
The Deradicalisation Programme for Indonesian Deportees: A Vacuum in Coordination

Chaula Rininta Anindya^{a1}

^aResearch Analyst, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Abstract

This paper aims to describe and provide an assessment of the rehabilitation and reintegration programme for Indonesian deportees in 2017. Hundreds of Indonesians aspired to join the militant jihad in Syria, but many were arrested before entering the country. Deportees without criminal charges were sent to the Ministry of Social Affairs' (Kemensos) shelters in East Jakarta to undergo a one-month rehabilitation programme. The rehabilitation was executed prematurely with the absence of clear guidelines. A reintegration programme should play a pivotal role in a long-term deradicalisation process. Yet, the acute problem of "sectoral ego" among Indonesian institutions hampers the effectiveness of the reintegration programme, as there are overlapping responsibilities between state agencies and non-governmental organisations. Severe competition among relevant stakeholders also slows down information sharing in the handling of deportees. This paper finds that sectoral ego has created significant obstacles for the reintegration programme. There are "too many hands" on one deportee, which makes it hard to assess which programme works more effectively. In addition, the deportees also receive several visits from various stakeholders that have similar offers and provide repetitive discussions, leading to some deportees becoming reluctant to cooperate. As a result, "too many cooks spoil the broth". The relevant stakeholders must enhance transparency and coordination that is not limited to an agreement on paper. The management of deportees can also provide lessons for policy makers to improve broader CVE efforts in Indonesia.

Article History

Received Feb 6, 2019

Accepted Mar 25, 2019

Published Mar 29, 2019

Keywords: Indonesia, Deportees, Civil Society Organisation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation

Introduction

In May 2018, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) Chief Tito Karnavian claimed that over 1,100 Indonesians had left to Syria to join what they believed was the Armageddon, or final

¹ Corresponding Author Contact: Chaula Rininta Anindya; email: ischaula@ntu.edu.sg; Indonesia Programme, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Twitter: @ayaelectro

showdown between the Islamic Messiah, Mahdi, and the false Messiah, Dajjal. However, hundreds failed to enter Syria; they were arrested before crossing the borders. Chief Tito's statement was released in the aftermath of the May 2018 terror attack in East Java, when a deportee named Khalid Abu Bakar was suspected of taking part in the perpetrators' *pengajian* (Quran Recital Meeting) group. Khalid Abu Bakar was deported from Turkey back in 2017 for his alleged intention to cross the Turkish-Syrian border to join a terrorist organisation (Jones, 2018).

Khalid is not the only deportee under scrutiny. In August 2017, Anggi Indah Kusuma alias Khanza Syafiyah Al Furqon, a former migrant worker in Hong Kong, was arrested for plotting terror attacks against an Indonesian arms manufacturer, the State Palace, and the headquarters of a special police branch (Mako Brimob). Anggi was radicalised in Hong Kong after encounters with radical individuals on Facebook and deported from Hong Kong in March 2017 after she pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Based on the previous law on terrorism, Law no. 15/2003, Indonesian security services could not apprehend Anggi because she did not have any prior involvement with terror activities. Deportees who are merely sympathizers are sent to one of two Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos) shelters located in Bambu Apus, East Jakarta, by the authorities. Anggi spent less than one month at the shelter. After finishing the programme, Anggi was sent back to her parents' house in Klaten, Central Java, but soon ran away to rejoin the radical network by marrying Rahman Factory, whom she met in a Telegram group called "Redaksi Khilafah".

This raises questions over the effectiveness of the government's strategy of dealing with deportees once they are back in Indonesia. Although many are concerned about the potential threat of deportees to national security, there has been limited discussion over approaches to prevent deportees from launching terror attacks in Indonesia. In fact, Indonesia has only a one-month rehabilitation programme for deportees who are considered sympathizers of terrorist groups. Having such a short window does not seem to be enough to deradicalise someone who has been radicalised over months, or even years.

This paper aims to describe and provide an assessment of the rehabilitation and reintegration programme for deportees in Indonesia. It will not be restricted to government approaches, but also the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in providing assistance to these programmes. It shows that an initial personal approach from social workers at the temporary shelters has proven to be significant as a prelude for a sustainable reintegration programme. However, unhelpful competition among relevant stakeholders during the reintegration programme undermines efforts to distance deportees from radical networks. Very little research has been conducted to assess what is happening on the ground. Both state and non-governmental organisations should realise the importance of effective coordination among stakeholders to counter violent extremism (CVE), otherwise these efforts will fail to prevent national security threats to the country while wasting a substantial budget allocated to addressing the problem.

