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## Working Across Boundaries in Preventing Violent Extremism: Towards a typology for collaborative arrangements in PVE policy

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### **Abstract**

Preventing violent extremism has become a concern for policy makers at all levels from municipal governments to international organisations. A common feature of policy at all levels is the call for collaboration between different sectors, professionals, organisations and communities. While collaboration features so centrally in PVE policy, currently there is no overarching framework through which the many instances of collaboration can be analysed or compared. This paper offers a typology of collaborative arrangements in PVE policy derived from a multilevel policy analysis. This typology creates a foundation for further research into the effectiveness and limitations of different collaborative arrangements in the context of PVE.

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### **Introduction**

The question of how to prevent violent extremism is being vigorously pursued by policy makers, practitioners, and researchers, across the world. We need only briefly peruse the research literature to see that this is a question crossing disciplinary lines with theories and perspectives emerging from education, psychology, psychiatry, criminology, sociology, public health, and political science. Similarly, the wide range of sectors addressing this question is evident in the working groups convened by the European Union's Radicalization Awareness Network, which includes: youth, families and communities, education, local authorities, prison and probation services, police and law enforcement, and health and social

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care (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019). Professionals and practitioners across these sectors are called upon to collaborate with one another, and at times with ‘society-as-a-whole’, in a joint endeavor to prevent violent extremism (e.g. European Commission, 2016; Home Office, 2015; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismedebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2016; Public Safety Canada, 2013; United Nations General Assembly, 2015; Vlaamse Regering, 2015). Thus, teachers, doctors, clergy, municipal workers, community leaders, social workers, police, and individual citizens find themselves tasked with working across traditional boundaries in order to address a problem that is cast as one of the major challenges of our time.

While some studies have pointed to the benefits of collaborative approaches in preventing violent extremism (PVE) (e.g. Sestoft, Hansen, & Christensen, 2017), it is far from a simple matter. Indeed, a significant body of literature has been highly critical of approaches which have involved educators and health and social care workers in monitoring and flagging signals of extremism (e.g. Mattsson & Säljö, 2017; McKendrick & Finch, 2017; Middleton, 2016; O'Donnell, 2016; van de Weert & Eijkman, 2018). We are faced then with a complex social problem requiring a multi-faceted response but in which there are significant barriers to collaboration. This challenge necessitates a deeper examination of what collaboration does, and could, look like in the context of PVE, and what kinds of collaborative arrangements may be the most effective.

Beutel and Weinberger (2016) make helpful steps in this regard, drawing on lessons from public-private partnerships in other areas of social policy and highlighting distinct features of partnering in the context of violent extremism. However, a comparison and evaluation of the effectiveness of different collaborative arrangements is hampered by the absence of an overarching theoretical framework through which to view different instances of cross-sector collaboration in the context of PVE. As a step towards greater clarity in this area, this paper proposes a typology of collaborative arrangements in the field of PVE, derived from an analysis of policy documents.

Although the issue of preventing violent extremism is relatively new in social policy, the notion of collaborating across boundaries to address social problems is not. There is a rich history, particularly in the realms of crime and public health, of policies directed at drawing together different sectors including health, education, and civil society, to address a common problem. A brief review of the literature on this topic provides the central dimensions along which the typology is built, and highlights some of the distinct issues associated with collaboration in the context of preventing violent extremism. This is followed by the policy analysis, the resulting typology, and two examples from practice highlighting some of the challenges of collaboration. Finally, the implications of this typology for future research and practice are discussed.

### **Working Across Boundaries in Social Policy**

Efforts to promote cross-sector collaboration to address social problems has given rise to an extensive literature addressing all manner of issues, and a host of new concepts relating to governance including: ‘collaborative governance’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007), ‘network governance’ (Provan & Kenis, 2008), the ‘whole-of-government approach’ (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007), ‘partnered government’ (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016), and the ‘whole-of-society approach’ (Papademetriou & Benton, 2016). The full extent of the literature on working across boundaries in social policy is beyond the scope of this brief review, rather the literature is drawn upon to highlight some key issues arising in relation to collaborative arrangements. Particular attention is given to the literature on collaboration in crime prevention and public health as fields in which the prevention of violence, and the collaboration of educators, health and care workers, has played a central role. Three key issues are addressed in the review: why collaborative ways of working emerge, the different forms of collaboration that exist, and the constraining and enabling factors in collaborative arrangements.

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*Why Collaboration?*

A number of authors point to the fact that collaborative approaches have grown in prominence in social policy in Europe and the United States in recent decades (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Crawford, 1997; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). The literature addresses two aspects related to this rise in collaboration: the first is the general drive to collaboration due to the inherent complexity of social problems defying single-sector solutions, the second is the particular motivations that may drive any given collaboration. That is to say, while complexity may be considered the fundamental genesis of collaborative approaches, in any particular instance of collaboration the actors may be driven by a range of motivations, for example, conviction in the importance of collaboration or an institutional requirement to collaborate.

*'Meta-' or 'Wicked' Problems as a Driver of Collaboration*

The nature of many challenges addressed in social policy is complex, with multiple interacting factors at play. These challenges cannot be adequately addressed through single-sector approaches as their causes do not fall neatly within organisational boundaries such as 'social care', 'health', 'education', or 'security' (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Crawford, 1997; Selsky & Parker, 2005). These are issues that 'tend to fall through the cracks of prevailing institutional arrangements' and therefore necessitate multi-institutional collaborations (Selsky & Parker, 2005, p. 852). An issue such as high crime rates in a particular neighbourhood cannot be effectively addressed by policing alone, but rather touches upon issues such as the planning of urban space, the availability of extra-curricular activities, and access to work, that are the concern of multiple organisations and professionals.

This complex, multi-faceted, nature of many social problems becomes particularly acute when a preventive logic is applied. Rik Peeters (2013), who charts the historical rise of prevention as a mode of social policy, describes prevention as a boundless concept in that there is almost no limit to what can be embraced within a preventive framework:

“As there is no way of knowing whether enough is being done to prevent an undesirable future, prevention has the tendency to produce more prevention. At the very moment a causal scheme is constructed between an undesirable future and its possible determinants, this expansive logic may take effect: seen through a preventive gaze, the effectiveness of interventions is presumed to increase when measures are taken as early as possible and when the range of measures is as broad as possible to cover all identified risks.”

