

Cyprus, British Colonialism and the Seeds of Partition: From Coexistence to Communal Strife

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A look at the pre-1974 demographic map of Cyprus along ethno-religious lines, Christian Greek and Muslim Turk, shows a mosaic-like landscape, one resembling a colorful quilt extending all over the island. Indeed, the two groups lived in proximity and were interspersed throughout the island. By definition partitions are topo-centric as they usually revolve around the movement of populations from one territorial space to another. As a rule, with rare exception, this population movement is the result of the use of force. The purpose of this paper is to examine the process, the diplomacy and the dynamics on the ground that can become catalysts for partition, looking at Cyprus as a case study or a *sui generis* study rather, considering that before the Turkish invasion, occupation and de facto partition of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, the island's demographic landscape resembled an ethno-religious mosaic.

The context is the British colonial rule in Cyprus that lasted 82 years, from 1878 to 1960. Preceding Britain's arrival, Cyprus was ruled by the Ottoman Turks for three centuries, 1571 to 1878. Ottoman rule was an Islamic rule par excellence. Like the rest of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus was ruled under the millet system whereby the *ahl-al-kitab*, people of the book, Christians and Jews, were recognized as religious communities with their religious leaders representing them before the Sultan. Thus, during the three centuries of Ottoman rule, religion defined and regulated relations between the two groups, the Muslim Turks, the rulers, and the Greek Orthodox Christians, the subjects known as *rayas*, with the Greek Orthodox Church becoming their dominant institution, not only in the religious domain but in the social and political spheres as well.

The population proportion in Cyprus, the Christian Greek- Muslim Turkish ratio, was stable throughout the 20th century. Despite minor fluctuations, Greeks constituted about 80% and Turks about 18% of the island's population. The population ratio remained steady throughout British rule, 1878-1959.¹ This ratio cannot be disputed because it is based on British colonial censuses. For instance, according to the British census of 1946, out of a population total of 450,114, the Greek population was 361,199 (80.2%) and the Turkish population was 80,548 (17.9%). (The rest, 2.1%, represented Armenians, Maronites and "Others.")² Considering that in 1946, the island's population was overwhelmingly rural, the spatial distribution of villages acquires added significance since urban centers and their residents represented a rather small proportion of the population. Moreover, towns had distinct rural characteristics. Specifically, in 1946, there were five peasants to one urban dweller. Out of a population total of 450,114, less than a quarter, 96,969 or 21.5% were living in cities. On the other hand, the overwhelming

majority of the population, 353,145, or 79.5% lived in villages.³ The capital, Nicosia, representing the largest urban center of the island, had a population of merely 35,000, this, in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁴

Taking into account the predominantly rural character of Cyprus, according to the 1946 census, the total number of villages was 627. Eighty-eight years earlier, in 1858, and as the Ottoman era was coming to a close, the number of villages was about the same, totaling 605. In 1946, out of a total of 627 villages, 369 villages, or 58.8%, were inhabited exclusively by Greeks. There were 146 (23.2%) villages with mixed population. One hundred-twelve (112) villages (17.8%) had exclusively Turkish population.⁵ The size of villages was characterized by smallness. Sixty-one percent of Greek villages had a population under 500. Turkish villages tended to be even smaller. Eighty one percent or 91 out of 112 Turkish villages had a population under 250.

Peaceful Coexistence

Throughout British rule and up until 1955, peaceful relations between Christian Greeks and Muslim Turks characterized life in mixed villages and towns throughout the island. Turks living in mixed villages and towns, even those that had an overwhelmingly Greek majority, did not feel threatened. The same held true for Greeks living in mixed villages with an overwhelming Turkish majority. As a rule, Christians and Muslims lived in separate quarters in villages, towns and cities for that matter.⁶ This was a result of the Christian-Muslim dichotomy that was brought about by Ottoman Islamic rule, one based on the millet system and the social segregation of Muslims on the one hand and the “non-believers,” Christians and Jews on the other.⁷ However, in mixed villages, given their smallness, Christians and Muslims lived in separate quarters but in close proximity and in a village of 250 people, everybody knew everybody. In some towns, while there was a separate Greek and Turkish quarter, this separation was mitigated by the fact of the close proximity of Greek and Turkish homes. For instance, in the little port town of Kyrenia, in the mixed Greek-Turkish neighborhood known as *Ano* (Upper) Kyrenia, Greek homes were in one side of the street and Turkish ones on the other side while the church and the mosque were in close proximity.

Overwhelmingly, the historiography of modern Cyprus describes ethnic relations, from 1878 up until to 1955, as “peaceful coexistence.” Conceptually, “peaceful coexistence” refers to groups of different ethnic, religious or racial background, living side by side and in conditions where absence of violence is the norm while violence is the exception. In such an environment, the degree of cooperation between the groups varies. Under this definition, the Christian Greeks and the Muslim Turks of Cyprus lived in conditions of peaceful coexistence, cooperating in a variety of areas.⁸ This was a rather delicate state of affairs, however, because a major factor contributing to maintaining this

peaceful coexistence was the overpowering legal, administrative and political control of the British authorities on the one hand, and the relative religious tolerance that prevailed between the Christian Greeks and the Muslim Turks on the other. It would be more accurate to describe this condition in Cyprus as Christian-Muslim symbiosis since, in the longer term, religion was central to the social life of both groups.

While peaceful coexistence between the Christian Greek majority and the Muslim Turkish minority has prevailed from the commencement of British rule onward and for about three quarters of a century, this coexistence was characterized by complexity that can be captured by the term “compartmentalized symbiosis.” This symbiosis was not tantamount to the social integration of the two groups. It was under this condition of compartmentalized symbiosis that Christian Greeks and Muslim Turks in Cyprus coexisted peacefully.