The analysis is based on twenty-one interviews with academics, relevant government officials, social workers, and personnel from CSOs from late 2017 to mid-2018. First, the paper begins with a brief literature review on exiting terrorism. Second, it discusses rehabilitation programmes for deportees at two Kemensos' shelters, namely Social Rehabilitation for Children Against Law (Panti Sosial Marsudi Putra or PSMP Handayani), and Protection House and Trauma Centre (RPTC). Third, it explains the reintegration programme assisted by CSOs, as well as coordination between CSOs and government institutions. Against this backdrop, an assessment on both government and CSOs approaches to engaging the deportees will follow. This paper recognizes that there is no silver bullet in CVE, while attempting to draw lessons from the programme for deportees to understand “what works” and “what are the challenges” for CVE programmes in Indonesia.

Methods and Data

This research is based on qualitative interviews lasting between forty minutes and two hours. The selection of interviewees was based on two parameters. First, the interviewees are

directly involved in the rehabilitation and reintegration programme for deportees. Second, the interviewees are experts in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism in Indonesia, even if they only played minimal roles in the programme for deportees. Interviews took place in the offices of respondents or in public places, based on the interviewees' preferences. Conversations were recorded by the author and transcribed by a field research assistant.

The author strongly acknowledges the limitations of the interview sample within this study particularly as there were no direct interviews with deportees who underwent the programme. The access to deportees was limited during the time frame of this project in order to ensure that the reintegration process was not disrupted and that the trust between relevant stakeholders and deportees was not jeopardized. Nevertheless, further research is required to get a deeper insight from deportees as programme participants. Interviews with these individuals should be conducted with care and caution to ensure the smooth continuation of the reintegration programme.

The interviewees were informed about the nature and purpose of this research, in order to provide them with the necessary information to determine if they wanted to participate in it or not. The participants could also suggest to the author which information from the interviews should not be disclosed on the paper to protect their identities. The interviews covered a broad range of topics, including, for example, issues related to the radicalisation process of the deportees, the contents of the rehabilitation and reintegration programme, and the tasks of relevant stakeholders. However, the information conveyed by the interviewees might be susceptible to bias due to their own involvement in the programme. Therefore, this paper attempted to verify the obtained information by comparing various interviews to cross-check their validity. The study ensures the confidentiality and anonymity of research participants given the delicate relationship between state agencies and non-governmental organisations. An overview of the interview sample is provided in Table 1, with the interviewees subsequently identified through unique numerical codes (e.g. 01, 02, etc). A list the interviews and their identificatory is provided in the Appendix.

Table 1. Interview sample (see Appendix):

Role/position description	Number of interviewees
Researchers	3
Civil society activists	12
Government officials - Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos) - National Counterterrorism Agency	3
Social workers	3
Total	21

Deradicalisation or Disengagement?

Pathways to leave violent extremist groups have been linked with two key terms: deradicalisation and disengagement. Understanding these terms is important to designing and evaluating programmes for radicalised individuals. Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon without a single explanation. The reason why terrorists leave their organisation also involves multiple factors and these factors may reinforce each other (Chernov Hwang, 2018). The processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation of an individual are often nonlinear and context-specific (Spalek & Davies, 2012: 360). Deradicalisation is the process of renouncing radical ideologies that might reduce the person's commitment to engage in violent activities (Horgan 2009: 153). Disengagement is a process of behavioural change whereby an individual ceases participation in acts of violence, without necessarily implying they have denounced their ideological beliefs (Chernov Hwang, 2018: Horgan, 2009). In other words, the fundamental distinction between deradicalisation and disengagement is that

deradicalisation implies a cognitive evolution, while disengagement refers only to a behavioural shift (Chernov Hwang 2018: 4).

The debate continues on the most appropriate goals for an exit intervention programme. Rabasa et. al (2010) suggest that deradicalisation is still the most appropriate goal for a programme that seeks to counter Islamist extremism. Instrumental disengagement will be difficult to achieve and is not sustainable given that Islamists are strongly ideologically motivated (Rabasa *et al.* 2010: 10). However, a number of scholars argue that disengagement should be the focus for CVE programmes as it is more feasible. Horgan and Bjørgo suggest that policymakers should develop programmes focusing on disengagement instead of deradicalisation (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 3). Horgan asserts that based on his interviews with former terrorists, the majority has yet to reach the stage of deradicalisation, although they have disengaged (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009: 27). Abuza also concurs, stating that many detainees from the Southeast Asian Jihadi organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) claim to have relinquished violence, yet still aspire to establish a state based on Islamic law (Abuza 2009: 194).

These discourses have shaped different approaches in different countries regarding CVE. Nevertheless, CVE is a complex issue requiring a holistic approach. Neuman (2013) underlines that no one should separate political belief and political action to approach this issue. He believes that both behavioural and cognitive approaches are equally important in examining the root causes of an individual's radicalisation (Neumann 2013: 885). The act of terrorism cannot be separated from the social and political context. An individual's reason to join a terrorist group may be somehow related to a particular belief. A recent study by Schulze and Liow (2018) explains the phenomenon of "glocalization" among Malaysian and Indonesian Jihadis. The local dynamics have given a boon to IS propaganda, encouraging aspiring Jihadis to join the fight in Syria. For instance, sectarian conflict between Shi'a and Sunnis in Syria resonated with the local sentiment toward the Shi'a community in Southeast Asia, who are seen as a threat to Islam in Sunni-majority countries like Malaysia and Indonesia (Schulze & Liow, 2018: 4).

