central (but perhaps still not fully recognized) issue in temporary Greek cultural research. That is, the differentiation between Greek culture as a textual, class or institutional construct and Greek culture as human practice. This question both addresses the possibility of a concrete experiential Greek folk culture and at the same time recognizes its possible ideological extinction. To establish the symbolic status of Greek folklore studies in the past, as she has done, is to clear an epistemological space for the critical exploration of Greek folk culture in the present.

Alki Kyriaeidou-Nestoros has written with philosophical insight about the antagonisms and dichotomies engendered by the co-existence of oral and written culture in Greek social history. In doing so, she has contributed to the pluralization and democratization of the concept of culture in Greek studies.

By separating oral cultures from the distorting dominance of the text in Greek historical studies, she has followed the ethical concerns of one of her teachers, the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss who wrote emotionally about the cultural "Violence of the Letter."

Yet, this respect for the integrity of oral culture in her work has not resulted in an anti-intellectual or anti-rational position. To the contrary, it has produced a rigorous scientific position. She has demonstrated that once we salvage oral tradition from the prior distortions of an archival research tradition, we are free to perform a sensitive translation of the reality of that oral culture into a systematic body of objective knowledge.

It is only with the establishment of this body of objective knowledge that the dialogue between ourselves and our cultural others can be raised to a universal and paradigmatic experience.

On behalf of the Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies and the New York anthropological community, I welcome professor Alki Kyriaeidou-Nestoros, this year’s Constantinos Paparrigopoulos Lecturer.

---

Introduction to Modern Greek Ideology and Folklore

ALKI KYRIAIDOU—NESTOROS

YOUR EXCELLENCY, YOUR GRACE, ladies and gentlemen, dear graduating students.

I am very honored and very happy to be here with you tonight on this most joyful occasion for you, for your parents and for those of us who have come from Greece and are proud to attend the graduation exercises of the Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies Program at Queens, which is the most extensive program on Modern Greek history and culture at any institution of higher learning outside of Greece.

To Professor Harry Psomiades, the founding and caring father of both the Program and the Center, I would like to express my deepest gratitude — not only for inviting me to speak to you tonight, but for all that he has been doing these past eleven years for the promotion of Modern Greek studies in this country: for the seminars he has organized on Greek economic, social and cultural problems, for the books that have been published in the Modern Greek Research Series that have made these problems known to a wider public, for the personal attention and encouragement that he has bestowed to each and all of his students and his guests from Greece.

My colleague at the University of Thessaloniki, Dimitri Maronitis, was his guest some time ago and he gave a lecture in the recently established Linos Politis lecture series. I was so surprised and so touched that a series of lectures at Queens should be named after our well loved and respected teacher at the University of Thessaloniki, Linos Politis. This is really more than we ourselves, his students, have done for his memory in Greece and that is why we look upon the Center of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies as an example of what dedication and faith can work — miracles.
The title of my lecture tonight is also the title of a course I have been teaching in the School of Philosophy of the University of Thessaloniki for the past eight years, since October 1976. When I first started teaching it, I had, now that I think of it, some very distinct revolutionary overtones; they were not, however, out of tune, but fitted into the general climate of the times. For the years immediately following the fall of the dictatorship in Greece witnessed a kind of ideological fever, an overheated interest for political issues and, as the Parisian May of 1968 has taught us, all issues can be political, since “tout est politique.”

I know that it is risky to draw historical analogies, for they tend to bring out the similarities and gloss over the differences, but I would venture to say that the Greek universities lived their revolutionary May after 1974 and, I am sorry to say, have not as yet outlived it. However, what is significant to note is that today the university spirit does not any more set the general ideological pace as it did, for example, in November 1973, during the student uprising against the junta in the Polytechnic School of Athens, and as it continued to do for some time afterwards. Today, I would venture to say that the revolutionary cause our students once proclaimed have, in one way or another, been incorporated into the established order of the political parties in Greece — in short, they have been factionalized. Consequently, and as a corollary to the above, my course on "Modern Greek Ideology and Folklore" has also lost its revolutionary impetus and has become — so to say — “historicized”: a methodological exercise, as I now see it, in how to connect and interrelate history, ideology and folklore, or, in other words, how to combine the history of events with the history of ideas during the formative years of the Modern Greek State: starting some fifty years in advance of the Greek War of Independence (1821) and ending with the Second World War.