Because a preventive logic implies tracing back to address antecedent issues, it quickly expands beyond the sector in which the problem to be prevented finds expression. By its very nature then, prevention tends to extend beyond single sector boundaries.

This is readily apparent when considering two areas strongly associated with preventive policy making: improving public health and tackling crime. Consider the case of obesity, a problem which finds its culminating expression in the field of medicine, with doctors seeking to mitigate the impact of obesity on the life of the individual involved. Seen from a preventive perspective, obesity becomes an issue that is to be addressed by the food industry, the media, schools, and local community groups, and others. This is evident for example in the approach of ‘Health in all policies’ for tackling obesity outlined by Hendriks et al. (2013). Similarly, preventing crime involves intervening long before something falls under the realm of the police, which means addressing issues in other realms including education, youth work, and care. As a recent example, the concern with knife-related crimes in the United Kingdom has led to teachers and schools being assigned a central role in preventing the spread of knife ownership amongst young people (Bulman, 2019).

In a similar vein to the impact of a preventive logic, the recent trend towards resilience-building as a central concept in social policy (Duit, 2016) inherently motivates multi-sector approaches. The notion of resilient governance is predicated on the idea of the complexity of social problems requiring complex and multi-faceted responses (Chandler, 2014). Thus, complex social problems, particularly when addressed through the lenses of

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prevention and resilience building, tend to demand multi-sector or whole-of-society, responses.

Complexity as a driver of collaboration is certainly relevant to the issue of preventing violent extremism. That the causes of violent extremism are complex and multi-faceted is widely accepted. Identifying the causes and pathways to extremism has been a fractious matter, with ongoing debates about what drives the process of individuals becoming ‘radicalised to violent extremism’ (Coolsaet, 2016; Dzhekova, Mancheva, Anagnostou, Stoyanova, & Kojouharov, 2016). Regardless of the accuracy of the identification of the factors involved in driving violent extremism, for the purpose of this current analysis it is sufficient to state that multiple factors have been identified, and that most policies advocate multi-faceted responses (Hardy, 2018). The factors include, amongst many others, a lack of capacity for complex or critical thinking (Liht & Savage, 2013), a lack of a sense of purpose (Kruglanski et al., 2014), discrimination and marginalization (Zięba & Szlachter, 2015), the attraction of being part of a clearly defined group (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008), and experiences of violence (Crone, 2016; Sageman, 2017). These factors clearly cannot be adequately addressed by a single sector, particularly not the police and security services who are charged with preventing extremist-motivated violence. A preventive lens on extremism, and the current focus on resilience building (Stephens & Sieckelinck forthcoming), leads us directly to seeing the relevance of the role of educators, youth workers, and social care.

#### *Motivations for Collaboration*

While the issue of complexity may underlie the drive towards collaboration, the actual motivations for any particular instance of collaboration is often not as simple as actors collaborating from a shared conviction that they require one another in order to address a particular problem. There are other factors at play. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) point to the changing role of the state as a key factor explaining the rise of collaboration in social policy in general. A commitment to cross-sector collaboration may be driven by a desire for ‘small government’ or a desire for new institutional arrangements rather than simply by the demands

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of the problems faced. Christensen and Laegreid (2007) chart the move to a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to tackling social problems in the UK, which has contributed to an institutional culture in which collaboration and partnership are the expected norm. A similar idea is addressed by Crawford (1997) in his analysis of the emergence of partnership as a central aspect of a modern discourse on crime prevention. He suggests that part of the move to collaboration and partnerships is driven by an institutional or ideological commitment to this mode of working. Thus, the overriding reason for partnerships may be to address complex problems, but for any given partnership the motivation may be driven more by an external requirement to work in collaboration or an intrinsic belief in the importance of collaboration rather than a direct response to the failures of a single-sector approach.

The differences in motivation for collaboration are nuanced but important. This becomes clear if we consider three examples in the context of preventing violent extremism: a group of professionals, organisations and agencies may enter into a partnership out of a shared desire to tackle the problem of preventing violent extremism and a recognition that they cannot do it alone, or they may be driven to collaborate primarily to meet funding requirements, or they may be institutionally or legally required to collaborate.

In the context of PVE then, there are likely to be motivations and drivers for collaboration beyond the fact that the problem to be addressed is a complex one. For example, multi-sector approaches to tackling crime exist in many cities, and often preventing violent extremism becomes one of the questions tackled by these existing collaborative structures (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada). The starkest example of collaboration driven by legal requirement is the UK’s Prevent strategy, in which different sectors such as health and education have a statutory duty to engage in collaboration with other agencies including the local government. Clearly, the forces motivating any collaborative arrangement can affect the dynamics of such an arrangement – the question of the distribution of power is central to the effectiveness of collaboration and is taken up in more detail later.

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### *Forms of Collaboration*

After considering the reasons for collaboration and the motivating factors, a second significant issue is what form collaboration takes. The terminology for different ways of working across traditional boundaries is extensive, representing somewhat different notions and ideas (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). These include: ‘cross-sector partnerships’ (Selsky & Parker, 2005), ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007), ‘multi-agency’ (Sestoft et al., 2017), ‘community engagement’ (Cherney & Hartley, 2017), and ‘networks’ (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002).

Following others (e.g. Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Whelan & Dupont, 2017) who have sought to distinguish between forms of collaboration, rather than seek to define all the different terms used in the field, consideration is given to some central factors that shape different forms of collaboration, namely, a) the degree of formality of the collaboration, b) the composition of the collaborative arrangement – that is, which actors are involved, and c) the purpose of the collaborative arrangement.

### *Degrees of Formality*

One of the key dimensions along which forms of collaboration can be differentiated is that of the degree of its formality (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Sullivan & Skelcher (2002) draw on concepts from organisational science to distinguish forms of collaboration along a spectrum ranging from a ‘network’, in which collaboration is informal, loose, and self-governing, to ‘integration’, in which different bodies merge and there is a clear hierarchical structure. In between is the amorphous concept of ‘partnership’, which has a higher degree of formality than a network, involving some form of agreement between the different parties involved but one in which distinct organizational identities are retained. It should be noted that the application of terminology is not consistent across the literature, and in some places ‘network’ may be used to refer to a formalized arrangement. The central issue here is to point to degree of formality as an important dimension across which forms of collaboration can be compared.

