

The spirit of patriotism – How constitutional is German citizens' national attachment? The case of mosque construction.

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Abstract

Patriotism can have various facets. It can exclude or include the same group of individuals depending on the situation. However, the more important question is whether it is inclusive when it comes to principles of modern democratic societies namely the democratic constitution. In this respect, the construction of publicly visible mosques is a constitutionally protected right in Germany. In this article, I examine the relationship between German citizens' patriotism and the willingness to restrict that right. Empirical findings from a representative sample of German citizens reveal a pattern of patriotism that drives opposition toward Muslims' right to construct mosques. The more interesting finding is that this effect occurs only among those individuals who generally approve of Muslim claims-making. Results are discussed and suggestions for future research are presented.

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Introduction

The soccer World Cup 2006 can be regarded as a turning point within the discourse on German national identity: the official slogan “*Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden*” [“The world as guest among friends”] was accompanied by a new perspective among Germans of their own country as a welcoming place that made an effort to be perceived as open to the world, colorful, and friendly (Hay & Joel, 2007). A new side of national consciousness symbolized by the “sea of German flags” appeared which seemed to emphasize a positive connoted patriotism (Hebeker & Hildmann, 2007; Lau, 2006). This stood in stark contrast to the former

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restraint regarding positive identification with Germany (Kersting, 2007). However, this new “party patriotism” was also questioned due to its potentiality to exclude certain groups (Becker, Wagner, & Christ, 2007; Dembowski, 2009; Staud & Heitmeyer, 2012). Some years later, in 2014, another side of patriotism came to light. The “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident” [*“Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes”* (PEGIDA)] movement started to organize mass rallies in the city of Dresden in the federal state of Saxony in East Germany. Since then, speeches have been held against the political and media establishment, foreignization, and Muslims, who are stereotyped as a potential threat to a German Christian-occidental identity every Monday (Demuth, 2016; Thran & Boehnke, 2015). In January 2015, at the peak of these rallies, approximately 25,000 people marched through Dresden. (Berger, Poppe, & Schuh, 2016, p. 120).² Politicians from the party “*Alternative für Deutschland*” (AfD, [*“Alternative for Germany”*]) participated in those mass rallies as well (Geiges, Marg, & Walter, 2015; Meisner, 2016).

The AfD is a political party that was founded in February 2013 and developed into a national-conservative party with bridges to right-wing extremism (Niedermayer & Hofrichter, 2016; Stöss & Lanig, 2016).³ In its manifesto, the AfD declares that Islam does not belong to Germany. In addition, the “presence of a constantly increasing number of Muslims” is seen as a “great danger” to the state as well as to society and its values, respectively (AfD, 2016, p. 49). In the rhetoric of the AfD, German national identity is emphasized, as is the need for protection against the threats stemming from Muslims and multi-culturalism (Baier, 2016; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, & Siri, 2015). In this vein, the party wants to restrict the right to

² In 2016, the numbers have decreased to between 2,000 and 3,000 people. On the second-year anniversary in October 2016, between 6,500 and 8,500 people came to protest (see <https://durchgezaehlt.org/pegida-dresden-statistik/>, & <https://twitter.com/durchgezaehlt>, accessed 18 February 2017). The share of Muslims in Saxony is estimated to be 0.7 per cent (Haug, Müssig, & Stichs 2009, p. 102).

³ With a vote share of 4.7 per cent, the party missed the 5 per cent threshold to enter the German Bundestag in September 2013. Since 2014, however, the party has passed the 5 per cent hurdle in all federal state elections and is represented in 13 of 16 federal state parliaments. The highest vote share was won in Saxony-Anhalt in East Germany (24.3 per cent) in 2015. In the economically powerful federal state of Baden-Württemberg in West Germany, the party reached 15.1 per cent in 2015. In recent federal election polls, the party has ranged between 10 per cent and 15 per cent (Cantow, Fehndrich, Schneider, & Zicht, 2017).

