Greece, The European Community, and the Balkans
In An Era of Sovereignty Redistribution

YIОРГОС CHΟULΙΑΡΑΣ

THIS ESSAY FOCUSES ON QUESTIONS INVOLVING GREECE’S
actual position and projected role vis-à-vis the European Community
(EC) and the Balkans in a changing international environment. An examina-
tion of these questions presupposes an understanding of the
challenges to national sovereignty which increasingly represent a defining
feature of world-wide developments during the final decade of the
twentieth century. The position of Greece, a new conceptual framework
within which to rethink issues of sovereignty especially in Europe, and,
finally, Greek-Balkan relations are, therefore, considered in sequence
in what follows.

Membership in the EC is Greece’s fundamental anchor in terms of
its international relations today. As one of the currently twelve members
of the EC for a decade, Greece is a full participant in Western Euro-
pean developments and now firmly supports the further integration of
Europe. If 1992, as the year after which the single European market
is projected to come into effect, is taken as the emblematic date of
Community-wide European unification in economic as well as political
terms, Greece is an unwavering 1992 adherent. At the same time,
Greece’s geographic location in the Balkans and its multiple historical
links—cultural, religious, political, economic, and strategic—before,
during, and after the end of the Cold War to Eastern Europe provide
a direct and even privileged relationship with the less developed part

1 I wish to thank John Iatridides, Harry Psomiades, and Stavros Thomadakis for their
valuable suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper presented at a conference on “Greece
and Eastern Europe” in Montreal in April 1991.
of the European continent.

There is a second date in contemporary European history that is heavily invested with symbolism. This second date is 1989, which is the banner year for the still incomplete, especially as far as the Balkans are concerned, series of more or less peaceful regime changes and transitions away from centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe. Although 1989 chronologically precedes 1992, it is a subsequent date in historically symbolic terms. This is so because the momentous events of 1989 in Eastern Europe erupted within view of a horizon of expectations of further EC economic, but also political integration, abbreviated as the challenge of 1992.

In real as well as symbolic terms, the unification of Germany (through the absorption, essentially, of the eastern part of the now unified country) is a key event in the process of interaction and merging of developments relevant to regions which had been set apart by the Cold War division of Europe. German unification represents a particular fusion of 1992 and of 1989 as dates emblematic of European developments with world-wide repercussions. The significance of these changes remains unquestionable, despite the fact that they were eclipsed temporarily on the front pages of the press by the war in the Middle East.³

¹ The revolutionary events of 1989 were not foreseen by analysts, despite any subsequent claims to the contrary. The failure of the neo-Stalinist model in the Balkans, which appears to follow a more violent trajectory, is even less understood by Western commentators. Notions of Balkan “exceptionalism” are, therefore, to be expected. Greater violence surely indicates greater weakness in the opposition and in civil society institutions in general. It is not, however, an unambiguous indicator of greater interethnic rivalry or “brutality” associated with a lower level of development. Among other things, the more extended longevity of Balkan communist-era regimes may also reflect higher legitimacy as a result of leadership roles in World War II resistance activities. The violence in Romania corresponded to an especially repressive and “demonic” regime which was the recipient of Western support as a result of its foreign-policy divergence from the Soviet and Warsaw Pact mainstream. Significant violence in the future cannot be ruled out, to the extent transitions in countries like Yugoslavia and Albania remain incomplete. (A Yugoslav breakup and civil war were predicted in a C.I.A. “National Intelligence Estimate,” which was described as “unusually firm and sharp” by The New York Times, November 28, 1990.)