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*The Constellation of Actors*

Another distinguishing feature of different forms of collaboration concerns *who* is involved. Collaborative arrangements in social policy can include: government agencies, professionals, civil society organisations, community groups, community leaders, private industry, or even the public as a whole (Bryson et al., 2006). A ‘partnership’ between government and ‘community’ is different than a partnership between a group of organisations – in large part due to the concreteness of the entities involved in the collaboration, and the relative distribution of power amongst the entities. That is, *who* is involved in the collaboration can be an important dimension in influencing its functioning, with different constellations of actors giving rise to different degrees of trust and power imbalance.

*The Purpose of the Collaboration*

A final, but central, distinguishing feature of different forms of collaboration arises from their purpose and mode of functioning. Collaborative arrangements can exist for a wide range of purposes, Whelan and Dupont (2017) identify a number of different classifications of network goals, including service implementation, information diffusion, information exchange, knowledge generation, problem solving, coordination, and community capacity building. It is possible to distinguish between collaborations on the basis of their primary function, the suggestion being that collaborations with the same purpose or function are likely to have similarities regardless of their specific context. For example, networks of professionals and academics that centre on the sharing of expertise and ‘best practice’ can be found in relation to many different social issues and can be distinguished from the many partnerships whose primary function is to plan interventions for specific cases.

While there are probably other dimensions along which different forms of collaboration can be distinguished, and although all collaborations will be unique, these factors are identified in the literature as particularly relevant for understanding the functioning of collaborative arrangements.

In the context of PVE we can find a full range of forms of collaboration operating at different levels of formality, with different constellations of actors and working for different purposes. As will be explored in the coming sections, the question of the constellation of actors and the purpose of collaboration may be particularly pertinent to issues surrounding the question of collaboration in PVE. Given its relation to issues of national security, the constellation of actors may not formally include intelligence agencies – but their presence as an invisible actor to whom any information shared may be relayed – likely influences questions of trust and transparency in collaborative arrangements. Similarly, as will be explored further, there can be a perception in the context of PVE that collaborations which purport to do one thing, build community cohesion for example, mask a hidden or additional purpose to gather intelligence.

#### *Constraining and Enabling Factors in Collaborative Arrangements*

Central to much of the literature is the question of what makes for effective collaboration. It should be noted that most often effectiveness is addressed in terms of the ability to collaborate rather than the effectiveness of the *outcomes* or services provided through collaboration (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2009). A starting premise is that collaboration tends *not* to be easy, and its effectiveness cannot be presumed (Bryson et al., 2006). There are a number of factors that are suggested to be working against collaboration. In his analysis of partnerships in crime prevention, Crawford (1997, p. 59) uses a colourful metaphor to highlight the mismatch between the desire for collaborative working and existing structures and modes of working:

“It is as if collectively we have suddenly awoken from a two hundred year reverie to find that we have been preoccupied with playing a game according to the wrong set of rules. And yet, the new rules do not seem to fit the structure of the game, the terrain it is played on, or the traditional relations between the players, let alone between them and the spectators, now called upon to join the game.”

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This metaphor alludes to the challenges posed by the different logics driving different entities that are expected to work in collaboration. This issue is often raised in the context of preventing violent extremism, in which the different logics of educational professionals and security agencies are in conflict (O'Donnell, 2016): whereas the educationalists are concerned with developing and cultivating skills and knowledge in young people, the security agencies are more concerned with maintaining order and preventing attacks. It cannot be taken for granted that these two different institutional logics and purposes can easily collaborate without undermining one another's purpose (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, & de Winter, 2015).

How these differences in logic and purpose are navigated and overcome brings into sharp relief the question of power. Mismatches of power are frequently cited as a constraining factor in effective collaboration, with one entity in a collaborative arrangement holding more power in decision making and the allocation of resources (Bryson et al., 2006; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). At the extreme end of the spectrum would be collaborations in which the mismatch of power renders the involvement of certain actors essentially tokenistic, in that they have no real say or veto in relation to decisions. At the other end would be an equal sharing of power and responsibility, in which each actor carries equal weight in decision making.

In the case of PVE, this is often a markedly important issue. Given the nature of the challenge of violent extremism and its relation to national security, there is often a controlled flow of information along hierarchical lines, meaning, for example, that intelligence services will have access to information not available to the police, and police will have access to information not available to frontline social workers. While this asymmetrical flow of information may cause frustration to certain parties, it takes place within a context of asymmetrical responsibilities and rights. Not only are there, of course, legal restrictions on the sharing of information, there are also different standards to which parties will be held. If something does go wrong, culminating in an attack, the police and intelligence services will be held accountable in a way that an organization involved in a preventive practice will not.

Given these factors, the possibility of an equal dialogue in such a context is contextually constrained.

This is particularly significant given that the factors that have been indicated to facilitate effective collaboration include trusting and transparent relationships and a shared vision and purpose (Bryson et al., 2006; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). While not suggesting these conditions are impossible to achieve in the context of PVE, the issues discussed above point to the significant challenges that are faced in collaborating in this context.

The literature on collaboration in social policy is vast, and this review is far from exhaustive; however, it serves to highlight some of the overarching issues that have emerged in relation to collaboration, and has sought to indicate some of the distinct features of PVE in relation to these issues. A primary purpose of this is to identify pertinent factors that can be drawn upon in developing a typology of collaboration in the context of preventing violent extremism.

### **Towards a Typology**

A typology is not a classification which seeks to create exhaustive, mutually exclusive categories through which existing entities can be sorted. Rather, it consists of the development of an 'interrelated sets of ideal types' against which entities can be measured in terms of the extent to which they 'fit' the ideal type (Niknazar & Bourgault, 2017, p. 194). Typologies are valuable in that they reduce complexity whilst capturing important relationships and interdependencies (Niknazar & Bourgault, 2017). As theory, they contain both descriptive and predictive power: the closeness of an entity's fit with an ideal type should predict an outcome associated with that type (Niknazar & Bourgault, 2017). In the context of violent extremism, Koehler (2017) presents a typology of approaches to de-radicalisation arguing that, as there can be no-one size fits all approach, we need to be able to draw conclusions about what strategy will work best for any given situation. He suggests that a typology allows for assessing the particular suitability of different programmes for different contexts. In the

specific case of networks, Whelan and Dupont (2017, p. 681) argue that a typology is helpful in so far as it is able to ‘bring into focus the underlying purpose behind any network’ which can aid researchers and practitioners in matching a network arrangement to a specific goal.