The cognitive approach cannot be completely isolated from the CVE programme. It could function as a trigger for the participants to develop their critical thinking abilities (ICPC 2017: 16). However, the cognitive approach should not directly confront the ideological beliefs of the participants. Kurt Braddock uses the framework of Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT) to explain human behaviours when their freedom is restrained. PRT suggests that when an individual's belief is overtly challenged, individuals may reject the promoted belief and behavior and thus seek to fortify the forbidden belief (Braddock, 2014). Braddock advises that persuasive messages in such programmes should be refined into a subtler approach to avoid psychological reactance (2014: 70). The cognitive approach can therefore be a two-way reciprocal dialogue between the facilitator and participants.

Designing a programme that aims for behavioural change also requires an understanding of both “push” and “pull” factors. Studies found similar patterns among individuals from different backgrounds – Islamic militancy, far-right groups, and violent oppositions groups – on why they leave extremist groups (Marsden 2017: 9). Push factors are internal dynamics within the group that drive individuals to leave, while pull factors are the external influences that draw the individual to return to a non-radical society (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan 2014: 648). Julie Chernov Hwang (2018) drew four repetitive patterns among 55 Indonesian Jihadists that lead them to disengagement. The notable push factors are: disillusionment with the group leader, tactics, or their own actions; and rational assessment of contexts, conditions, and cost and benefits. On the other hand, the pull factors are: social networks outside the Jihadi groups; and changing priorities, such as education, employment, and family (Chernov Hwang, 2018: 50). Chernov Hwang observes that push factors alone are sufficient to induce an individual shift in his/her support away from the terrorist group, but it is the interaction with alternative social networks that becomes a key supporting factor in the disengagement process (2018: 173). Positive social interactions with new friends may introduce the individuals to alternative ways to express who they are and how they should act in society (Chernov Hwang, 2018: 174).

An exit intervention programme should incorporate both cognitive and behavioural approaches. Disengagement and deradicalisation are gradual processes whereby the targeted individuals are exposed to different programmes and cultural environments that may affect their decisions. Although studies suggest that most individuals do not leave extremist groups for ideological reasons, the cognitive approach should not be completely eliminated from the equation. An ideological belief might not be the decisive factor that radicalises or deradicalises individuals, but a belief that resonates with social and political contexts might. For instance, while JI has shifted its focus to non-violent means, they might employ violence when they deem it necessary to respond to social and political dynamics (Singh, 2017). The programme should therefore find a balance between cognitive and behavioural approaches.

One-Month Rehabilitation Programme

In January 2017, the Indonesian government received an influx of deportees from Turkey. According to C-SAVE (Civil Society Against Violent Extremism) - a consortium of experienced CSOs in CVE – there were 75 deportees who came in one group in January with 70 percent of them being women and children. Indonesia continues to receive deportees; not only from Turkey, but from other countries as well. Most of them are migrant workers in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia who were exposed to radicalism. The second shelter, RPTC, started receiving deportees in the second half of 2017 and only hosts adults without children. RPTC's main mandate is to provide a rehabilitation programme for victims of violence and trafficking, mostly migrant workers.

The one-month rehabilitation programme consists of three phases: arrival, rehabilitation, and pre-repatriation. Once deportees arrive at the shelters, social workers, along with a team of psychologists from the University of Indonesia, conduct the identification process. They must verify the deportees' identities despite limited information, as most of them have lost their identification documents. The only available information is their names and gender. The psychologists examine each deportee's level of radicalisation. The team has a

specific set of variables to make that determination, such as assessing the deportees' understanding about Islam, jihad, and *thaghut* (idolatrous). This team will also use one-on-one interviews with deportees to determine the level of radicalisation. It varies from level 1 to 10 with 10 for people who are strongly radicalised.

The level of radicalisation is assessed continuously during the entire course of rehabilitation programme by observing their behavioural changes. According to social workers, there are several patterns of behaviour which they monitor from deportees. First, their responses, or lack thereof, to the Islamic greeting *As-salam Alaykum* from the social workers. Deportees refuse to reply to the greetings from social workers because they consider social workers *kafir* (unbelievers). Second, whether they eat meat provided by the shelters. Deportees usually ask for seafood because they are afraid that the meat provided by the shelters is not slaughtered based on religious regulations (halal). Third, whether they join daily prayers at the mosque within the compound. The highly radicalised deportees usually refuse to pray with other Muslims whom they consider *kafir*. Social workers claim that they can clearly see the behavioural changes among the deportees after a few weeks. At first, the deportees usually refuse to communicate with the them. However, deportees tend to be more open to communicating with social workers after close and intensive interactions with them for weeks. (Interview 05)

