvements in program performance. Such practices are employed by some traditional donors and involve funding activities to collect data, paying fees to access contextual data for comparisons, buying software to track the data, etc. Such practices also are associated with impact evaluation studies. The international experience shows that most of the IDA projects (including those implemented by new donors) are assessed in more basic ways to avoid expensive surveys and experts.

Another angle for establishment and operationalization of the national IDA M&E systems is the choice of the indicators. The development needs are usually reflected in the achievement of the relevant indicators, which are selected for particular IDA projects/programs.

The international experience shows that successful implementation of the project relying on correct indicators contributes to long-term sustainability while misguided approaches for identifying the project indicators leads to failure and increase of development risks. That is why choice of relevant indicators, contributing to successful outputs is crucial.

The choice of indicators should be associated with the development goals of the project and largely depends on the availability of relevant information, on donor's past experience, as well as on the frequency of interventions. Project goals in development aid usually relate to social and economic transformation at the country level and to human development at the local level, which makes

project performance measurement even more complex (Crawford & Bryce, 2003). What is more, indicators provide important information for managing, monitoring and evaluating development programs and individual projects, as well as for reporting on performance (Canoog, 2009).

Indicators used for long-term projects must be standardized to ensure comparability among projects, recipients as well as development engagement continuity. They help to plan development intervention while providing the information on the broader characteristics and challenges in a country, sector or intervention area. They could include both impact-level and output indicators.

The use of indicators (as well as wrong indicators) in practice could also lead to adverse effects for project implementation and undesired outcomes. First, not every goal or objective can be measured and reported as performance output. However, appropriate resources could be essential to attain desired results. Second, the use of right indicators to show right performance leads to misallocation of resources with a shift to easily measurable areas. This often leads to risk-averse behavior of people, who are responsible for aid project/program management.

The use of the information from indicators could be useful for decision-making and managing development interventions. They are helpful for allocating resource with respect to relevant objectives attainment.

Cooperation with partner countries is usually realized through country partnership strategies. To ensure the focus on development impact, strategies need to be developed in partnership with recipient countries, focusing on the most important development challenges, while taking into account existing partnerships the recipient country may have. These strategies should clearly articulate the specific value added through each donor's contribution consistent with the donor's goals of development aid. Nowadays most of the traditional donors have introduced into practice their country partnership strategies (CPS), which include the main indicators of country-specific activities and their link with the main goals of the donor's development aid. In most cases of traditional donors the country partnership strategies include some element of M&E to contribute to the effective provision of development aid.

*M&E systems of recipient countries.* The research of IDA M&E practices in donor countries was supplemented by overview of M&E of domestic resources in recipient countries. The analysis

covered such traditional recipient countries in Africa (Gambia and Rwanda), Latin America (Columbia) as well as in Central Asia (Kyrgyz Republic).

In Gambia the National Planning Commission is responsible for launching and operationalizing the national development strategies as well as for effective implementation of them. However, the commission is not responsible for M&E of IDA projects implemented in the country by the donors. In some cases, it is mandated to evaluate these projects by special orders of the Gambia's President (WorldCat Identities, n.d.).

Among many other recipients on the African continent, Rwanda is among those which have made the most significant progress in adapting M&E systems with respect to IDA projects. The local Government has launched a framework for evaluation of donor activities. The framework is an integrated tool for monitoring donors' performance at the national level in terms of implementing the stated commitments and the quality of assistance provided to Rwanda. The framework provides an opportunity to conduct an aggregated and disaggregated analysis of donor performance in terms of achieving indicators grouped into six main categories<sup>1</sup>. This allows assessing the results of the work of the donor community, as well as reporting to various stakeholder groups. Such practices contribute to Paris Declaration implementation.

The Kyrgyz Republic was among the pioneer countries in Central Asia which started to undertake the efforts on assessing the IDA flows along with national M&E practices exercised with respect to domestic resources. These efforts were undertaken in the framework of the national programs on increasing the efficiency of public administration and domestic resources management. Moreover, the Kyrgyz Government has initiated the Coordination Council of the Development Partners in the Kyrgyz Republic (Development Partners Coordination Council, n.d.). This largely contributes to aid effectiveness agenda development in this country through donor coordination, information exchange and donor self-assessments.

Columbia was selected as the Latin American recipient economy which has established advanced M&E practices. Most of the M&E practices are

undertaken by the National Planning Department with respect to governmental programs in the public sector. In spite of the fact that analysis of recipient countries' M&E practices is not comprehensive, some general trends were identified.