The aim of this lecture is to show how and under what specific historical circumstances — within the greater period of Greek history ranging from 1770 to 1940 — Greek folklore rallies forth in support of the dominant ideology. The fact that it does is taken for granted, because folklore belongs itself to the ideology as it is the “par excellence” discipline that theorizes about who the “folk” is and how the idea of the “folk” relates to the concept of “national identity” or “national consciousness.” As a matter of fact, in most countries of Europe (except France and England where the process of the making of a nation-state was accomplished well before the nineteenth century) the rise of folklore is closely related to questions of national identity and national consciousness. National consciousness, of course, a prerequisite for national unity, for the achievement of national independence and, finally, for the creation of a nation-state.

But why should folklore be so crucial in determining the national identity — not only of the Greeks, but also, as has been amply illustrated in the relevant bibliography, of the Germans, the Hungarians, the Norwegians, the Finns and the Irish? Folklore means the “lore” of the “folk”: i.e. “what the folk knows.” The term was coined by the English archaeologist William John Thoms in 1846 and it immediately supplanted the older terms used to denote the same content, i.e. “popular antiquities” and “popular literature.” The term was also accepted in Greece, where it replaced the term “Arts et traditions populaires” and in Italy, where it replaced the term “tradizioni popolari.” It did not find an easy way in Germany, because the term Volkskunde, which means not “what the folk knows,” but “what we know about the folk,” was already well established. In Greece we use the term laographia, coined by Nikolaos Politis and based on an older, Hellenistic term. According to its current definition, which was given by Sulpion Kyriakides in the 1940, laographia is the discipline that studies the folk and its culture; it is the discipline of folk culture.

Now in order to be able to understand the connection between “folk culture,” on the one hand, and what is considered as “national culture,” on the other, we shall have to go into the relationship between what is “folk” and what is “national” and examine the historical circumstances under which they came to be, not only associated, but actually identified. That identification came about in nineteenth-century Europe, during the time of the rise of nationalism and in the spirit of the Romantic movement. It could not have happened earlier. For in the rationalist spirit of the eighteenth century, the spirit of the Enlightenment — which survived, to some extent, in both the British and the French folklore — the “folk,” which is predominantly the rural, illiterate part of the population, is considered as the backward part of the nation and its culture is viewed as an agglomeration of survivals of older times, which are pre-jurisprudently called “customs and superstitions.” The best part of the nation, its progressive part, are its enlightened members, the literati.

3 The titles of folklore treatises in the eighteenth century are indicative of the rationalist trend. For example, Traite des superstitions by Jean Baptiste Thiery (1741) and Enquiries into Vulgar and Common Errors by Thomas Brown (translated into French in 1733.) See Arnold van Gennep, Manuel de folklore français contemporain, (Paris, 1943) 1, p. 6. In the nineteenth century also, the definition of folklore included in the “First Report of the Council of Folklore Society” (published in Folklore Records, 2 (1897) 4, explains the irrational elements in contemporary life as “survivals” from the pre-history of mankind — a rationalist explanation that stems from the notions of progress and evolution.
The scene changes radically when Romanticism breaks in: folk culture becomes the source, the "fons et origo" of the national culture and the literati are relegated to the secondary role of the interpreters of the mystical "Volksgeist" (the spirit of the doer) (the new Romantic notion) — which, however, cannot be approached by way of cognition, but only by way of empathy, by "Einfühlung" (an original German notion). Romanticism, nationalism, and the emergence of the concept of "Volksgeist" are all phenomena belonging to the history of ideas and as such they are intimately related to the economic, social and political changes that marked the history of nineteenth-century Europe. As an example I would like to take the case of Hungary, because it is a relatively older, pre-romantic — one could say — case.