In mixed villages, the significance of religious affiliation for both groups was demonstrated in the residential patterns and the social life as these revolved, to a very great extent, around religious practices, traditions and customs. In mixed villages, towns and cities the two groups lived in distinct quarters. But this did not mean that members of the two groups did not interact. Quite the opposite was true, especially since the British abolished the legal segregation of the two groups prevailing under the Ottomans. This was brought about by the introduction of the rule of law, the legal system of equality under British law. The interaction between the two groups, however, was rather complicated. In the case of the Greek Orthodox residents in mixed villages, baptisms, weddings, funerals, name days, and the *panegyri*, the religious festival honoring Virgin Mary or the local saint, dominated the village’s social relations with the church being a central focus of these activities. The village’s agricultural rhythm, planting, harvest and the trading of what the village produced, was interwoven into church rituals and festivities, the *panegyri* especially. For the Muslim Turks of the village, circumcision festivities, weddings, Muslim holidays like the *Kurban Bayram*, dominated social life with the mosque being the focus of such activities. The church and the mosque in the village, often being quite close to each other, became symbols of peaceful coexistence.

The significance of religious identity as the main determinant of communal interaction was evident in the core social institution of the two groups, family and marriage. Christian–Muslim intermarriage was not socially permissible in either community. A love affair between a Greek man and a Turkish woman or the other way around, being a social taboo, would become a theme of Greek Cypriot folk songs, especially when it had tragic ending.⁹ At the same time, in several villages in the Karpasia Peninsula and the Tylliria region, weddings became symbols of coexistence. Christian families would invite Muslim families to the wedding of their children, and Muslims would invite Christian families to the weddings of their children as they shared each other’s joy.¹⁰

While religion set certain social boundaries not to be crossed, there was a parallel Christian-Muslim economic interaction taking place in the village. To a considerable degree, the smallness of villages and the economic requirements of agricultural life necessitated interaction between Christian and Muslim peasants. Peasant cooperatives constituted an economic agency where cooperation between Christian and Muslim farmers was quite evident and mutually beneficial.¹¹ Land cultivation, planting and harvesting and share-cropping dictated considerable amount of cooperation as well.¹² In this respect, class interests formed a horizontal linkage between Greek and Turkish peasants. In cities, class interests between Greek and Turkish workers led to cooperation in labor unions with a significant amount of Turkish Cypriots being members of the Pancyprian Labor Federation.¹³ In the final analysis, there was a significant economic interdependence between Greeks and Turks, yet another manifestation of peaceful coexistence.

In terms of social interaction, in many mixed villages with a Christian majority, there was only one coffee shop, Greek-owned for that matter. Muslim men of the village would visit daily the Greek coffee shop and sip coffee along with the Christian patrons conversing with them in Greek. Up until the time of independence in 1960, 38% of Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek as a second language.¹⁴ Furthermore, the *panegyri*, the religious festival, taking place in monasteries and churches around the island, attracted many Muslim Turks. Some were *Linovamvakoi*, meaning the linen-cotton people, as the Crypto-Christians of Cyprus were called. The term *Linovamvakoi* meant to convey the religious syncretism of the group and the dual loyalty of its members. That is what *Linovamvakoi* means, half-linen and half-cotton, since during the day the members of this group practiced Islam and during the night they practiced the Christian Orthodox faith.¹⁵ The majority of *Linovamvakoi* lived in the Karpasia Peninsula and the Tylliria region especially

At the *panegyria*, the religious festivals, there were also many Muslim peasants who took part in the agricultural trade fare that was integrated into the *panegyri*.¹⁶ Under the umbrella of this religious festival, a most significant economic function took place. In a predominantly agricultural economy as Cyprus has been up until independence in 1960, the trading of agricultural goods, produce and animals was essential for the economy. Consequently, the *panegyri* served a crucial market function in addition to its religious function; therefore it was called *emporopanegyris*, or commercial *panegyri*. Here, at the *panegyri*, one could see the integrated character of Cypriot agricultural economy as Greek and Turkish farmers and animal traders interacted as producers and buyers in an agricultural bazar with the *lingua franca* of trade being Greek.

There were also certain trades and professions practiced widely or exclusively by Turks who also catered to the needs of Greeks. There were Turkish pastry shops in cities, Nicosia especially, patronized mainly by Greeks. Trades that were dominated by Turks included those of the *paplomatas* (quilt makers) and *kallikas* (horse shoe makers). As

winter approached, the Turkish *paploomatas*, would visit his Greek customers in their homes and “turn the cotton” of their quilts and mattresses so they become softer. This took the whole day. The *paploomatas*, who spoke fluent Greek, engaged in friendly conversations with the Greek family. It was also quite common for Turkish food vendors to go around Greek neighborhoods selling their delicacies and feeling quite safe. They would sell their sweets while engaging in friendly conversations in the Greek language with their Greek patrons.

