Beware of Branding Someone a Terrorist: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

By: Quirine Eijkman[1]
        Josien Roodnat[2]

Abstract

This article is about the effect of local tailored interventions to counter (violent) extremism, and therefore contributes to the academic and policy debates. It focusses on local, professional perspectives on person-specific interventions utilising a Dutch case study as the basis. The interventions are part of the wider-ranging counter terrorism policy that entails (local) measures that are deployed in relation to designated high-risk individuals and groups. By reviewing policy documents and conducting semi-structured interviews, the exploratory study concludes that the key factors for a hand-tailored intervention are a solid network, expert knowledge to assess potential signs of extremist ideology, an awareness of not having too many concurrent measures, good inter-institutional cooperation and information-sharing. The professionals involved felt that person-specific interventions have contributed to reducing the threat of religious extremism in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, municipal officials and security agents emphasised the importance of setting realistic goals and a focus on preventive rather than repressive measures. Furthermore, despite the central role that municipal actors play, they run up against problems such as cooperation within the security and care sector. National entities appear to emphasize information-gathering and monitoring more than community-focused cooperation. Thereby questioning whether, on the national level, local professionals are perceived as playing a key role in dealing with extremism.

Keywords: Integrated Counter Terrorism Approach, Person-Specific Intervention, Violent Extremism Programmes, Local Professionals, Prevention, Effect

[1] Quirine Eijkman, PhD. Chair Research Group Access2Justice, Centre for Social Innovation (KSI), HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht / Senior-Researcher Security & the Rule of Law, Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) Leiden University, The Netherlands
[2] Josien Roodnat, MSc, Researcher, Senze.

Introduction

In response to recent national security threats, European countries have devised local policies to intensify counter-terrorism and violent extremism efforts. This has been undertaken to complement increased efforts to protect the rule of law and bring to justice those accused of crimes of terrorism. Many states have widened and strengthened the powers of the criminal justice system and administrative authorities, and including in some cases the powers of the intelligence and security services. Relevant legislation has also been tightened-up to facilitate the counterterrorism effort (Coolsaet 2010/2011; Vermeulen 2014). Countries including the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have invested in local activities designed to prevent and tackle terrorism. It is assumed that those professionals working at the municipal level, more than anyone else, may pick up signs of possible extremism and are most likely to have access to relevant communities.

Therefore great efforts are being made to share intelligence, at an international level, but also locally to enable relevant security - and social professionals to have the information they need (Waxman 2008) presumably to help prevent acts of terrorism. This form of countering (violent) extremism falls under the so-called 'community-targeted approach', where the emphasis is on intelligence-gathering and monitoring society (Spalek 2012; Thomas 2010). Various others (violent) extremism prevention programmes have been set up in and beyond Europe for the based on the 'community-focused approach' (Horgan & Braddock 2010; Koehler 2016; Mastroe & Szmania 2016). This approach is largely geared towards cooperation between public authorities and communities, taking account of the complexity relating to ethnicity, politics, religion, and the local context (Spalek 2012). Despite these developments recent research has concluded that it is not, as yet, possible to determine the effects of, amongst others, the local approach to countering terrorism or (violent) extremism in the Netherlands (Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos & Klem 2016). Consequently, it is currently clear that the effects of the local, person-specific approach in the Netherlands cannot be determined.

Furthermore, international studies have suggested that there are few empirical data available about the effect of countering violent radicalisation or disengagement programmes (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan & Braddock 2010; Koehler 2016; Williams, Horgan &

Evans 2016). In other words, specific measures may or may not convince (potential) extremists to discontinue their actions. Additionally, there is very likely no direct, objective, way to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism or countering (violent) extremism policy (Vidino & Brandon 2012). This is probably because that policy consists of a multiplicity of interventions and instruments deployed by different partner organisations. Moreover, the context may differ significantly per community. Also, it is possible for effects envisaged by policymakers to be produced as a result of other causes (Horgan & Braddock 2010; Mastroe & Szmania 2016; Noordegraaf et al. 2016). Last but not least, countering terrorism as well as (violent) extremism is a subject that has scarcely figured to date as the subject of thorough empirical research (Crenshaw 2000; Koehler 2016; Lum, Kennedy & Sherley 2006; Mastroe & Szmania, 2016; Schmid 2013; Schuurman & Eijkman 2013; Silke 2001). For all these reasons, it is not easy to establish a causal relationship between particular effects and particular interventions at the local level.

This article discusses person-specific interventions to counter extremism (primarily religious extremism) on the basis of the case study of local professionals in the Netherlands. In section two we reflect on the methodology and methods of this exploratory study, and in section three we briefly introduce the Dutch counter-terrorism approach. This is followed by an analysis of person-specific interventions and the way they are implemented. In section six and seven the local professional perspective on preventive - and repressive hand-tailored measures as well as the continuous learning curve in devising them is debated. This is followed by a reflection on the sides-effects of the actual interventions. Finally, points for further discussion are set out in the conclusion.

Methodology & Methods

This exploratory study focuses on the local integrated approach from the vantage point of the professionals whose task it is to implement it. We assess the way the person-specific approach is envisaged by central government and ask how municipal authorities actually implement it in practice. In addition to this we also assess what the effects of the person-specific intervention are, as experienced by local professionals. The Netherlands was chosen as a case study, because one of the characteristic features of the Dutch counter-terrorism and (violent)

policy extremism is its focus on the preventive role of local authorities (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) 2014a/b, 2016a). The role of municipal authorities is particularly important in dealing with (violent) radicalisation in society, as well as in preventing and/or altering the actions, and sometimes the ideas, of known or potential extremists. Consequently, in view of these policy and academic public debates on the role of local professionals in preventing terrorist activity and violent extremism in Europe, this article, focusses on their experiences with so-called person-specific interventions and the (side-)effects.

We opted for a qualitative methodological approach in responding to these research questions. Two different research methods were employed: policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The policy documents assisted us primarily in reconstructing the local integrated approach, including the hand-tailored interventions. In September and October 2016 we conducted ten interviews in the eastern, southern and western regions of the Netherlands. They were conducted in seven different municipalities. Each respondent was a public official with experience in implementing the person-specific approach. The central questions in these semi-structured interviews were: How have, 'you' (the respondent) implemented the person-specific approach in your municipality? And, what effects have you noted?