The analysis makes it possible to identify different approaches used by traditional and new donors, as well as by recipient countries in M&E of IDA flows. Traditional donors are mostly interested in establishing the IDA M&E systems to make the best value of their money spent on development needs of recipients to be accountable to a wide range of stakeholders. On the other hand, recipients are concentrating more on the effectiveness of managing resources (both domestic and external, received as IDA) at the national level. This makes them focus more on developing their own national M&E practices.

Moreover, some of the recipient countries (such as Rwanda and Kyrgyz Republic) are trying to evaluate external finance coming with IDA projects with special national initiatives, which stay separate from their domestic M&E systems.

What is more, some new donors (such as South Africa), being both donor and recipient in some cases, are still more focused on raising the effectiveness of their own resources. This makes them place a greater emphasis on developing M&E practices focused on managing domestic resources. That is why they do not distinguish separately the IDA M&E systems with IDA flows being considered part of the budgetary expenditures.

Much of the aid effectiveness debate has been (though not always successfully) about recognizing that countries spend most of the available resources from domestic revenue and only a small share from IDA. This fact is mainly reflected in the practices of new donors toward principles that allow for consistency between externally and domestically financed development projects.

## Conclusion

The provided analysis makes it possible to elaborate a set of policy recommendations on how to use M&E systems both in donor and recipient countries to raise aid effectiveness. The model of traditional

<sup>1</sup> These categories are: 1) Financing of national strategies to support the achievement of the LRC and the implementation of the VISION 2020 program; 2) use of national systems and institutions to strengthen their own development potential; 3) Strengthening long-term planning and implementation systems through predictable development financing; 4) Reducing transaction costs and strengthening partnerships through the

adoption of harmonized approaches; 5) Improving the effectiveness of projects and programs at the sectoral level through the use of competitive advantages; 6) Strengthening the principle of national ownership, increasing predictability and reducing transaction costs through the provision of budgetary support.

M&E systems contributing to aid effectiveness includes such elements as planning the M&E tasks, data collection and use. This model is adopted by many traditional and new donors, as well as by recipients (in the case of domestic resource management). In most cases the choice of a given M&E system at the national level is associated with the use of the above-mentioned elements.

The establishment of the M&E system contributing to aid effectiveness is usually associated with a step-by-step approach. The first stage consists of the monitoring of IDA projects and the whole IDA politics of the country. As a first step, a standard methodology of evaluation is elaborated and applied for the current IDA projects.

The further steps according to the international experience deal with cooperation with other stakeholders to develop sectorial IDA indicators and elaborate a shared M&E methodology. It should help stakeholders to evaluate themselves.

What is essential in building up an M&E system is to be able to articulate clearly why the initial focus was placed on the selected areas. Without the clarity of reasoning, which may be different from what is proposed, the subsequent steps will not have received the necessary guidance and may well end up technically correct. That is why the prioritization is crucial almost for all M&E practices considered in this research.

The global SDG agenda has raised new challenges for national M&E systems having introduced new targets and time frameworks for national governments. The introduction of SDG evaluation provides accountability at the national and international level in IDA project implementation. From a technical point of view, paying attention to a specific SDG is more successful than creating a monitoring system of performance relative to all SDGs. SDGs themselves have a specific ambition to establish a sound M&E system. The SDGs evaluation system can not replace, but can add a value to serve as a platform for further development and operationalization of M&E systems in developing countries that are lacking evaluation skills and practices. However, the SDGs tackle issues are not simple linear problems. There are many unknowns and a complex system of evaluation needs to be built.

Each of the examined national M&E system is unique in its own way. The fact is, the installation of a new system can be significantly faster than the adjusting more established systems. Sometimes there is no reason to introduce a full system, but it is easier to regularly collect performance information for some activities and gradually build up an M&E system. In contrast, rapid reviews and

similar types of evaluation can be conducted at a much lower cost. The piloting of rapid evaluations provides an important addition to M&E information for budget decision-making and national planning. Such information is relatively inexpensive to produce and can achieve representative results. This has high relevance especially for developing economies.

In spite of the fact that donor and recipient countries have different purposes and approaches in implementing IDA projects, the use of the M&E is usually helpful to bridge their interests and to increase the aid effectiveness. The suggested recommendations do not reflect the special aspects and institutional traits of particular donor and recipient countries but could serve as a general framework for launching M&E systems in new donor and recipient countries.

This article has its limitations associated with a lack of quantitative methods, which could reveal the links among different factors affecting the choice of a particular model of IDA M&E systems in both donor and recipient countries. This could help test different hypotheses on the basis of the evidence. However, this could be a subject of further research.