The key to building trust with deportees is the personal and humanistic approach by social workers. Social workers are ready 24 hours a day to engage with them. They do not merely give instructions but sit together with them during the sessions and assist in their daily activities. As an initial interaction, they will not jump into questions about deportees' motivation to emigrate to Syria. Social workers first ask about the deportees' plans when they return to their hometowns, as well as their future plans by drawing a life road map. Social workers admit that it is difficult to interact with highly radicalised deportees. They refuse to engage with the social workers when they arrive at the shelters. Nevertheless, they become more open once they realize the personnel is keen to help them, even with personal matters. A

representative from PSMP Handayani shared her personal encounter with a highly radicalised deportee who initially ignored the social workers:

There was a deportee, named A, he was a recidivist who had spent 7 years in Nusa Kambangan Prison. From the very beginning, he was very cold to us. During the psychological examination, he refused to draw living things, such as humans or animals, because it was against what he understood as Aqidah (creed). However, he became more open to us after we helped him solve his family's problems. His wife is the widow of a coal entrepreneur from South Kalimantan. Her former husband sought custody of their children because he was afraid that his children would become terrorists if they live with A. A did not want to give up the custody of his wife's children. PSMP Handayani helped to mediate the two parties and talked heart-to-heart with A. Although at the end A could not get the custody of his wife's children, A started to open his heart to social workers. He replied to our greetings and apologized to us for his inappropriate behaviour. (Interview 04)

During the rehabilitation programme, deportees must attend daily sessions by BNPT, The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag), and former Jihadists. The sessions with BNPT and TNI emphasise the archipelagic outlook (*wawasan kebangsaan*) (Anindya, 2018). It seeks to educate deportees about the values of Pancasila (belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, consensual democracy, and social justice) as the sole ideology of Indonesia. The goal of these sessions is to instil loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia. On the other hand, Kemenag and former Jihadis approach the deportees from the religious perspective. Former Jihadis share their narratives about joining terrorist organisations.

The rehabilitation programmes for adults and children are different. At PSMP Handayani, social workers will engage children with interactive games. The social workers

often encounter difficulties interacting with children who are already highly radicalised. A researcher made the following observations based on her visit to PSMP Handayani during the rehabilitation programme:

In the first batch of deportees, there was a 14-year-old girl who was already highly radicalised. When the first group of deportees arrived, the children of deportees and children with criminal charges lived under the same roof as an effort to reintegrate them into a non-radical environment. However, this girl was already highly-radicalised and she sought to indoctrinate the others. She also verbally attacked a non-Muslim kid in the dorm and threw this kid's Bible out the window. There were also five and three-year-old children who did not want to join the sessions and only observed the sessions from outside. Their parents taught them not to interact with non-mahram (mahram: unmarriageable kin). I believe they are interested to join the sessions, but their parents prohibited them to do so. (Interview 03)

Parents have strong influence over their children's behaviour. Each child has a different level of radicalisation. There are also cases of children who are radical, but they gradually join the activities and follow the instructions of social workers. For instance, there were some children who refused to clap their hands during the games because it is considered an un-Islamic practice, but in the end, they finally joined the others in clapping their hands.

The programme for adults seeks to prepare their life skills once they return to society. One of the programmes at RPTC provides cooking classes for the deportees in which they receive guidance from social workers (Anindya, 2018). A representative of RPTC said many deportees refuse to join other activities, such as morning exercise, although they are willing to join the cooking class, particularly the women. It shows that social workers might be able to start communicating with deportees by engaging them in more practical activities which may help them to reintegrate into society.

At the end of the programme, deportees must sign a document pledging loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia (*kembali ke NKRI*) and abide by the 1945 Constitution, as well as Pancasila. Social workers reveal that it is very hard to persuade deportees to sign the document. Social workers will sit together with the deportees and try to convince them until they agree to sign. There were times when social workers have had to stay until late into the night in order to talk heart-to-heart with deportees and convince them. Sometimes if an influential deportee agrees to sign, the rest will follow him. As a last resort, POLRI also threatens them with jail unless they sign the agreement (Topsfield, 2017). These coercive measures are used claiming it is necessary to avoid overcrowding in the shelters. However, this approach can potentially fuel resentment against the government that will be detrimental to the long-term goal of deradicalisation programme. In addition, a forced declaration of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia can only have a very limited credibility.

Before sending the deportees back home, the shelter's staff will contact their relatives to determine their levels of support at home. In a few cases, the relatives refuse to receive the deportees due to their stigmatization as a terrorist. There was one deportee whose own husband refused to receive her back home because of the strong stigma in his local community prior to her repatriation. At last, she was sent back to her relatives who live in a secluded area in Sukabumi, West Java. It took a few weeks to locate her family because they did not have access to mobile phones.