Seven interviewees were municipal officials in charge of coordinating the local integrated approach within their municipality. Two of these municipalities are large with a so-called 'priority' designation,[3] while three are somewhat smaller but close to 'priority' areas.[4] We also interviewed two municipal officials from a region with apparently few problems and no 'priority' municipalities. One of these large municipalities had a substantial multicultural population,[5] while the other was smaller.[6] In addition, we interviewed representatives of partner organisations such as a policy adviser for the Public Prosecution Service (OM),[7] and a process manager and an information analyst for a Community Safety Partnership

---

[3] The two respondents from 'priority' municipalities are referred to here as municipal officials 1 and 2.
[4] These respondents are referred to here as municipal officials 3, 4 and 5.
[5] This respondent is referred to here as municipal official 7.
[6] This respondent is referred to here as municipal official 6.
[7] This respondent is referred to here as the OM policy officer.

(*Veiligheidshuis*; CSP),[8] both of which organisations operate in priority regions. Finally, we interviewed a police officer in the Counterterrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation unit (CTER),[9] in a region that does not have any priority municipalities.

Nine of the ten interviews were conducted in person and one by telephone. Each interview was transcribed and coded. We used an inductive ('grounded theory') approach for analysing the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967). We commenced with a few initial codes based on different topics used in our interview questions (local problems with radicalization and extremism, organization of the local approach, interventions and access to justice). While coding and analysing these transcriptions we added codes based on repeating and meaningful themes within the *a priori* topics, and frequently consulted the literature to find relevant theoretical frameworks. By using an inductive approach we allowed categories to flow from the data and new insights to emerge (Glaser, 2002). Interview quotes were translated from Dutch into English.

The Dutch counter-terrorism approach

The 'broad approach' that characterises the Netherlands' counterterrorism policy is in line with international strategies for combating terrorism and violent extremism, such as the European Union's counterterrorism strategy (Council of the EU 2005) and that of the United Nations (UN 2006). These strategies are geared towards prevention, protection, pursuit, and response, and are therefore intended to constitute an integrated approach to countering the threat of terrorism. This 'broad' or 'integrated' approach was laid down in the National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020 (NCTV 2016a) and builds on the National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2011-2015. This in turn originated from the government-wide National Security Strategy (V&J 2007) and the foreign ministry's International Security Strategy (BuZa 2013). Furthermore, the Dutch approach involves a combination of preventive ('soft') and reactive ('hard') measures. The latter are geared towards identifying, monitoring and combating terrorism and extremism, especially religious extremism, while 'soft' or 'preventive' measures are geared towards promoting social cohesiveness, the integration of

---

[8] The process manager is referred to here as CSP employee 1 and the information analyst is referred to as CSP employee 2.
[9] This respondent is referred to here as the police officer.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

minorities, as well as tackling discrimination (De Graaf & De Graaff 2008; De Graaf & Eijkman 2011; De Graaf & Eijkman 2011). The local integrated approach, including the hand-tailored interventions, is just one aspect of this broader effort.

Recently, the Minister of Security & Justice (V&J) promised the Dutch House of Representatives, in its consultations with the permanent committee on matters relating to the intelligence and security services, to draw up a plan of action to tackle jihadism. This led, in August 2014, to the publication of a plan of action entitled 'An Integrated Approach to Jihadism' (AIJ) (Ministry of Security & Justice and Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment 2014). The AIJ sets out 38 measures, some pre-existing, others enhanced or new, that can be deployed as part of the integrated approach to violent jihadism. They focus on five policy lines: reducing the risk of people travelling from the Netherlands to conflict zones to wage jihad; interventions to stop those trying to travel to conflict zones; tackling radicalisation and social tension; social media and information-sharing; and cooperation (NCTV 2014a). The plan of action consists of criminal-law, administrative, and other preventive measures for use by a range of local partner organisations.

Municipal authorities play a key, coordinating, role in the Dutch counter-terrorism approach, primarily, because at the local level those concerned are assumed to have insight into the social context and are in a position to notice changes amongst young people or adults (Kop & Moors 2015; Witte 2015). Before municipal authorities launch interventions, it is essential for them to prepare the ground by setting up local structures, finding partners for cooperation, and developing their knowledge of the problem. Possible signs of extremism and radicalisation are discussed in multidisciplinary case conferences. Where necessary, specific individuals or groups that are deemed to pose a risk are targeted in interventions involving the cooperation of various partner organisations with the municipal authority adopting a coordinating role. Effective networks are a prerequisite for information-sharing, so building up networks around the problem of violent extremism is essential. These networks are broader than the security partners in the approach (e.g. (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), the police and the Public Prosecution Service) and should include primary healthcare workers, key figures, and other members of the community who are involved in preventing violent extremism.

Finally, local professionals are assumed to possess a certain amount of knowledge and expertise to be capable of detecting and interpreting signs of radicalisation and of setting up hand-tailored interventions. A number of training courses are available for this purpose. After this preparatory phase of knowledge development and training, the guidelines, which the NCTV (2014b) developed to help municipal authorities to improve their own counter (violent) extremism measures. However, as recognized in research it is impossible to create a single, specific profile with points that are indicative of (violent) extremism, since so much depends on the context (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Horgan 2010; Schmid 2013; Schuurman & Eijkman 2015).

To prevent and combat such processes, municipal authorities are advised to concentrate on weakening the breeding ground for (violent) extremism and on strengthening the resilience of young people in relation to radical ideas and influence. It is important to focus this preventive approach on the small group that is vulnerable to extremist ideas - and not, in other words, on entire sections of the population on the basis of shared characteristics (NCTV 2014b). Together with key figures in the environment of those belonging to this small group (such as their family and friends, teachers and sports coaches, spiritual leaders or local entrepreneurs), professionals working on the front line can help to discourage extremism from taking root. They can provide opposing views and offer alternatives to terrorist and extremist manipulations, to prevent those concerned from becoming radicalised.

The governmental guidelines also discuss de-radicalisation: the process of halting or reversing radicalisation once a person has already become radicalised. A distinction is drawn between 'disengagement' from the extremist sphere of influence and 'real de-radicalisation', which means renouncing extremist ideology. This distinction between disengagement and de-radicalisation is also found in the literature (Barrelle 2015; Bjørgo & Horgan 2013; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2009/2010; Koehler 2016; Schmid 2013). In these academic studies, 'disengagement' is regarded as distancing oneself from the violent, terrorist *modus operandi* in one's *behaviour*, whereas 'de-radicalisation' implies an actual change in a person's views (Schmid 2013). According to the literature and central government, disengagement is more achievable than 'real de-radicalisation' as a result of governmental effort (Barrelle 2015; Bjørgo & Horgan 2013; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2010; NCTV 2014b). Supervising a

person in an organised structure may help to detach the person from the extremist sphere of influence.