In many villages, and in most towns and smaller cities like Kyrenia and Paphos, up until independence in 1960, the majority of Muslim women, would wear a long black or sometimes grey dress covering the whole body along with a head scarf. A considerable number would cover their face with the veil as well. The Greeks called them *hanoumisses*, from the Turkish *hanoum* (lady). When they ventured out, the *hanoumisses* had their face covered with the *hijab* (veil), that the Greeks called *feretze*.¹⁷ The *hanoumisses* would leave the Turkish quarter and walk through the Greek neighborhood without any fear, in order to visit the homes of Christian families and exchange pleasantries for the holidays. This took place during major Christian holidays, Easter especially. The fact that Muslim Turkish women in Cyprus wore the headscarf and many of them also wore the veil in urban areas up until the 1950s or even later, constituted a clear indication that Muslim customs were still prevailing. While Ataturk’s secular reforms influenced members of the Turkish Cypriot elite in Nicosia, these reforms had limited influence among common people, many living in towns but especially in villages. After all, the great majority of Turkish Cypriots lived in villages. To a very great extent, these Turkish villagers maintained and followed Muslim traditions and customs that dominated their social and cultural life. Western historiography on Cyprus, especially after the Second World War, concentrated on the Turkish Cypriot elite, the bureaucrats and the educated class in Nicosia while it tended to overlook the great majority of Turkish Cypriots who resided in villages and for whom Islam regulated the main aspects of their lives.¹⁸ In the process, phenomena like the wearing of the long black dress and the head scarf, and especially the veil, by Muslim women in Cyprus were overlooked. They were seen as signs of “backwardness” that was contrasted to the “modern” outlook of the Turkish Cypriot elite which embraced Ataturk’s ideology.¹⁹ Apropos, since 2003 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey under the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayipp Erdoğan, the country has been following Islamic-oriented policies. Furthermore, under Erdoğan, the armed forces, which served as the bastion of secularism, have been gradually stripped of their role as the “Guardians of the Constitution and the secular system.” All these demonstrate the rather limited impact of Ataturk’s secular reforms on the Anatolian masses, while it does confirm that these masses never abandoned the Islamic ethos and that Islam remained the epicenter of their social existence. It is no accident that the wives of both Turkish

President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan wear the headscarf as the great majority of women do in the Turkish countryside and as the *hanoumisses* did in Cyprus.

Blocking Self-determination

One might argue that peaceful coexistence in Cyprus had been disturbed primarily because of the introduction to the island of Greek nationalism in the form of *enosis*, the union with Greece, movement, this, following the commencement of British rule in 1878. Then in the 1940s, the ideology of Turkish nationalism influenced the Turkish Cypriot elite. Yet, peaceful coexistence continued even after Greek nationalism and *enosis* became the rallying cry among the Christian Greek population from 1878 onward. The liberal principles Britain represented, gave the Greek population, being the overwhelming majority, a great hope or expectation that England, as it had done with other colonies, would grant Cyprus the right to self-determination leading, in the case of Cyprus, to union with Greece. Subsequently, especially in the 1940s, Turkish nationalism also began affecting the Muslim Turkish community. Yet, peaceful coexistence still prevailed. Overall, the predictability in relations between Greeks and Turks preserved peaceful coexistence while the two groups had no fears about the physical safety of their respective members until the mid-1950s. This is remarkable, considering that there were mixed villages where one group vastly outnumbered the other.²⁰ Through sheer numbers, one group could have overwhelmed the other and through intimidation could force the Turks or the Greeks of mixed villages to leave. When it came to safeguarding security, the colonial power maintained the monopoly of force that could employ whenever it was necessary. In this way, British monopoly of power was combined with the mutual tolerance between the two groups and their economic interdependence to contribute to the preservation of the status quo, and along with it the predictability in relations between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority. Indeed, the British colonial administration prevented *a priori* the Greeks' overwhelming numerical superiority to be translated into political power while the Turkish minority entrusted the British colonial rulers to maintain the status quo. That is precisely what transpired during the October 1931 nationalist rebellion aiming at *enosis*. The majority population, the Greeks, rebelled and burned down the Governor's Mansion. The colonial rulers acted swiftly, put the rebellion down by force and engaged, throughout the 1930s, in severe repression of Cypriot Greek nationalists. The Turkish Cypriot leadership as well as Turkey supported Britain's repressive measures.²¹ Yet, despite strong Greek resentment, there were no inter-communal incidents and peaceful coexistence was preserved.

This lasted until April 1, 1955, when the Cypriot Greek guerrilla organization, EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) commenced its violent anti-British campaign. After that, the essential element of

predictability in relations between Greeks and Turks underwent serious disturbance, the main reason being that from 1955 onward, the Greek population posed the potential of asserting its political rights as a majority. EOKA's anti-British rebellion was consistent with and was influenced by the principle of self-determination and the anti-colonial winds and national liberation movements sweeping the globe, especially Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The rebellions in Kenya against the British, in Algeria against the French and Nasser's revolution in Egypt in 1952, are good examples in this regard. Such revolutionary violence against British and French colonialism became legitimized morally and politically in the eyes of world public opinion. In the United States, Senator John F. Kennedy, who became President in 1960, was a staunch opponent of colonialism and one of the most vocal supporters of the principle of self-determination. On June 6, 1956, while the Algerian revolution against France was ongoing and as the Cypriot rebellion against Britain was raging under EOKA, Senator Kennedy gave a speech in Kansas City, Missouri, in which he criticized colonialism and also declared:

We have permitted the reputation of the United States as a friend of the oppressed people, in short, to be hitched to the chariot of the conqueror, because we have believed we could have it both ways.²²

