The Athens Mosque: From a Foreign Policy Tool to the Formation of Public Islam in Greece

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The issue of Muslim communities in Greece was for decades tightly connected to the country's foreign policy and most importantly to the fluctuations in Greek-Turkish relations. The issue of the Mosque in Athens, however, was always kept away from discussions related to domestic politics and was considered to be beyond the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty.

Up until the Athens Olympics in 2004 the issue of establishing a mosque in Athens was a matter of Greek foreign policy and particularly of Greece's relations with the Arab states and the Muslim world in general. It was seen as a tool for a friendlier stance by the Arab and Muslim states in international forums such as the Arab League and most importantly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, where Turkey has found fertile ground for promoting her positions on Cyprus and the Muslim minority in Thrace.

The first attempt to establish a mosque in Athens was by the dictatorship in 1971 at the old Ottoman mosque, in the Monastiraki area, just under the Acropolis. As there were no Muslim communities in Athens, the only reason for this initiative was to be found in foreign policy. At that time, the Greek military regime was marginalised by most European states and European institutions and was trying to develop ties, which would not question the absence of freedom and democracy. Such friends could be found
in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Africa. Moreover there was a growing Arab interest for investment on oil refineries in Greece. The mosque plan was thwarted by the Ministry of Culture on the ground that the building of a non-Christian religious institution next to the Parthenon would violate the environment and the sanctity of the ancient monument. The ideological premise of the dictatorship was of course an absurd mixture of ancient Greek civilization and the Greek Orthodox tradition. Thus, anything that could contravene this premise was out of the question. Such arguments, however, have continuously resurfaced in various circumstances.

Beyond the oil factor, Greek governments in the 1970s were discussing the issue of a mosque in Athens as a way to improve relations with Muslim and mainly Arab states and to court regional or international organisations such as the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). From the Turkish invasion and occupation in Cyprus, in 1974, until the mid-1980s the main battleground for the Cyprus issue was the UN, where Greece needed the votes and support of the Third World and most importantly, of the Arab and Muslim members.5 Furthermore, Turkey, a leading member of the OIC, had been trying, to a certain extent successfully, to use this forum for promoting her interests in Cyprus and on Muslim minority in Thrace. The absence of an Athens mosque was always in the agenda of bilateral negotiations and official trips between Greece and the Arab states, with Saudi Arabia being the keenest supporter for the establishment of the mosque.

The issue came again in the forefront of Greco-Arab relations after the first Gulf War in 1991, when the Greek siding with Kuwait and the coalition forces created high expectations for Gulf investments in Greece. Establishing a mosque was considered by Constantine Mitsotakis center-right government to be an incentive for Arab investments.5

For the first time since 1971, in 1997, Constantine Simitis’ PASOK Government and its Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos started serious work for the establishment of a mosque in the greater area of Athens. All negotiations related to the establishment of the mosque were conducted by the Foreign Ministry with the Arab Embassies in Athens, led by the Saudi Ambassador.4 This is indicative of the view that the mosque was part of foreign policy domain despite the influx of tens of thousands of Muslim immigrants to Greece who were coming mainly from South Asia rather than from Arab countries.

In 2000 a law provided for the construction permit of a mosque and the establishment of an Islamic Culture Centre in Paania, about 30 km from the city center on the highway to the new international Athens airport. Another four years of negotiations were needed to conclude the organisation of the project. In 2004 the two parts agreed that the project would be a Public Benefit Foundation, built on state land funded by the King of Saudi Arabia. It was to be administered by an Executive Council of six representatives of the Greek state and six of the Arab ambassadors in Athens. The President would be permanently the Saudi ambassador in Athens.

Similar patterns were first introduced in the UK in 1944 with the Islamic Culture Centre and the Mosque Trust and in 1977 with the subsequent opening of the London Central Mosque at Regents Park by the British Government. Similar arrangements are found elsewhere in Europe in institutions such as the Islamic Culture Centres in Brussels and Rome.

The main aims of this policy had to do almost exclusively with foreign and national security issues. Part of Greece’s international public relations campaign before the Athens Olympics was to enhance Greece’s image as a country, which respects fundamental rights of worshipping and religious identity. This image would be tarnished if Athens continued to be the only European capital without a mosque for the needs of its 100,000 Muslim immigrants. The establishment of the Islamic center was part of the general 2388 framework law that regulated all the preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games.7

The chosen pattern decoupled the mosque and its legal function from the legal status of the Muslim community in Thrace, which is governed by the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. In that regard, it
is interesting to note that there is no social or political interrelation between the Muslims of Thrace and the new Muslim immigrants in the Athens area. Even Muslim Turkish-speaking communities who have emigrated from Thrace to Athens find it difficult to cooperate or connect with new immigrants from Asia or elsewhere. Additional security concerns were raised by the rise of extremist political Islam.

