referred to a “limited opening” by the Greek government to Eastern Europe in 1956, also pointing out that this opening suffered a temporary slow-down in the immediate aftermath of the Hungarian crisis. The commercial agreements with all the eastern countries (save Albania), the settlement with Romania, the establishment of a “special relationship” with Yugoslavia, or the clearing of the Corfu channel were important developments, but not diplomatic achievements, let alone triumphs; the most spectacular results of the “new look” of Greek policy must certainly be sought in the country’s relations with – and indeed its position in – the western world. But, anyway, in the mid-1950s Greek diplomacy did not aim to inaugurates a new era of Balkan relations. Its efforts involved only a minimum and predominantly defensive aim: consolidation of the existing balance and therefore safety for the country’s borders. Yet, this diplomatic activity in the Balkans was indeed crucial. It would have been practically impossible for Athens to achieve its main aims – develop its economy and seek a position in the new Europe and the western world – without having its back covered with regard to Balkan affairs: this, in the end of the day, was the very essence of “detachment.” Athens’ main aim in the mid-1950s was attained. It was only in the mid-1970s – when the international climate became favourable to an imaginative initiative, and when confidence had been restored, at least between the states of the Balkan mainland – that Greece took the lead in trying to realise its maximum aim in the region – the setting up of multilateral co-operation in South Eastern Europe.49

47 That was in fact the main argument of the Greek reply to the Romanian proposal: see Karamanlis to Stoica, 23 September 1957, Karamanlis, vol. 2, p.421.


49 It is indeed possible to suggest that since the conclusion of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Greek policy in the Balkans followed a pattern: the country had a maximum and a minimum aim. The first was peaceful multilateral cooperation of all regional powers. However, when this was impossible, because of the expansionist or hegemonist tendencies of a Balkan state, Greece sided with the conservative countries of the region, aiming to achieve its minimum aim, the preservation of balance in South-eastern Europe, which would ensure security for the country itself. See Hatzivassiliou, “Greek Policy in the Balkans, 1923-1981: toward a Synthesis of Greek Bibliography”. On the Greek initiative in 1975-80 for the setting up of multilateral Balkan co-operation, see Constantinos Svolopoulos, Η Ελληνική Πολιτική στα Βαλκάνια, 1974-1981 (Greek Policy in the Balkans, 1974-1981) (Athens, 1987).

The Hellenic Diaspora and the Macedonian Issue

PANAYOTIS J. TSAKONAS*

Introduction

The dissolution of communism in the Eastern bloc as well as the disintegration of former Yugoslavia found Greece unprepared to tackle the complex issues that emerged in the Balkan region. In fact, Greece has neither a clear-cut vision of, nor long-term plans for, the region’s future. In this article, I argue that the Macedonian issue has been a symptom of the difficult ongoing relationship between the so-called “national center”1 (Greece) and the Greek community (its Diaspora).2 The case in point is the Greek diaspora in the United States of America, a host country which has always played and will continue to play a

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1 As Professor Kazakos aptly points out, “the terms “national center” was used as a term by governments in Greece which pursued different policies and had different philosophies vis-a-vis Hellenism. On the one hand, the 1967-1974 military regime used the term in its dispute with Cyprus while, on the other hand Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) used it when in power to justify its own foreign policy decisions.” See Panos Kazakos, “Greek Diaspora and National Issues,” Greek Political Science Review, Vol.3, April 1994, (Reference No.1).

2 The term “Greek Diaspora” refers to all the Greeks who live outside the Greek territory, with the exception of certain areas which have historically been integral parts of the Greek nation. According to this definition Greeks in Cyprus and in Northern Epirus (the southern part of Albania) as well as those few still residing in Turkey, should not be considered as Greek diaspora. For this clarifications see “Introduction” in The Greeks Abroad, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publications, (Athens, n.d.)
decisive role on issues of great national importance to Greece. The case study from which I will draw empirical material runs from December 1991, when the European Community introduced three conditions as a prerequisite for the official recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to February 1994, when the US government proceeded to the recognition of the new state and the newly elected government in Greece imposed an economic blockade (embargo) on the republic of FYROM.3

The argument of this article is that the lack of clearly delineated aims and strategic objectives on the part of Greece has led to a downgrading of its diaspora in the U.S. to a level of tactical support of the motherland’s short-term objectives. In addition, the treatment of the Greek diaspora in the US by Greek governments being in power for as long as the Macedonian issue has dominated Greece’s political agenda has taken place on the basis of a “traditional way” of achieving foreign policy objectives by promoting the country’s national rights. Thus, as the Macedonian issue would clearly demonstrate, Greece has proved itself unable to integrate its “mobilized” diaspora in the US into an overall strategic plan as far as the country’s role in the Balkans is concerned, since its policy chose to highlight the divergence of interests existing between the diaspora’s host country and Greece. In the years to come, Greece is faced with the difficult tasks of developing a grand strategy for the Balkan region as well as integrating its diaspora into this long-term objective.