Kennedy used the term "chariot of the conqueror" to imply the colonial powers of France and Britain. Then on July 2, 1957, Senator Kennedy delivered a seminal speech in the Senate chamber entitled, "Imperialism: The Enemy of Freedom," generally known as the "Algeria speech." In a most eloquent manner, Kennedy denounced colonial rule and defended the rights of peoples to fight for freedom and self-determination.²³ Moreover, on several occasions, including speeches before the Senate, Senator Kennedy expressed openly his support for Cypriot self-determination.²⁴ All these were not seen favorably by British colonialism, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which was subservient to Ankara.²⁵ They all realized that the Greeks' rebellion was leading inexorably to the redistribution of political power according to the principle of majority rule, which was inherent in self-determination. In turn, this could lead to the upsetting of the existing equilibrium guaranteed by British colonial rule. In the Turkish mind, this equilibrium would certainly be disturbed by the long-advocated Greek demand for *enosis*. But it would also be disturbed, and this is of most critical importance, under any political arrangement, including self-government and independence which would allow the Greeks to rule on the basis of majoritarian and democratic principles, in other words if self-determination applied to the island. This was unacceptable to Britain and to the Turkish side for that matter. Already in August 1954, the Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük made it clear that if Britain were to give up Cyprus "it should be handed to Turkey. . . The Turkish youth in Turkey, in fact, has grown up with the idea that as soon Great Britain leaves the island the island will automatically be taken over by the Turks."²⁶ Also

in August 1954, Dr. Küçük sent a telegram to the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in which he declared that the Turkish Cypriot community “vehemently rejects Enosis, self-government or plebiscite.”²⁷ Thus, it was not just *enosis* that the Turkish side had been rejecting. Rather, it was opposing any settlement that would allow the great majority of the population to determine their future. In other words, the UN principle of the self-determination of colonial peoples had to be rejected in the case of Cyprus. This Turkish position was advocated before EOKA started its anti-British campaign. A logical outgrowth of this was that partition offered an alternative in case Turkey did not take over the whole island if and when Britain decided to leave. The intensification of the self-determination and *enosis* campaign by the Greek population under the leadership of the Church and its head, Archbishop Makarios, the Ethnarch, in the early-mid 1950s, elicited the strong reaction of Britain. From 1954 onward, London embarked on a systematic policy of “divide and rule” and encouraged the Turkish minority to turn against the Greeks.²⁸ Simultaneously, Britain prompted Turkey to become more actively involved in the Cyprus dispute. Christopher Hitchens quotes from *Something Ventured*, the memoirs of Christopher Woodhouse, the legendary British army officer who fought with the Greek resistance against the Nazis in Greece and who also served as a British diplomat in the 1950s. Writing about the situation in Cyprus in 1954, Woodhouse commented:

Harold McMillan [then Foreign Secretary] *was urging us to stir up the Turks in order to neutralize Greek agitation*. I wrote a minute in opposition to this tactic. I also asked the Prime Minister’s private secretary if I could see Churchill on the subject, but he absolutely refused to pass on the suggestion, which he clearly regarded as impertinent. I did not think it right to make use of the family connection to see him privately.²⁹ (Emphasis added)

In this way, the British tactic of drawing the “Turkish factor” deeper into the Cyprus dispute as part of its “divide and rule” diplomacy, led to the emergence of an Anglo-Turkish alliance against the Greeks at two levels.³⁰ The first one was on the ground in Cyprus. The second was at the diplomatic level against Greece with the main battleground being the United Nations. At the international level, Britain and Turkey were already allies, first in NATO and later in the Baghdad Pact. This pact was signed on March 30, 1955, as EOKA was about to embark on its anti-British campaign.³¹

Leading the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination was the charismatic Archbishop Makarios, the popular Ethnarch who, since 1951, undertook an international campaign to advance the Cypriot cause as of self-determination and *enosis*.³² If self-determination applied, would have led to the decision of the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot Greek population to unite with Greece. A propos, on January 15, 1950, the Ethnarchy organized a plebiscite that resulted in an overwhelming vote in favor of *enosis*

with 95.7% voting for union with Greece. The British authorities rejected the plebiscite and cast doubt for its results. The Ethnarchy repeatedly challenged the British administration to organize a plebiscite to be supervised by the colonial government and in order to determine what the desire of the Greek population was. Britain refused to do so because by doing so, it would acknowledge the right of Cypriots to self-determination to which was adamantly opposed. In addition, a plebiscite supervised by the colonial government would, in all likelihood, still result in a vote favoring *enosis*.

In the fall of 1954, Makarios had the opportunity to once more present the Cyprus issue as one of self-determination at international fora. He did so from the very center of the United Nations, the UN Headquarters in New York, where deliberations had begun regarding whether the Cyprus issue should be considered as falling under the category of “self-determination of peoples.” These deliberations were the result of Greece’s August 20, 1954 application to the United Nations to place the Cyprus issue on the General Assembly’s agenda. The first step was a debate at the UN General Committee that took place on September 23-24, 1954. The Committee agreed to forward the Cyprus issue to the Political Committee prior to placing it before the General Assembly. A month later, Makarios was on his way to the UN headquarters in New York to support Cyprus’ right to self-determination, something that he kept repeating at all fora.

Throughout October 1954, there were intense deliberations at the United Nations regarding the question of Cyprus’ right to self-determination. British colonialism, through England’s UN delegation, wanted to raise doubts whether the question of Cyprus was an issue of self-determination. According to the British argument, the Cyprus case was not one of self-determination since it involved the ceding of Cyprus to Greece through *enosis*, and this was tantamount to transferring sovereignty from England to another country. England was concerned that the anti-colonial winds blowing around the globe and strongly felt at the United Nations, might lead to a British setback meaning that the Greek draft resolution, calling for the self-determination of Cyprus, would reach the General Assembly for a vote. London found a most valuable ally in its UN diplomacy, Turkey, which sided squarely on the British side. Behind the scenes, Britain had also secured the crucial support of the United States. At the same time, Turkey’s vociferous opposition to the placing of the Cyprus issue as one of self-determination before the General Assembly became a very useful diplomatic weapon for Britain. As British author Robert Holland put it:

Without reliable help from elsewhere, and reluctant to stage a walk-up from the General Assembly, turning Turkish water into fire at the United Nations after September 1954 became not only desirable for Britain, but imperative. This was done in various ways. *‘Discreet patronage’ was afforded a Turkish-Cypriot mission to New York*, extending to ‘touching up’ their propaganda, and taking its

members around foreign Delegations—the whole purpose being to catch up some ground lost to Makarios in recent years.³³ (Emphasis added).

