giving—he engages the reader in a prayerful reflection on what it means to be “made by God...like God...and for God” (p. 15).

Although internationally acclaimed as a nonviolent advocate for human rights, Tutu writes for the average person: people who continually have to choose how to respond with integrity to troubling and/or hurtful experiences at home, at work, or within their larger socio-cultural milieu. He exhorts the reader to adopt a “tend and befriend,” rather than the “fight or flight,” response of conventional wisdom—to meet the challenge and strive to resolve it in ways honoring the dignity of each person and fostering a mutually life-giving relationship among them.

The book begins by grounding the claim that we are made for goodness within the Judeo-Christian tradition and describes the difference between trying to be good and choosing to do good. Particular attention is given to helping the reader learn how to manage the multiple and complex realities of repeatedly making that choice, even when our efforts challenged by adversity, hardship, doubt or failure. And, the final chapters invite the reader to cultivate prayer practices that nurture increased awareness of the nature of God and human being. The combined effect of the topics Tutu selected for reflection and his accessible writing style is both inspiring and instructive. The reader is led to a deeper understanding of who Desmond Tutu is and how he remains true to his most authentic self. More importantly, the reader is carefully and compassionately led to a fuller embrace of his or her own self as an instrument of God’s infinite and unfailing goodness.

Eva Marie Lumas
Franciscan School of Theology
Berkeley, CA


John Bradshaw is an engaging writer having written four other books that were bestsellers, three of which were *New York Times* #1 Bestsellers. *Reclaiming Virtue* is a largely autobiographical introduction to the subject of moral
formation by a psychotherapist who had once studied for the priesthood. It is Bradshaw’s own attempt at integrating the psychological theories he utilizes in his practice with the traditions of moral theology.

I had two hopes for this book when I first picked it up: One hope pertained to this book’s potential for use as an introductory text in the seminary classroom; the other hope pertained to the interesting linkage between virtue theory and psychology suggested by the book’s topic. This was probably too much to ask. Bradshaw does come close, though, but with mixed results for both of my expectations: meeting these pedagogical goals for seminarians and addressing questions about the relationship between psychology and moral virtue. I’m still attracted to and intrigued by this book, but I’m also a little disappointed in it on both counts.

_Reclaiming Virtue_ does seem to offer a promising bridge between virtue theory and contemporary models of psychology, but it tends to beg some of the questions raised by the relationship between the two. Western virtue theory inherits a rich classical tradition about the formation of moral character, but much of the language about moral formation continues to be built upon the bedrock of classical Greek models of the self. The discipline of ethics is challenged to speak meaningfully about moral character given newer models of the psyche.

The challenges to moral discourse from psychology are several, depending on the psychological model being discussed. First, the more positivist and determinist approaches to psychology, such as behaviorism, social psychology, and physio-psychology make salient the perennial question of determinism versus free will. Given environmental, social, or biological determinants of behavior, whence freedom and volition?

Second, non-directive and non-judgmental approaches to counseling and therapy, which form the foundation of much of the pastoral practice and the formational pedagogy for readers of this journal, make salient the question of the role of moral judgment and discernment in pastoral practice. Given the presumption of non-judgmentalism, how do we nurture people of discerning wisdom able to decide and act justly? In addition to the question, “Whence freedom?” we would ask, “How normative?”

Recent advances in cross-cultural psychology widen these questions to challenge the very way we conceptualize the “self” in general, as well as the “moral self” in particular. My own experience teaching both psychology and social ethics at the ecumenical Protestant Pacific Theological College in Fiji drove this home. My students were all from the more communal and
less individualistic cultures of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia. I was
drawn to the distinctions made by scholars such as David Matsumoto and
Hazel Rose Markus between the “more independent self” of Western cul-
tures and the “interdependent self” typical in many non-Western cultures.1
What is an individual moral self in the first place and how is it related to
agentic others in a shared world of meaning?

How, then, does Bradshaw offer a conceptual link between contempo-
rary psychological models and conceptions of character formation and mor-
al virtue? What kind of bridge does he end up constructing?

Bradshaw draws on a wide variety of psychological theories in pre-
senting his own thought. Yet, he focuses on theories that posit a degree of
freedom and volition. He does not attend in the same way to more deter-
ministic strains of thought. This is important for him both personally and
professionally—personally in his own struggle against addictions and pro-
fessionally in his work to empower others.

His beginning point for conceptualizing our ability for moral choice,
though, is Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. He equates an Aristotelian notion
of “right desire” with Martin Buber’s understanding of “grand will,”2 with
Malcolm Owen Slavin and Daniel Kriegman’s idea of the “true self,”3 and
with James Hillman’s understanding of “soul.”4 Bradshaw writes: “My true
self, my soul, my grand will is where I feel alive, where I have the most en-
ergy, and where I seem to belong” (p. 317).