THE HELLENIC-AMERICAN COMMUNITY: PROSPECTS FOR INFLUENCE

According to official statistical data, around 2.2 million Greeks live in the United States today.3 This Hellenic-American Community

3 For the purposes of the examination of this period, I reviewed the Greek daily press. Specifically, the daily newspapers ELEFTHEROTYPIA, PONTIKI, TA NEA, ESTIA and ETHNIKOS KYRX. I also found particularly useful Sotiris Dalis’ chronology on the Macedonian issue published in Yearbook 1993 (Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, Athens, 1993), pp. 307-320 and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Michalis Papaconstantinou’s book, The Diary of a Politician: The Skopje Entanglement (Athens, Estia, 1994).

4 See The Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1970 (Abstract of the Census Tables 14 & 15). Criterion of national definition in this census was the place of birth of the people questioned. However, there is a need for a (omogeneia) prospers in nearly every field of activity and actively participates in the US political arena. The Hellenic-American community is a “mobilized diaspora” in the sense that it is an ethnic group enjoying a series of material and cultural advantages vis-a-vis other ethnic groups, while it –at the same time, acquires a series of skills necessary to the host country. Hence, this ethnic group has managed to, so far, enjoy specific benefits in the host country, such as economic resources, social status as well as access to the foreign policy decision-making elites.

The Hellenic-American community has been active in promoting both the interests of itself and the foreign policy objectives of its home country by lobbying at two levels, the local and the national.4 Successful lobbying at local/state level is a prerequisite for the successful promotion of interests at the national level, for it is at the local level that voters can reach their elected representatives in the Congress. Electoral fundraising seems to be the most successful issue of the recent – and more accurate – census of Greek-Americans living in the US to be conducted. For remarks along this need see the interview by Ioannis Naphenas, Coordinator of the National Council. Naphenas argues that although, according to the 1980 census, there were 980,000 Greeks registered, Greek-American themselves believe that they are no less than 3 million. This gap is due partly to technical problems of registration and partly to the loss of national consciousness and the assimilation of Greeks into American society. See Ethnikos Kyrx, June 11, 1992.


4 In the 1980s the Greek lobby operated at a national level in Washington D.C. by means of mainly two organizations: the United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC) and the American-Hellenic Institute (AHI). The latter seems to posses an overall strategic plan regarding ability to make the Hellenic-American lobby efficient. The role of the Orthodox Church has been also significant, (it had developed into a powerful conservative and highly centralized institution with a national network of more than 400 parishes and about 150,000 members) while it maintained strong ties with UHAC. At the national level, the role of the four Greek-Americans in the US Congress has been also very important. Another Greek-American institution of diminishing importance is the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA).
Greek-American involvement. In fact, thanks to their relative strong economic position, Greek-Americans are able to raise considerable funds for the election campaigns of both the Republican and the Democrat candidates. This in turn, has allowed a number of businessmen (as well as people in other professions) to translate economic might into political influence, although it is a question of debate whether there is a direct linkage between an ethnic group's economic strength and its ability to exert political influence over the decision-making process of the host country.³

It is worth mentioning that the political environment where the Greek lobby operates is extremely tolerant compared to that of other host countries.⁴ More specifically, in sharp contrast to Australia's or Canada's parliamentary democracies, presidential democracy in the United States allows for a weak state and a rather strong society. This in turn means a fragmentation of power and the exercise of authority by a plethora of autonomous (and/or semi-autonomous) agencies. In this receptive political environment, the various interest groups have better access to the policy-making process and they can exercise considerable influence over the various decision-making centers. Greek diaspora is not an exception in this regard, and it seems able to exercise influence over the various administrations even on issues of "high politics."⁵


⁴According to Walker Connor "the principal explanation for the greater influence of diasporas within the United States as compared to other immigrant states appears to lie in the form of political system." See Walker Connor, "Diasporas and the Formation of Foreign Policy: The US in Comparative Perspective" in Dimitri Constas & Athanasios Platias (eds.) Diasporas in World Politics. Greeks in Comparative Perspective, (London: Macmillan, 1993), p.171. For remarks along this argument see Gabriel Sheffer "Jewry, Jews and Israeli Foreign Policy: A Critical Perspective" in the same volume, pp. 203-228. Sheffer argues that the Jewish diaspora within the US has exerted great influence over Washington's Middle East policy, but in no other country has a Jewish diaspora been able to exert comparable leverage.