² One of the effects of pulling together a coalition (in which German participation was only passive) against Iraq for the purposes of the Gulf war was to block a perceived U.S. tilt toward Germany as the potentially preeminent power in Europe. Achievement of this desirable, from a British perspective, outcome, which appeared to reassert U.S. interest in a “special” Anglo-American relationship, may also have contributed to the eagerness of British participation in the war. Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait indicated that the message of the end of the Cold War had reached him. He provided an internationally isolated and attractive target of opportunity. Punishing his country with the forthcoming acquiescence of the Soviets and the Chinese—did confirm the position of the U.S. as an uncontested military superpower. Lacking a better option, the French presented themselves as active in the conflict, but “with a difference.” It is significant for the analysis here that these configurations did not upset the principal force of continental integration, i.e., French-German collaboration, with Great Britain remaining on the sidelines at least during its early post-Thatcher period. Thus, the French can continue to believe that Germany is controllable through the institutional mechanisms of the EC, while the Germans can continue to believe that their expanding power acquires legitimacy by being channeled through these same conduits. Other EC members, including those that used to be recalcitrant, find advantage in currently pursuing implementation of their objectives as mediated through the EC. (I am drawing from three presentations: “Greece, the European Community, and the Community of Europe,” Vyronis Center Inaugural Conference in Sacramento, California, April 21-22, 1990; “Greece and the New Europe: Culture, Society, and Politics,” Cornell University, March 29, 1991; and “Anglo-American Foreign Policy and the Gulf War,” Dawson College, April 22, 1991.)

³ Current usage in U.S. editorial pages of “Balkanization” and related words as terms of opprobrium rivals examples cited in The Oxford English Dictionary Supplement from British periodicals during the early 1920s.

Against such a background of a changing international order, the region of the Balkans is an instance of the interface of Western European trends and Eastern European developments. The potential significance of this Balkan experience remains underappreciated, to the extent discourse on the Balkans has been “Balkanized”—to highlight what has become a term of abuse in the vocabulary of international relations. It is one of the responsibilities of students of this region to seek to redress this stereotyped view.³

To put it differently, Greek-Balkan relations represent a focal point of interest where “East” and “West” meet in Southeastern Europe, because of Greek membership in the EC and because of a tradition of mutually influential interactions among Balkan states. Greece’s Western orientation and Ospolitik are, therefore, not only of obvious interest to Greece, but also of significance to other Balkan countries, as well as to the pace and substance of international relations, to the extent these relations are affected by developments in a historically sensitive region.

Let me add at this point that what I have described as a Greek Ospolitik, i.e., Greece’s foreign policy toward Balkan and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, has been on clear display since at least 1974, the year when an era of political normalization and stability was ushered in, following the collapse of the military government which had assumed power seven years earlier in a coup on April 21st.

As always, an exclusive focus on Greek affairs runs the risk of distortion, if it is not informed by a view of the overall context of European and international developments. The Greek-Balkan interface of 1992 and 1989 becomes quite elusive and difficult to grasp without a sense not only of the distinctness, but also of the complementarity of these
developments on a pan-European scale.

An apparent generalization is that what has been going on in Western Europe involves a process of integration, while what has been going on in Eastern Europe involves a process of disintegration. (In relation to these trends, “Western Europe” is understood to include Greece, while “Eastern Europe” includes other Balkan states undergoing regime transitions.) Nevertheless, as I have suggested elsewhere, although Western European integration (i.e., 1992) and Eastern European disintegration (i.e., 1989) may be very different phenomena, they are not as disparate as they appear at first sight. Their common ground can be sought at a different level of analysis. In fact, both sets of developments can be understood as fundamental instances of a redefinition of national sovereignty which characterizes late twentieth-century international relations.

To put my argument very succinctly, there is an ongoing international redistribution of sovereignty with developments in both Western and Eastern Europe as distinct, independently generated, yet synchronized instances of this overall phenomenon, which have significant world-wide repercussions. I am suggesting, therefore, that the “new (Western as well as Eastern) Europe,” the “common European home,” the “new European architecture,” or however else we may choose to name this vision is not only a glint in the eye of policy-makers or a wish, whether calculated or utopian, of various pressure groups and citizens in European countries, but a palpable and coherent historical projection, regardless of its undoubted penetration by contradictory interests. What the actual outcome of such a projection may be, however, is clearly another story.