Person-specific interventions

If individuals carry out terrorist activities, the local authority may have to deal with criminal investigations of terrorism and the arrest of suspects within their municipality. In the Dutch context criminal investigations of terrorist or violent extremist activity are a matter for the Public Prosecution Service and the police. However, the municipal authority and other partners also play a role by reporting any actions that may indicate preparations for (violent) extremist activities. As studies about religious extremists and foreign fighters suggest the threat of a terrorist attack has been present in the Netherlands for more than a decade (Bakker & de Bont 2016; Bie, de, de Poot & van der Leun, 2015; Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie 2008; Van San 2015; Schuurman & Bakker 2015; Schuurman, Eijkman & Bakker 2015; Weggemans, Bakker & Grol 2014). Therefore, any signs of violent terrorism or terrorist action, may put the local authorities under severe pressure.

Once the nature of the terrorist threat is in the public order domain, it falls under the responsibility of the mayor. He or she must put adequate security measures in place to prevent criminal offences or public order disturbances (NCTV 2014a/b). If an act of terrorism has been committed, the government's actions must focus on helping the victims, maintaining public order, finding the perpetrators, and taking action in terms of possible follow-up attacks. For person-specific interventions, the national government advises local authorities to set up a multidisciplinary case conference with partner organisations. Good cooperation and information-sharing within the multidisciplinary case conferences are deemed essential (NCTV 2014b). Signs of radicalisation, jihadist travel, and the return of religious extremists from conflict regions are discussed concurrently within the multidisciplinary case conference.

The participants in the multidisciplinary case conference are municipal officials and representatives of the local authority, police, Public Prosecution Service, the Probation Service, youth care services, the child protection board, and youth workers, with the municipal authority acting in a coordinating role (Association of Netherlands Municipalities 2015). Tailoring each response to the particular person and situation is crucial. The action

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

taken will often involve a combination of monitoring, criminal-law and administrative measures, and/or a form of supervision. The person-specific intervention strategy will vary in form, degree of coercion, and intensity from one case to the next. Those returning from a conflict zone will be subjected to a criminal investigation by the Public Prosecution Service, which will look at the reason for the person's travel and ascertain whether the person has committed one or more criminal acts. The local authority may also decide to impose administrative measures on those returning from a conflict zone, such as revoking their passport or discontinuing benefits or student finance.

In setting up the multidisciplinary case conference, knowledge and support can be drawn from existing national - and local structures, such as the Community Safety Partnership (CSP) or other existing consultative bodies dealing with specific target groups. Alternatively, a separate working group may be set up, if the problem calls for it. The mayor may discuss the chosen intervention strategy in the local 'tripartite group' (involving representatives of the police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the local authority). Then the chosen interventions are applied by the various agencies concerned. Over the past few years, the NCTV and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) have provided support to priority municipalities to help them put the local integrated approach into practice. They do so by notifying mayors at regular intervals about the developments within municipalities, helping authorities to set up case conferences, and facilitating a monthly exchange of information between the most relevant municipal authorities, the NCTV, and the AIVD (NCTV 2014b). Nonetheless, as evidenced by research, municipal authorities sometimes complain that in practice they are not kept sufficiently informed. One example cited is the limited amount of information the secret service incorporates into its official notifications (De Jongh 2015).

The Dutch local person-specific intervention could be classified as a combination of the so-called community targeted - and community focused approach to counter violent extremism (Spalek 2012). On the one hand professionals involved in the multidisciplinary case conferences share information and monitor subjects, whereas on the other, cooperation between public authorities and communities is emphasised. The latter takes account of the complexity relating to the context of the person deemed a risk. Across the globe programmes aimed at countering violent extremism often stress the need for individual or hand tailored measures and community resilience (Mastroe & Szmania 2016). Although the broad Dutch

183

approach includes community focused initiatives such as the SMN, an umbrella organization for Dutch-Moroccans, radicalization helpline, as well as state-funded de-radicalization initiatives and family support units, in contrast to many other programmes countering (violent) extremism, the local person-specific intervention is government-led and not a specifically community-based (Feddes, Mann & Doosjes 2015; Ministry of Security & Justice 2015). In the operationalisation phase it may or may not include people who are from the local community or who know the potential extremist personally. This in contrast to other programmes targeted at countering violent extremism such as, an American community-based programme developed by the World Organization for Resource Development and Education and Muslim-led or the Muslim Council of Wales' Prevent programme. These involve religious representatives or peers who fulfil key roles in local implementation (Sheikh, Sarwar & King 2012; Williams, Horgan & Evans, 2016).

Local professionals' experiences

In this section we reconstruct how local professionals - in practice - set up municipal procedures, deal with raising awareness and interpreting signs and the network, in order define the details of person-specific interventions and deal with (violent) extremism. All the respondents we interviewed stated that signs of radicalisation and extremism had been observed or reported within their municipality or region. The primary focus in this area is on religious extremism. In the two priority municipalities, which receive extra financial support and expert advice from the central government, there are known cases of people travelling to, and returning from, conflict zones - approximately ten cases in each municipality. The respondents also referred to dozens of cases in which signs of radicalisation have been noted and some individuals have been identified as potential travellers to conflict zones. In one of these municipalities, a criminal youth gang was radicalised a few years ago, and many of its members left for conflict zones within a short space of time.

The non-priority municipalities have fewer signs of radicalisation, or known or potential cases of people travelling to conflict zones or returning from them or other cases. However, four respondents[10] did note signs and cases causing concern. Almost every

---

[10] Municipal officials 5, 6, 7 and the police officer.

municipality has had some dealings with one or more persons travelling to, or returning from, a conflict zone. They also reported signs of possible radicalisation among young people, a certain retreat into isolation among Salafist and certain other Islamist movements and societies, and the establishment of an association believed to have links to religious extremists. Such signs are generally reported either by partner organisations or key figures within the municipality or in an official report of the secret service.