GREEK GRAND STRATEGY AND THE MACEDONIAN ISSUE

The end of the Cold War provided Greece with opportunities and challenges to play a leading role in the region. As a member of the European Union and NATO, Greece was primarily positioned to be the leading economic power in the Balkans, with the subsequent support of both the EU and US. Instead of exploiting its comparative advantage, Greece found itself unprepared to deal with these new possibilities and tripped over her own shortcomings. The Macedonian issue was left dormant during the Cold War until it suddenly emerged as a top priority foreign policy consideration following the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and the newly-founded state's efforts of official recognition by the European Community.⁶

Undoubtedly, the facts regarding both Greek efforts to prevent the recognition of FYROM under the name Macedonia and the rationale behind those efforts are well-known. In this article I will use key-points (taken place on both the domestic and the international level) as reference points to stress out those events that highlight both a number of shortcomings in Greek grand strategy and the problematic relationship between Greece and its diaspora in the US. Moreover I will demonstrate the lack of a coherent and long-term foreign policy on the part of the home country (i.e. Greece) and, most importantly, the domination of short-term considerations over long-term interests (the latter being a prerequisite of a Greek grand strategy).

Needless to say, that these shortcomings and weaknesses in Greek grand strategy had a direct negative impact on the ability of the Greek diaspora to achieve the goals traditionally expected by its motherland, namely to influence the US decision-making to the advantage of Greece's foreign policy objectives.

The parameters on which a state's grand strategy is developed are:
- a) military strategy, b) economic policy, c) diplomacy and d) legitimization (internal and external).⁷ I will show that Greece's strategy

⁶The newly-founded state applied for the first time to the European Community for recognition under the name "Republic of Macedonia" on September 2, 1991. The EC member-states recognized Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992 and Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992.

⁷In strategic studies literature, reference to these four issues is considered as empirically useful. See -inter alia- Paul M. Kennedy, "Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition" in Idem, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 1-7.
was a failure as regards diplomacy and external legitimization. Specifically, these failures can be defined in two ways: the lack of long term objectives on the part of the successive Greek governments as well as the domination of the latter short-term considerations over Greece’s strategic interests.

Lack of Long-term Objectives

Greece had not developed a Balkan strategy with the ending of the Cold War. Yugoslav irredentism in Tito’s “Macedonia” had not been a focus of Greek foreign policy or public concern for over forty years, yet with Yugoslavia’s dissolution, that same “Macedonia” suddenly became the center of Greece’s political and diplomatic concern. It was not by chance that such an emotionally loaded issue became the cornerstone of Greek foreign policy. Greek public opinion was mobilized by the politicians so successfully that the same politicians were forced into a position where they were unable to compromise when it was in Greece’s long term interests to do so. Foreign policy was therefore trapped in a situation whereby any attempt to end the stalemate by negotiations would have led to public condemnation and anathema. The vicious circle that subsequently evolved, developed into a process whereby each party tried to outbid the other in its patriotism. Indeed, “how could Greeks be convinced to accept compromise over a “right”, which is, by definition, absolute?”

Thus the Skopjization of Greek foreign policy had at least two negative implications for the development of a grand strategy. First, it undermined the role of Greece as a potential agent of positive influence and stability in the turbulent Balkan region. For the US and the EU this role was best suited to EU member state, Greece. Instead of seizing the opportunity, the Greek leadership openly rejected this role, choosing to be part of the Balkan problem and not part of the solution. Thereby identifying herself as an unstable, underdeveloped and immature Balkan state Greece failed to productively link its foreign policy objectives to prevailing international trends, such as playing a role in the policy of “democratic enlargement” in the Balkans as promoted by the US.

Secondly, Greece’s actions alienated her from Europe and diminished her position in the eyes of her allies. Following the Lisbon resolution, Greece’s Balkan strategy should have sought a decent compromise with the ultimate aim of uprooting FYROM’s irredentism, with or without economic and political tutelage of the neighboring state. Fortunately, it is worth mentioning that extreme policies, such as the break-up or dismemberment of FYROM which have at times proposed by a number of morbid analysts were eventually not adopted. However, the obstructive policy adopted over the issue of the name resulted in a waste of a great deal of time and diplomatic capital for Greece. More important than Greece’s “right to monopolize” the term “Macedonia” was the allies’ convincing argument that it was this very name that was the root of the problem.

64% of those polled in 1992 supported the embargo placed on Skopje, those polled in 1994 who agreed had fallen to 28.1%. For specifics on the 1994 poll by MRB see Yiannis Loulis “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: 1994 as a turning” in Yearbook of Defense and Foreign Policy 1995, (Athens, ELIAMEP, 1995), pp. 121-139.


term which kept the various diverse groups within this new state together. Without the unifying factor of the name, these groups would ultimately weaken their link to each other, leading to a state of internal anarchy, thus further destabilizing the Balkan region.