Hungary, as we all know, was part of the Hapsburg Empire and already before the middle of the eighteenth century it had been gravely affected by the Germanizing process which was part of the political strategy of the Empire. The members of the Hungarian aristocracy and the bourgeoisie spoke German or French and Latin was the language of the sciences. It was then that the enlightened Hungarians became conscious of the danger their nation risked of losing its identity, its national character, and they turned to that part of the population that was, until then, the least affected by foreign influence: i.e. the rural people, who faithfully adhered to their ancestral ways and customs and, of course, kept their language intact. Thus folk culture emerged as the genuinely Hungarian, the "national" way of life.

The second and more illustrous example, which can serve as a model for the symmetrical development of the idea of the "folk" (Volks tüm, Volkskultur), on the one hand, and the (Romantic) idea of the nation, on the other, is Germany. The Napoleonic wars and, more specifically, the defeat of the German army at Jena in 1806, and the compulsory application of the Napoleonic Code in the German lands sounded the alarm for a national resurgence, based on the genuinely German traditions of the folk: Savigny discovered das Volkrecht, the brothers Grimm die Volksmärchen, von Arnim die Volkslieder and Wilhelm Heinrich Rahl established, by the 1850s, die Volkskunde als Wissenschaft.

The Greek discipline of folklore, called by its founder, Nikolaos Politis, laographia in 1884, is deeply indebted to the German "Volkskunde" of Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl; this debt, however, was not incurred by Politis, but, much later, by his successor in the University of Athens, Georgios Megas, who became Professor of Laographia in 1947. It was with Megas that the mystical notion of "Volksgeist" entered the discipline of laographia. Politis, on the contrary, had been influenced, on the one hand by German philological antiquarianism (and particularly by his teacher in Munich, the ethnologist Albrecht Dieterich) and, on the other, by the theory of survivals of Edward Burnett Tylor, one of the major representatives of cultural evolutionism in England during the second half of the nineteenth century. The tyranny of Ancient Greece on its humble descendant, the newly established Kingdom of Greece, excluded, at least for the first formative years (1833-1880) all other consideration for a probable source of our national character and national culture: everything had to have its origin in the Classical times or in Homer — in "the glory that was Greece." Our medieval culture, i.e. the civilization of the Byzantine Empire, and its immediate successor, the folk culture of the period of the Turkish domination (1453-1821), roughly) were considered decadent and worthy only of contempt. The cult of the folk, which developed in the spirit of German Romanticism and nationalism that turned to the Middle Ages for inspiration, was — with one significant exception — transplanted in Greece in the early years of the twentieth century, when, as we shall see, there was a real ideological demand for it.

This quick overview of the ethnocentric implications of European folklore, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the intellectual affinities of Greek laographia with the international theoretical spectrum, was meant to be an introduction to the systematic approach of what I have already described as the aim of this lecture: i.e. to show how and under what specific historical circumstances Greek folklore rallies forth in support of the dominant ideology.

Footnotes:
1See J. E. Spenle, La persee allemande du Luther a Nietzsche (Paris, 1964), pp. 80-81.
By systematizing and articulating the ideas and feelings about the “folk” — which, in Romantic terms, represents the “we,” our national “ego” as opposed to the “non-ego” of the aliens — folklore becomes a powerful ideological tool for the formation of national consciousness. The way it chooses to portray the folk (that is, the choices that folklore makes as regards which features of the folk should or should not receive the aura of the “national”) usually depends on the demands of the dominant ideology.

In the discipline of folklore, as well as in the social sciences in general, there is no escape from the historical context in which ideas develop and choices are made. In no way can we limit ourselves to the so-called “object” of our study; for this object (the folk and its lore, in this case) does not exist “out there,” but takes shape as soon as some specific intellectualss for specific historical reasons decide to focus on it. Any valid definition of folklore should, I think, include not only “what” is studied, but also “who” studies it and “why.” These questions can be asked and answered successfully, I think, in the framework of the relationship between — in our case — Modern Greek ideology and laographia (folklore).

II

We shall now examine this relationship in the context of each of the four periods into which I have divided Modern Greek history, following, more or less, the standard periodization: 1) 1770-1820: the Greek Enlightenment; 2) 1833-1880: the Reaction to the Enlightenment or Greek Romanticism; 3) 1880-1922: The Rise of the Bourgeoisie; 4) 1922-1940: the Refugee Period.