construct visible mosques. Recently, the AfD and a representative of the PEGIDA movement mobilized citizens against the construction of a mosque in the city of Erfurt, which is situated in the federal state of Thuringia (Leubecher, 2016). In general, there are approximately 2,600 mosques in Germany, most of which are in backyards, factory sites, or former shops (Häusler, 2011; Leggewie, Joost, & Rech, 2002). Since the 1990s, increasingly visible mosques have been constructed, which – metaphorically speaking – can be seen as a sign of the arrival of Muslims in German society (Kraft, 2002; Rommelspacher, 2009). Less than one-tenth of the 2,600 religious buildings are recognisable as mosques by domes and minarets (Häusler, 2011). Plans to construct visible mosques are regularly accompanied by heated debates in the public sphere (Beinhauer-Köhler, Leggewie, & Jasarevic, 2009; Kuppinger, 2014). This might not be surprising since large parts of the German population show negative attitudes toward the construction of mosques. According to the German General Social Survey, 56 per cent of the German population do not support the construction of mosques (Terwey & Baltzer, 2013, p. 194). Yet, the construction of religious buildings is a constitutionally protected right. Therefore, denying or restricting that right would be unconstitutional (Wieland, 2016). The question in this regard is then, whether those individuals strongly attached to Germany are actually more willing to restrict the construction of publicly visible mosques than those who are less patriotic. In other words: how constitutional is German citizens' patriotism regarding Muslims' right to construct mosques? To address this question, I first present the theoretical framework and formulate the hypotheses. I then describe the data and methods used to test these hypotheses, and present the empirical findings. The final section summarizes the findings and offers conclusions.

Theoretical Framework and Research

What is patriotism?

Several definitions of patriotism revolve around the term “love of country”. These definitions usually differ from each other by means of varying supplement attributes. Adorno

et al. (1950, p. 107) define genuine patriotism as “love of country and attachment to national values [...] based on critical understanding”. By contrast, the authors use the counter-term pseudopatriotism as “blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 107). According to them, genuine patriotism is characterized by appreciation of values and ways of other nations, and pseudopatriotism by rejection of other nations as outgroups. Similarly, Staub (1997) distinguishes between constructive and blind patriotism. Blind patriotism is defined as “an intense alignment by people with their nation or group and uncritical acceptance and support for its policies and practices, with an absence of moral consideration of their consequences or disregard of their impact on the welfare of human beings who are outside the group or are members of its subgroups” (Staub, 1997, p. 213). Constructive patriotism instead stands for a “balancing attachment to and consideration for the well-being of one's own group with an inclusive orientation to human beings, with respect for the rights and welfare of all people” (Staub, 1997, p. 214). While constructive patriots do allow for national criticism and dissent, blind patriots view that as inherently disloyal (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999, p. 153). Finally, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989, p. 271) determine patriotism more generally “as the affective component of one's feelings toward one's country [...]. It assesses the degree of love for and pride in one`s nation - in essence, the degree of attachment to the nation”. The authors put patriotism in contrast to the term nationalism defined as national attachment with claims of superiority.

Empirical findings using these definitions on the relation between patriotism and disregard of minorities are mixed. Authors using patriotism in the sense of love for the nation as proposed by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) find an association of patriotism with in-group preference, social dominance orientation, and racism (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997), whereas others find no relationship between patriotism and negative attitudes towards minority groups (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001). Studies utilizing patriotism as genuine or constructive indicate no relationship (deFigueiredo & Elkins, 2003), or a negative relationship between patriotism and intergroup bias when controlling for nationalism (Blank

& Schmidt, 2003; Cohrs et al., 2004; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012). However, the distinction between patriotism and nationalism has been criticized. Billig (1995, pp. 57–58) argues that nationalism and patriotism are inter-related concepts, and that nationalism associated with out-group rejection is usually accompanied by patriotism. From this point of view, patriotism can rather be regarded as a necessary condition of nationalism. Hence, assessing patriotism by its supplemental attributes remains self-referential *per definitionem* and can be spurious as those attributes might be correlated with other constructs in various ways. Empirical items on different facets of patriotism are thus ambiguous (Fleiß, Höllinger, & Kuzmics, 2009; Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Therefore, in this article, I use the term patriotism in its “core sense of positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to country” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153). This positive national identification can be related to out-groups in various ways (e.g., inclusive or exclusive, nationalistic or non-nationalistic, constitutional or non-constitutional⁴) and can be empirically captured by patriotism indicators proposed by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989).