"Low politics" is "high politics." The Domination of Short-term Considerations over Strategic Interests

We have shown how there was a lack of long term objectives by Greek governments on the issue of the future role to be played in the region at the end of the cold war. This resulted in the "Skopjesization" of Greek foreign policy and the monopolization of the political agenda for short-term considerations. Contradictions in the exercise of Greek foreign policy, further reinforce this point.

1992 seemed to be the apex of the simultaneous exercise of differing political approaches. The Greek Prime Minister realized that insisting on the policy of non-negotiation was futile, he therefore attempted to change his Foreign Minister’s position, who insisted on not negotiating directly with FYROM. It was, in fact, the same Foreign Minister who brought to light the existence of two opposing views in the same government.17 The Prime Minister neither dismissed the opposing views of the Foreign Minister, nor adopted his maximalist views. Instead, he tried to make it clear to his counterparts outside Greece, that his main concerns were the two clauses of the 17 February Lisbon resolution (i.e. modification of FYROM’s constitution and renunciation of its irredentist claims) avoiding the third clause regarding the issue of the name. The Foreign Minister was eventually ousted two months later, immediately after a meeting of party leaders which was chaired by the President of the Republic, with the Prime Minister taking over the Foreign Ministry portfolio.

It was a government spokesman who now argued that the government had ceased to waiver between two policies. Greek Foreign policy had made a complete volte-face. The until now continuous postponements cease to be considered to be in Greece’s interest, as the possible recognition of FYROM under the name “Macedonia” was considered to be destabilizing for the Balkans. The new government policy followed the rationale of its EU and US allies, that as long as the

matter remained unresolved, it would lead to further regional destabilization. Consequently, the government started to work towards a rapid settlement of the dispute.18 Specifically, the Prime Minister allowed two “non-papers” to be leaked to the press. In the first, the stalemate generated by the governments policies is negatively analyzed, in view of the forthcoming recognition of FYROM by the EU and US, while in the second the idea of the “double name” is promoted so as to prepare the ground for it acceptance by the Greek electorate.19

In June of the same year Greece rejoices at the EU summit decision in Lisbon, whereby the recognition of FYROM is dependent on their coming to an agreement with Greece on the issue of the name (i.e. that the term “Macedonia” or its derivatives are not used). Accordingly, the Greek Prime Minister issued a cryptic statement to the press: "... we shall see to it that this state (FYROM) be recognized by all states, and in the United Nations and all other international organizations, go under a name which will not compromise the word "Macedonia." It goes without saying that within the neighboring state itself, they may use, as they already do, whatever name they like.” This statement further emphasizes the contradiction in the acceptance of the use of the term “Macedonia.”

18The Prime Minister (and now Foreign Minister), Constantine Mitsotakis publicizes the government’s new policy at every available opportunity. During his official visit to Portugal on 20 April, he announces that “... it is not the intent of the Greek government to gain time but to resolve the matter as soon as possible. For time does not necessarily work in favor of Greece, or for stability in the area.” Roughly two months later during an official visit to Luxembourg to participate in the EU foreign minister’s summit, he reiterates the governments position: “The Greek government’s position remains firm, as you know it, I have declared it from the first day I took over the position of Foreign Minister, we do not wish to neither avoid the problem, nor to gain time. Time works for no-one. It works against everyone ...” See Macedonia, More Than a Name ..., (Athens: General Secretariat of Press and Information, 1992), pp. 9-10, 22-23.

19The former Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras, presented to the Parliamentary Group of the New Democracy Party a series of papers where it is evident that the Greek government attempted on three occasions to discuss the issue of the “double name” via letters sent to Great Britain (Virginia Tsouderou), the US (Ambassador Zaharakis), and the EU (Deputy Foreign Minister Tzounis). According to these letters, Greece would have accepted the use of a “double name” by FYROM. See Ethnikos Kyryx, 22 October 1992.

In May 1993 the issue of the name came before the UN, after FYROM’s unsuccessful efforts to gain recognition from the EU. During these negotiations the issue was almost resolved, with Skopje yielding to demands regarding borders, symbols and its constitution.\(^{20}\) However, the negotiating parties failed to reach a final agreement because of the political price the Greek government would have to pay in view of the opposition hard patriotic line in the pre-election period and, more importantly because of internal opposition within the New Democracy party, which had come to power with an extremely slim majority. As a result no settlement was achieved and the question shelved.