Thus, in a field lacking a clear overarching theoretical framework through which to compare and analyse the many proposed collaborative arrangements, the development of a typology offers higher-level description allowing comparison of *types* of collaborative arrangement rather than *specific cases*. Higher-level description in this manner also offers the possibility of determining the *type* of collaborative arrangement best suited to a particular policy goal and context.

### *Context*

The research leading to this typology is part of a larger project funded by the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport under Grant 326434. This project, ‘Authoritative Alliances’, is investigating grassroots practices aimed at preventing violent extremism that involve the collaboration of different actors and adopt primarily social and educative rather than security-driven strategies. As well as following these practices in the field, we are examining the policy context in which these practices are embedded. It is in order to understand this embedded policy context that we have conducted a multi-level policy-analysis looking at international, national, and municipal level PVE policy documents or action plans. The following typology has been developed as an outcome of this analysis. Another strand of the project includes thirty-two interviews with policy-makers and practitioners in three countries regarding their perspectives on PVE<sup>2</sup>. While the interview data will be the subject of a future paper, and are not systematically analysed in this paper, two short vignettes drawn from three of these interviews are presented to highlight certain issues arising in collaboration in practice.

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<sup>2</sup> The research project meets the ethical requirements of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Informed consent was obtained from all interview participants, and participants have been anonymised. Interview data is stored on a secure server with access restricted to the project researchers.

### *Method*

The typology was generated through an iterative process of examining policy document descriptions of different forms of collaboration in the context of PVE and examining the academic literature on collaboration in social policy. Iterative coding of the policy document descriptions, and the academic literature, gave rise to the dimensions along which the typology is organized.

### *Documents Analysed*

As part of the larger research project discussed above, twenty-seven policy documents (Table 1) were analysed. These documents correspond to the localities of the practices under study. The practices were purposively sampled, to capture variation within a Western European-North American context. This region shares certain similarities in the overall context of the challenge being faced: instances of homegrown terrorism and foreign fighters, while having no current internal conflicts. The practices were selected for variation – tackling different forms of extremism: religious and far-right, and within different national and municipal contexts. The sampling of documents arose from an extensive search of all governmental (local, national, and international) documents that address the question of preventing violent extremism. The websites of each of the governmental bodies was searched for references to violent extremism, radicalization, and polarization. All documents that emerged from these searches were then reviewed to identify those documents that addressed the issue of preventing radicalization or preventing violent extremism. In addition, during interviews with policy makers from municipalities and national governments, participants were asked to identify policy documents relevant to issue. In identifying the documents from the European Union and United Nations, we looked at which documents were referenced in national and municipal policies, and then an extensive search was carried out on the sites of the different bodies of these organisations to identify further relevant documents. Finally contacts within the European Commission and United Nations were asked to identify key policy documents on the topic. All documents were included in the analysis if they were from

an official governmental body, addressed PVE explicitly, and covered the locality of one of the practices. In a number of cases ‘prevention’ was one part of an overall document on tackling extremism and terrorism. In those cases, only the sections explicitly dealing with prevention were analysed.

**Table 1: Documents Analysed**

	<b>Document Title</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>Intergovernmental</b>			
United Nations	Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674)	United Nations General Assembly	2015
United Nations	Letter dated 22 December 2015 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly Re. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/70/675)	United Nations Secretary-General	2015
United Nations	Preventing Violent Extremism Through Education – A guide for policy makers	UNESCO	2017
United Nations	Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity	UNDP	2017
European Union	European Commission Communication: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EUs response (COM(2013) 941 final)	European Commission	2014
European Union	European Commission Communication: supporting the prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism (COM(2016) 379 final)	European Commission	2016

European Union	A Europe that Protects: Preventing Radicalisation	European Commission	2018
European Union	Prevention of Radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations. (P8_TA(2015)0410)	European Parliament	2015
<b>National/Regional</b>			
Belgium (Flanders Region)	Action plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and polarisation: Overview of actions and measures	Vlaamse Regering	2015
Belgium (Flanders Region)	Actualisering van het actieplan ter 287reventive van gewelddadige radicalisering en polarisering	Vlaamse Regering	2017
UK	The Prevent Duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers	Department of Education	2015
UK	Counter-Extremism Strategy	UK Home Office	2015
UK	Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales	UK Home Office	2016
UK	Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local Authorities and Partner Agencies	UK Home Office	2018
Canada	Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counterterrorism Strategy	Public Safety Canada	2013
Canada	Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada	Public Safety Canada	2017
Netherlands	National Counterterrorism Strategy	NCTV	2016
Netherlands	Handreiking aanpak van radicalisering en terrorismebestrijding op lokaal niveau	NCTV	

Netherlands	Voortgangsrapportage integrale aanpak jihadisme	NCTV	
Netherlands	Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme		2014
Netherlands	De Role Van gemeenten in de aanpak van radicalisering	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten	
<b>Municipal/City</b>			
London	London – A safer city for all Londoners	Greater London Authority	2017
London	Preventing Extremism in London	London Assembly Police and Crime Committee	2015
London Borough (anonymised to protect identity)	Prevent Strategy and Delivery		
Utrecht	Utrecht zijn we Samen	Gemeente Utrecht	2015
The Hague	Speerpuntenprogramma	Gemeente Den Haag	2015
The Hague	Voortgangsrapportage Aanpak Polarisation	Gemeente Den Haag	2018

### *Coding*

The documents were analysed through coding using Atlas.ti 8.0. Initially the documents were coded according to a coding scheme (Annex 1). The codes in this scheme were derived from the different approaches to PVE that were found in a review of the academic literature (Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier, 2019). Coding was conducted by the main author, with regular debrief with two supervisors in which samples of the coding were discussed and adjustments made to the coding scheme. Additionally, a second researcher conducted blind coding of a selection of the documents. Following the blind coding, discrepancies and inconsistencies between the initial and blind coding were discussed until

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there was consensus on coding categories. During this first round of coding, in addition to the coding scheme, open codes were generated to capture approaches or strategies that were not covered in the initial coding scheme. These open codes were reviewed and discussed by the team of three researchers.