Raising awareness and interpreting signs of extremism

All municipal authorities have invested in raising awareness of religious extremism over the past few years. They have held theme-based discussion days, lectures and presentations to inform municipal councils, internal staff, partner organisations, and key figures in the municipality. In addition, local professionals who are frequently confronted with these issues attended a three-day training course to deepen their knowledge. People who work 'in the street and at the desk' attended a one-day course. 'It is important for people to learn to recognise certain signs', observed one respondent, 'and also to learn what are *not* signs, and not to be afraid of everything'.[11] All the respondents agreed that properly interpreting signs is a specialist task. This is corroborated by studies of the problems regarding the identification and interpretation of signs of radicalisation. There are no standard patterns or standard sets of indicators for radicalisation and extremism. This makes the task of identifying and interpreting signs a difficult one (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Horgan 2010; Schmid 2013; Schuurman & Eijkman 2015).

Municipalities frequently rely on the help of experts with a profound knowledge of Islam, many of whom have a Muslim background themselves.[12] All municipal officials said that they were under no illusion that they possessed sufficient knowledge or expertise to talk about such issues and emphasised the importance of experts to help interpret signs. Such experts are in short supply, however.[13] Nevertheless, the respondents did believe that the process of raising awareness had helped them to pick up more signs and gain more insight

---

[11] Municipal official 4.
[12] Noted by municipal officials 2, 3, 4, 7 and CSP employees 1 and 2.
[13] Municipal officials 2, 3, 4 and CSP employees 1 and 2.

into radicalisation and into religious and cultural differences, and that front-line professionals are now better able to find each other when needed.

Local procedures after identification

Respondents from all municipalities but one[14] stated that person-specific interventions had been devised in response to distinct needs. Signs were picked up and action had to be taken. In the priority municipality this had happened in or around 2012-2013, while in most of the non-priority municipalities it had happened later. All respondents indicated that one or more cases had occurred within the municipality or region, in response to which interventions had been initiated using a multidisciplinary approach. This approach specifically targets religious extremism rather than any other form of extremism. Many municipalities adopted this approach in response to a distinct need, having observed signs of religious extremism. When such signs are reported, local officials start by gathering information internally and making an initial assessment.

The person-specific response is scaled up if there is any possibility that the signs are indicative of (violent) extremism or terrorism. The signs are then discussed and considered in a case conference.[15] All municipalities have set up multidisciplinary case conferences to discuss signs of this nature, as recommended by central government, but these conferences operate in different ways from one municipality to the next. However, as mentioned before, the so-called priority municipalities receive extra support from central government, both financially and in terms of knowledge and expertise. As they deal with more cases, there is wide appreciation of the need and usefulness of this approach. These municipalities have more experience with person-specific interventions and possess the necessary capacity to manage the practicalities of implementation. Regular forms of consultation foster greater cooperation. This is harder for smaller municipalities to achieve, as a result of which they try to forge cooperative relationships with larger and priority municipalities. Such relationships have not yet been built up in all parts of the Netherlands - something that may impede the local integrated approach.

---

[14] Municipal official 4.
[15] Municipal officials 1 to 7.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

Local networks and cooperation

All respondents agreed on the importance of maintaining a good network: not only relations with their partner organisations in the approach, but also with key figures and local professionals who have close ties with the community, who are in a position to pick up relevant signs, and who can present an accurate picture of new developments. It is important to continue to invest in the network, and the respondents do so by arranging for partner organisations to meet each other and exchange information and to determine a carefully-considered, joint course of action. The network of 'people in the street', such as youth workers and community police officers, is crucial both to information-gathering and to appropriate intervention.[16]

One region has a network coordinator who is specifically concerned with the theme of (violent) extremism and individuals and groups deemed to pose a high risk. The network coordinator maintains close ties with the local community and key figures. This individual not only works in response to specific incidents, but also maintains a network of contacts and conducts preventive talks with people in the surrounding area. The latter includes not only worried parents and other concerned members of the public, but also individuals who have reportedly exhibited signs of radicalisation. A network coordinator has a wider range of operation than local professionals working in particular communities or regions.[17] Youth workers and community police officers are important to the network and frequently have good access to the community and.[18]

On the whole, the respondents expressed satisfaction with the cooperation they receive with partners in the approach. Adequate mutual trust is an important condition for information-sharing. Structural consultations help to build this trust. Four of the respondents noted that they sometimes had problems relating to information-sharing. This was particularly the case in regions that did not have structural consultations. Each partner organisation takes part with a different objective and people are not always used to sharing information externally. In addition, several respondents reported a certain dissatisfaction with the information provided by the AIVD. The official secret service reports they receive are often

---

[16] Municipal officials 1, 2, 6, 7 and police officer.
[17] Comment by CSP employee 1.
[18] Municipal officials 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

uninformative. The respondents appreciate that it is not always possible to supply more information, but this can hamper their ability to make well-founded decisions - especially since the municipal authority is responsible for coordinating the local approach and in some cases a particular intervention plan has already been set in motion. This lack of information from the partners at national level has already been noted in earlier research (De Jongh 2015).

Preventive or repressive interventions?

All the respondents stated that they had launched interventions as part of the effort to tackle (religious) extremism. These ranged from criminal law and administrative measures to supervision in care strategies and other preventive interventions. When we asked them about the effect of interventions, the CSP employees said that this was hard to answer, since each intervention was different: 'Each one is a carefully-considered combination of interventions and partners deemed appropriate to the specific case'. All the respondents confirmed this: each response is tailored to the individual circumstances (Coolsaet 2016). This weighing of possible interventions and tailor-made responses is also used in tackling other kinds of crime. The importance of the context of each case is often emphasised (Menger & Krechtig 2016). In some cases it may be 'strategically convenient' to refrain from certain interventions, such as discontinuing someone's unemployment benefit. Keeping communication channels open and attaching conditions to certain advantages may make it easier to keep track of someone and to stay in contact with them.[19] The choice of intervention strategy and partners will depend on many factors: the degree of extremism, the person's environment and social circumstances and the degree of access that local professionals have to the person concerned.

The respondents insisted that there was no standard set of interventions that can be applied to a particular target group. The measures listed in the AIJ plan of action do not transform the person-specific approach, as currently used to combat religious extremism, into something completely different from the regular person-specific approach as pursued by the CSP.[20] Officials draw from the available stock of options. Meanwhile, this stock is constantly

---

[19] Municipal official 6.
[20] It is already common practice within the CSPs to collaborate with partners in the criminal justice system, care services, and municipal partners and authorities, to tackle nuisance, domestic violence and crime arising from a complex set of problems. To tackle these problems, it is common to impose care-related measures, combined

being expanded and tightened up with new measures.[21] Most of the respondents said that they felt that they had gained a better picture of the problems and of those involved since 2012. Although it is true that there is always a degree of uncertainty involved, this was the respondents' stated experience. In addition, they said they had noted some positive effect, provided the interventions were carried out correctly and the cooperation with partner organisations worked well.