The election of PASOK did not result in a deviation from the contradictory policy based on short-term considerations that was followed by New Democracy.\(^{21}\) Indeed so, PASOK initially withdrew from UN sponsored negotiations (November 1993), then, in order to satisfy public feeling, decided to impose an economic embargo on FYROM, then rejoined UN negotiations in June 1994 and finally, with US mediation concluded an interim agreement with FYROM in September 1995. The Interim Agreement referred only to the so-called small package deal (i.e. it provided for a lifting of the embargo on the part of

\(^{20}\)According to Michalis Papaconstantinou, the Foreign Minister at the time, and chief negotiator, the negotiations had led to a mutually agreed document consisting of 25 articles. See his interview with the Hellenic-American Community radio program “Cosmos FM” as recorded in the Greek Consulate in New York’s report to the General Secretariat of Press and Information, (16 January 1994). For more information on the negotiations between Greece and FYROM, see Papaconstantinou’s book, The Diary of a Politician, pp. 380-416.

\(^{21}\)As Professor Dimitri Contas comments “... for as long as the New Democracy government was dealing with the problem, their marginal majority and internal friction forced it to vacillate between what was desirable and what was practicable in terms of party politics. PASOK in need of both a Balkan and European policy, tried to tone down the hard line it had held while in opposition, without however, damaging its patriotic reputation as the party which fights for the country’s national interest, as in the imposition of the economic embargo on FYROM during Greece’s presidency of the European Union. See Dimitris Constas’ introduction in Marilena Koppa, A Fragile Democracy: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between the Past and Present, (Athens: Papazisis, Institute of International Relations, 1994) pp. 9-19.

Greece, change of the flag and a statement by FYROM’s government on its constitution), while the issue of the name of the new state remained unresolved.

A realistic assessment of the period is that all Greek government’s were to blame to a greater or lesser extent; those who tried to outdo each other in untimely patriotism, choosing to postpone difficult decisions, and those who feared taking initiatives.

**The Motherland’s Policy Towards its Diaspora**

The shortcomings of a State’s grand strategy undoubtedly negatively affects the effectiveness of the diaspora in promoting the motherland’s interests in the host country. It seems that, as far as the Macedonian issue is concerned, the Greek government’s policies vis-a-vis the Hellenic-American Community, are characterized by the following:

**Paternalism**

The element of paternalism appears to be a characteristic in relations developed in a motherland’s policy towards its diaspora. As far as Greece is concerned, not only is paternalism not questioned but is seen as an integral part of its policy towards the diaspora. Professor Stavrou has repeatedly stressed that the issue of paternalism appears, either implicitly or explicitly in the relationship between the “national center”\(^{22}\) and its diaspora. As he aptly points out, “… for the past thirty years, what has been presented as policy has suffered from lack of focus and paternalism. Post-war Greek policies towards American Hellenism can hardly be defined as ‘policies,’ but emotionally laden improvisations ... driven by old-fashioned partisan politics. … Decrees, statements and initiatives (on the part of Greece) thus far, seem oblivious to the uniqueness of this group, and ignore its potential.”\(^{23}\)

Expressions of a motherland’s paternalism towards its diaspora are many: The Greek government’s tendency to consider relations with the Greek-American community on the lines of party politics; main-
tenance and strengthening of the motherland’s ties with “traditional organizations” within the community (such as the Church, AHEPA, etc); the isolation and the consequent marginalization by Greece of social groups, such as academics, successful businessmen, managers etc., who express independent views and react against client relationships.\(^{24}\)

**From Indifference to Great Interest**

It is interesting to note the relative indifference, on the one hand, Greece normally displays towards the Hellenic-American community (understandable given both the friendly “environment” provided by the host country and the tradition of excellent relations between the host country and home country) while, on the other, its disproportionate (verbal) interest in the diaspora during periods of national concern. It is then when the diaspora is chosen by the national center to emerge as a factor of critical importance as far as the promotion of the motherland’s interests are concerned.

The Macedonian issue is a case in point where the diaspora was required to play a critical role by achieving by itself its motherland’s short-term objectives. Greece realized that the Hellenic-American community, given its good record in keeping the issues of Cyprus and the Turkish threat on the US agenda, should play a prominent role in promoting its objectives. The next step was to mobilize the community effectively. Threat, (a determinant of successful mobilization of any diaspora) acquires meaning easily, as history comes to the fore again for thousands of Greek-Americans who had experience of territorial claims and conflicts over control of the region during the German occupation, the Greek Civil War and the creation of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by Tito before they left Greece en masse and moved to the new world seeking hope, work and a new life.

Indeed, conditions (i.e. the existence of issues of national importance and a sense of threat),\(^{25}\) were ideal for the diaspora’s mobiliza-

tion.\(^{26}\) Thus, the Hellenic-American Community managed to overcome inherent and long lasting shortcomings related to organization, geographic, parochial and partisan fragmentation, introversion as well as an indifference to the motherland’s domestic concerns.\(^{27}\) It thus succeeded in organizing vast and impassioned rallies, culminating in a rally outside the White House in Washington, on 31 May 1992, indicating unprecedented harmony and united efforts for the “common goal.” However, the effective mobilization of the Hellenic-American community could not “make any difference”, since it did not constitute an integral part of an overall strategic plan on the part of the home country, namely Greece.