In the next section of the paper certain critical questions are raised about challenges to and shifts or transfers of sovereignty in the European context. Obviously, this can only be a preliminary effort toward constructing a theoretical framework which can make sense of recent changes in their interrelation. Greece, as the only member of the EC in the Balkans, will then be considered briefly, in the final section, as a case study of substantial interest with respect to this interpretation of late-twentieth-century developments in Europe.

---

4 The distinction between, but also complementarity of, Western and Eastern European developments was an explicit premise of my comments on “Diasporas and Foreign Policy: The Case of the United States” at the Panteion University International Conference on “The Greek Diaspora in Foreign Policy” in Athens, May 3-5, 1990. (For a substantive example of the reconstitution of national interests in response to environmental problems, see my review of Peter M. Haas’ Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation in Mediterranean Quarterly, 21 (Winter 1991), 106-10.)
sovereignty and will therefore be considered only as necessary background to this analysis. In this sense, it represents a very decisive variable in the formulation of Greek foreign policy, including Greek relations with other Balkan countries.

I now turn to contemporary, voluntary, and domestically supported types of challenge to sovereignty with reference, firstly, to European Community integration. The most that can be done here is to identify and comment upon a few key developments. One form Community integration takes is analogous to the classical type of federal arrangement. On a large number of issues (e.g., a common external tariff) decision-making authority has been shifting from peripheral nodes of authority (in this case, national capitals) to the center (i.e., the Commission or Brussels as short-hand for institutions of central authority). Sovereignty is redistributed; specifically, it is transferred to the headquarters of a larger territorial unit through a process of federal centralization.

If that were all that was happening, there would be little theoretical interest in Western European integration. But there are at least two other modes of sovereignty-transfer and integration which characterize the evolution of the Community and which do not fit a pattern of federalization. These two modes can be identified as convergence through harmonization and as majoritarian multilateralism.

Harmonization is one of the most important principles of Community regulation. Its sphere of application potentially extends to the entire spectrum of economic as well as social activities which come within the purview of the EC. It can apply to technical standards for products and other commodities, but also to goals of convergence with respect to "social space" (i.e., the whole gamut of labor, welfare, and other such regulation). Harmonization as agreement in advance about rules and regulations provides a framework and orients convergence through competition in commodities, following mutual recognition, by Community members, and coexistence of differing national standards and economic practices. Sovereignty from national economic authorities articulated with a domestic market is dissipated to a single Community-wide market regulated by agreements (on a narrowing range of harmonized targets) between Community and national authorities.

Finally, majoritarian multilateralism is the form of sovereignty redistribution effected through inter-governmental deliberations in which explicit consensus procedures or the veto power of member states have been significantly downgraded or even abolished. Amendments to the Treaty of Rome under discussion adhere to this general pattern on the two most critical issues for Community integration, i.e., economic and monetary union, on one hand, and political union, on the other. Moreover, the complexity of arrangements is augmented by the possibility of exceptions for those who will not or cannot join in or adjust currently to the overall trend, for example, with regard to the European monetary system. Multiple speeds of adjustment, however, do not only imply flexibility; they also carry the seeds of non-integration.

One conclusion from these observations is that the EC is neither becoming a United States of Europe nor is it reverting to a League of Nations of Europe. There is a transfer of sovereignty from member states, which cede effective authority over activities undertaken within or directly affecting their territory, toward incipient as well as explicit Community institutions (including the European Parliament) which do not, nevertheless, add up to a structure of federation. It cannot be said, therefore, that a post-nationalist logic is at work in Western European integration. Sovereignty is not challenged by a rationality which cor-


7 A substantially more detailed analysis is required in order to clarify the sovereignty redistribution within the boundaries of the EC. Things appear especially complicated because "the P word," i.e., "federalism," is both used and avoided for rhetorical or ideological purposes as against a descriptive and analytical usage here. For example, Commission President Delors increasingly appears to use "federalism" as equivalent to a positively-valued process of integration, while a segment of the British press delights in labeling as "federal anything it considers offensive about the Community. Nevertheless, it should be clear that at least a different bureaucratic-political node predominates in each of the three forms of sovereignty redistribution identified in this essay. These three authority nodes are: Brussels or a federal-type, centralized Community bureaucracy (in the case of "federal centralization"); Community-national committees of experts and appointees under the presumed guidance of elected officials ("convergence through harmonization"); and elected national political leaders or the highest representatives of national authorities, meeting in the presence of Commission leaders ("majoritarian multilateralism").