James Hillman, a Jungian analyst, was the first director of studies at the
Jung Institute in Zurich. Known for his “acorn theory” that he describes in
his book, The Soul’s Code, Hillman argued that “our calling in life is inborn
and that it’s our mission in life to realize its imperatives.”5 Bradshaw also
discusses Carl Jung’s understanding of the shadow side of personality with
reference to the distinction Bradshaw draws between “true self” and “false
self.” The shadow, according to Bradshaw, “includes the repression of the
true self” (p. 252). “Making the shadow conscious,” he continues, “is a pre-
condition of prudence” (p. 254). The claiming and integration of the positive
side of one’s shadow is a part of the process of discovering one’s true self,
which Bradshaw also calls “the recovery of innocence” (p. 261). Bradshaw
begins the concluding section of his chapter on shadow work with this de-
scription of the true self: “Each of us has a true self that holds the positive
powers and talents we were born with and makes us the unique, unrepeat-
able people we are” (p. 267).

The other stream of thought is evolutionary theory, which has its genesis with Darwin. Part I of Slavin and Kriegman’s book is focused primarily on evolutionary theory. The book begins with the question about “whether psychoanalytic notions about the seemingly irrational, conflict-filled nature of the human mind could be reconciled with the Darwinian search for the fundamentally adaptive designs that govern all living creatures.” They draw on Winnicott’s notion of the “true self” to posit such an evolutionary adaptive design of the human psyche. Slavin and Kriegman explain:

In this view of the development and maintenance of intrapsychic structure, the basic (universal) organization of the self and its motives will be seen as an individual’s elaboration of a *universal*, innate, human strategy for negotiating *universal relational* dilemmas in *specific environmental* contexts drawing on that individual’s *unique* attributes. Slavin and Kriegman’s definition of the “true self” thus incorporates universal as well as particular dimensions of the psyche, and it involves evolutionary phylogenetic structures for the species as a whole as well as the ontogenic relational history of an individual. It is at once social as well as personal and of key importance is the fit of the self with the ongoing social context of the individual. I find this a very helpful model that can accommodate both an understanding of the more autonomous “independent” self characteristic of more individualist Western cultures and that of the “interdependent” selves formed in more communal cultures.

Slavin and Kriegman’s understanding of the true self would then seem to be saliently different from Bradshaw’s, which tends to elevate the individual beyond the influences (and confining determinants) of his or her social environment and biological heritage.

One place, though, where they do overlap in their conception of the “true self” is their respective appreciation for the work of Erik Erikson. Bradshaw draws heavily from Erikson. The book as a whole tends to move through Erikson’s psychosocial crises with the emphases on the development of trust in early childhood and dealing with the potential for shame in a healthy rather
than a toxic manner. Bradshaw moves most explicitly into Erikson’s framework, however, when he discusses the challenges of adulthood.

Echoing and amending Erikson, Bradshaw expands Erickson’s final three psychosocial crises of adulthood into four. Bradshaw refers to our “first career” as facing the challenge of “intimacy versus isolation” and developing the virtue of “love”—avoiding the extremes of “out-of-control lust” on the one hand or the vices of anger and jealousy on the other. Love, here, is the virtuous mean.

Bradshaw also considers the development of the virtue of work to be a part of adulthood’s “first career.” Virtuous work is the result of successfully facing the challenge of “meaningful livelihood versus laziness,” avoiding the vicious extremes of sloth on the one hand, or avarice as “work addiction” on the other. Virtuous work is here the mean.

For Bradshaw, our “second career” is similarly composed of the virtuous resolution of two psychosocial crises. “Generativity versus Self-Absorption” characterizes the struggle that results in the virtue of “Care,” avoiding the vicious extremes of gluttony on the one hand, or narcissistic pride on the other. Care is the virtuous mean.

The final challenge is to develop the virtue of wisdom as a result of facing the crisis of “ego-integrity (or self-love) versus Despair, avoiding the vicious extremes of resentful anger or regrets on the one hand, or envy on the other.

Throughout this process of living through these crises and developing virtuous capacities, the virtue of prudence as moral wisdom guides our choices. Bradshaw is not as clear, however, as to how virtue can be contextualized to social situations and at the same time must unleash one’s “true self;” a self which transcends environmental constraint. Bradshaw is also unclear as to how virtue as the “mean” is consistent with the many stories of more extreme heroism that he recounts as examples. Bradshaw’s work with Erikson, though, linking the ontogenic, relational development of self with a revised understanding of classical virtue theory, is both suggestive and constructive.

I experienced mixed results using *Reclaiming Virtue* in the class room. On the one hand this is a long book, but on the other hand, it is easy to read and engaging—at least it is engaging for native English speakers, but can be confusing if English is your ‘second’ language. On the one hand, it does offer a good introduction (but only an introduction) covering the bases of classical virtue theory, psychological theory, professional practice, nurturing people of virtue, and vocational discernment. On the other hand, this was as likely to be as confusing to students as helpful. For students, too much is presented
too quickly and not always systematically or logically. This book requires explanation in the classroom—a challenge for lecturing. Every week in which there was an assignment from this book, I was challenged to explain and fill in the blanks where Bradshaw does not. Bradshaw writes more intuitively, associating more freely than logically from one topic to the next.

_Reclaiming Virtue_ does provide a good example of the kind of integration between psychology and virtue theory that I was hoping for, but too much too soon to help typical students integrate the material for their own life and work. It is nevertheless an engaging and suggestive book on this subject—one that I will continue to recommend (though not require) for students and colleagues alike.

Joseph E. Bush, Jr.
Wesley Theological Seminary
Washington, DC

NOTES


10. Ibid., 78.