Drawing on social identity theory and self-categorization theory, I first illustrate the particularistic nature of patriotism. Then, I formulate the hypotheses.

Patriotism and out-grouping

According to social identity theory, individuals’ self-concept is linked to the evaluative connotations of the social categories or groups to which the individuals perceive themselves as belonging to (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Consequently, individuals strive for positive social identities to maintain their self-concept. In this vein, the simple categorization of individuals into in- and out-groups can produce intergroup bias (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Self-categorization theory notes another feature of

⁴ It is important to note, that asking here whether patriotism is constitutional is not the same as asking whether individuals are constitutional patriots. For example, Habermas (1988) uses the term “constitutional patriotism” to describe the attachment to political culture that is inscribed by universalistic principles of democracy and human rights. In this respect, not the nation, but the democratic constitution, which overarches particular forms of life and enables equal opportunity for participation is the main point of identification.

social categories: they are usually connected to (situational) stereotypes deployed by individuals to categorize themselves and others alongside prototypical identities (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Diverse prototypical identities are prevalent in specific social situations and domains (Canan & Foroutan, 2016; Hogg & Terry, 2000). As prototypical identities are malleable, especially higher-order identities (e.g., national identities) can be contentious, because the idea of how such an identity should appear is highly negotiable (Onorato & Turner, 2002). Patriotism as positive national identification is based on a conception of national identity that marks shiftable lines of distinction between in-groups and out-groups. In this context, the line of distinction is more relevant among individuals with high group identification. Identity shifts that undermine the in-group - out-group distinction can be perceived as threats, resulting in more intergroup bias (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004, p. 864). In this regard, positive national identification drives intergroup bias (Verkuyten, 2009). For the specific case of mosque construction, the first question to answer is then: are Muslims viewed as part of German national identity?

The share of Muslims living in Germany is estimated to be approximately 5,5 per cent (Stichs, 2016). Almost all Muslims in Germany have a migration background, that is, they are migrants or descendants of migrants. Considerable Muslim immigration began in the 1960-1970s in the context of labour force recruitment. In the 1980-1990s, Muslims arrived predominantly as refugees.⁵ In historical terms, Muslims represent a recently arrived group. The Muslim community is denominationally heterogeneous. The most important groups are Sunnis (74.1 per cent), Alevis (12.7 per cent), Shiites (7.1 per cent), and Ahmadis (1.7 per cent) (Haug et al., 2009, p. 92). At this time, only the Ahmadi community has been accepted as a corporation under public law and has the same institutional status as Catholicism, Protestantism or Judaism. The other Muslim denominations (i.e., the vast majority) do not yet

⁵ Important regions of origin are Turkey (63.2 per cent), South East Europe (13.6 per cent), and the Middle East (8.1 per cent) (Haug et al., 2009, p. 91). Most Muslims with Turkish origin were labor migrants. Migrants from the Middle East mainly came as refugees. By contrast, migrants from Southeast Europe or the former Yugoslavia first arrived as labor migrants and later as refugees due to the Balkans conflict in the 1990s (Haug et al., 2009, pp. 115–120). Current immigration from predominantly Muslim countries occurs in the context of the Syrian civil war.

fulfil the required criteria for that status (Sachverständigenrat, 2016). Accordingly, Islam has not achieved institutional equality. Moreover, the general population's opinion on Islam is exclusionary. Recent polls show that nearly 60 per cent of the German population do not see Islam as part of Germany (Delhaes-Guenther, 2016). Additionally, it is generally acknowledged that prejudices against Muslims are widespread (Foroutan et al., 2014; Pollack, 2014; Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011).