British actions such as this, the use of the “Turkish factor” in the Cyprus dispute, were a sign of things to come on the ground in Cyprus through the “divide and rule” English tactic. Not surprisingly, following the eruption of the EOKA rebellion in April 1955, Britain employed this tactic that resulted in turning Turk against Greek and forced Greeks to retaliate.

Diplomatically, the battleground over the principle of self-determination was being fought was the United Nations. From the outset, Makarios realized the grave danger posed by the British tactic to present the Cyprus cause at the UN as one of Greek aggrandizement instead of being one of self-determination. In this British effort to discredit the Greek position in support of Cypriot self-determination by stipulating that enosis represented “Greek aggrandizement,” Britain found willing ears in India.³⁴ This was quite remarkable considering that India, given its own epic struggle against British colonialism and the fact that it was leading the de-colonization campaign at the United Nations. Yet, India repeatedly opposed self-determination for Cyprus.³⁵ Indeed, when it came to supporting the hallmark of anti-colonialism, the right to self-determination of colonial peoples and when it came to Cyprus, India balked. The architect of India’s UN policy with regard to Cyprus was none other than Krishna Menon, a major figure in India’s independence movement. He was serving as Permanent Representative of the Indian delegation at United Nations. Certainly, Menon had no sympathy for perpetuating British colonial rule over Cyprus. Yet, he opposed the application of the principle of self-determination in the case of Cyprus as it would lead to its union with another state, Greece. Hence, Menon argued, this was a matter of “territorial aggrandizement.”³⁶ This, however, happened to be the position advanced by Great Britain and Turkey as well. The reason behind such Indian thinking was that Menon feared that self-determination for Cyprus resulting in its union with Greece, would open the door for the self-determination of Kashmir.³⁷ The issue of Kashmir touches a raw nerve in India. (The same holds true for Pakistan.)³⁸ In turn, a plebiscite in Kashmir could lead to its detachment from India and its union with Pakistan, considering that about three quarters of the population of Indian-administered Kashmir are Muslims and only one quarter Hindus. Contrary to what one might have thought, Pakistan did not support the cause of self-determination for Cyprus. In fact since its inception in 1947, Pakistan remained one of the closest allies of Turkey, providing Ankara its full diplomatic support when it came to Cyprus. On the other hand, following Cypriot independence in 1960, India and Cyprus became allies in the Non-Aligned movement.

Krishna Menon was a most fierce defender of India’s position that it was the legitimate ruler of Kashmir. Apropos, the longest speech ever made before the UN Security Council was the one delivered by Krishna Menon on January 23, 1957. It

revolved around the question of Kashmir and lasted eight hours in all with its transcript covering one-hundred sixty pages.³⁹ Thus, with Kashmir uppermost on his mind, Menon took a stand against granting self-determination to Cyprus.⁴⁰ On the other hand, adhering to India's anti-colonial credentials, he proposed that instead of self-determination, the UN should support Cypriot independence on the basis of the existence of a distinctly "Cypriot nation."⁴¹ In this way, Cyprus would rid of British colonial rule.

Prima facie, this position by Menon favored the Greeks since it would put an end to British colonial rule. Apropos, the Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff, who was heading the Greek delegation at the UN, did not appear unsympathetic to Menon's proposal for Cypriot independence.⁴² On the other hand, both Britain and Turkey expressed their displeasure with Menon's advocacy of Cypriot independence.⁴³ From an international law point of view, however, Menon's position was inconsistent with the UN Charter regarding the right to the self-determination of peoples. This was so because India was placing pre-conditions to the exercise of this right by the people of Cyprus. Specifically, Menon's position contradicted the UN General Assembly Resolution 742 (VIII) passed on November 23, 1953. According to this Resolution the General Assembly:

6. Considers that the manner in which Territories referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter can become fully self-governing is primarily through independence, although it is recognized that self-government *can also be achieved by association with another State* or group of States if this is done freely and on the basis of absolute equality.⁴⁴ (Emphasis added)

Furthermore, in an Annex, the same Resolution listed the factors indicative of the attainment of independence or other forms of self-government. One of the factors stipulated:

2. *Freedom of choice*: Freedom of choosing on the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples between several possibilities, including independence.⁴⁵

Thus, Menon's position that the principle of self-determination could not be applied to Cyprus because it could lead to the annexation of the island to Greece, the argument of "Greek aggrandizement," was of dubious nature since it was contradicted by the specific provision (6) of Resolution 742 (VII). Indeed, this provision permitted the association or union of a territory such as Cyprus, to "another State," Greece in this case. Then, Menon's argument that Cyprus could not be united with Greece but should become independent instead, was conflicting with another provision of the same Resolution that called for the freedom of choice. Exercising the right to self-determination, it was up to the people of a given territory to be de-colonized to choose freely between several

possibilities. One possibility was independence. Another was to unite with another country. Yet, Krishna Menon's position carried a lot of weight at the United Nations considering India's influence in the overall debate regarding the de-colonization process, as well as Menon's enormous personal prestige in the emerging Third World. Even unintentionally, Krishna Menon's opposition to the right of self-determination for the people of Cyprus violated a cardinal principle of the United Nations, that of self-determination. It was precisely the opposition to self-determination that constituted the pillar of British and Turkish policy vis a vis Cyprus.