In general, the respondents singled out preventive interventions as the most effective. Examples included supervision and having a robust network of key figures to provide opposing views - at least, where such interventions were appropriate to the circumstances. The police and OM respondents likewise underscored the importance of preventive action and supervision plans. It is important to improve the social circumstances of those concerned precisely because such cases are often greatly influenced by social and economic factors, such as employment, prospects, and social context (Coolsaet 2016). The police and OM respondents emphasised the importance of preventing matters escalating to the stage of criminal proceedings. Their perception is that if someone is still in the early stages of the radicalisation process, a conversation with an expert or key figure may achieve a great deal. It is crucial, however, that this expert is conversant with the person's religion and milieu, that he or she can build up a relationship of trust, and that the person concerned is interviewed and not interrogated.[22] Several studies have focused on the use of key figures and on efforts to engage with radicalised individuals or extremists. The results have been variable, depending on the context. It is important to avoid taking action that ends up stigmatising a specific section of the population, or merely uses them to gain intelligence (De Jongh 2015; Vermeulen 2014; Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012; Sieckelinck & De Winter 2015; Thomas 2010). Nonetheless, one also needs to guard against seeing all those involved as victims: some may be potential perpetrators, adds one of the respondents.[23]

However much care has been taken, an atmosphere of unrest frequently develops in the surroundings, which calls for a constructive response. The primary focus at such times is

---

where necessary with criminal-law measures (http://www.veiligheidshuizen.nl/achtergrond#.WBR-PuCLS00, accessed on 1 November 2016).
[21] CSP employees 1 and 2.
[22] Municipal official 2.
[23] Municipal official 4.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

on schools and mosques and on finding ways of reassuring and informing pupils and visitors.[24] However, a respondent from one municipality said that the schools and mosques you would want to reach are precisely those that are not receptive to preventive action of this kind.[25] After all, there may often be a lack of trust, or concern that information may end up with the intelligence and security services (De Jongh 2015). One important target group consists of those who are left behind when their friends or relatives travel to conflict zones. It is imperative to keep close contact with these friends and family members. This helps provide more information, ensures the prompt notification of a person's return, and makes it possible to watch for any signs of radicalisation of the person's brothers and friends, for instance. When someone travels to a conflict zone, it has an enormous impact on that person's family, school, and neighbourhood in all instances (Weggemans, Bakker & Grol 2014). This is often picked up by the media and the suffering is exacerbated by repeated news reports. This may also lead to greater polarisation, since people in the surrounding neighbourhood may turn against the person's friends and family.[26]

When it comes to administrative measures such as the revoking of a passport, the respondents expressed different views. Three of them believed that the passport measure has a useful disruptive effect, since it creates an extra barrier making it harder to leave the country.[27] But others said that someone who was determined to leave would be able to do so even without a passport, and did not see any added value in the passport measure.[28] In fact one municipal respondent thought that the measure attracts more attention to the case. If the security & justice minister imposes this measure, the partner organisations appear to take the case more seriously and to 'become more active'.[29] Another point that was raised was the difficulty of proving that someone plans to travel to a conflict zone and is not simply going on holiday.

The national financial sanctions measure is a complex and exceptional measure.[30] It is extremely important to apply it in the right way. Experience with this measure has shown it to

---

[24] Municipal officials 1 and 2.
[25] Municipal official 6.
[26] Municipal officials 1 and 2.
[27] Municipal official 1, police officer and OM policy officer.
[28] Municipal officials 3, 4 and 6.
[29] Municipal official 5.
[30] CSP employees 1 and 2 and OM policy officer.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

be effective when applied to people who are fighting in a conflict zone. It helps to guard against the Netherlands financing the conflict. However, when people return home, the measure may have a negative effect, since it hampers integration and fills them with a sense of exclusion that actually strengthens their radical views.[31] This conclusion has been confirmed by study among ex-detainees (Weggemans & De Graaf 2015). In addition to this, a substantial number of people travelling to conflict zones have a criminal past (Coolsaet 2016). So the financial sanctions measure actually encourages them to 'find other sources of income'.[32]

Municipal authorities often look for administrative grounds for 'soft' interventions. These grounds relate primarily to the kinds of support that authorities can offer in relation to housing, daytime activities, benefit, personal supervision, and other types of (care) counselling. Attaching conditions to support like this makes it possible to remain in close contact with the person and to require something in return. This can help a person devote his or her energy to building up a meaningful way of life and finding useful ways of spending their time, for instance by looking for a job or signing up for an education - or skills training course. 'The local authority's rule of thumb is to take soft measures when possible and hard action when necessary'.[33] This approach seeks to avoid possible triggers for radicalisation, such as a feeling of social exclusion and a form of identity crisis and distrust of the authorities (Barlett, Birdwell & King 2010).

In summary, all respondents stated a preference for preventive and 'soft' measures rather than measures taken under the criminal law. However, if someone is far advanced along the path of radicalisation, more repressive interventions may be necessary.[34] The main effects of these "hard" measures are to disrupt and monitor and to remove any danger that may be posed to society. The OM policy officer stated that using the criminal law was something that should not be done only as a last resort but more importantly as the 'best resort': in other words, 'how can we best use the criminal law, along with other interventions, to achieve the desired effect?' Politicians often call for tough action: 'in national politics, prevention does not have a sexy image'. However, according to this respondent's experience,

---

[31] CSP employees and OM policy officer.
[32] OM policy officer.
[33] Municipal official 2.
[34] CSP employees and OM policy officer.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

tough action and criminal-law measures are less effective than a combination of 'softer' interventions.