Thus, Muslims represent a minority group that is not established in Germany in various ways. The legitimate and legal claim to construct visible mosques, which relies on freedom of religion and which is ruled in German Basic Law (Article 4 (I, II))⁶, may be seen by German citizens as a threat to national identity. Therefore, I initially expect:

Hypothesis 1: Highly patriotic German citizens will be more receptive to restricting the construction of visible mosques than less patriotic citizens will be.

Freedom of religion is a basic right in modern democratic societies and thus relates to democratic self-understanding (Habermas, 2006; Honneth, 2014).⁷ Therefore, support or opposition towards the construction of religious buildings touches the value of the individual's modern democratic identity. In this vein, the relationship between the individual's patriotism and the willingness to restrict Muslims' right to construct mosques might be "noised" because the approval of Muslim claims-making can be generally denied by some individuals (Foroutan & Canan, 2016). This can cover diverging effects of patriotism (see Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005).

A claim can be defined "as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals,

⁶ Freedom of religion is a basic right that is far-reaching in its scope (Barczak, 2015). Within this scope, the building of visible places for worship is constitutionally protected as long as it agrees with the Federal Building Code (Bielefeldt, 2007, pp. 80–81; Muckel, 2004).

⁷ In Germany, the commitment to democracy is very strong. On a 10-point scale regarding the perceived importance of living in a democracy, the score of the German population is nearly 9.5 points (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2014, p. 6).

criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005, p. 24). In this respect, the recognition of Muslims as legitimate participants in the public sphere is a precondition for Muslims` democratic participation (Soysal, 1997).

However, the ongoing integration of Muslims is accompanied by normative paradoxes of universalistic and particularistic value horizons (Honneth & Sutterlüty, 2011). A normative paradox evolves when the implementation of universalistic values creates counter-effects of particularization that undermine the initial universalistic idea (see Hartmann, 2002). For example, individuals may generally share the idea of equal democratic participation of Muslims but the realization of this idea can make particular value horizons relevant so that demands for constraining that realization can emerge. In this light, those paradoxes can only occur when individuals are holding universalistic views of Muslims. More concretely, individuals who generally disapprove of Muslim claims-making will also do so in the specific case of mosque construction. By contrast, individuals who generally approve of Muslim claims-making are exposed to normative paradoxes and are more variable in their positioning towards Muslims in the specific case.

Gibson (1998) finds that the more individuals exhibit general democratic values, the more they are politically tolerant towards disliked groups. This effect is not as strong as the positive effect of low democratic scores on political intolerance. In other words, individuals that initially are intolerant are more likely to remain so than those that initially are tolerant. In this constellation, the particularistic drive of patriotism is a factor that can promote the change of positions. Especially in the case of mosque construction, patriotism can take effect within the paradox of universalistic modern democratic identity and particularistic national identity, so that patriotic individuals with universalistic views are more likely to change their position than less patriotic individuals will be. An explanation for this pattern is that the increasing visibility of perceived “others” in the public sphere can trigger perceptions of threat to the own particular group position/identity (e.g., Sutterlüty, 2011). Now, the particular group position/identity is more emphasized among patriotic individuals, which, in turn, makes them

more susceptible to view specific group constellations as a threat than as having equal rights of participation. Against this backdrop, another hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 2: The association between increasing patriotism and higher willingness to restrict the construction of visible mosques will be more pronounced among German citizens that are generally approving of Muslim claims-making.