These four periods actually form the outline of my course at the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki. During the course each period is approached in a uniform way, focusing on the relationship between the dominant ideology and folklore. It is a simple approach: first I draw a rough sketch of the political, social and economic background of each period; then I analyse the dominant ideology, on the one hand, and the contemporary theory of folklore, on the other, and finally I trace their relationship, focusing primarily on the ideas of the “folk” or the “people” and the “nation” and their ideological uses — and abuses. This lecture is, of course, limited to the highlights only of the extensive discussion that takes place during a whole year’s course, but I shall do my best to make these highlights sound sensible.

In the first period we are going to discuss, the so-called Greek Enlightenment (1770-1820), it would certainly be an anachronism to speak of folklore; for neither the term nor its content have been established as yet. Nevertheless, the interest for the “people,” which usually precedes the emergence of folklore proper, is already manifest among the Greek elite, mainly for two reasons. The first is related to the educational ideals of the Enlightenment: Korais and his circle in Paris strive, as they put it, “to open the eyes of the common folk” and liberate them from superstition. The people are blind, says Korais; it is only through education that they will be able to see the light. From this point of view the “lore” of the people, i.e. folk songs, folktales etc., is naturally not held in high esteem — except for some of its aspects, such as proverbs, that have a strong didactic character which suits the educational purposes of the enlightened elite.

The second reason for taking an interest in the “people” is to be found in another branch of the Greek Enlightenment, the one headed by Dimitri Katartzis in Bucarest. The interest for the people is related here to a new theory of language, the “organic theory,” which raises the common folk to the status of the only legitimate creator of language. “Nobody has the right to give to a word the form that it does not have in the mouth of the people,” says Dimitri Katartzis around the 1770 — actually presaging the development of the “organic theory of language,” which will be established in Germany much later around the 1820, in the context of the Romantic movement, by Grimm, Schlegel and Bopp. Both in Germany and among the Greeks of this period, the “organic theory of language” opened the way to an appreciation of oral folk literature and, in 1824, to the first publication of Modern Greek folk song by Claude Fauriel.

The ideology behind the “organic theory of language” is the Romantic view of the folk as the creator of the genuine ethnic culture, which express the spirit of each particular nation — its Volksgeist. Katartzis, however, and his enlightened circle in Bucarest in the 1770s cannot be considered as representatives of the Romantic movement, because the latter breaks forth in Germany in the beginning of the nineteenth century; they should rather be considered as its precursors. Constantine Dimaras, our most distinguished historian of Modern Greek literature, calls the “organic” theory of Katartzis “an herderisme avant la lettre.”

Thus on the eve of the Greek War of Independence and the establishment of the Greek nation-state the ideas about the “folk” that the Greek

6For the rationalist views of Korais see Alexis Politis, The Discovery of the Modern Greek Folk Songs (Athens, 1984), pp. 135, 158 (in Greek).
precious gems among the debris of contemporary peasant life. The Greek peasants themselves and their culture were of no consequence for the laoagraphia of this period: the peasants were viewed as simply the bearers of pieces of the old cultural treasure, which they had preserved in an irrational form—in the form of "superstitious"—by force of habit.

Now this is the rationalist idea of "the blind folk," the idea that we have already met in the Koraï's circle of the Greek Enlightenment. This idea, as formulated now by the discipline of laoagraphia, was very much in keeping with the oligarchic politics of this period of Greek history. In spite of the exaltation of popular lore and customs in the context of the historical continuity of the Greek nation, the "people" themselves were still considered as "the illiterate and vulgar populace." 14

This view began to change in the following period, the one that we have called "The rise of the bourgeoisie" (1880-1922). The dominant ideology of this period can be summarily described as "demoticism," i.e. the movement that favored the use of the demotic, as opposed to the use of the archaic language. But not only of the language: "Demoticism," writes George Ventiris, the historian of the early Venizelos' era, "adopted the art, the music and the social organisation of the popular classes. This was a vast program and, as soon as it were put into practice, would overturn the whole oligarchic structure." 15