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## Annex A: The Key Elements of National M&amp;E Systems

Countries	Purpose	Political system	Planning	Institutional framework	Methodology	Reporting and follow-up activities	Evaluation principles	The role of partners	Quality control	Number of evaluations per year	Evaluation expenditures	Financial control
<i>Traditional DAC members</i>												
<b>Germany</b>	transparency for general public	Federal parliamentary republic	demand driven process (bottom-up approach), agreed with BMZ and GIZ	Evaluation of Development Cooperation and Audit Division, BMZ	evaluation DED working group	available to the public with distribution practices	DAC principles	all evaluations are made by external experts	mandatory inception report, involvement of stakeholders and external experts (reference groups); DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation (checklist)	6-10(Deval); 100 (GIZ); 55 (KfW)	EUR 7,4 million (Deval); EUR 1,5 million (BMZ); EUR 2,2 million (GIZ ); EUR 4,8 million (KfW)	
<b>Netherlands</b>	accountability function	constitutional monarchy with Prime Minister as a head of Government	Plan is agreed after consultations with Financial and Economic Affairs Department (FEZ)	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department at MFA of NL	Evaluation policy and guidelines document (mixed methods)	reports are accessible to the public	DAC principles	cooperation with non-governmental organisations; joint evaluations with other donors	internal peer reviews, reference groups, the departmental meeting, the advisory panel and the self-evaluation	Produced 10-15 evaluations per year	EUR 2,5 million (0.06% of ODA)	Order on Periodic Evaluation and Policy Information (RPE, 2006)
<b>Australia</b>	greater transparency and accountability for government programs	Federal parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Each department issues annual portfolio evaluation plan, with a 3-year forward coverage and submits it to DoF	federal Department of Finance (DoF)	rapid evaluations, rigorous impact evaluations, cost-benefit analysis	reports are directed to the Parliament	DAC principles	N/A	DoF	every program be evaluated every 3–5 years	USD 136 billion (13% of GDP)	DoF
<b>Canada</b>	accountability function in the design and delivery of government policies and use of public funds	Parliamentary democratic republic	program-level performance measurement frameworks, annual multi-year planning for evaluation (department level - 37)	Treasury Board Secretariat and internal evaluation units	formalized M&E policies and guidelines	Management Resources and Results Structure Policy (2005); follow-up discussions that take place in the Public Accounts Committees	DAC principles	Canadian Evaluation Society	the Office of the Auditor General, Management Accountability Framework Process	230 evaluations	USD 32 million	Federal Accountability Act (2005),
<b>UK</b>	drive performance using evidence from evaluation, allowing DFID to test, innovate and scale up, modify or discontinue initiatives	constitutional monarchy with Prime Minister as a head of Government	Evaluations are planned and commissioned by country, regional and global programme and policy teams	DFID	high standards, rigour and ethical practice in evaluation to ensure its quality and utility.	Independent Commission on Aid Impact reports to UK Parliament; all evaluation products are published	OECD DAC evaluation principles and standards	involvement of beneficiaries in evaluation	external experts, DFID advisors	28	EUR 15.1 million	five-year Evaluation Strategy (2014)