**The “follow your motherland’s policy” syndrome**

At this point, it should be emphasized that the Macedonian question was not new to the Greek-Americans in the US. However, the Greek lobby remained loyal to the policy of the Greek governments throughout the Cold War era,\(^{28}\) a policy of passivity in order not to affect Greece’s relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia. The Greek-American diaspora thus failed to influence Greek foreign policy (reverse influence phenomenon)\(^{29}\) during the Cold War, despite the fact that propaganda on behalf of Skopje was responsible for the confrontation between Greek-Americans and the small and comparatively weak

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\(^{24}\)bid, p. 85

\(^{25}\)For the conditions to be fulfilled for the effective mobilization of the diaspora (i.e. a) issues to be perceived as “truly national” and b) the existence of a great threat), see Marios L. Eviropias, “Mobilizing the Greek Diaspora: The Role of Athens and Nicosia, *Discussion paper No. 94-08*, (Athens: Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, 1994), pp. 1-2.

\(^{26}\)Panos Kazakos, *Greek Diaspora and National Issues*, p. 117.


\(^{28}\)Interview with A. Pyzas (President of the Center of Macedonians Abroad), September 1997 and George Hatzidakis (Former President of National Union of Greek Australian Students, Perth), December 1995. Both interviewees have pointed out to the author that deviation of the Hellenic Community (especially in Australia) from the national center’s official policy, at times, resulted in obstacles being placed in bureaucratic matters.

\(^{29}\)In the past, the Hellenic-American community had succeeded in influencing the foreign policy of the national center. See for instance the case of the opposition of the Hellenic-American community’s opposition to the Papandreou governments strident anti-Americanism, especially prior to 1987, and controlling any radical actions during the critical period following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, etc. For these remarks, see Van Couffoudakis, “The Greek-American Lobby and Its Influence on Greek Foreign Policy, 1974-1989,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 2:4 (Fall 1991), pp. 70-82.
Slavo-Macedonian diaspora.\textsuperscript{30}

With the emergence of the Macedonian question following the end of the Cold War, the Greek-American community has been caught up once more in the policy of the motherland. What is worse, however, it has adopted the tough language imposed by the “national center” for domestic consumption, as well as slogans such as “Macedonia is one and belongs to Greece,” which in former foreign minister Papaconstantinou’s words, were not carefully thought out. In other words, the Greek diaspora in the US has closely followed Greek governments’ instructions which lacked specific long-term goals concerning the issue of Balkan stability (of which the Macedonian question was a part.) The national center in turn has downgraded the diaspora to the level of tactical support of “self-evident national rights.” Moreover, according to the reasoning and practice of the “national center,” it is the diaspora’s duty to become active in order to promote these rights.

The approach adopted by the Greek state with regard to its expectations of the Greek community in the US has been somewhat typical. According to a pamphlet issued by the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

... moreover, the Greek-American lobby maintains open communication and information lines with American public opinion and, more importantly, with politicians at all levels of the administration on modern Greek issues in an effort to responsibly and continuously inform politicians in the US of evidence and facts which firmly show who is in the right and who is in the wrong. The necessary preconditions are thus created for a favorable stance and unbiased judgment (sic) by the American foreign policy decision making centers on issues related to Greece and Hellenism.\textsuperscript{31} [emphasis added]

However, this simplistic view is not compatible with the more complex reality of world politics. In fact, each state promotes its national interests which spring from international events and chiefly from the international balance of power and interests. The notion of national rights is an emotional one and applies only to the domestic affairs of a country and not to its foreign relations. As it has been rightly argued, “no state is likely to harm its own national interests for the sake of another state.”\textsuperscript{32} The overall national strategy of a state should therefore be based on the balance of power and the ensuing convergence of national interests.

It is therefore clear that the Greek diaspora in the US was yet another instrument of the national center’s improvisations, reproducing a strategy which not only insisted on a counterproductive and pointless series of arguments on Greece’s national rights, but which at the same time, chose to focus on the elements in which Greece’s interests clashed with those of the US. As a result, Greece was widely regarded, both in the EU and the US, as a destabilizing factor in the Balkans.

Consequently, it would be more effective if the Greek diaspora intervened (both in the Executive and Legislative, in the Republican as well as the Democratic Party) only where there was a convergence of interests between Greece the US and Greece’s partners in the EU. Interests such as the goals of stability and “democratic enlargement” in the unstable Balkans.