A first analysis of the results of the coding indicated that, broadly, all the documents referred to a wide range of strategies and approaches, and the major differences between documents lay in the particular weight given to different approaches. However, a striking feature was the frequency with which the open-generated code ‘partnership’ occurred across all the documents – it was the most frequent code in the analysis. In order to investigate this more closely, three subsequent rounds of coding were conducted in which the ‘partnership’ code was disaggregated, first in terms of the stated goals or purpose of the collaboration or partnership, second in terms of composition of actors stated to be involved in the collaboration or partnership, and finally in terms of the degree of formality of the collaboration. In terms of the stated goals or purpose the collaboration, eight different codes were generated to capture the purposes mentioned in the documents. These included ‘best-practice exchange’, ‘intelligence sharing’, and ‘dialogue’. Through comparing and contrasting these codes, they were reduced to six distinct purposes, which make up the ‘purpose’ dimension of the typology. All instances of collaboration were coded in terms of the composition of actors, coding by all named actors e.g. ‘police’, ‘education professionals’ or ‘experts’. The composition of these arrangements was then also compared with the ‘purpose’ codes to look for patterns or consistencies between purpose and composition. The final stage of coding distinguished between different degrees of formality, ranging from ‘aspirational’ where there was a call for collaboration but no structure described, to ‘formalised structure’ where a clear outline of the form and functioning of the arrangement was described.

These disaggregated codes were then examined in light of the wider literature on collaborative approaches to addressing social problems. An iterative process of moving between the coding and the literature to identify key themes across different dimensions, led to the typology presented in this paper.

### *The Dimensions*

As highlighted earlier, a number of central dimensions along which collaborative arrangement can be compared have been identified in the literature. The dimensions selected for this typology are: purpose, composition, degree of formality, and power dynamics.

Purpose refers to the goals and aims of the collaborative arrangement, which can range from the sharing of information, to the devising of plans, to the carrying out of joint activities.

Composition refers to the different actors involved in the collaborative arrangement, this can range from a well-specified group of actors to a vaguer notion of collaboration of ‘relevant organisations’ or the public as a whole.

Degree of formality refers to the extent to which formal mechanisms and arrangements exist to manage and organise the collaboration. These can range from informal ad-hoc arrangements in which modes of collaboration are figured out by the parties involved, perhaps for short term periods, to formalised structures and arrangements with a clear delineation of duties and powers.

Power dynamics refers to the relative distribution of power in decision making and resource control among the parties involved in the collaboration.

The first two dimensions – purpose and composition - are constitutive of the different types of collaborative arrangement, the final two - degree of formality and power dynamics – are largely outcomes of the purpose and composition of the arrangements.

Other dimensions considered were ‘geographical spread’ and ‘time span’ – that is whether these are arrangements operating at local, national, or international levels, and whether these are arrangements operating for short term projects or span many years. However, these dimensions did not add significant descriptive or explanatory value, with each

of the ideal types identified operating at city, regional, and national levels, and across different time spans.

### **The Typology and Its Implications**

This typology (Table 2) presents six types of collaborative arrangement derived from an analysis of policy documents directed towards preventing violent extremism. While other typologies of partnerships and networks exist (e.g. Mitchell & Shortell, 2000; Moore & Koontz, 2003; Whelan & Dupont, 2017), this typology is valuable in that it addresses the specific context of PVE, a context in which there is a proliferation of partnerships yet with no coherent theoretical framework through which to view these collaborations. It should be noted that this typology concerns the forms of collaboration envisaged in policy rather than those that are found on the ground in practice – the implication being that there are likely other types of collaborative arrangement, or combinations of these types, that emerge outside the strictures of policy documents that may not conform with these ideal types. The final section of this paper addresses each of the ideal types, providing a brief example of each from the documents reviewed, and then considers the implications of this typology for research and for policy and practice.

**Table 2: A Typology of Collaborative Arrangements Across Traditional Boundaries in the Context of Preventing Violent Extremism**

	STRENGTHENING SOCIETY			INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND INTERVENTION		
	<b>Coalitions for Countering</b>	<b>Dialogue and Bridging Networks</b>	<b>Engagement to Build Trust and Legitimise</b>	<b>Intelligence Links</b>	<b>Arrangements for Informing and Intervening</b>	<b>Knowledge Exchange Networks</b>
<i>Purpose</i>	To present a united front against extremist ideas, united around a set of values or a narrative. To generate and disseminate counter/alternative narratives.	To engage in dialogue and build bridges between groups perceived as different.	To create links between the ‘grassroots’ and institutions and agencies. Two-fold role: to ‘hear from the grassroots’ and for decisions to build trust and legitimacy by communicating policy plans through local actors.	To facilitate a flow of intelligence pertaining to risk of radicalisation.	To assess risks and plan for multi-agency interventions to tackle risk. Referring of high-level risk to security services.	To facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practice pertaining to preventing violent extremism
<i>Composition</i>	Government, civil society, religious groups, community groups, former extremists, schools, media, private sector, public as a whole	Community groups, religious groups, civil society.	(Local) Government, Police, Community leaders or key individuals in communities	Local government Police Community groups Professionals Public as a whole	Local government Police Professionals	Academics Government Practitioners Professionals
<i>Degree of Formality</i>	Ranges from aspirational to formalised contracted partnerships	Ranges from ad-hoc to more formalised ongoing arrangements	Ranges from ad-hoc arrangements for specific policy questions to ongoing engagement.	Ranges from informal to formal.	Formalised structure and protocols.	From ad-hoc to networks with a structure and coordinating body.

			Formal structure of engagement.			
<i>Power Dynamics</i>	Often driven by government, although government may be an invisible partner.	Within network dynamics usually largely equal. No high stakes decisions or actions.	Driven by government, community representative has limited power to influence decisions and no veto.	Largely one-way communication: intelligence flows towards institutions, feedback/ intelligence does not flow back to the grassroots.	Complex. Driven by guiding institution – often local government. Controlled flow of information – not all have access to the same information	While operating notionally as an equal exchange of knowledge, certain disciplines perceived to be closer to ‘hard science’ may exercise more influence.

*Two Overarching Orientations: Strengthening Society and Intervention.*

The types of collaborative arrangement fall under two overarching orientations. The first orientation, ‘strengthening society’, is concerned with creating a bulwark against extremism and polarization. That is, these are types of collaborative arrangement that in various ways seek to create conditions to prevent extremist ideas from taking hold in communities. This can be likened to the discourse on resilience building, in which actions are taken to build values, narratives, or connections, that are strong enough to resist attraction to extremism and violence. The first three types, ‘Coalitions for Countering’, ‘Dialogue and Bonding Networks’, ‘Engagement to Build Trust and Legitimise’ would fall within this overarching orientation.