A learning curve

However as one respondent mentioned in relation to devising hand-tailored interventions, 'it remains an area that comes with a learning curve, one that calls for a pioneering approach'.[35] This means that people need to be confronted with cases on a regular basis in order to learn from them. Some of respondents do not see many cases, and as a result they may lack the knowledge and expertise that is needed to continue shaping this developing approach. In addition, capacity has to be freed up to allow people to devote themselves regularly to studying cases. This too is hard to achieve in practice, particularly in municipalities that do not have many cases. Another side-effect is that it is not only the officials who are on a learning curve; the subjects are learning too: 'they get smarter all the time and keep finding new ways of staying below the radar or evading interventions'.[36]

In the process of an intervention it is important to set realistic goals and to adopt a realistic view of the situation. That means distinguishing between what is desirable and what is possible - to 'prevent disappointment and discouragement'.[37] For instance, it is not a realistic objective to disengage the leading figure of an extremist movement, since this person's radicalisation is probably too far advanced. All respondents confirmed this view and said that they were under no illusion that they could de-radicalise heavily extremist individuals. The literature likewise refers to the limits of what can be achieved in terms of de-radicalisation (Koehler 2016). Disengagement is seen as a more realistic goal, which can be successful in the case of individuals whose radicalisation is less far advanced (Barrelle 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2009/2010; Sieckelinck & De Winter 2015).

In the case of someone whose radicalisation is far advanced, the goal might be to monitor him and to prevent him from disseminating his radical ideology when setting realistic goals. This will involve following the person in his or her development and intervening or adopting different measures when necessary. The respondents added that the most important

---

[35] CSP employees 1 and 2.
[36] Municipal official 1.
[37] CSP employee 1.

consideration here is to protect society.[38] This must be done as early as possible if the objective is to prevent radicalisation or to achieve a person's disengagement from radical ideology. There will be a higher chance of success in case conferences where those concerned can still be encouraged to break away from radical circles. This is not always possible and is not always a realistic goal.[39]

Side-effects

The above observations suggest that person-specific interventions may also have side-effects. This applies not only to the interventions themselves, but also to the way in which they are applied.[40] Amongst others, the deployment of too many interventions within a short space of time may be counter-productive with all the available ammunition being used up at once. For instance, it may be unwise to set up a wide range of support measures at once instead of starting off with just one form of support. Doing too much at once leaves no options to be explored, and if the approach fails, there is no path left to pursue. All the respondents agreed that taking preventive action at the same time as deploying criminal law interventions will not have the desired effect, and may indeed have a negative impact such as a willingness to cooperate with local professionals. They also agreed that it was unwise to start off with a heavy-handed approach. For instance, in the case of a young girl, starting immediately to talk about the possibility of travelling to a conflict zone and setting up measures to prevent this may go too far and prove counterproductive.[41] The intervention should be kept as low-key as possible, if the case lends itself to this approach, and should focus more on the specific individual. This means working in a measured way and constantly weighing the options. This will also provide a better picture of the effects of interventions. It is not always possible to predict the side-effects attached to the risks of potential extremism,

When asked about their experience with the detention of extremist, the respondents expressed different, in some cases ambivalent, views. A similar ambivalence emerges from research, which concludes that it is difficult to strike the right balance between the high level

---

[38] CSP employees 1 and 2 and OM policy officer.
[39] CSP employees 1 and 2.
[40] CSP employees 1 and 2.
[41] CSP employees 1 and 2.

of security in terrorist wings and resocialisation efforts (Veldhuis, Gordijn, Lindeberg & Veenstra 2011). On the one hand, the respondents considered it necessary in some very high-risk cases to remove someone from society for a while.[42] On the other hand, they also spoke of the side-effects of detention. For instance, confinement to a closed institution can aggravate a person's existing isolation. One respondent cited the example of a girl who was placed in a closed youth detention centre.[43] Support staff in the institution could not gain sufficient access to her, and after this period of detention she appeared to be more alienated from society and her extremist ideas had grown stronger. The OM policy officer stated that it was also important to think carefully about where to place the detainee, to prevent people with similar extremist ideas ending up together and reinforcing these ideas. All in all, the respondents concluded that it was not the case that 'people came out of detention having been de-radicalised'. A study of ex-detainees also found that in some cases the detention had increased their sense of frustration and strengthened their radical ideas (Weggemans & De Graaf 2015).

Overall, local professionals emphasised their responsibility in designating an individual or group as posing a risk to society, and were adamant that no one should unjustifiably be branded a terrorist, extremist, or radical. Essentially they were keen to avoid any form of anticipatory justice. The importance of protecting national security leads to forms of intervention that are determined more by the potential risk than by an actual or potential act of extremism (Amoore & De Goede 2012; Beck 1986; Hirsch Ballin 2012; Lomell 2012; Van der Woude 2010). Attaching the label 'high risk' to a person's name may have far-reaching consequences, including public sanctions lists and intrusive media coverage. Knowing this, local professionals pay particular attention to interpreting the risks posed by particular individuals or groups, to 'daring to cross someone's name off the local lists' and to the privacy of those concerned. The professionals were clear the information should only be shared when it was really necessary. Public safety always has to be weighed against the privacy of the person concerned. It remains debatable, of course, whether this particular weighing of interests should be carried out in this way (Asworth 2007; Lomell 2012). One alternative might be to assess the violation of privacy in its own right, rather than weighing it against the interests of protecting public safety.

---

[42] Municipal officials 1 and 5, police officer and OM policy officer
[43] Municipal official 7.

Conclusion

In this article we explored the effect of person-specific interventions to counter (religious) extremism. As discussed the implementation of person-specific interventions is an important pillar in dealing with terrorism in Europe and elsewhere. Although portrayed as a politically neutral policy based on expert knowledge, hand-tailored interventions in the Dutch case study are in fact 'works in progress'. Municipal authorities have been designated an important task in the interest of national security and maintaining public order. Yet, what this means in practice or what its effect is from the local professional perspective is something that has received modest attention from academics and policymakers' attention. Therefore, our aim in this exploratory study was to contribute to debates on the effect of dealing with (violent) extremism locally.

We found that each of the local professionals we interviewed implemented the person-specific interventions in their own way within the framework of national policy. Potentials signs of violent extremism are assessed and interpreted in local multi-disciplinary case conferences. If necessary, an intervention strategy is devised and tailored to the specific situation. The key factors here are a solid network, an expert in interpreting signs, not too many concurrent measures, more a preventive - rather than a repressive focus, good inter-institutional cooperation and information-sharing, all of which appear easier to achieve in so-called priority municipalities than elsewhere. From the perspective of local professionals involved person-specific interventions have had some effect in countering religious extremism. According to them it has helped provide a better picture of the problem within their municipalities and high-risk individuals are now monitored more effectively. Local professionals, however, emphasised the importance of setting realistic goals: for instance, monitoring persons who already have extremist ideas instead of setting the unattainable goal of de-radicalising them. Monitoring them can serve a useful purpose, making it possible to potentially disrupt certain activities if the need arises.