8 Contrary to some press accounts (e.g., The New York Times, April 7, 1991), the formal status of all EC members is secure. The danger confronting Greece, given the weaknesses of its economy, is remaining outside the mainstream of the single European market. A blunder pointing to this effect was issued by the Greek Prime Minister in an address to the Federation of Greek Industries. (Athens News Agency "Daily Bulletin," May 31, 1991) Reversing the situation is the responsibility of Greeks. At the same time, the condition of its weakest members affects the EC as a whole. Structural funds are intended to increase economic convergence among regions. In other words, assistance provided to Greece is not a "favor," but an action resting on the much firmer ground of self-interest of its Community partners.
responds to an “exhaustion” of the nation-state. Instead, Europe is in the process of redefining, in reality as well as in conception, its probably most successful institutional and intellectual export, i.e., the nation-state. As the unit of effective authority and sovereignty, the (nation-) state has patterned inter-national relations and has structured domestic social arrangements in the modern world, including quite significantly post-colonial societies in the contemporary period.

Today’s challenges to sovereignty which characterize Western European integration have been distinguished from traditional, external and, in this sense, involuntary threats, as well as from a post-nationalist and federalist rationality. If we must call it anything, it is a supra-national trend that can be discerned in European Community developments, which is driven by the interaction of economic competition and political calculation of elites and is sustained by generally widespread popular support. In ceding aspects of their sovereignty to collective arrangements which include weaker partners, strong partners expect to retain leadership, while improving their position in a changing international environment against global competitors. At the same time, weaker partners expect to strengthen themselves as members of a powerful collective, in return for negotiating away exclusive and sovereign authority over national territory.

If developments in Western Europe were following a post-national (rather than supra-national) trend, then they would have been in direct opposition to the neointernational trend of developments which characterizes the disintegration of Eastern Europe as a bloc of states directed by regimes under Soviet hegemony. What developments in both, and formerly divided during the Cold War, parts of Europe have in common is a voluntary, domestically supported, though only semi-consciously defined effort toward a real and conceptual redefinition of the role of the nation-state.

While 1992 was intended to have been the end of traditional “Western Europe,” 1989 intervened and put an end to traditional “Eastern Europe.” Nineteen ninety-two has been associated with a rhetoric of building up and a process of integration. Nineteen eighty-nine has been associated with a rhetoric of devolution from domination and a process of breakdown. Given the withdrawal of a Soviet threat to intervene and under external and internal pressure, especially with regard to economic issues, Eastern European regimes collapsed. Pent-up nationalism and economic disparities quite naturally threaten less secure institutions, especially structures of federalism, whether in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.

Eastern European neo-nationalism is an ideology of coherence, solidarity, and opposition, which can easily slide into excesses, particularly with regard to the espousal of minority issues and attendant challenges to territorial integrity under the banner of self-determination. Nevertheless, this neo-nationalist trend in Eastern Europe should not be equated with traditional nationalism. It is infused by a projection of economic improvement which is expected to come about not through isolationism, but through association. This is the striking sound that is heard as Eastern European (including Balkan) countries are knocking at the door of the European Community. The assertion of long-denied national prerogatives and symbols is coupled with willingness to cede sovereignty, especially with respect to economic policy. In fact, Eastern Europe’s eagerness to participate is constrained by the European Community’s calculation that neither itself nor less developed prospective partners are yet ready to engage in more formal types of integration. Significant initiatives, such as the recent inauguration in London of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, must be seen in the context of this priority of “deepening” rather than “widening” the Community.9