The second, ‘Intelligence Sharing and Intervention’, refers to collaborative arrangements with a more targeted focus on individuals and information pertaining to specific risks. They are concerned with the flow of intelligence between different sectors, and the planning and carrying out of interventions.

The final type ‘Knowledge Exchange Networks’ falls outside of these overarching orientations, and represents a typical kind of network found in other professional and academic circles to enable the exchange of knowledge and best-practice.

*Coalitions for Countering*

This refers to collaborative arrangements which have the purpose of countering extreme ideas and narratives by promoting a sense of shared values that are in opposition to extremism or generating and disseminating alternative narratives to undermine or replace extremist narratives.

They can range from informal collaborations at a community/city level to generate and disseminate positive messages about the community, to formalized collaborations between schools and civil society, to the most formal, contracted partnerships to produce counter-narratives. At the most informal end of the spectrum would be loose, even rhetorical, collaboration in which different groups, and society as a whole, are to present a united front

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against extremism, uniting around a set of values which are argued to be representative of the city, nation, or region and are placed in opposition to extremism. The rhetorical power of this collaboration often rests on the diversity of the entities involved (different religious groups, different community groups, or society as a whole) being united around a set of values. There is an implication that either one is part of the coalition against extremism or one supports extremism. In some ways this may appear akin to the notion of bonding in social capital theory, in which social bonds create a shared identity (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). However, rather than the development of connections at the grassroots these coalitions tend to be built on governmentally defined shared values or narratives. This can be likened to an artificially constructed shared identity which renders ‘extremists’ as the ‘out group’, but without necessarily strong bonds between those encapsulated within this constructed identity.

An example from the United Kingdom’s Home Office is:

At the heart of this strategy is a partnership between government and all those individuals, groups and communities, who want to see extremism defeated. It is a partnership that will not only seek to counter the ideology spread by extremists, but will stand up for the shared values that unite us as a country: values that include democracy, free speech, mutual respect, and opportunity for all.

The more formal manifestations of this type of arrangement involve coordinated and specific efforts to generate and promote alternative messages and ideas to specifically undermine the narratives of extreme groups. The following is an example of such an arrangement as described by the European Commission:

Support local and community groups working with former violent extremists and with victims of extremist violence to show young people that there is another side to the story. The Commission will also task the RAN with setting up a pool of practitioners, victims of terrorism, and former terrorists for the benefit of schools interested in

addressing these issues in more depth.

These collaborative arrangements are largely driven by government, although the operation of power in the forming of counter-narratives may be more subtle, with the government choosing to be an invisible partner funding civil-society organizations at a distance to avoid the narratives being directly associated with government (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016; van Eerten, Doosje, Konijn, De Graaf, & de Goede, 2017).

#### *Dialogue and Bridging Networks*

Dialogue and bridging networks are collaborative arrangements designed to strengthen understanding and bonds between different groups. Given their primary bridge-building function, these arrangements are not concerned with decision-making or taking action, nor with constructing counter-narratives or changing values, which somewhat evens out power dynamics as the stakes are low. From a social capital perspective this would reflect the notion of social bridging in which bridges of understanding and tolerance are built between different communities (Ellis & Abdi, 2017).

An example of this can be found in one of the policy documents of a municipality in the Netherlands in which there is a strategy to strengthen debate and dialogue between different groups and communities. There is a particular focus given to interreligious dialogue in order to foster connection and social cohesion at neighbourhood and city levels.

#### *Engagement to Build Trust and Legitimize*

These collaborative arrangements exist in order to smooth the relationship between community and government or other institutions of the state. They tend towards the more formal arrangements, in which selected individuals are included in higher-level discussions in order to represent the interests of a group or community. They are seen as a conduit for information to come from the 'grassroots' and as a means of legitimizing actions by communicating them through trusted individuals. Again, from a social capital perspective this

can be seen as a form of social linking – which refers to the building of communication and trust between communities and institutions (Ellis & Abdi, 2017).

The Canadian federal government provides two examples of such forms of collaboration in its national strategy for building resilience against terrorism:

1. the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, jointly supported by Public Safety Canada and the Department of Justice, which brings together leading citizens from their respective communities with extensive experience in social and cultural issues to engage with the Government on long-term national security issues; and
2. the RCMP's National Security Community Outreach, which responds directly to the threat of radicalization leading to violent extremism through local initiatives intended to address potential political violence and to identify and address the concerns of minority communities.

These first three types fall under the overarching orientation of strengthening society. It is unsurprising then that they can be viewed through the lens of social capital theory which posits these different forms of connection – social bonding, bridging, and linking – as necessary for strong, resilient, societies (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). The following two types have a narrower orientation, directed at the identification of and response to risk.

#### *Intelligence Links*

This refers to arrangements designed to facilitate the flow of intelligence. At their most informal and loose these arrangements include the public as a whole being called into collaboration with the local government and police, to share information. They extend to more formal arrangements for professionals such as doctors, teachers, and social workers, to systematically share concerns and intelligence regarding risks.

An example of such an arrangement is illustrated by a policy document of a municipality in the UK:

...we are ensuring that partners adopt a complete approach to preventing people from being drawn into terrorism. When a potential extremism or radicalisation issue is identified we need to ensure there is compliance with the referral pathway and escalation process. Furthermore, we need to ensure that individuals/agencies/organisations involved in the referral are supported through the process to manage the concern or issue.

#### *Arrangements for Informing and Intervening*

This refers to collaborative arrangements which focus on the exchange of intelligence regarding security threats and potential instances of radicalization and which develop multi-agency response plans. While these arrangements also involve the exchange of intelligence and information, they differ from the former arrangement in that there is a degree of reciprocity in information exchange and collaboration in decision making and action.

They often exist at a city or regional level and involve local government, police, and other professionals such as educators or social workers. The balance of power is usually asymmetrical: government or the police have a monopoly on information, so not all information is available to all parties in the collaborative arrangement if it is deemed to be security-sensitive.

Examples of such arrangements can be found the ‘Safety Houses’ in the Netherlands, and ‘Channel Panels’ in the United Kingdom in which various agencies and the local government share information on specific cases and develop multi-agency action plans to respond to the identified risk.