<b>USA</b>	accountability to stakeholders and learning to improve development outcomes	Presidential Republic	Decentralised project evaluations are planned and performed by the Operating Units in the countries, whereas selected thematic and meta evaluations are planned and carried out from the central level. Performance Management Plans (PMP).	USAID, US Department of State, US Millennium Challenge Corporation (US MCC)	Performance evaluations; impact evaluations; cross-sector evaluations.	use for Mission Orders, Country Development Cooperation Strategies	DAC principles (emphasis on transparency)	use of evaluation standards for external evaluation teams	2012 Policy on Evaluation: "evaluation into the entire project cycle of a programme with a focus on measuring results as well as outcome and impact".	USAID (200); MCC (100)	3% of total program budget. USAID (EUR 14 million); EUR MCC (20 million)	Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016
<b>Scandinavian group</b>												
<b>Norway</b>	identifying lessons learned in a systematic way, so that they can be used in policy development	constitutional monarchy with Prime Minister as a head of Government	Two-year rolling Evaluation Programme is agreed by external and internal stakeholders. Selection criteria: risk, type and strategic importance	The Evaluation Department, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	Thematic/cross-cutting/ impact/ Policy/strategy evaluations	communicating evaluation results to public and decision/policy makers (General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment)	OECD DAC criteria	cooperation with other donors is limited. African Development Bank, the World Bank and the UNDP.	External reviews of the Evaluation Department	13	EUR 3,3 million (0.1% of the ODA budget)	Instructions for Evaluation Activities in Norwegian Aid Administration (2015)
<b>Finland</b>	ensuring that evaluations are used for intervention planning	Presidential - Parliament Republic	initial evaluation plan is integrated in the funding proposal of the project/ programme	Unit for Development Evaluation (EVA-11), Ministry for Foreign Affairs	criteria and standards of the OECD DAC and the EU	available to the public with distribution practices	DAC principles	few joint evaluations: joint evaluations in the past five years with the EU and Sweden	quality assurance report after evaluation research is produced and peer reviews by the managers	4 or 5	EUR 2 million, 0.25% of the ODA budget	
<b>New DAC members</b>												
<b>Korea</b>	inform the stakeholders	Presidential Republic	Evaluation Office establishes an annual evaluation plan	Evaluation Office/Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Evaluation Team/Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF)	CIDC guidelines on evaluation of Korea's international development cooperation	Evaluation Office publishes and disseminates evaluation results to the KOICA headquarters, overseas offices, other government departments and agencies in partner countries	DAC Quality Standards	cooperation with bilateral donors and partner countries	KOICA's 'Quality Assurance Criteria	15	EUR 1.1 million (0.23% of the ODA budget)	Framework Act on International Development Cooperation (2010)
<b>Slovakia</b>	policy makers and senior management	Parliament Republic	Evaluation work plan is decided by DCHAD together with policy makers and senior management	Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DCHAD), Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic (MFEA)	Evaluation guidelines are in process of elaboration	results of evaluations are made public on the SAIDC's website	OECD DAC criteria	One joint evaluation has been conducted with the Czech Development Agency.	independent evaluators are selected with public procurement procedures	5	EUR USD 30.000 (0.5% of the ODA budget)	The Act on Official Development Assistance
<b>Emerging donors</b>												

<b>Brazil</b>	inform on particular aid projects	Presidential Republic	N/A	Brazilian Cooepration Agency (?)	methodologies, used by international organisations (UNDP and FAO)	N/A	Principles depend on project, but the emphasis is put on South-South cooperation	evaluation research is implemented by NGOs as part of technical assistance projects of IOs	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>South Africa</b>	improvement of government's transparency and accountability	Parlamentarian Republic	proposed by government departments and approved by the Cabinet of South Africa	Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME)/ Outcomes Monitoring And Evaluation branch (OME)	National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF); DPME Standards for evaluation in government documents	accessible for the public	Evaluations should be development-oriented and should address key development priorities of government and people	evaluation partnerships with bilateral and multilateral agencies	Providing guidance through standardised procedures guidelines	N/A	N/A	National Evaluation Plan (NEP)
<b>Chili</b>	informing on relevance, sustainability, gender mainstreaming and human development	Presidential Republic	N/A	AGCI	N/A	N/A	N/A	Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Social Development, Interior and Economy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>China</b>	mainly for internal use of the government	Socialist Republic	Inter-agency coordination mechanism	Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and its Department of Foreign Assistance; China Eximbank; Ministry of Finance	Measures for Administration of Foreign Aid (MOFCOM)	evaluation repor for stakeholderst	South-South Cooperationand DAC principles	joint-evaluation with partners	N/A	N/A	N/A	White Papers on Foreign Aid in April 2011, July, 2014.
<b>Russia</b>	informing the government, the parliament and Russian aid projects outcomes	Presidential Republic	no current institutional practices of planning evaluation research of aid projects	Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	the methodology will be a subject to discussion with sectorial ministries and MoF	reports are planned to be directed to the Parliament and a wide audience	could be inherited from OECD DAC	evaluation could be coordinated with other ministries	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

<b>Mexico</b>	assess progress in federal meeting policy and program objectives to inform the performance-based budgeting decision-making process	Annual Evaluation Program	National Evaluation Council (Provides evaluation, technical guidance, and coordinates social programs' M&E and policy feedback), SHCP (Ministry of Finance: SED coordination, linkage to budget, evaluation of public services, and provisions of public goods), SFP (Ministry of Public Management: Coordination of Public Management Improvement Program and evaluation of public services and provisions of public goods)	CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP guidelines, matrix of indicators for results [MIR]	evaluation response document (2008), implementation plan to deal with evaluation recommendations	evaluation guidelines (national executive branch)	ASF annual report (Federal Supreme Audit)	two-level (program and institution) implementation plan to deal with evaluation recommendations	100 evaluations every year;	US\$12.4 million (CONEVAL)	N/A
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