Data and Methods

The empirical data stem from a disproportionate stratified nationwide dual-frame RDD telephone survey of the German-speaking population over the age of 16 that addressed issues of national identity and attitudes towards Muslims. The survey was conducted from October 2013 to April 2014 by ZeS (Centre for Empirical Social Research), and data were gathered from 8,270 respondents. Because the questionnaire was split only one-half (n= 4,074) of the respondents received questions on patriotism.⁸ Muslim (n= 107) and non-German respondents (n= 173) were excluded from the analysis. Cases with missing values were dropped. Ultimately, the sample consisted of 3,193 respondents. The data were weighted to adjust for unequal probabilities of selection and for over- or undersampling of certain subgroups with known population parameters. For the analysis, I conducted logistic regression models (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).

Variables of interest

The dependent variable was the individuals' willingness to restrict the construction of publicly visible mosques in Germany. Exact question wordings are provided in the Appendix. Responses were rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale and were dichotomized into disagree (0) and agree (1) for the purpose of the analysis.⁹

⁸ See methodological report, for detailed description of the study (Beigang, Kalkum, & Schrenker, 2014).

⁹ I dichotomized the variable, as the parallel lines assumption for the ordinal regression model was not fulfilled (Brant test).

The independent variables of interest were respondents' patriotism and approval of Muslim claims-making. Based on Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), patriotism was measured with a four-item summary index that was rescaled to range between 0 and 1 (0 = no, 1 = high; Cronbach's alpha = .76). Approval of Muslim claims-making was measured with a single item asking whether it is within Muslims' rights to make demands or not.

Control Variables

As control variables, I chose the following socio-demographic characteristics: age (16-97), gender (0 = man; 1 = woman), education (1 = secondary low, 2 = intermediate, 3 = academic high, 4 = pupils), equivalent income (1 = under 1000 Euro, 2 = between 1000 and under 2000 Euro, 3 = over 2000 Euro, 4 = otherwise), migration background (0 = no, 1 = yes) and region (0 = West Germany, 1 = East Germany). Furthermore, I controlled for denomination (1 = Catholic, 2 = Protestant, 3 = other Christian, 4 = other religion, 5 = no religion), self-reported religiosity (1 = not at all, 5 = very religious), political orientation (0 = very left, 10 = very right), cultural threat perception (0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = otherwise)¹⁰ and contact with Muslims in the neighbourhood (1 = never, 5 = very often). These variables are frequently used to investigate negative or positive attitudes towards minority groups (Citrin, Johnston, & Wright, 2012; McLaren, 2003; Semyonov, Rajman, & Gorodzeisky, 2008). In addition, I used a rescaled two-item summary index of secularism in the school context (0 = no, 1 = high, Cronbach's alpha = .62) to measure attitudes related to the manifestation of religion in public space in general (Aarøe, 2012).

¹⁰ Threat perception was measured with three items (Cronbach's alpha = .68). First, I generated a summary index. Then, I dichotomized the index at the 75th percentile and included a "don't know/ refused" category as the measure would produce too many missing values otherwise.

Results

In Table 1, descriptive statistics for the variables are presented. The mean value for patriotism indicates that national identity is rather important among the respondents. At the same time, a majority approve of Muslim claims-making. Nonetheless, nearly half of the respondents agree with restricting the construction of publicly visible mosques. Based on what factors do people arrive at a position on mosques?

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (N=3,193).

Variable	Mean	SD
Restricting mosque construction	.46	.50
Patriotism	.69	.24
Approval of claims-making	.71	.45
Woman	.50	.50
Age	49.99	18.16
<i>Education</i>		
Low	.37	.48
Intermediate	.29	.45
High	.31	.46
Pupil	.04	.19
<i>Equivalent income</i>		
Under 1000 Euro	.22	.42
1000 - under 2000 Euro	.43	.50
Over 2000 Euro	.25	.43
Otherwise	.10	.29
Migration background	.12	.32
East Germany	.17	.37
Catholic	.32	.47
Protestant	.37	.48
Other Christian	.03	.18
Other religion	.01	.08
No religion	.27	.44
Religiosity	2.58	1.23
Contact	1.94	1.27
<i>Threat</i>		
No	.61	.49
Yes	.26	.44
Otherwise	.13	.33
Political orientation	4.77	1.42
Secularism	.37	.30

Data are weighted.