The Cyprus Issue and the anti-Greek Pogrom in Turkey

Greek government diplomatic blunders in August 1955, also contributed to elevating Turkey to an important interlocutor in the Cyprus dispute. On June 29, 1955, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden invited Greece and Turkey to take part at a tripartite conference to take place in London on August 29, 1955. The objective of this British-Greek-Turkish conference was to discuss the future of Cyprus, as the Foreign Office put it. But the ulterior motive of Britain in injecting Turkey into the Cyprus imbroglio was to use Ankara as lever to pressure Greece. Archbishop Makarios, the legitimate leader of the overwhelming majority of the people of Cyprus, the Greeks, was not invited even though the London conference was to deal with the future of the island. On his part, Makarios warned the Greek government to reject the invitation to such a tripartite conference since it would legitimize Turkey as a key party to the Cyprus dispute. Still, the Greek government committed a historic blunder and agreed to take part at the conference. While the London conference was ongoing, a pogrom against the Greek community of Istanbul (Constantinople) took place. As it transpired, it was the *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*, meaning Cyprus is Turkish Society, known simply as *Kıbrıs Türktür*, Cyprus is Turkish, which organized the massive anti-Greek riots in Istanbul on September 6, 1955.⁴⁶ The *Kıbrıs Türktür* organization was established on August 24, 1954, with the full blessings of the government of Adnan Menderes. Four days later, on August 28, 1954, the Turkish Prime Minister met the Executive Committee of *Kıbrıs Türktür* that included, Hikmet Bil, the senior leader, and later president of the organization.⁴⁷ The organization also had the support of the opposition Republican People's Party of İsmet İnönü.⁴⁸ The ideology of *Kıbrıs Türktür* derived from Pan-Turkism. It was an irredentist ideology that found supporters among what was known as the *milliyetçis*, or nationalists.⁴⁹ According to Jacob Landau, Cyprus emerged as "one of the pet issues of Pan-Turkists in Turkey since the end of the Second World War."⁵⁰ The objectives of *Kıbrıs Türktür* were to promote Turkish irredentist nationalism with Cyprus serving as its rallying cry. This was reflected in the organization's charter, which stated that its aim was:

... to acquaint world public opinion with the fact that *Cyprus is Turkish*, to defend the rights and privileges of Turks with regard to Cyprus and [do it] from every point of view, and to condition Turkish public opinion.⁵¹ (Emphasis added)

With Cyprus as its banner, Kibris Türktür expanded rapidly throughout Turkey and by early 1955 it was able to establish 50 branches around the country. The Istanbul region alone had 13 branches. In the summer of 1954, Kibris Türktür established a branch in Izmir (Smyrna). Given that Kibris Türktür entertained the support of both the Turkish government and the opposition since the summer of 1954, this meant that Turkish claims over Cyprus had been manifested among official circles through Kibris Türktür even before EOKA started its campaign in April 1955. As it transpired, on July 21, 1955, the Kibris Türktür president, Hikmet Bil, visited Cyprus. He was accompanied by Kamil Önal, the organization's general secretary.⁵² In Nicosia, they met, among others, Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük and helped him organize his political party. In 1945, Dr. Küçük had established the *Kibris Türk Millî Kibris Partisi*, or the Cyprus Turkish National Union Party. By the mid-1950s it became evident that this party needed rejuvenation. Consequently, Dr. Küçük, assisted by the Kibris Türktür organization in Turkey, renamed his party to *Kibris Türktür Partisi*, Cyprus is Turkish Party (CTP). Now, the Kibris Türktür of Turkey had an affiliated organization in Cyprus with an identical name, Dr. Küçük's CTP.⁵³ Charles Foley, a well-known British journalist residing in Cyprus and who published the magazine *The Times of Cyprus*, met Hikmet Bil at a reception at the Turkish Consulate in Nicosia. Present at the reception was Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük. According to Foley, Bil had "come from Ankara with an important mission: to help reorganize the Turkish Cypriot Political party."⁵⁴ In addition to helping in the organization of Dr. Küçük's party, Bil and Önal, made arrangements with Faiz Kaymak, a close associate of Dr. Küçük, to assist CTP financially by sending money from Turkey.⁵⁵ In a conversation with Foley, Bil repeated the irredentist argument of Pan-Turkism, "If and only if Britain decides to abdicate in Cyprus, then we shall put forward our claim to regain the island for Turkey. If necessary we shall fight."⁵⁶ The meaning of such dire warning was felt in Turkey six weeks later when an anti-Greek pogrom took place, a riot organized by Kibris Türktür. Hikmet Bil and Kamil Önal spent four days in Cyprus traveling around the island and visiting Turkish communities propagating their message: Cyprus is a Turkish island, and if the British gave up the island it should be given back to Turkey. The British authorities had full knowledge of Bil's and Önal activities in Cyprus but found nothing objectionable in the fact that, among others, they helped establish a party in Cyprus under the name Cyprus is Turkish. As Foley put it:

The Cyprus [colonial] government raised no objection to the new party or its title when it was announced, and no questions were asked of Mr. Bil, a foreign national concerning himself with colonial politics.⁵⁷

It was not surprising then that the next stop of Bil and Önal was London. Indeed, on July 25, 1955 they left Cyprus for London. They stayed in London for a week and during this period they set up a branch of Kibris Türktür under Necati Sager.⁵⁸ After London, Bil and Önal visited Paris and Rome and returned to Istanbul on the 9th of August. By this time, there were affiliated organizations of Kibris Türktür in Cyprus and London.