The Greek government, wishing to avoid funding the center in cooperation with international Muslim organisations such as the World Muslim League or with wealthy individuals, kept the whole project tightly linked to bilateral Greek–Arab state relations. These were considered much more manageable through diplomatic means. Last but not least, the deal with the Arab ambassadors redeemed the state from the whole notion of Muslim representation in Greece and the implications this might have on the Muslim community. In other words the state could finesse the choice who to accept and who not to as genuine representative of the Muslims.

There is no accurate estimate of the Muslim immigrant communities in Greece. The number of those that, to a certain degree, observe the basic Islamic religious obligations, the attestation of the One God, the prayer, the zakat, fasting and pilgrimage cannot exceed 200,000. To include Albanians in this group is misleading and as they abstain from all the above-mentioned obligations. Most of them came to Greece in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1990s there was no institutionalised Muslim communities’ representation and some embryonic organisations were not representative of the majority of the Muslim migrants. The political and social leadership of the Muslim minority in Thrace showed no interest in leading the new Muslim migrant communities, and there was no Muslim middle class to negotiate with the state and the society as it was the case with second generation Muslims in the UK or the Netherlands.

The establishment of the Islamic Culture Centre and the Mosque in Athens brought forward the issue of the visibility of Islam in the urban space. As Jocelyne Cesari points out, "the mosque not only expresses the presence of a local Muslim community, it also represents the evolution of Islam from the private to the public sphere. Whereas, in the past Muslims in Europe were isolated in invisible and private prayer rooms, the mosque openly, publicly and visibly marks an Islamic presence." It is remarkable that the first objections coming from the Greek Orthodox Church were founded on the argument that a grandiose mosque on the road to the new Athens airport would confuse the foreign visitors of the country as to the religious and national identity of Greece.

The Orthodox Church presents the modern Greek national conscience as identical with, and a continuation of the Greek Orthodox “national” conscience under Turkish domination. During the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s there was a growing siege mentality in the Greek society, cultivated by the Orthodox Church and Archbishop Christodoulos. As G. Mavrogordatos has noted, the Archbishop “could successfully promote the Orthodox Church as the only ‘ark’ of Greek national identity threatened by European integration and globalisation.”

The establishment of an Islamic Centre meant for both the Church and local authorities an expanded mosque’s role in organising social and cultural activities and thus posed a threat to the Greek national identity. The official line of argumentation by the Greek Orthodox Church and its supporters in the press and the Parliament was that although it was in favor of the establishment of a mosque, it thought that an Islamic Culture Centre under the control of Saudi Arabia would disseminate radical political and religious propaganda and thus pose a threat to national security. The Church erroneously pointed out the example of the radical mosque in Milan, which is not the product of an interstate agreement but an institution of the local Muslim communities. This is again not a unique Greek pattern. In countries such as Spain and Italy where mosques and public visibility of Islam is a rather new phenomenon, Islam is also very much connected with threats to international and national security.

There are more manifestations of the Church’s attitude towards the mosque, which reflect the siege mentality in the Greek society threatened by European integration and globalisation. Metropoli-
tan Nicolas of Laureotiki (the diocese of Paania, which was the proposed site of the mosque) argued vividly against the mosque and the public visibility of Islam. He maintained that “whoever is visiting our country, instead of looking at the Parthenon or a church, he will contaminate his sight and confuse his thought with the image of a Muslim mosque completely alien to any historical substance or social necessity in our country . . . Do not hear those who say that it [the mosque] is to be accomplished because it is a plan of the Americans. They have a lot of plans but they failed to succeed . . .” The same line was more or less followed by Lianna Kanelli, an MP of the Communist Party (KKE) in parliamentary debate and in various articles she published in Rizospastis the newspaper of the KKE. She connected petrodollars, terrorism and the USA with the establishment of the Islamic Culture Centre.14

On the local level, the reaction of a large part of the local society and the Mayor of Paania took the form of the protection of the local identity against Islamic invasion. Public visibility of Islam was again at the center. As a symbolic collective protest, town’s residents built a large wooden cross on the land allocated for the mosque. A small Orthodox chapel also appeared on the site. Paania’s mayor, Paraskevas Papacostopoulos, said residents were angry that the site is on a hill, meaning the mosque will be visible from afar and seen by visitors flying into the airport. “It spoils the religious and cultural character of our region, as well as of the whole of Greece. . . . It’s not pleasant to enter a country and the first thing you see being a mosque.”15 He said residents also did not want thousands of worshippers congregating in their town, “Our residents look at it as a foreign object in their area that is being forced on them without anyone asking their opinion.” A similar phenomenon can be seen in the controversy over a mosque in the northern Italian town of Lodi recounted by Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg.16 Stefano Allievi noted, “mosques – like any form of construction that is proposed in an area where previously it was not present – constitute a form of symbolic ownership of the land. At the same time, resistance to them becomes a very concrete and material sign of dominance and power over the territory. It is clear, therefore, that the conflict surrounding mosques is, above all, a genuine conflict of power.”17