In Table 2, the results of the logistic regression are presented. The bivariate model indicates that increasing patriotism is associated with growing willingness to restrict Muslims' right to construct visible mosques (model 1). Accordingly, the bivariate model supports hypothesis 1. When the variable on the approval of Muslim claims-making and the control variables are included, the relationship between patriotism and the willingness to restrict mosque construction remains significant, still confirming hypothesis 1 (model 2). Moreover, some interesting effects can be observed. Among the control variables, the strong effect of threat perception is to be expected (e.g., Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004) and indicates that perceived threat increases the willingness to restrict mosque constructions.

Table 2. Logit models of willingness to restrict the construction of publicly visible mosques.

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Agree vs disagree	SE	Agree vs disagree	SE	Agree vs disagree	SE
Patriotism	2.208***	.264	1.306***	.281	.354	.536
Approval of claims-making			-.897***	.150	-1.890***	.452
Woman			.265*	.129	.275*	.129
Age			.008	.004	.008	.004
<i>Education</i>						
Low (Ref.)						
Intermediate			-.012	.167	-.011	.166
High			-.536**	.165	-.524**	.166
Pupil			-.516	.417	-.567	.420
<i>Equivalent income</i>						
Under 1000 Euro (Ref.)						
1000 - under 2000 Euro			-.332	.175	-.348*	.175
Over 2000 Euro			-.353	.195	-.369	.195
Otherwise			.314	.256	.306	.256
<i>Migration background</i>						
East Germany			.474*	.194	.465*	.196
Catholic (Ref.)						
Protestant			.204	.165	.213	.165
Other Christian			.284	.304	.252	.305
Other religion			.651	.531	.717	.561
No religion			.056	.205	.062	.209
Religiosity			-.020	.066	-.021	.067
Contact			-.052	.054	-.052	.054
<i>Threat</i>						
No (Ref.)						
Yes			1.046***	.158	1.050***	.157
Otherwise			.443*	.198	.437*	.200
Political orientation			.231***	.047	.227***	.047
Secularism			.250	.250	.242	.251
<i>Interaction</i>						
Patriotism x app. of claims-m.					1.388*	.625
Constant	-1.709***	.191	-2.479***	.491	-1.758**	.595
F(df)	69.72 (1)***		11.94 (22)***		12.55 (23)***	
N	3,193		3,193		3,193	


* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Data are weighted.

A somewhat surprising finding is the effect of the variable of migration background. Respondents with a migration background were more willing to restrict the construction of visible mosques than natives without a migration background. At first glance, this result is counter-intuitive because those groups may also be targeted by intergroup bias due to their

minority group status. However, the result suggests potential group hierarchies among the population with a migration background (Hagendoorn, 1995).¹¹ Furthermore, in East Germany, respondents are more willing to restrict the right to mosque construction. A reason for this finding might be that East Germany has less experience with pluralism due to its past as the GDR (German Democratic Republic) (Rohrschneider, 1999). Finally, respondents who approve of Muslim claims-making are more likely to disapprove of restricting the construction of visible mosques. This was initially to be expected (see Gibson, 1998). The results reveal an interaction effect between individuals' approval of Muslim claims-making and patriotism (model 3). Considering this, the findings confirm the pattern of patriotism predicted in hypothesis 2: Increasing patriotism is associated with growing willingness to restrict Muslims' right to construct visible mosques among individuals who approve of Muslim claims-making. Among individuals disapproving of Muslim claims-making, patriotism has no significant effect.

¹¹ This is reasonable because different immigrant groups have faced different modes of incorporation. For example, the so-called (*Spät-*)*Aussiedler* (ethnic German immigrants), who came predominantly from successor states of the former Soviet Union and the East European countries around the 1990s, immediately were naturalized and were supported by German language lessons. By contrast, the so-called guest workers who came as part of the workforce around the 1960s did not have similar opportunities for nearly four decades (Piller, 2001, p. 269).