Four weeks later, on September 6, 1955, Hikmet Bil's organization, Kibris Türktür, organized the anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul (Constantinople). It did so with the support of the Turkish government.⁵⁹ The main slogan chanted by the demonstrators throughout the pogrom was "Kibris Türktür Türk Kalacak" meaning "Cyprus is Turkish and Turkish shall Remain." In about six hours, from the late evening of September 6 to the early morning of September 7, 1955, the well-organized pogrom against the Greek minority destroyed the Greek communal presence in Istanbul. In addition, anti-Greek riots erupted in Izmir (Smyrna). The Greek minority in Turkey and its communal institutions suffered such a devastating blow that they never recovered.⁶⁰ Indeed, the September 6, 1955 anti-Greek pogrom "signaled the beginning of the historic Greek community in Turkey."⁶¹

The reaction of the British government was muted. In fact, the government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden was not displeased by the anti-Greek pogrom taking place at the same time the London tripartite conference was ongoing. In this regard, there has been suspicion that Britain had somehow encouraged the pogrom so that Greeks were being given 'taste of their own medicine' and as a means to pressure on Athens to desists from supporting the EOKA insurgency in Cyprus and in advancing the cause of Cypriot self-determination at the United Nations.⁶² Following the anti-Greek riots, the slogan of *taksim*, partition, swept Turkey and became the rallying cry of the Turkish nation.⁶³ It is noteworthy that *taksim*, was considered by the Turkish government as a great sacrifice. After all, the Kibris Türktür ideology that had been promoted throughout Turkey with the blessings of the Mender government was that "Cyprus is Turkish and Turkish shall Remain." Therefore, partition that cut Cyprus in half, to a Greek and Turkish part, was seen as a great compromise by the Turks who were claiming the whole island. In a cyclical way, this Turkish demand of partition that was not just the government's position but it was sweeping the Turkish nation, came to reinforce British diplomatic efforts that the partition of Cyprus should be considered a "reasonable" option for a Cyprus settlement, otherwise, Britain would run the risk of alienating its most trusted ally in the region, Turkey.

Enters Partition

What is clear, therefore, is that from 1955 and especially 1956 onward, the threat of partition was utilized by Britain as powerful diplomatic tool. At the same time, while the Greeks were fighting for self-determination leading to union with Greece, partition, *taksim*, became the rallying cry for the Turkish side with the slogan *Taksim veya ölüm*, Partition or death. The 35th parallel that runs through Cyprus and splits it in two was promoted by Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük who had the full support of Ankara, as the solution of the Cyprus dispute.⁶⁴ Inherent in the Turkish demand of partition was a forceful population movement that would create a Turkish north and a Greek south, and that is precisely what Turkey was able to accomplish through its invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the military occupation of 38% of the island republic's territory, the northern part of it. An essential condition for partition to advance in ethnically diverse societies that also involves mass population movement is facilitated by evidence on the ground that religious, ethnic or racial groups are unable to coexist while bloodshed marks their relations. For the sake of peace and their own physical welfare, it is preferable for these groups to get a "divorce," and move, somehow, into separate territories. Under these circumstances, partition appears a reasonable alternative and acquires the veneer of legitimacy in the international community.

In an attempt to counter EOKA and provide credibility to the threat of partition, the British fomented ethnic discord. The colonial government encouraged Turkish Cypriots to oppose and fight EOKA. Accordingly, in the first week of August 1955, the colonial administration formed a special security force, the Auxiliary Police and the Mobile Reserve Force, estimated at 2,250, that was manned exclusively by Turkish Cypriots.⁶⁵ A number of them joined the Auxiliary Police and the Reserve Force out of sheer necessity. Yet the creation of special Turkish security units for riot-control meant that on the ground, the suppression of the EOKA movement and its mass following was transformed into a joint Anglo-Turkish operation.⁶⁶ As Crawshaw put it:

The cooperation of the Turkish community was vital to the struggle against EOKA. The Mobile Reserve was entirely composed by Turkish Cypriots. Turks also served as in large numbers in the regular police force and as auxiliary and special constables. As guards and escorts were irreplaceable.⁶⁷

All this points to a joint front between the British security forces and Turkish Cypriots in "attempts to crush the guerrilla movement . . . and in hunting down the [EOKA] guerrillas."⁶⁸ Likewise, Foley described this joint British-Turkish security cooperation as follows:

(Governor) Harding took personal charge of Security and welded together the police, whose ranks were filled with Turkish Cypriots, and the Army, which had

now grown to twelve thousand men. The offspring of the marriage was called the 'Security Forces.'⁶⁹