#### *Knowledge Exchange Networks*

This refers to collaborative arrangements whose purpose is to facilitate the flow of knowledge and best practice concerning approaches to PVE. This can consist of one-off

collaborations between countries or regions, or more systematic and ongoing networks with a structure to coordinate the flow of knowledge. The paradigmatic case of the latter would be the Radicalisation Awareness Network which operates to facilitate the sharing of expertise and practice in Europe (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019).

### *Challenges in Practice*

This typology is derived from an analysis of policy documents and as such captures the ideal types as envisioned at the level of policy making. However, as previously discussed, a starting premise in much of the literature on collaboration is that it is not easy and cannot be presumed to be effective.

Accounts emerging from interviews conducted with practitioners involved in different forms of collaborative arrangements testify to some of these challenges. We will briefly address two examples to highlight some of the issues at play, the first being an example of a ‘coalition for countering’, and the second relating to an arrangement for informing and intervening.

#### **Troubles in a Coalition for Countering**

The director of a large mosque in a large European city, serving thousands of community members, was involved in taking action to combat and counter potentially radicalizing influences. He engaged the mosque in a collaboration with a government-backed provider which aimed at providing alternative avenues and information to the youth of the mosque. For some time this collaboration continued, receiving both academic and media attention. However, the collaboration came to an abrupt end when the mosque cut ties with the provider. During an interview the director of the mosque described his sense of betrayal when it became apparent that the other partner in the collaboration had a remit not only to provide a service to the young people, but also to monitor and report issues considered a security risk. This led to an immediate loss of trust and faith in the collaboration, making continued engagement impossible.

This example points to a number of issues that have been addressed in the literature on collaboration, and some of the distinct issues associated with collaboration in the context of Preventing Violent Extremism. A collaborative arrangement of a religious institution and a civil society organisation around a shared goal of counter-messaging was rendered impossible by different institutional goals, and a profound breach of trust. The religious institution had as its primary goal to build trust with young people in the community and share an alternative message to those presented in extremist propaganda about their role and place in society. The civil society organisation had a goal of monitoring and reporting that overrode its goal to build trust. While the civil society organisation was in a ‘partnership for countering’ with the mosque, it was also working as a partner in an ‘intelligence link’<sup>3</sup> with the police and security services. This is a particularly challenging issue in the context of preventing violent extremism in which the connotations and implications of being referred as a potential extremist risk are bound up with its association with terrorism and being subject to surveillance and intervention by security services.

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<sup>3</sup> We are not in a position to ascertain the exact role being played by the civil society organization and rely on the perceptions of our interviewee, however regardless of whether the issue was real or perceived, the implications were the same.

### **An uneasy arrangement for informing and intervening**

In a small city in the United Kingdom that is particularly concerned with issues pertaining to far-right extremism, an independent youth service organization developed, over time, a program for dealing with issues of far-right sentiments amongst the young people they were interacting with. Gaining attention and subsequently funding from the national government, this organization and its program expanded. As a service provider in the city, the programme is considered a partner of the local government, both in the exchange of information and in provision of interventions. However, during interviews with the organization, the local authority, and the police, clear tensions in this arrangement emerge. The organization describes the repeated calls for it to refer cases to the local authority, but states that none of the cases it has come across seem of severe enough to refer to a formal government-driven body. During an interview with an official from the local authority, a great frustration was expressed at the lack of referrals. The official felt that they had no cases to address because the cases were getting stuck at the level of the youth organization. It was opined that the reason for the lack of referrals was that the organization wanted to protect its funding and continue to receive funding from the national government. The tensions are well captured in this quotation from the local authority official:

“Because we don’t get funding we do rely on the likes of [youth organisation] but we’ve never had a referral from [youth organisation]. We’ve had many arguments about this, I said ‘come on you must have some’ but they’ve got quite negative thoughts about Prevent. That’s the way they come across to us. So they’ve openly said...one of their members has said they don’t believe in Prevent and the legislation, so that’s difficult. We have referred a few to [youth organisation] for support and they did a good...well one they worked really really well, but the other one I was a bit disappointed.”

This second example highlights again some of the challenges associated with partnership working identified in the literature. It would seem in this example that the drive to participate in collaboration is not motivated by a shared intrinsic belief that collaboration will address the complex problem at hand. On the one hand the local authority requires collaboration in order to have access to the information it deems necessary to do what it feels it is required to do. On the other hand, the civil society organisation is reluctant to share information with the formal body of the local government as they do not judge their cases to be sufficiently risky to require this, while the local government official is sceptical of their

judgement in this regard. Issues of trust and shared vision seem to work against a functioning collaborative arrangement in this case. Again, the specificities of the context of preventing violent extremism would seem to have a role to play, with the civil society organisation reluctant to share information that will then be accessible to the police and security services when they do not perceive the risk to warrant such attention. This example points to one of the challenges Beutel and Weinberger (2016) point out in the context of violent extremism: the partners that may be valuable to government may also have significant barriers to collaborating due to a mistrust of authorities and a desire to maintain the trust of their community by maintaining a distance from authorities.

These two small vignettes are not offered as representative of collaborative arrangements as they play out in practice, but rather to highlight some of the specific challenges to collaboration in the field of PVE. These challenges will be examined more thoroughly through an analysis of the interview data in an upcoming paper.

## Discussion

The typology presented in this paper offers a descriptive framework of different forms of collaborative arrangement structured according to their purpose. Given the extent to which professionals and practitioners, communities, and even individual citizens, are called upon to work across traditional boundaries in order to prevent violent extremism, it is helpful to distinguish between different types of collaboration in order to recognise the possibilities and limitations of different ways of working.

That preventing violent extremism falls into the realm of a complex social problem requiring a multi-faceted, collaborative, response is beyond much contestation. However what form this collaboration should take and how it could and should look is a more complex matter. It is abundantly clear in the extensive literature on collaboration that one of the central constraining and enabling factors are the level of trust and transparency between the actors

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involved, however this is perhaps one of the central challenges to collaboration in the context of PVE.

It is unsurprising, given that these types are derived from policy documents, that government is often a central player in these arrangements. However, this makes for arrangements with often unbalanced dynamics of power, and the imbalance is potentially exacerbated by the nature of violent extremism as a national security threat, which creates insurmountable mismatches of information accessibility, since information that is deemed sensitive is accessible to some in a collaborative arrangement, but not others. The vignettes presented illustrate some of the challenges arising from this tension between the need for collaboration and the issues of power and trust that pervade the relationships between the parties in collaboration. Because of the nature of parties involved in these collaborations and the mismatches of access to information, issues of power and trust appear to be baked into these collaborative arrangement types. Whether and how this tension can be overcome in the context of PVE is an important question for empirical research. Examining different manifestations of these types of arrangement in different settings could throw light on how this has been achieved in practice.