Impediments During the Rehabilitation Programme

The social workers encountered multiple obstacles while handling the influx of deportees. First, they had no capacity to provide rehabilitation for radicalised individuals. Social workers at PSMP Handayani are trained only to handle juvenile delinquents. When the first group of deportees arrived at the shelters in early 2017, they had no specific guidelines in how to treat deportees and attempted to use programmes and activities used for other children. The earlier batches of deportee children lived under the same roof with the purpose of reintegrating these

children into a non-radical environment. However, they could not control the behaviour of some highly radicalised children towards the other children and were afraid that the highly radicalised children would indoctrinate the others. Thus, the shelters decided to separate them from the rest of the children in the shelters. Second, social workers had no prior knowledge of radicalised individuals or their ideology. Social workers initially could not find anything peculiar about deportees' behaviour. It took time for them to discover deportees' radical views and attitudes towards the others. Without adequate knowledge, the social workers were themselves an easy target for radicalisation. Third, the shelters only had a small number of social workers to assist deportees. The shelters could not run several rehabilitation programmes simultaneously with only limited manpower. As a result, a number of deportees were sent back to their home earlier than the estimated time. Fourth, there was no specific budgetary allocation to handle the deportees. A representative from RPTC claimed that deportees often stayed more than a month in the shelter but doing so was a drain on their budget. She needed to request additional funding from other directorates at Kemensos. She also revealed that RPTC used the remaining amount of the allocated budget for victims of violence and trafficking. RPTC targets to host around 750 victims of violence and trafficking every year, yet they usually only meet 70% of their target. Thus, the remaining budget was allocated to provide basic needs for deportees during the programme. (Interview 14)

BNPT only plays a minimal role during the rehabilitation programme. They provide basic daily needs for deportees and speakers for the sessions, and BNPT officers attend these sessions. However, the representatives from BNPT do not employ personal approaches to deportees during the rehabilitation phase. Their presence is only apparent when they provide sessions for the deportees in a seminar setting.

The staff at PSMP Handayani and RPTC shared different perspectives regarding BNPT's role in rehabilitation programmes. Most rehabilitation programmes were conducted at PSMP Handayani, while RPTC only received more or less two groups of deportees in 2017. While the PSMP Handayani was ill-prepared to handle the deportees, they became accustomed to it with time. A senior social worker at PSMP Handayani claimed that BNPT

provided them with necessary basic support, such as clothes for deportees and attended the meetings when they were invited. Though, she admitted that at the end of the year, BNPT barely attended the meetings due to their full schedules. (Interview 13)

On the other hand, an interviewee from RPTC gave contradicting statements regarding the presence of BNPT during the programme. She stated that she did not understand the chain of command in BNPT and was unsure who to turn to:

The deportees often arrive late night, such as 1 or 2 am. Social workers must prepare everything for them beforehand. Yet, there is no one from BNPT who helps us to prepare it. With only 5 to 7 people in the shelters, we must bust a gut to prepare everything for them. (Interview 14)

She also added that she does not really understand the meaning behind several activities instructed by BNPT:

I do not know the indicators for activities instructed by BNPT. We have yet to receive any clear guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). What is the point of hoisting the flag? What is the point of memorizing Pancasila? Will they be loyal to the Republic of Indonesia by doing these activities? How can we measure their loyalty to our country? (Interview 14)

These statements show that the coordination between BNPT and the shelters is not working well. First, the shelters do not have any clear guidelines for running the programme. One of the shelters was unsure who to consult once regarding problems and specific needs. The chain of coordination is scattered. Second, BNPT fails to pass the messages to social workers about the aim for each activity they provide for the rehabilitation phase. If the social workers do not fully understand the meaning behind the activities for deportees, it will be hard to justify their assessment on the level of deradicalisation of each deportee. Lastly, insufficient budget and

manpower creates an extra burden for the shelters which hinders the programme's effectiveness. Sometimes deportees were sent back to their hometown before completing the one-month programme due to these issues.

Role of CSOs for Rehabilitation Programme

The Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos) has become the key player in assisting day-to-day programming during the rehabilitation phase for deportees. They are willing to assist deportees during the rehabilitation programme. However, Kemensos does not have the expertise to provide a deradicalisation programme for deportees. Experienced civil society organisations (CSOs), namely C-SAVE - a consortium of experienced CSOs in countering violent extremism - offered to provide assistance for the rehabilitation programme. When C-SAVE learned about the influx of deportees from Turkey in early 2017, they immediately contacted the Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) Task Force of The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) to offer assistance. Subsequently, the FTF Task Force referred them to Kemensos (Sumpter, 2018: 6). C-SAVE was established in 2016; its members are experienced in CVE, such as The Institute for International Peace Building (YPP), Indonesia Muslim Crisis Center (IMCC), The Habibie Center (THC), and Empatiku Foundation who have been working in the fields of CVE for years.