To recap this part of the argument: At first sight, Western and Eastern Europe appear to have been moving in exactly opposite directions. While the European Community appears to have undertaken, in anticipation of 1992, significant steps in the direction of federalism in its integration, Eastern Europe since 1989 appears to have followed a process of assertion of national sovereignty verging on disintegration into smaller territorial units. A closer look, however, indicates that Western European integration is not exclusively or even predominantly a process of federal centralization. It is a much more complex phenomenon of supranationalism developing on transfers of sovereign power. Eastern European developments, synchronized with events in the West, have also hinged on transfers of sovereignty. Such transfers initially could only assume a nationalist form, yet specifically a form of neo-nationalism which anticipates further redistributions, leading to reductions of traditional national sovereignty and undertaken on principally economic grounds in response to a changing international order. Events in Europe have been having profound global repercussions. They
play a leading role in defining the late twentieth century as an era of sovereignty redistribution. For the purposes of the next, and final, section of this paper, these events represent an explicit and necessary background to the interface of 1992 and 1989 in Southeastern Europe, i.e., actual and projected relations between Greece and other Balkan states.

**Greece as a European Community Member in the Balkans**

As the only member of the European Community in the Balkans, Greece occupies a privileged position. Involved in orderly and voluntary transfers of sovereignty in favor of EC structures and arrangements, Greece (regardless of what Greeks themselves may think) appears in this context as an island of institutional stability and on a higher level of development in the very rough waters of Eastern Europe, and especially Balkan, changes and disorderly challenges to sovereignty. But a privileged position does not of itself guarantee positive outcomes, without prescience and successful implementation in the pursuit of national interests. The question, therefore, is what has Greece been doing and what can it do vis-à-vis its Balkan neighbors, in light of the European developments referred to earlier. No matter how briefly, two interlinked themes must be addressed in this respect: firstly, Greek attitudes toward the Balkans, and, secondly, Greek policy initiatives.

An understandable ambiguity pervades Greek attitudes toward the Balkans. There is no doubt that the singular importance of the Balkans for Greece is well appreciated. Given the country's location, Greece's most significant interactions during the formative early decades of the twentieth century took place in the Balkan peninsula. The very shape of the country was defined through the Balkan wars and follow-up conflicts. The importance of the Balkans in Greek affairs remained undiminished in the interwar period, while the years of World War II occupation and, especially, of the civil war, were marked by the role of Balkan neighbors in Greek domestic conflicts. There was, therefore, a strictly Balkan dimension to the Cold War, which was not substantially alleviated before the mid-60s, despite the earlier assumption of nonaligned status (and even short-lived participation in a three-way alliance with Greece and Turkey) by Yugoslavia. It was during the 1960s that relations with Bulgaria and maverick Romania began to improve, following the crisis in Greek-Turkish relations on account of Cyprus and the attendant pogrom against the Greek minority in Turkey. An improvement in relations with Albania did not come about until much later, during the years of the military dictatorship, which pursued a Balkan detente under the guidance of Foreign Minister Pipinelis and in an effort to counterbalance its isolation from Western European democratic regimes.

The restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 is linked to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the consolidation of a Turkish threat against Greece. A Greek Ostpolitik (which presumes the denial of a threat “from the north”) can be firmly dated as of 1974, with Karamanlis as its architect in a series of related actions, including the initiatives leading to Greek membership in the EC, a redefinition of relations with NATO and the U.S. and, domestically, the legalization of the Communist Party. It is significant that a Greek foreign policy consensus toward the Balkans preceded by many years the emergence of a consensus in Greece, since the mid-80s, on its role in the EC. Greek-Balkan relations and, especially, an Athens-Sofia strategic axis which counterbalancing a commonly perceived Turkish threat, were strengthened during the Papandreou administrations. Finally, under the current Mitsotakis government, there is a very activist Greek foreign policy toward the Balkans and Eastern Europe, which seeks to deal with problems and build on opportunities. Relations with Bulgaria retain their significance, while relevant exchanges include visits to Athens in the spring of 1991 by the Soviet Foreign Minister.11