A second issue that arises when considering these different types is that of shared vision. As highlighted earlier, the literature on collaboration also points to shared vision as central to enabling effective collaboration. This raises two distinct issues. The first is for those collaborative arrangements that have the overarching orientation towards strengthening society. In these, collaboration involves uniting around and protecting of a certain set of norms and values in opposition to those that are extreme. This is rarely problematic when looked at in terms of uniting against violence; however, the uniting around deeper levels of norms, values, or narratives is no simple task. This is evident in the contentions that arise around the notion of teaching ‘national values’ (Elton-Chalcraft, Lander, Revell, Warner, & Whitworth, 2017; Peterson & Bentley, 2016), or reactions against narratives of multiculturalism as a project of the ‘liberal elite’ (as described by Lesińska, 2014).

The second is for those collaborative arrangements with the overarching orientation towards intelligence sharing and intervention. In this instance we are faced with the challenge of shared vision around purpose and approach. Schools, youth workers, and police may share the overarching vision of preventing violence, but the more fine-grained vision of what it means to intervene in the lives of young people might be quite different. As discussed previously, the different institutional logics of these professions does not necessarily lend itself to the ready emergence of a shared vision in practice. Again, empirical analysis of different instances of collaboration can highlight how these tensions are overcome in practice.

#### *Implications for Research*

This typology presents a foundation for further research into collaboration across traditional boundaries in the context of preventing violent extremism. By providing a higher-level description it is possible to consider specific cases of collaborative arrangements in relation to these types, facilitating the comparison and evaluation of arrangements across different policy regions. Further, the typology lays the foundation for evaluating the effectiveness of *types* of arrangements, rather than specific cases of arrangements, for achieving different policy ends. For our own research, this is an important step in being able to address the question of what forms of arrangement are most effective in facilitating resilient identity development in young people.

Further, refining and extending this typology through an analysis of collaborative arrangements that exist ‘on the ground’ and may not reflect the ideal types of policy perspectives will give a fuller picture.

#### *Implications for Policy and Practice*

This typology can play both a clarifying and prescriptive role for policy makers and practitioners. By describing the different functions associated with different network types enables policy makers and practitioners to understand and describe their existing

arrangements, and to consider what arrangements they will put in place in the future. It also allows the identification of what certain arrangements *cannot do* in order to identify gaps.

By providing the language and framework through which potential partners can describe the purpose and form of their collaboration it is also anticipated that this typology can assist in mitigating some of the tensions that can emerge around partnerships in PVE.

### **Conclusion**

This typology provides the foundation of a theoretical framework to enable more extensive research into the types of collaborative arrangement in the context of PVE and their potential for achieving different policy goals. The typology is limited to official policy-prescribed collaborations and will benefit from extension through the mapping of collaborative arrangements that have emerged outside of an official policy context.

### **Limitations**

This typology is derived from a selection of policy documents across different contexts, however there are not sufficient documents or contexts to claim of representativeness. Applying this typology to other contexts will be necessary to test its limitations and refine its scope.

By focussing on policy documents this typology addresses the proposed forms of collaborative arrangements but cannot capture what happens in practice. Policy documents can represent politically motivated statements rather than actual reality in the field. Therefore, the collaborations in policy may very well not come to fruition for many reasons, and alternative forms of collaboration may emerge in practice that are not captured in policy documents. The short case studies presented in this paper highlight the value of mapping out

the arrangements that exist in practice in order to compare these with the ideals presented in policy.

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**Annex 1: Initial Coding Scheme**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Sub Codes</b>	<b>Code Description</b>
Individual		Interventions/approaches/perspectives aimed at addressing the individual
	Individual- Cognitive	Interventions/approaches/perspectives focused on building some form of cognitive skill or capacity in individuals as a form of prevention. (e.g. critical thinking)
	Individual-SocEmot	Interventions/approaches/perspectives focused on developing some social or emotional capacity in individuals as a form of prevention. (e.g. empathy)
	Individual – Values	Interventions/approaches/perspectives focused on promoting or developing values in individuals as a form of prevention.
Community		Interventions/approaches/perspectives aimed at community level changes.
	Community – engagement	Perspectives aimed at building connections and trust between communities and formal institutions of society.
	Community – resilient	Perspectives aimed at promoting certain features or characteristics within communities (e.g. improving connections between community members)
Society		Perspectives directed towards society level change (e.g. creating a more just society, reducing inequalities)
Identity		Discussions of any identity related issues
	Identity – Adolescence	Reference to identity development/search and period of adolescence.
	Identity – Threat	Reference to identities being threatened e.g. by globalization or minority status
	Identity – safe space	Reference to need for space, safe space etc, for exploring identity questions – as a form of prevention.
	Identity – Strengthening	Reference to strengthening certain forms of identity as a form of prevention.
Dialogue and Discussion		Reference to dialogue or discussion as a form of prevention.
Agency		Reference to agency/engagement in action as a form of prevention.
Drivers		Reference to drivers of radicalization
	Drivers – Ideology	Reference to ideologies as driver of radicalisation
	Drivers – Vulnerability	Reference to individual vulnerability as a driver of radicalization
	Drivers – Group Dynamics	Reference to group related drivers of radicalization, e.g. desire to be part of a group
Goals		Any reference to the goals or desired outcome of the policy
	Goal – Democratic Life	Reference to developing democratic values/practices as desirable outcome
	Goal – Safety	Reference to safety as desired outcome

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**Annex 2: Codes Generated Through Open-Coding**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
Counter-narrative	References to the use or development of counter or alternative narratives.
Employment	References to tackling unemployment or creating opportunities for employment
Partnership	References to the need for collaboration or partnership between different organisations, institutions, and/or actors.
Religion	References to the role of religious communities or clergy in prevention.
Restrict Propaganda	References to restricting or blocking access to messages, websites, films, social media.
Signaling	References to training of actors to signal signs of radicalization or a requirement for actors to signal.
Tackle Discrimination	References to tackling discrimination (racism, islamophobia, hate speech, xenophobia etc).

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