C-SAVE established a partnership with the shelters to provide fundamental guidance for the rehabilitation programme. First, C-SAVE delivered a briefing to social workers on understanding violent extremism, who the extremists are, and how to facilitate their rehabilitation. Social workers initially did not understand the concept of terrorism, knew little about the Islamic State nor that Indonesians had attempted to join them in Syria. Second, C-SAVE reviewed the existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to handle the deportees. According to C-SAVE, the shelters originally used the SOP for juvenile delinquents, unaware that there should be different treatments and approaches for deportees. C-SAVE helped to revise and create a suitable SOP for the deportees. They invited relevant agencies, including

CSOs, Kemensos, POLRI, and BNPT to discuss the SOP's draft. It consists of designated roles for each stakeholder and seeks to provide a communication framework to enable efficient information exchange between relevant stakeholders (C-SAVE 2019: 63). It also provides a safety and security protocol for the social workers and CSOs who are at risk of radicalisation due to their intensive interaction with deportees (C-SAVE 2019: 63). C-SAVE has been working together with Kemensos' legal bureau to propose a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) as a legal basis for this SOP. After finishing the final draft, C-SAVE visited more than 20 regions in Indonesia to study the feasibility of implementing the SOP at the regional level. The implementation of the SOP also requires the support from local governments to carry out the programme once the deportees return to their hometown. The local governments welcomed the initiatives and they believe the SOP can also serve as a guideline to curb other forms of violent extremism in their area. Third, C-SAVE provided speakers for the social psychological sessions to complement sessions given by BNPT and Kemenag, focussing on nationalist and religious dimensions respectively.

Repatriation and Reintegration Programme

CSOs play a central role in the repatriation and reintegration programme. Together with social workers and Detachment 88 (POLRI's counterterrorism unit), they accompany deportees to their respective hometowns. If a Jakarta-based CSO cannot accompany deportees, they will ask for assistance from local CSOs. Several local CSOs have been involved in the repatriation and reintegration process, such as Peace Generation Bandung, Generasi Literasi, and Fatayat East Java. During the first half of 2017, BNPT staff accompanied most of the repatriation process, yet they rarely did so during the second half of the year. Most of the time, it would be only CSO, social workers, and Detachment 88. According to a representative from BNPT, they decided to withdraw from the repatriation process due to resistance from deportees who regard BNPT as a tool of propaganda from the *thaghut* (idolatrous) government.

C-SAVE is the main coordinator that assigns CSOs to each deportee and region. CSOs will make an assessment on deportees' basic needs once they return to their hometowns, including the socio-economic conditions, identification cards, and health care provisions. They talk to the deportees about their economic aspirations and their skillsets as well as skills they would like to develop for work. CSOs will also assist them with training and finding networks that can help the deportees start their own business. Business capital is not their priority; there is more emphasis put on training for long-term sustainability. For instance, IMCC has been conducting training on t-shirt printing.

CSOs will later ask the local government's assistance to provide other basic needs. Most deportees have already lost their identification cards, hence the need to create a new one. They also need medical check-ups and further health care after spending months or years overseas. The deportees mostly spent their time moving from one apartment to other apartment in Turkey. These apartments reportedly had poor sanitation, thus some of them returned with skin diseases. The local government will refer them to a local hospital or community health centre (Puskesmas). CSOs will assist them in getting National Health Insurance (JKN) covered by The Health Care and Social Security Agency (BPJS) for health care.

Nevertheless, coordination is not always efficient. Some local governments are reluctant to provide basic needs for deportees. A civil society activist explained that she had assisted repatriation and reintegration programmes in two different locations, Pandeglang (Banten) and Depok (West Java) with contrasting experiences. The local government in Pandeglang, Banten did not understand what they needed to do with the deportees, hence the district heads (Camat) were reluctant to help them. In contrast, the Depok government was more cooperative despite the absence of clear guidelines and budgets. They assisted her in contacting the Civil Registry and Population Agency (Disdukcapil) to help deportees with submitting applications for their new identification cards (KTP). (Interview 19)

Aside from the bureaucratic problems with local government, another common problem during the reintegration programme is community ostracism. Local communities

tend to refuse the return of deportees to their hometowns. Local police and media often complicate the situation. The former receive the information in advance about the return of deportees, which sometimes is leaked to local media. This is often reported on their platforms. CSOs seek to work silently to avoid stigmatization but this situation creates a great obstacle for the reintegration programme. Deportees often move from place to place because they seek to find a community that might accept them. Thus, their intention for moving away from their original community is not always to avoid the security apparatus' surveillance. If they find that society cannot accept them, they might return to a radical network.

Competition Between Relevant Stakeholders

In 2017, the reintegration programme for deportees was still highly problematic, not only due to the absence of clear guidelines, but also because of competition among relevant stakeholders. The competition did not only occur between state government agencies and non-governmental organisations, but also among non-governmental organisations. C-SAVE and BNPT, who are supposed to be the coordinators for non-governmental and government stakeholders respectively, could not address this problem.