Each intervention must be tailored to the person concerned. Interventions have to be evaluated and always weighed against one another and against the context. The interviewees considered that preventive measures such as supervision were the most effective kinds of intervention, provided they were appropriate to the context. They also spoke of the side-

effects: the simultaneous use of preventive - and repressive measures may have the opposite effect to that desired and the responsibility of labelling an individual as posing a risk to society. Despite this call for caution before intervening, it appears as if their primary concern is obtaining information as well as assessing specific situations from an interdisciplinary perspective. This consequently suggests that from a national security perspective this form of prevention primarily targets potential extremists and groups, thereby emphasizing information-gathering, monitoring and involving stakeholders for disengagement, rather than widespread community involvement.

Furthermore, despite the central role that municipal authorities play in countering (violent) extremism policies they run up against problems such as their cooperation with the security - and care sector. The basic principle is that the local professionals with whom information is shared are selected strategically, and that each person bears a professional responsibility for dealing with that information in all confidentiality. Moreover, information can only be shared if it is essential from a national security perspective. But what does that mean to a local professional who is operating from the care services perspective? These are responsibilities of local authorities at the interface of care and national security. How can authorities ensure that subjects relating to diverse areas are embedded in policy and procedure across the board? And even if they do so: are they human rights proof? Is this even feasible? Could it work with a broad integrated approach to dealing with (violent) extremism and terrorism, or is this by its nature mainly about taking action in response to incidents?

The article's findings have some obvious limitations, including that the interviews were processed anonymously at the respondents' request. The desire for anonymity is a common problem affecting studies of terrorism and (violent) extremism (Schuurman & Eijkman 2013; Silke 2001). This may impede efforts to check that the conclusions have not been falsified (Schuurman, Eijkman & Bakker 2015). Furthermore, although the authors are not affiliated with the Dutch government and the research was self-funded, there is a potential bias problem. Primarily, because the experience of the individuals who are targeted in the person-specific approach fell outside the scope of this study, thereby excluding potential critical reflection on the effect of the intervention. For this reason, we collated the qualitative data with existing research and the existing literature wherever possible.

Literature

Amoore, L. and M. de Goede (ed.) (2008). *Risk and the war on terror*. London, Routledge.

Ashworth, A. (2007). Security, terrorism and the value of human rights. In B.J. Goold & L. Lazarus (ed.), *Security and human Rights*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, pp. 203-226.

Association of Netherlands Municipalities (2015). De rol van gemeenten in de aanpak van radicalisering. https://vng.nl/onderwerpenindex/veiligheid/aanpak-radicalisering/nieuws/rol-gemeenten-in-integrale-aanpak-radicalisering-factsheet. Accessed on 30 October 2016.

Bakker, E. & R. de Bont (2016). Belgian and Dutch jihadist foreign fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, motivations, and roles in the War in Syria and Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27 (5), pp. 837-857.

Barrelle, K. (2015). Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 7 (2), pp. 129-142.

Bartlett, J., J. Birdwell & M. King (2010). *The edge of violence: A radical approach to extremism*. London, Demos.

Beck, U. (1986). *Risikogesellschaft: auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp.

Bie, J. L., de, C.J. de Poot & J.P. van der Leun (2015). Shifting modus operandi of Jihadist foreign fighters from the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013: A crime script analysis. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27 (3), pp. 416-440.

Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology* 21 (2), p. 405-420.

Clubb, G. (2009). Re-evaluating the disengagement process: the case of Fatah. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3 (3), pp. 25-34.

Coolsaet, R. (2010). EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera? *International Affairs* 86, pp. 857-873.

Coolsaet, R. (2011). Counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation in Europe: How much unity in diversity? In R. Coolsaet (ed.) (2011). *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge*. Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 227-246.

Coolsaet, R. (2016). Deradicaliseringbeleid en de IS-Generatie. *Politiejournaal*, September, pp. 14-19.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

Council of the European Union (2005). De terrorismebestrijdingsstrategie van de Europese Unie. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?f=ST+14469+2005+REV+4&l=nl. Accessed on 19 October 2016.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (9), pp. 797-814.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2013). Promoting exit from violent extremism: Themes and approaches. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36 (2), pp. 99-115.

Demant, F. & B. de Graaf (2010). How to counter radical narratives: Dutch deradicalization policy in the case of Moluccan and Islamic radicals. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (5), pp.408-428.

Demant, F., M. Slootman, F.J. Buijs & J. Tillie (2008). *Decline and disengagement - An analysis of processes of deradicalisation*. Retrieved from Amsterdam, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES): http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/64714 Accessed on 19 October 2016.

Feddes, A., L. Mann & B. Doosje (2015). Increasing self-esteem and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: a longitudinal quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on adolescents with a dual identity. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 45, pp. 400-411.

Glaser, B. (2002). Conceptualization: On theory and theorizing using grounded theory. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1 (2). Article 3. http://www.ualberta.ca/~ijqm/ Accessed on 20 November 2016.

Glaser, B. G. & A. L. Strauss (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research*. Chicago, Aldin.

Graaf, B. de & B.G.J. de Graaff (2008). Counter-terrorism in the Netherlands after 9/11: The "Dutch approach". In J. Moran (ed.) *Intelligence, security and policing Post-9/11. The UK's response to the war on terror*, Houndmills/New York, Palgrave, pp. 183-202.

Graaf, B.A. van & Q. Eijkman (2011). Terrorismebestrijding en securitisering; Een rechtssociologische verkenning van de neveneffecten. *Justitiële verkenningen* 37 (8), pp. 33-52.

Graaff, B.G.J. de (2008a). Hoe breed? Contraterrorisme- en radicaliseringsbeleid onder de loep. In J. van Donselaar & P. Rodrigues (ed.), *Monitor racisme & extremisme: achtste rapportage*, pp. 125-140. Amsterdam/Leiden, Anne Frank Foundation/University of Leiden.

Graaff, B.G.J. de (2008b). Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten in de strijd tegen het terrorisme. Blessing in disguise? *Criminaliteit en samenleving* 42, pp. 21-25.

Hirsch Ballin, M.F.H. (2012). *Anticipative criminal investigation: Theory and counter-terrorism practice in the Netherlands and the United States of America*. The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, PhD thesis.

Horgan, J. (2004). The case for firsthand research. In A. Silke (ed.), *Research on terrorism: Trends, achievements and failures*. London/New York, Frank Cass, p. 30.