There is no doubt that in the turn of the nineteenth century a major ideological change occurs: the image of the "Hellene" gives way before the image of "Romios," 16 of the popular hero like Makriyannis, for example, or Odysseas Androutos. The classicist trend is replaced by the popular, the "demotic" trend, which recognizes the folk as the only genuine creator of culture. The elite should draw from the well of popular tradition, which is our true national culture; then they should give shape to their inspiration and return their creations back to the folk, as "flesh from its flesh." This is the true Romantic ideal, which enters Greece in the turn of the nineteenth century via Germany. Its most

---


13For the history of this cliche see my Theory of Folklore in Greece, pp. 66-67.

14The option for the use of the archaic language during this period created an abyss between the literate and the illiterate part of the population, as the latter were excluded from all information and communication with the authorities. In trying to rationalize their opinion, the proponents of archaism maintained that the people as "vulgar" were morally degenerate anyway. See my The Theory of Folklore in Greece, pp. 63-6.


16It was the publication, in 1901, of The History of Romiosyne by Argyris Eftatikos that started the dispute about which should be the national name of the Modern Greeks: "Hellene" or "Romios." See my article on "Romiosyne, Hellenes and Philhellenes" in collection of my essays Απογραφικά Μελετήματα (Athens, 1977), pp. 217-34 (in Greek).
prominent exponent is Ion Dragounis, a disciple of Nietzsche and Barres in his early years.\textsuperscript{17}

The concept of the folk formulated by Ion Dragounis is also geared toward the past. This time, however, it is not the distant past of Classical Antiquity, but the recent past: post-Byzantine times and the War of Independence. The "spirit of the race," the genuine Greek character is now to be found in the popular culture that has its roots in the Byzantine tradition. The folk, i.e. the rural part of the population, incarnates all the virtues of the nation and, what is more, acts as the official keeper of the traditional order. This Romantic view, which is definitely conservative, rallies at this point forth to support the ideological need for national solidarity, a need that becomes all the more pressing as conflicts develop within the society and class struggle seems imminent. By idealizing the conservative ways of the rural folk, laiographia consciously served the dominant ideology of this period, which concentrated on "ethnicity" and the preservation of our "national heritage" rather than on the doctrine of evolution and progress. The latter was attached to the doctrine of "internationalism" and therefore considered dangerous for our national experience.\textsuperscript{18} The Manichean distinction between "national tradition," on the one hand (which represents the Good) and foreign influence, on the other (modern technology included which represents the Evil) is established at this point and will continue to haunt us until today. This distinction is, of course, purely ideological and has no correspondance whatsoever with the actual conditions of life, then and now.

The following period begins with the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922 and the obligatory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey according to the Treaty of Lausanne. As a result, more than a million and a half Greek refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace were settled within the boundaries of the Greek state. The so many and so varying Greek regional cultures transplanted in Greece proper posed the problem of cultural variation, which had to be accounted for. The "Panhellenic" models that the laiographia of "the living monuments"

\textsuperscript{17}See Ion Dragounis, My Hellenism and the Hellenes (1903-1909) and Hellenic Culture (1913), re-edited together by Philip Dragounis (Athens, 1927), pp. 210, 216-19 and passim (in Greek). For a discussion on the "laistic" trend in the ideology of the early nineteenth century, see my Theory of Folklore in Greece, pp. 154-56.

\textsuperscript{18}See what Ion Dragounis has to say in the dispute that broke out in the camp of the democritics (dividing them into "nationalists" and "socialists") after the publication of Skleros' book, Our Social Problem (1907), in Rena Stavridi-Patrikiou, ed., Democritism and Social Problem (Athens, 1976), pp. 51-61, 164-73 (in Greek). Cf. Ion Dragounis, Community, Nation and State: Selection of Texts Introduction and Notes by Philip Dragounis (Thessaloniki, 1962), pp. 35-55 (in Greek).