\textbf{Signs of divergence: Diaspora’s Shift after the US Recognition of FYROM}

One should note the extremely interesting differentiation between the reasoning of the Greek-American diaspora in the US and the coun-

\textsuperscript{30}Serious problems and conflicts arose in countries where the Slavo-Macedonian diaspora was more numerous, for example in Australia (Melbourne and Perth) and in Canada (Toronto and Ontario Province). See Marilena Koppa, \textit{The Slavomacedonian Diaspora: Origins, Organization and Actions}, (unpublished paper, Institute of International Relations, Athens, 1995). For an “anthropological survey” on the issue see Lorin M. Danforth, \textit{The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World}, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995).


terproductive arguments used (both by the diaspora and the motherland) immediately after the initial shock of the new state’s official recognition by the Clinton administration. This recognition took place on 9 February, 1994, under the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had also been accepted by the United Nations.

Based on the protest letter sent by the American Hellenic Institute President Eugene Rossides to President Clinton, nearly all diaspora organizations departed from — without however entirely abandoning — the arguments they had used until then on Greece’s national rights and sought to base their new arguments on the emerging convergence between American and Greek national interests.

It is interesting to note the references made to “... Greece’s potential stabilizing role in the unstable Balkans, as the most important determinant of democratic enlargement eastwards,” “... with regard to certain new nuclear powers which emerged from the break-up of the former Soviet Union,” “... as well as broader questions touching on American security itself.” This healthy shift of the Greek-American leadership to views which were more realistic than the ones dictated by the “national center” and based on “national rights” should of course be appreciated. However, the vital question is still not whether the Greek diaspora can by itself work out a strategy but whether the “national center” is able to develop an overall strategy which will define the community’s ability to contribute, as a political, economic and cultural factor, to the long term Greek objectives.

GREEK GRAND STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE DIASPORA

It has made clear from the above analysis that Greece must cease to regard its diaspora in the US as an extension of itself with the primary role of implementing short-term goals improvised by various Greek governments. Greece must instead incorporate its diaspora into its grand strategy while a number of serious problems must be tackled in the light of the special characteristics and peculiarities of the Hellenic-American community.

More specifically, since demographic analyses of the Greek-American electorate do not support the view that influence is proportionate to numerical strength, the “traditional” (over the last fifteen years), policy on the part of Greece based on quantitative criteria (i.e. support of organizations with many members, the so-called “Astoria Syndrome”) must be re-examined, if not abandoned. Professor Stavrou further reinforces this point by arguing that

the size of the community is not a decisive factor in producing political influence, traditional structures are not the best vehicles by which general Greek policies, vis-a-vis the Hellenic-American community can be applied and an inverse relationship exists between the number of traditional organizations and political involvement.

Moreover, paternalism being exerted on the part of the home country on its diaspora is an issue of great significance as far as Greece’s ability to incorporate them into an overall strategic planning is con-

35 Or even worse, to quote Nikolaos Stavrou “as an extension of administrative structures conceived in absentia.” See Nikolaos A. Stavrou, “The Hellenic-American Community in Foreign Policy Considerations of the Motherland” in D. Constanas and A. Plati, Diasporas in World Politics, p.82. 36 The “traditional/old” (or according to Kazakos the “Greek-Orthodox”) approach refers to the maintenance and strengthening of cultural and spiritual ties of the “national center” with the Greek diaspora in the US.” See Panos Kazakos, “Greek Diaspora and National Issues,” Greek Political Science Review, 3 (April 1994), pp. 104-8. However, after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus this traditional approach has been broadened to include some purely political goals and objectives, see Stavrou, op.cit., p.79.

37 Ibid, p.81. This point is further enhanced by Marios Evriaidis who provides a number of interesting examples as to the insignificance, electorally, of the Greek-American community. See Marios Evriaidis, “The Greek Lobby as a Pressure in US Foreign Policy” in Yearbook 1996. (Athens: Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, Sideris Publ., 1996) p. 264.
cerned. To this end, no group, as Professor Psomiades aptly points out, can be allowed
to become the exclusive defining center of Greekness. The special role that Greece can play must be accepted, but no group should have a monopoly on what is to be done and how it is to be done in what is essentially a political question – who controls, who decides, and who governs… If this happens, the community will suffer intellectual decay, stagnation and ultimately extinction.38

It is worth mentioning, that in terms of, at least verbal policy, certain official representatives of the Greek state did acknowledge that the relationship between Greece and its diaspora should lack elements of paternalism. “It would be a disastrous mistake,” the Secretary General of Greeks Abroad asserted,

should Greek governments determine, from Athens, the form of Greek diaspora organizations. What they should do instead is to respect those chosen by the Greek community. These organizations being community, parishes, brotherhoods, whilst trying, at the same time, to further strengthen them in order that their mobilization and efficiency at a local, national and international level be improved.39