Even this schematic overview (which does not go into the particulars

---

10 Many Greeks view pessimistically the real conditions and prospects of the country. This reflects and prolongs the current economic and cultural crisis. By emphasizing missed opportunities, Greeks appear unwilling to compare their lot to the much worse conditions confronting their neighbors. There is also an overcompensating minority view which tends to the grandiose. It is unrealistic to imagine that Greece has special qualifications for Balkan initiatives, which more powerful regional neighbors, like Italy or Austria, somehow do not have. Yet, to describe Greece's position as "privileged" represents the fact that it is the only country in the Balkans which is an EC member. It may clarify matters to reverse this proposition: the only member or "component" of the EC that is geographically located in that region is Greece. In other words, while Greece seeks to achieve its objectives through the EC, there are other EC integration objectives which are to be achieved through Greece, given its location and a Community-wide "divinities of labor." Even the fact of a history of conflicts among Balkan peoples is not the kind of thing to be, when considering that it is precisely those involved in such...
of formal bilateral and multilateral Balkan exchanges, often undertaken on the initiative of Athens) can leave no doubt about the penetrating and sustained Greek interest in the region. Yet—and this is what fuels the ambiguity repeatedly throughout the modern era—recognition by Greeks of the singular significance of the Balkans is countered by what can only be described as Greece’s great reluctance toward its geographic location and partners, as well as antagonists, in the Balkan peninsula. The trauma of the civil war, sustained as it was by domestic and foreign rhetoric, from all sides, for a long time after the end of the hostilities, cannot by itself fully account for this Greek attitude. Its sources must be sought in deeper cultural and social roots and the negative view of the Balkans by a Europe toward which Greeks have often exhibited an aggressively defensive cultural reaction. It is in this sphere that the historical formation of psychological attitudes must be studied, instead of their being considered as inescapable attributes of ethnic groups which have had a tradition of conflicts. In fact, this latter stereotype emanates from an attitude of superiority toward peoples in the Balkans, including Greeks, who are seen as atavistic and primitive.

Greek ambiguity toward the Balkans has important foreign policy implications. It makes it difficult for policy makers to set correct priorities, starting with their backyard, so to speak. Resources, therefore, are not distributed rationally. In this connection, it would be instructive to have a study of the relative distribution of Greek resources, staffing decisions, and orientation of personnel-training with respect to the country’s Balkan neighbors. There are also difficulties in terms of securing the level of public attention and support required for various initiatives. As in all societies, there is a perennial danger of shifting impulses between isolationism and interventionism. However, deepening mutuality of interests is the only secure basis of good neighborly relations. The strengthening of the mutual interests of Greece and of other Balkan countries in improving their relations must be an actively pursued goal.

In light of the discussion in the preceding section, these various points advanced here can be grouped together as follows: It must be realized more widely and more sufficiently that Greek-Balkan relations are not simply of obvious interest to the parties concerned, and therefore somehow parochial in European terms, but a substantial instance of the cross-interactions between European Community members and Eastern European societies. There can be no European-wide common home without constructing a new Europe in the Balkans as well. The long-term Greek strategic interest in a stable and developed Balkans is an interest which even those who may not share it now can come around to in the future. According to the redistribution of sovereignty analysis sketched in this essay, a critical principle in contemporary international relations is the pursuit by political means of objectives of far-reaching economic cooperation. This principle cannot easily be applied to the situation in the Balkans, not only because of more narrowly political difficulties, but also because 1992 and 1989 remain incomplete in the region, to the extent the Greek economy is in crisis, on the one hand, while Balkan transitions are still unfolding, on the other. Nonetheless, without political facilitation of economic and attendant social and cultural relations, which will, in turn, reduce political frictions, cooperation will remain an elusive goal.