The project was eventually postponed, but that “postponement” has become more or less permanent due to Church pressure, the unpopularity of the project among Greek citizens, and a general downturn of the socialist government in 2000s.18 The government had from 2000 entered in a bitter controversy with the Church over whether or not to include religious affiliation on national identity cards. The controversy challenged the strong link between religion and national identity and became a hard trial for Church-State relations.19 In 2006, the new conservative government passed a new Law for the establishment a state mosque very near to the center of Athens, at the Votanikos area, on land owned by the Greek Navy. Law 3512 provided for a mosque funded exclusively by the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, which the Ministry gave the power to appoint the imam of the mosque. The mosque is to be administered by a board of seven members, five Greek public servants and academics and two representatives of the Muslim communities, all of them appointed by the Ministry.20

The debate over this new project had different characteristics from the previous one. Now there was no Islamic Culture Centre, the public visibility of the Mosque was reduced as the new location was in a rather underdeveloped area of the city and, most importantly, the mosque was now fully controlled by the state, with no ability to expand its role in various social and cultural activities. Thus, the Athens mosque is to become merely a space of prayer deprived of its role as community centre where pre-existing networks of solidarity come together. The Greek state, the Church and the society tried, in this way, to avoid the task of the redefinition of public space so as to incorporate Islamic elements. As Islam remained in the private sphere of prayer and under strict state control, the Church and the like-minded forces dropped their objections.

The Law provided that the Muslim members of the board would be chosen by the Ministry from a list of eight candidates submitted by the two most representative Muslim organisations (each of them
shall propose four candidates). These two organisations would be the most populous in membership and the most influential among the Muslim communities. Whereas membership can be measured, the influence factor is clearly subjective. The Greek state, in short, is attempting through the mosque to control the other forms of Muslim presence in the public sphere and space, namely grassroots groups, single-issue organisations (publishing or relief enterprises), representative councils and umbrella bodies of the Muslim communities. Dilwar Hussain pointed out similar examples in France and Belgium where the “state tried to impose representative councils upon the Muslim community and also tried to exclude certain individuals they considered to be fundamentalists. In this way it appears that the state has taken upon itself to decide what Islam is or should be. This would be, Hussain maintained, short-sighted approach that could risk deepening the feelings of isolation and alienation that many immigrants actually feel.”

The parliamentary debate that preceded the vote on the Law 3512 is revealing of the main concerns among political parties. These were more or less the same, notwithstanding differences as to whether the new law could address them in the proper manner. First, they all admit that the expansion of the Mosque’s functions beyond the pure “liturgical” ones might lead to discontent among neighboring non-Muslim inhabitants. The answer to this concern was either to reduce the mosque’s function to traditional religious duties, as the then Minister of Education, Mrs Giannakou declared, or to re-locate the Mosque, possibly outside the Municipality of Athens together with comprehensive urban planning and the neighbours consent, as Mrs Diamantopoulou of PASOK, then the largest opposition party in parliament, suggested. McLoughlin, however, has convincingly argued that mosques in the West not only provide secure religio-cultural continuity for those who have faced the dislocating experiences of migration to a new land but, most importantly, they take on community functions, such as advice centres for the unemployed, youth centers, and elderly day-care services, that they do not undertake in the countries of origin. Along the same line, most of the government MPs (the conservative New Democracy) pointed out that the mosque would be located away from areas designated as residential.

Another concern was the incompatibility of the mosque with other city functions nearby, particularly the proximity (about one and half mile) from the planned football stadium of the biggest Athens football club, Panathinaikos. PASOK representatives, in particular, argued that football hooligans might clash with Muslims gathered for prayer. Analogous security concerns of possible vandalism by hooligans were not expressed regarding the proximity to the new stadium of large shopping centres, the Agricultural University, or the new Stock Exchange Building.

There are currently more than fifty makeshift prayer rooms in apartments, basements, warehouses and garages in the greater Athens area. Apart from a couple of organisations the rest of the Muslim communities are organised on an ethnic basis, Pakistanis, Nigerians, Egyptians, etc. They resemble to some extent the millet system of the Ottoman Empire and their main task is to preserve the religious and ethn-cultural tradition of their country of origin, by establishing halal shops, Koran schools and communal solidarity centers.

The issue of the Athens mosque could have produced single-issue mobilisation and activism among the Muslim communal organizations. Such single-issue mobilisation could have opened, at the end of the day, a channel of negotiation with the authorities and the society, as was the case with mosque building in the Netherlands in early 1990s. Muslim organisations proved incapable of doing so due to inner divisions and immaturity in social activism. There was no government invitation of any Muslim organization to participate in the parliamentary sub-committee, which drafted the law for the Athens mosque. The reaction to such exclusion was again mild. Most of the leaders of the Muslim communities in greater Athens area are first generation migrants, who have spent at least 20 years in Greece and established families. They might be considered to be what Cesari terms “parochial leaders.”