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for willingness to restrict the construction of publicly visible mosques by patriotism and approval of Muslim claims-making.



As figure 1 shows, the more positively individuals identify with their country, the more the gap between individuals approving of Muslim claims-making and those disapproving of Muslim claims-making in regard of the willingness to restrict mosque constructions narrows. In other words, with increasing patriotism, individuals who recognize Muslims as legitimate claimants become more similar to those who do not. Concerning Muslims' right to construct visible mosques, increased patriotism results in more unified opposition.

Conclusion

The findings illustrate that increasing patriotism among German citizens is associated with a higher willingness to restrict the construction of publicly visible mosques. However, this relationship only occurs among individuals that generally approve of Muslim claims-making. Individuals generally opposing that right also oppose it in the concrete case of mosque construction, no matter the specific level of patriotism. As a result, individuals viewing Muslim claims-making as legitimated and those who do not become similar in their opposition to mosque constructions with increasing patriotism. The explanation proposed for this pattern is the existence of a normative paradox between a universalistic modern democratic identity and a particularistic national identity. Within this paradox patriotism is associated with the willingness to restrict the construction of visible mosques because visibility in the public sphere is perceived as a threat to one's particular group position/identity that is emphasized by patriotic individuals.

Thus, patriotism in Germany can take effect in such a manner that individuals with an actual democratic self-understanding are deliberately willing to restrict the constitutionally protected rights of others, which in turn relates to or, more precisely, contradicts principles of modern democratic states such as, for instance, the freedom of religion. In the case of mosque construction, patriotism is linked to unconstitutional sentiments. However, more research is needed to ascertain other factors that may influence the effects of patriotism. For example, not every religious claim or demand must be connected to freedom of religion and therefore relate to a country's principles of modern democracy. Accordingly, individuals in Germany who generally approve of Muslim claims-making might be unaware of the legal protection of concrete demands for equal participation (e.g., the construction of mosques) given under those principles. That is to say, there might be a lack of knowledge regarding democratic principles bolstering intergroup bias with increasing patriotism. A survey among pupils in the 9th and 10th grades in five German federal states revealed that only 60 per cent of the respondents could consistently distinguish between the characteristics of a democracy and a dictatorship

(Schroeder, Quasten, Deutz-Schroeder, & Heuling, 2012). In a situation in which individuals are not aware of the inter-connectedness between democracy and constitutional rights at a concrete level but generally support democratic participation of others, learning about democracy may be a way to change patriotism in order to ground it in constitutional categories. A democratic learning approach (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003, p. 244) suggests that citizens need to “be exposed to experiences that encourage the application of democratic norms to specific instances” to become aware of abstract democratic procedures on a concrete level. For example, that learning can already be initiated by exposing students to controversial political debates in the classroom (Hess, 2009). Additionally, democratic learning can be promoted by a supportive environment. For instance, teachers need opportunities to exercise critical reflection about national belonging (El-Haj, 2010). School textbooks could address more facets of diversity (Niehaus, Hoppe, & Otto, 2015). These are a few examples of factors that might influence the varying relationships between patriotism and attitudes towards constitutionally protected rights of minorities. At the moment, national attachment in Germany seems to fit better into the concept of patriotism represented by PEGIDA than that envisioned by the World Cup 2006.

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Appendix

Willingness to restrict mosque constructions (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree)

“The construction of publicly visible mosques in Germany should be restricted”

Approval of Muslim claims-making (no=0, yes=1)

“It is within Muslims` rights to make demands.”

Patriotism (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree)

“I love Germany.”

“When I listen to the German national anthem I am positively affected.”

“It is important for me that others regard me as German.”

“I feel German.”

Threat perception (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree)

“Muslim culture enriches Germany.”

“Muslims are more aggressive than us.”

“Muslims in Germany threaten many things that I deem good or right in this society.”

Secularism in the school context (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree)

“Religious symbols should be allowed in the classroom.”

“Religion lessons should be allowed at public schools.”

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