Even though C-SAVE has assigned each deportee to one CSO, in practice deportees receive several visits from different stakeholders, sometimes within a single week. A civil society activist from a Jakarta-based CSO recalled that she visited a female deportee in Subang, West Java to provide a reintegration assistance. At the same time, there was also a representative from a Bandung-based CSO who visited the deportee. As a result, the deportee did not leave her house and avoided to meet them even though they waited until late evening (Interview 10). These visits create obstacles for the reintegration process. First, the local community might grow suspicious when their neighbours receive visits from different groups of people. The local community initially did not know about their status as deportees because the repatriation was executed quietly to avoid stigmatization. Second, the deportees might be

reluctant to cooperate because of tiresome and repetitive discussions (Anindya, 2018). The stakeholders keep asking them similar questions on their visits with no follow-up actions on occasion. One interviewee admitted that it was hard for her to approach the deportees due to these issues:

When I first met them, they looked so annoyed and tired because everyone kept asking them the same questions. There is no follow up action as well. *Alhamdulillah*, I could keep in touch with them although the programme had finished because I approached them as a friend, not as part of the programme. They share their daily updates with me through WhatsApp. They feel someone is always with them. (Interview 19)

The acute competition also slows down information sharing between relevant stakeholders. They only share information with each other when they sit together in a joint meeting. Otherwise, they tend to keep the information to themselves. C-SAVE initially did not know the exact number of deportees who were undergoing the programme at the shelters. They went to both social shelters and directly asked the head of each. BNPT did not share this information with relevant stakeholders. Most CSOs also do not know that BNPT actually has another reintegration programme after their programme is done. In 2017, BNPT stated that they visited 150 deportees to provide a reintegration programme (Anindya, 2018). Representatives from BNPT visited the deportees together with a psychologist, former extremists, and/or clerics. They did not introduce themselves as members of BNPT, but said they were from other related parties as a preventive measure, as deportees tend to resist engaging in a programme conducted by government officials. BNPT visited deportees once they thought CSOs were done with their work. They recognize the competition among CSOs, hence the need for perfect timing. Nonetheless, there are still redundancies among relevant stakeholders. Lastly, CSO members often share responsibility for exactly the same region but do not inform each other due to the strong sense of competition. As a result, the process to

require basic needs for deportees is prolonged because they do not share important contacts with the respective local government authorities who can assist them.²

Preliminary Assessment

The intervention programme for deportees in Indonesia is still new, having only started back in early 2017 following an influx of deportees from Turkey. Preliminary assessment of the programme will not be based on the outcome of the programme, even though the number of recidivists is a widely-used metric to measure the positive result of deradicalisation programmes. It will be problematic to measure recidivism only in the short term as there are no base rates of recidivism to compare with (Koehler 2017: 172). Instead, the preliminary assessment will be divided into two sections. First, it will discuss the approach taken by each of the institutions, particularly Kemensos' social shelters and BNPT. Second, it will examine the organisational aspects and coordination among relevant stakeholders.

The social workers' skills are also significant for the initial stage of a long-term deradicalisation process. Radicalisation occurs at the juncture of multiple factors, and the same is true for disengagement and deradicalisation. Chernov Hwang (2018) argues that in disengagement narratives, a single factor could reinforce the others; for instance, a disillusioned member of an extremist group could have his disillusionment compounded through interactions with non-members. Deradicalisation and disengagement are two-directional processes, which aim to distance the individual from radical networks and re-engage the individual with the non-radical society (Koehler 2017: 80).

The alternative group should be able to provide counter-narratives to radical views and attempt to re-pluralize their worldviews. Social workers could play a pivotal role as the intermediary for radicalised individuals to settle in their new environments. Social workers'

² A civil society activist from Jakarta was in charge to assist the reintegration programme in Depok, West Java. She found out another CSO was also assisting a deportee in Depok but did not inform her. Subsequently, she could not share the contact of local governments' representatives or local medical facilities which prolonged the process.

24-hour companionship and patience with the deportees could help to downplay the narratives that government officials are un-Islamic and to curb deportees' hatred towards the government.

The social workers' personal approach has proven to be significant in providing an aftercare programme in the long run. Deportees will welcome a visit from an institution only if social workers are also involved with the team. Deportees are more familiar and comfortable with the social workers who accompany them during the rehabilitation programme. This approach is totally different from BNPT's. BNPT holds a session stressing Pancasila values that seek to negate deportees' radical views. A representative from BNPT stated that sometimes deportees tend to refuse a visit from BNPT. It is reasonable given that deportees do not know BNPT officers personally as they do the social workers; trust cannot be developed quickly. Social workers' 24-hour companionship has gradually built trust with the deportees, and these relationships are crucial for both assessing risk and providing relevant aftercare programmes.