had fabricated for the dominant ideology of the previous periods and then imposed on the people through primary and secondary education were now in sharp contrast with the actual situation. Nevertheless, the official position of laiographia, as expressed by the university professors, was that of indifference toward the problem. It was private initiative — Melpo Merlier and her French husband Octave Merlier — that founded the Center for Asia Minor Studies.\textsuperscript{19} The Center, however, focused on the folk culture of the refugees before they left their countries of origin; it was the old cultures that it strove to document and reconstruct, so that they might not be completely forgotten. How these cultures merged into a new form of popular culture — this time of true "Panhellenic" character — was a social problem that did not interest the Center nor the official laiographia of the period, which remained true to the survivist ideals. And yet, this was the major cultural and social problem of the times.

The 1930s witnessed in Greece, under the Metaxas regime, the transfer of the political models of Nazi Germany, such as "der volkische Staat" (the people's state) and what was translated as "The Third Greek Civilization," i.e. the merging of the Classical, the Byzantine and the popular models into a glorious "Panhellenic" in a diachronic sense — burlesque. This, however, was not the way of the official Greek laiographia of this period, represented by Stilpon Kyriakides, who held the chair of "The Religion of the Ancient Greeks, Their Private Life and Modern Greek Folklore" at the School of Philosophy of the University of Thessaloniki. Laiographia continued to serve the need for unity, but Kyriakides opted for a less emotional and more historically oriented procedure: the unity of the Greek nation that he proposed was not established on the level of the ultimate origins of Greek culture in classical and pre-classical antiquity, but on the level of its more recent formulation into a homogeneous whole. This formulation took place, according to Kyriakides, in late Graeco-Roman times, with the merging of Greek, Roman and Eastern traditions under the influence of Christianity. He associated the emergence of modern Greek popular culture with the emergence of the modern Greek language, the koine of later antiquity, and thus placed the Greek folk in the same pool with the folk of other European and Mediterranean nations, who also trace their cultural origins in that germinal period.\textsuperscript{20}


Opting for a pragmatic rather than a romantic view of history, the laographia of this period was able, during the Second World War, to refute successfully the renewed attacks, instigated by the propaganda of the German occupying army, against the “purity” of the Greek race and the continuity of Greek culture. The German propaganda, in trying to prevent the German soldiers stationed in Greece from making the connection between the Ancient and the Modern Greeks, published and circulated books and pamphlets repeating the old thesis of the Fallmerayer about the Slavic origin of the Modern Greeks and, as if that was not enough, adding a new theory about their “Levantine” origin. The Germans used these arguments in order to deprive the Greeks of their rights on their ancestral “Lebensraum.”21 Greek folklore answered to the task of providing the continuity of Greek culture with arguments drawn, this time, from documentary rather than speculative history.

21 About Kyriakides’ efforts to refute the German propaganda on the “purity” of the Greek race during the Second World War, see my Theory of Folklore in Greece, pp. 127–31.

The Art of Greek Folk Music

RODERICK BEATON

GREEK MUSIC HAS ALWAYS SUFFERED from a bad press. Even in classical times, when a sophisticated musical tradition flourished, the art of the practical musician was not held in particularly high esteem. Most ancient writers on the subject considered acoustic theory far superior to music-making, and Plato, in the Republic, is ever harder on musicians than he is on poets, taking away from them most of their musical instruments, restricting the modes in which they should be allowed to play, and finally subordinating music to the words it accompanies.1

In Byzantine times the Church took a predictably stern view of all music other than that prescribed for its own rituals, and this Church music, up until the later Middle Ages, was probably quite distinct in character from the secular music of Greek-speaking lands, of which not a note survives. The views of the Cypriot monk, and later saint, Neophytos Enkleistos, toward the end of the twelfth century, are commonplace in their condemnation, but are especially interesting because Neophytos was the first writer ever to record a fragment of what is recognizably a modern Greek folk poem.2 The chances are that this description of a wedding feast is not mere conventional tirade but based on first-hand knowledge: “from the morning they devote themselves to blameworthy and diabolical works, I mean dances and instruments and music and shameful acts and wine-bibbing and other things hateful to God and to the Devil most pleasing.”3

1 Republic 398-400.