It is not my intention to pretend to offer an elaborate projection for Greek-Balkan relations, which in any case will evolve on the basis of perceived opportunities and shocks of adjustment. Given this practical character of politics, my purpose has been to suggest, instead, a comparative framework within which it may become easier to seek coherence between apparently conflicting objectives. A few examples will therefore be given to bring this argument to practical conclusion. In other words, they are examples of the types of initiatives to be pursued in the Balkan context of East and West coming closer together in an attempt to replace traditional threats to national sovereignty with responses appropriate to an era of redistribution of sovereignty. Such initiatives include:

(1) The encouragement of investments and joint ventures (in manifold portfolio combinations) and of exchanges of products and services with Balkan countries by the Greek private sector and Greek diaspora entrepreneurs. This can only have a stabilizing influence and represents a particular priority for areas where the Greek minority in Albania will continue to live. Recently extended, by Greece to Balkan neighbors, lines of credit must be strongly welcomed. In certain sectors, for example tourism, there is significant Greek know-how. A long-term rather than short and narrow view of competition is necessary in this respect.

(2) Public-private inter-Balkan undertakings are necessary in relation especially to infrastructural projects and the environmentally sound utilization of natural resources. Transportation is of strategic interest to Greece, as the country is insufficiently linked with other Community

---


11 On Greek responses to Europe and, more broadly, Greek “cultural dualism,” see my “Greek Culture in the New Europe,” forthcoming in the volume of papers from the conference on “Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order” at The City University of New York (May 30, 31, and June 1, 1991).
members and, in general, European markets. Moreover, the sound of moving trucks over a modern highway may, for example, drown Skopje propaganda on the so-called "Macedonian question" more effectively than other methods. This, however, also presupposes the existence of alternate transportation routes, a fact which discourages the temptation to block any single one of them.

3. A high priority should be to restore the economic links between Thessaloniki and the Balkans, which were severed by the Cold War. Given the current structure of trade, for any initiative to be successful it must be undertaken in conjunction with Greece's European Community partners. (More generally, a Greek policy toward Balkan states is only one component of any Greek policy toward Balkan states. Another significant component is the Greek contribution to the formulation of an EC policy toward the Balkans.) Possibilities to consider include a bank for Balkan development, headquartered in Thessaloniki, or other financial, economic research, and knowledge-transfer institutions (including chambers of commerce), which can fulfill a similar function.

4. As the intellectual center of Macedonia and given its multifaceted institutions of learning, Thessaloniki is well-positioned to serve as a "cultural capital" of Balkan cooperation in terms of scientific, scholarly, artistic, religious, political, technical, and all other related activities, including exchanges in the area of mass media.

In the context of the overall analysis, these examples illustrate the fact that stability in the Balkans cannot be achieved simply by countering instability. Positive projections of especially economic, but also cultural, cooperation must be provided. In an era of sovereignty redistribution, it should be obvious that the calculated concessions of sovereign authority required for cooperation promise to deliver substantially multiplied mutual advantages. And the real test comes with the orderly implementation of conceptually sound initiatives. It is, of course, too early to know how other critical developments, especially in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, will impinge upon European and more particularly Balkan trends of cooperation. Nevertheless, in the best or in the worst circumstances, Greece's membership in the E.C. and location in the Balkans make it a privileged activist partner in the development of the region to the benefit of all those concerned.

There is a final point to be made. Paradoxically enough, in economic, political, as well as cultural terms, the truest future measure of Greece's European orientation may yet prove to be the extent of its involvement in the Balkans. If Greeks are to insist indignantly that they are "European," then they will remain prisoners of their "Balkan" roots and attendant ambiguity. If, on the contrary, Greeks are to claim

and highlight their place in the Balkans, then they will confirm their position and role in Europe. To be "European" is "Balkan"; to be Balkan is to be European.

1992 POSTSCRIPT

International developments since this paper was written have increased the usefulness of a sovereignty-redistribution type of analysis. It is indicative in this respect that, in an article just published in Foreign Affairs, the Secretary General of the United Nations stated firmly: "A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty..."14 In the European context, the impact of questions of sovereignty can be observed in the tortuous Maastricht phase of European integration, as well as in the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

During this time, a priority of Greek foreign policy has been to counter the demand of Skopje authorities to be recognized under the name "Macedonia." National security arguments have been more effective than cultural or historical ones in preventing so far an undesirable outcome for Greece. Future developments will test, among other things, EC solidarity and Greek-American relations. An examination of the issues involved, however, must wait for another paper.