Horgan, J. (2009). *Walking away from terrorism: Accounts from disengagement from radical and extremist movements*. London, Routledge.

Horgan, J. (2010). De-radicalisation or disengagement? *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2 (4), pp. 3-8.

Horgan, J. & M.B. Altier, M. B. (2012). The future of terrorist de-radicalization programs. *Georgetown Journal of International* Affairs, Summer/Fall, pp.83-90.

Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the terrorists? Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization Programs. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22 (2), pp. 267-291.

Jongh, L.C.J. de (2015). *Sugar-coating over a bitter pill? The effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level in the Netherlands*. Master's thesis in political science, University of Leiden.

Koehler, D. (2016). *Understanding deradicalization. Methods, tools and programs for countering violent extremism*, Oxon/New York, Routledge.

Kop, N. & H. Moors (2015). Radicalisering en jihadisme. Welke opgaven liggen bij de politie? *Cogiscope* 2, pp. 20-24.

Lomell, H. (2012). *Punishing the uncommitted crime. Prevention, pre-emption, precaution and the transformation of criminal law*. In B. Hudson & S. Ugelvik (ed.), *Justice and security in the 21st century. Risks, rights and the rule of law*. New York, Routledge, pp. 83-100.

Lum, C., L.W. Kennedy & A.J. Sherley (2006). The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies. *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2, pp. 1-55.

Mastroe, C. & S. Szmania (2016). *Surveying CVE metrics in prevention, disengagement and de-radicalization programs*. Retrieved from College Par, MD: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVEMetrics_March2016.pdf Accessed on 15 November 2016.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

Menger, A. & L. Krechtig (2016). Werkplaatsen ZSM: samenwerken bij betekenisvol sanctioneren. *PROCES 2016*, pp. 21-33.

Ministry of Security & Justice (2007). Strategie Nationale Veiligheid. Kamerstuk 30821 no. 3.

Ministry of Security & Justice (2014). Kamerbrief over de integrale aanpak jihadisme. 29 August, 554913.

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) (2014a). Actieprogramma integrale aanpak Jihadisme. Overzicht maatregelen en acties. The Hague, NCTV.

NCTV (2014b). Handreiking aanpak van radicalisering en terrorismebestrijding op lokaal niveau. The Hague, NCTV.

NCTV (2016a). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020. The Hague, NCTV.

NCTV (2016b). *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland (DTN)*, 42, no. 779821, The Hague, NCTV.

Neumann, P.R. (2010). *Prisons and terrorism: Radicalisation and de-radicalisation in 15 Countries.* London, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

Noordegraaf, M., S. Douglas, A. Bos & W. Klem (2016). *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen? Evaluatie van de nationale counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015.* Utrecht, Utrecht University, Department of Public Administration and Organisation (USBO).

Schmid, A.P. (2013). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: A conceptual discussion and literature review, The Hague, ICCT Research Paper (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism).

Schuurman, B., & E. Bakker (2015). Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013-2014. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8 (1), pp.66-85.

Schuurman, B. & Q. Eijkman (2013). Moving terrorism research forward: The crucial role of primary resources? The Hague, ICCT.

Schuurman, B. & Q. Eijkman (2015). Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 8 (3), pp. 215-231.

Schuurman, B., Q. Eijkman & E. Bakker (2015). The Hofstad group revisited: Questioning its status as a 'quintessential' homegrown terrorist network? *Journal Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (5), pp. 906-925.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

Sheikh, S., S. Sarwar & E. King (2012). *Evaluation of the Muslim Council of Wales' Prevent work*.

Merthy Tydfil, Office for Public Management.

Sieckelinck, S.M.A. & M. de Winter (2015). Formers & families: Transitional journeys in and out of extremism in the UK, Denmark and The Netherlands. The Hague, NCTV.

Silke, A. (2001). The devil you know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (4), pp. 3-9.

Spalek, B. (2012). Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism. In B. Spalek *Counter-terrorism, community-based approaches to preventing terror crime*. London, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 27-49.

Thomas, P. (2010). Failed and friendless: the UK's "Preventing Violent Extremism" programme. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 12 (3), pp,442–458.

United Nations (UN) (2006). Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. (A/RES/60/288), UN, New York.

UN (2014). Resolution 2178 of the UN Security Council. 24 September 2014.

Van San, M. (2015). Striving in the way of god: Justifying Jihad by young Belgian and Dutch Muslims, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38 (5), pp. 1-15.

Veldhuis, T.M., E.H. Gordijn, S.M. Lindenberg & R. Veenstra (2011). Terroristen in detentie: Een evaluatie van de terroristenafdeling. Groningen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.

Vermeulen, F. (2014). Suspect communities. Targeting violent extremism at the local level: Policies of engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26 (2), pp. 286-306.

Vermeulen, F. & F. Bovenkerk (2012). *Engaging with violent Islamic extremism: Local policies in Western European cities*. The Hague, Eleven International Publishers.

Vidino, L. & J. Brandon (2012). Countering radicalization in Europe, London, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

Waxman, M. (2008). Police and national security: American local law enforcement and counter-terrorism after 9/11. *Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers*. Paper 08157.

Weggemans, D., E. Bakker & P. Grol (2014). Who are they and why do they go? The radicalization and preparatory processes of Dutch Jihadist foreign fighters, *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8 (4), pp. 100-110.

Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter Extremism

Weggemans, D.J. & B.A. de Graaf (2015). *Na de vrijlating: Een exploratieve studie naar recidive en re-integratie van jihadist ex-gedetineerden.* Reeks Politiewetenschap 81, Programma Politie en Wetenschap, Apeldoorn, Reed Business, Amsterdam.

Williams, M. J., J. Horgan & W.P. Evans (2016). *Evaluation of a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE Program.* https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Accessed on 16 November 2016.

Williams, M. J. & S.M. Kleinman (2013). A utilization-focused guide for conducting terrorism risk reduction program evaluations. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 6 (2), pp. 102-146.

Witte, R. (2015). Radicalisering signaleren! Maar wat, wie, hoe? Expertise loont pas in een proces van samen goed kijken en een oordeel vormen. *Cogiscope* 2, pp. 16-19.

Woude, M.A.H. van der (2010). *Wetgeving in een Veiligheidscultuur. Totstandkoming van antiterrorismewetgeving bezien vanuit maatschappelijke en (rechts)politieke context* (PhD thesis). The Hague, Boom Legal Publishers.