The answer to the public visibility of Islam came from an external factor. In 2006, a Saudi millionaire spent 2.5 million Euros and
bought an old factory in the center of Athens refurbishing and transforming it into a large mosque under the name “Greco-Arabic Culture Centre,” capable of serving the prayer needs of more than 2,000 Muslim faithful. The municipality and the state authorities tried to cancel the project with heavy fines. These state measures to control Islam and keep it outside the public space are likely to prove counterproductive. As Cesari noted, “Islamic membership introduces confusion between the public and private spheres. Islam cannot be confined to the mosques and private worship” as in present day Christianity.29

It seems that the only way that might prompt social visibility of the Muslim communities and the formation of a public Islam in Greece will be what Oussama Cheribri called “sudden mobilization.”29 In summer 2009, sudden mobilization of the Muslims in Athens took the form of rallies, sometimes violent, protesting against an incident of the Koran’s desecration by two policemen. Although the protests were hijacked by the radical left that mingled the issue of public Islam with its own agenda, they triggered a discussion in the Greek society on how to redefine public space to incorporate Islamic elements. Moreover the decision of the Muslim Association, in November 2010, to call the Muslims of Athens to celebrate Id al-Adha openly, at the city’s main squares, vigorously challenged the strong social convention of Muslims’ “invisibility.”30

It should be noted that, although problems associated to immigration policy were at the forefront of the electoral campaign in November’s local elections, the issue of the Athens’ Mosque was, rarely, if at all, mentioned in the debates.31 In the meantime, the Mosque is yet to be built and any regulation or real dialogue with the Muslim organisations has been missing.

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Notes

1Kyriakatiki Eleutherotypia, April 2, 2006.
3Roussos, Sotiris. “Η Ελληνική Πολιτική στη Μέση Ανατολή [Greek Policy towards the Middle East],” in Arvanitopoulos Constantinos, Korpa Marilena (eds.), 50 Χρόνια Ελληνικής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής [50 Years of Greek Foreign Policy], Athens: A. A. Livianis, 2005, p. 92.
9Various sources in the press, parliamentary debates and surveys give a population of roughly 200,000 Muslim immigrants living mainly in the greater area of Athens, including illegal immigrants and immigrants with work permits, residence or Greek citizenship. See Rikou Anthi, “Ζήτηση Θερμεστικής Ελευθερίας Μεταναστών [Issues of Religious Freedom among Immigrants],” in Katounidou Jenny, Karydis Vasili et al. (eds.) Μετανάστευση στην Ελλάδα: Εμπειρίες, Πολιτικές, Προσπάθειες [Immigration in Greece: Experiences, Policies, Perspectives], Athens: IMEO 2008, p. 122.
12Interview of the late Archbishop Christodoulou, Politika Themata, October 17, 2005.
18A survey on behalf of the European Social Survey in 2003 showed that 26% of the Greek respondents gave the Church 10 (on a 1–10 scale of importance) as far as the church role in their society. See Danopoulos P. Constantine, "Religion, Civil Society and Democracy in Orthodox Greece," Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 6:1, April 2004, p. 45. According to another survey of 1,500 Athenians conducted in February 2007 by VPRC, a research firm, more than half of Athens's five million residents oppose creating a mosque to serve the Muslim immigrant community. Kitsantonis Niki, 'Muslims in Athens build their own mosque, New York Times, July 6, 2007.
20Law, no. 3352/2006, Ισλαμικό Τέμενος Αθηνών και άλλες διατάξεις [Islamic Mosque of Athens and other Provisions].
23The Municipality of Athens was the only Municipality of the greater Athens area that had accepted the establishment of a Mosque in its boundaries.

26The parochial leader, is one who works primarily at the local (district or town) level and whose actions are principally inscribed within the local space of the mosque or within the Islamic association. Until very recently, the parochial leader was in most cases a primo-immigrant, a family man and head of a family, who had been living in France for around 20 years, and whose children were born and educated there. Cesari Jocelyn, "Mosque Conflicts in French Cities: Towards the End of a Conflict?" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31:6, November 2005, p. 1032.
30A. Hekimoglou, D. Vythoulkas, ‘Ες πλατείες προεκκίνησαν τον Άλλαχ [They pray for Allah at the city's squares], To Vima, November 17, 2010.
31An e-poll made by www.in.gr, a major Greek e-news network, showed, on November 25, 2010, that 50.5% of the people clicked against the establishment a Muslim Mosque in Athens. See http://news.in.gr/greece/article/aid=1231067853 (assessed November 25, 2010).