However, overlapping responsibilities during the reintegration programme undermine the sustainability of social workers' initial efforts. The culture of sectoral ego (feeling of pride as the most credible institution) among Indonesian institutions remains highly problematic as it hampers the effectiveness of interagency cooperation. Furthermore, CVE is of paramount concern in Indonesia, and the substantial sums of funding allocated for this issue only deepens the inter-agency competition. A civil society activist claimed that there are "too many hands" on one participant in CVE efforts in Indonesia, which makes it hard to assess which programmes work more effectively. (Interview 21)

Although the number of deportees has been decreasing significantly in 2018³, the programmes for deportees in 2017 could provide a useful insight to maximize the broader CVE effort in Indonesia. According to Law No. 5/2018, BNPT plays the role as a crisis centre and has the mandate to provide policy recommendations for the President, including resource

³ According to IPAC Report, by May 2018 no deportees undergoing programme at PSMP Handayani. From January to May 2018, only eight Indonesians were deported.

deployment to address the threat of terrorism. Therefore, BNPT's role is to provide a clear division of responsibility to overcome the overlapping responsibilities. CVE programming requires interagency cooperation to augment its impact. BNPT must make the best use of each institution's expertise to assist with the particular CVE programme. BNPT can start mapping out existing activities from relevant stakeholders, with collated information accessible and updated periodically to allow for more effective coordination among the relevant stakeholders.

BNPT does not always need to be on the ground but should provide required assistance to relevant institutions. For instance, the agency could provide briefing and training for social workers to understand the issue of terrorism and extremism. BNPT should also monitor and evaluate the implementation of agreements with other institutions. In 2018, BNPT signed numerous Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with other government institutions, including the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri). One of the points within the MoU with Kemendagri is that former inmates, returnees, and deportees have the rights to obtain electronic identification cards (E-KTP) which becomes a compulsory requirement to access health care insurance and Smart Indonesia Card (Kartu Indonesia Pintar). This agreement must not only end up on paper, but BNPT should also monitor and provide an assessment of the implementation.

BNPT should also work together with CSOs and social workers, both at the national and regional levels. A representative from BNPT claimed that in 2017, there were only 55 staffers under the deputy of deradicalisation. With no representative at local regions and limited human resources at the national level, BNPT must work together with local CSOs and social workers. Working together with experienced CSOs at the national level, BNPT authorities need to provide intensive training for local CSOs and social workers. The training modules should consist of model cases from different extremist groups, not only militant Islamists. Such cases will help social workers understand the complexities of dealing with radicals, as well as similarities in the narratives of extremist groups from different ideological backgrounds. Training for local CSOs and social workers will help maintain the mentoring

programme for deportees when they return to their communities. Social workers who understand the dynamics of terrorism and extremism could also be employed to assist the aftercare programme for former inmates on parole (IPAC 2018: 12).

Aside from training for local CSOs and social workers, BNPT also needs to provide training for clerics assigned to engage with deportees. The clerics may have no problems while delivering sermons in front of large audiences in a mosque but talking to radicalised individuals requires a different approach (Ramakrishna, 2014). Indonesia could learn from the RRG (Religious Rehabilitation Groups) in Singapore, where a group of Islamic scholars and teachers with strong religious backgrounds are required to sit down for a counselling course to supplement their religious knowledge (Ramakrishna 2014: 202). It could help the clerics to build reciprocal discussions with deportees and explore the participants' understanding about Islam. The ideological approach has proven to be challenging in a short one-month programme. Clerics should first understand how to start conversations with the deportees without directly confronting their beliefs.

To sum up, the most significant challenge for these deportee programmes is the deeply ingrained culture of sectoral ego. Relevant stakeholders have shown their willingness to increase the effectiveness of interagency cooperation through Memoranda of Understanding and Standard Operating Procedures. Nevertheless, the implementation remains the biggest question. They should realise that ineffective coordination in CVE could ultimately pose a serious threat to national security. No one wants another Anggi or Khalid who returned to violent means upon their release from a rehabilitation programme.

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- Interview 01 with civil society activist, Singapore, 2 November 2017;
- Interview 02 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 13 November 2017;
- Interview 03 with researcher, Jakarta, 14 November 2017;
- Interview 04 with government official, Ministry of Social Affairs, Jakarta, 14 November 2017;
- Interview 05 with social worker, PSMP Handayani, Jakarta, 14 November 2017;
- Interview 06 with researcher, Depok, 15 November 2017;
- Interview 07 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 15 November 2017;
- Interview 08 with researcher, Jakarta, 15 November 2017;
- Interview 09 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 29 January 2018;
- Interview 10 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 29 January 2018;
- Interview 11 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 30 January 2018;
- Interview 12 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 30 January 2018;
- Interview 13 with social worker, PSMP Handayani, Jakarta, 31 January 2018;
- Interview 14 with government official, Ministry of Social Affairs, Jakarta 31 January 2018;
- Interview 15 with social worker, RPTC, Jakarta, 31 January 2018;
- Interview 16 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 1 February 2018;
- Interview 17 with government official, BNPT, Jakarta, 6 March 2018;
- Interview 18 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 7 March 2018;
- Interview 19 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 7 March 2018;
- Interview 20 with civil society activist, Jakarta, 23 July 2018;
- Interview 21 with civil society activist, Jakarta 23 July 2018;

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ISSN: 2363-9849

Editor in Chief: Daniel Koehler