In addition, given that the mass migration flows which have taken place during the 1950s and 1960s from Greece to the United States will not be repeated it seems that the assimilation of Greeks into the host country’s society (“americanization”) will continue and be further reinforced. This new reality will have certain consequences for both Greece and its mobilized diaspora in the US. More specifically, the relationship between a “mature ethnic group” (i.e. the Hellenic-American Community) and its home country (Greece) is expected to change in order that a greater autonomy on the part of the diaspora is achieved. At the same time it is a question of debate whether Greek diaspora “will be able to confront its own government without apologizing for its activism and having to prove its ‘Americanism’.”40

Consequently, it seems obvious that because of this Greek-American Community’s “maturing process” there will be a reconsideration of the terms regarding the relationship between the Hellenic-American community and its home country based on the realization that it is the “Motherland who needs the Greek diaspora in the US and not vice-versa.” Political emancipation of the Greek diaspora is thus, a prerequisite in Greece’s long road to develop a grand strategy, with the diaspora being an integral part of this strategy.

In Search of the Diaspora’s Grand Strategy
The case of the Macedonian issue has highlighted the existence of serious problems in relations between the home-country and its diaspora in the United States. The total lack of long-term objectives on the part of Greece along with the problematic relationship between the “national center” and its diaspora have had very negative consequences for Greece’s foreign policy in general and the efficiency of the Greek-American community in particular. From the perspective of a state’s grand strategy two basic models are suggested:

(a) The model based on the development of radial relationships between the home country and its diaspora. This is a highly centralized model and allows for a domination of the “national center” over the relations to be developed between the home country and its diaspora. It also presupposes a centralized organization form for the diaspora thus, involving the risk of the diaspora’s neutralization. However, this model is usually promoted by the “national center” at times of crisis, where for reasons of national security it is assumed that the diaspora’s role and contribution in its motherland’s grand strategy needs to be supervised and fully controlled.

(b) The model based on the development of relations among the various sections of a specific diaspora as well as relations between the diaspora and the home country. This model places special emphasis on the issue of cooperation among Greek diasporas and is promoted by the “national center” in periods of stability when members of the diaspora do not wish to function under the supervision of a remote central administration.

It is worth pointing out, that a rational, long-term view of the diaspora’s contribution to the development of the motherland’s grand strategy suggests that the “national center” would promote the first model at times of crisis and the second one at times of stability. According to the provisions of the Presidential Decree for the Establishment and Operation of the Council for Greeks Abroad (Συμβούλιο Αποδινου Ελληνισμού) it seems that the “national center” is heading in the right direction, in the sense that the means available for implementing the “Strategy of Hellenism” falls between the two aforementioned models.

In fact, an examination of the two basic institutional bodies responsible for the implementation of the “Strategy of Hellenism,” namely the Parliament of Hellenism and the Council of Greeks Abroad, constitute positive signs by indicating Greece’s willingness to promote intra-diaspora cooperation as well as to facilitate forwarding messages and proposals from various diasporas to the “national center” (i.e. participation in the process of the motherland’s grand strategy) without at the same time depriving the “national center” of the privilege of supervising the contributions of individual diasporas.

The establishment of the Council of Greeks Abroad (SAE) shows that the government wishes for the diaspora to play a continuing role in its grand strategy. What, though, is the nature of its role? The SAE has the hallmarks of a nationally sponsored yet independent organization, that will be allowed to take initiative in promoting Greek policies. However, it lacks the economic wherewithal to independently implement its decisions, an ability possessed by the abolished deputy Ministry of Greeks Abroad. One indeed may ask, to what extent do these seemingly contradictory initiatives auger well for an efficient and productive role for the diaspora in Greece’s grand strategy.

Samuel P. Huntington, “The West Unique, Not Universal”: A Response*

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After his “Clash of Civilizations” (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993) Samuel Huntington is once more in pursuit of a new threat that will replace the Warsaw Pact as a unifying force of the Western world: Latin American and Asian illegal immigrants defying US attempts to keep them out, North Africans, Turks and Orthodox Slavs, violating the borders of Protestant and Catholic Europe. His article is a clarion call for the cultural and political unity of the West which demands control of immigration from non-Western societies and the assimilation of the immigrants who are admitted. Since he considers the market economy a vital element of the civilization he so treasures, Huntington ought to realize that as long as there is demand for youthful laborers willing to do jobs that our declining and aging populations in the West refuse to undertake, the incursion of illegal immigrants will continue, no matter what measures our governments take to prevent the inevitable.

Huntington warns us against sustaining the false hope that the world is becoming increasingly Westernized thanks to the wide circulation of Western consumer goods. We should not be beguiled by appearances and mistake Muslim, Orthodox, or Buddhist youth of having been Westernized simply because they might sport blue jeans and drink Coca-Cola. The essence of Western culture according to Huntington, “is the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac.” We are informed that the classical legacy of Western civilization (Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman Law, Latin and Christianity) was “also” shared