In this way Britain created an impossible dilemma for EOKA. If it persisted in its violent campaign against the British, it had to fight against the Turks too. EOKA was left with no choice. The attack on the Security Forces meant that Turkish policemen could be victims as well. And that is what inexorably transpired. Such close Anglo-Turkish cooperation against EOKA and the mass movement behind it was bound to lead to the polarization of the two communities. A typical scene during anti-British demonstrations by students was one when, on orders of British officers, Turkish policemen would charge, beat up and disperse Greek demonstrators, on many occasions, school children. Besides the resentment that this caused, it awakened in the Greek mind, bitter historical memories of Ottoman rule. Furthermore, the British used the Auxiliary Police and Tactical Reserve Force in counter-insurgency operations. British troops and Turkish policemen were engaged in joint patrols in pursuit of EOKA guerrillas. The inevitable result of this was that when EOKA attacked, for instance, and ambushed a British patrol vehicle, Turkish policemen in the vehicle might also be killed. Thus, EOKA killed Turkish policemen along with British soldiers who were the intended target. The Turkish leadership, however, saw this as a deliberate attack of EOKA against Turkish Cypriots. In turn, this would lead to Turkish resentment against the Greeks and to acts of retaliation. An incident in April 1956, demonstrates the point. On April 23, 1956, a Turkish Cypriot Police Sergeant was shot and killed in Nicosia while he was chasing two EOKA guerrillas. The next day, Turks rioted in Nicosia and attacked and set fire to nine Greek businesses adjacent to the Turkish quarter. On April 24, 1956, Turks set fire to a Greek-owned tobacco warehouse in Pallouriotissa, not far from the Turkish quarter in Nicosia. In the process, the peaceful coexistence was undermined as a result of the deliberate British policy to use Turkish Cypriots in riot control and counter-insurgency operations against EOKA. As Holland, put it:

Through the summer of 1955 events pushed the Turks and the British into closer harness, as the formation of the Auxiliary Police illustrated. Relations between Greeks and Turks in the colony began to change for the worse, therefore, not as a result of mutual violence or even innate hostility, but by the dint of the shift in the connection each had with the local administration, and especially the security machine. *The Times of Cyprus*, for example, referred to the 'picture of contrasting life' between the two main communities as they reacted differently to events, or were variously affected by the actions of the Army and Police. In this way Greek and Turkish Cyprus were progressively sealed off from each other, allowing suspicion and hatred to fester.⁷⁰

At about the same time that the British established the Turkish-manned Auxiliary Police Force, a new Turkish organization made its appearance in Cyprus. This took place in early September 1955 when the secret organization Volkan was established.⁷¹ The British authorities condoned Volkan who became their de facto ally in the fight against EOKA. In 1957, Volkan was replaced by another much more dynamic secret organization, the *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâtı* (TMT), meaning the Turkish Resistance Organization. TMT was condoned, and in fact, assisted by the British authorities. It was controlled by army officers from Turkey which financed the organization and provided most of its arms, enabling TMT to become the vanguard of the Turkish policy of partition.⁷² It has been a common argument that TMT was the Turkish counterpart to EOKA. There is, however, a most fundamental difference between TMT and EOKA, a difference that goes beyond organizational structure and tactics. From the outset, EOKA's enemy and target was exclusively British colonial rule and its security apparatus. The Turkish Cypriots were left alone as EOKA did not consider them as enemies. About three months before EOKA commenced its campaign, a secret document was circulated among its leading figures regarding the impending campaign against the British. When it came to Turkish Cypriots, the document included the following:

We see the Turks as brothers. We have nothing against them and we shall not do anything to harm them. We are asking them not to disturb us, not to stand on our way, not to become instruments of the British and not to aim them against our struggle. They [Turks] should rest assured that after liberation we are going to leave in peace and love, all of us together, as Cypriots, Greeks and Turks alike. Turks and Greeks are compatriots and they have to live freely in peace and brotherhood. The British are foreigners. They are the enemies of all of us as they are attempting to divide us. They have to go.⁷³

Following the commencement of the EOKA campaign on April 1, 1955, the organization repeated its friendly attitude and policy towards the Turkish Cypriot community. It did so in response to leaflets that had been circulated on June 30, 1955, throughout Cyprus, by supporters of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the leader of the Turkish community. These leaflets were calling the Turkish Cypriot youth to oppose EOKA. In response, EOKA issued in July 1955 a leaflet in Turkish that was circulated in the Turkish sector of Nicosia.⁷⁴ The leaflet included the following:

Our intentions toward the Turkish inhabitants of the island are pure and friendly. We are looking at the Turks as our genuine friends and allies and, as far as we are concerned and to the extent it is in our power, we will not condone any harm whatsoever against their life, dignity, honor and property.⁷⁵

Considering that EOKA was a highly disciplined organization and the Greek population followed its orders and instructions faithfully, this EOKA declaration left no doubt what was its stand towards the Turkish Cypriot community. EOKA did not consider the Turkish Cypriots as enemies. It is certainly correct that a number of Turkish Cypriot policemen were killed by EOKA. But as Hitchens put it:

It was only when Turks put on British uniforms to oppose a popular movement that they were shot up by Greeks.⁷⁶

However, Turkish Cypriot policemen were killed for their active collaboration with British authorities against EOKA. It was for the same reason, active collaboration with British security forces against EOKA, that the organization killed Greek Cypriot policemen, civil servants and other Greek Cypriot civilians.⁷⁷ On the other hand, from the outset, TMT's enemy was the Greeks while its allies were the British. Inherent in TMT's objectives was the fomenting of ethnic division which inevitably led to the logic of partition. Not surprisingly, the British "divide and rule" tactics on the ground, the creation of an exclusive Turkish-manned security force to fight EOKA, combined with British support to TMT, became a catalyst for ethnic strife that intensified in 1957 and culminated in 1958. On the diplomatic front, Britain and Turkey collaborated closely at the United Nations in opposing the Greeks' demand for self-determination. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes went so far as to threaten, in May 1956, that Turkey would go to war in order to prevent self-determination.⁷⁸

To counter the "clear and imminent danger" of self-determination that threatened its strategic control over Cyprus, Britain attempted to suppress the EOKA rebellion by military force and quell mass civil disobedience. By 1957, Britain had dispatched to the island 40,000 troops. Considering the relatively small territory they were injected into and that the ratio to the population was about one British soldier to every six adult Greek men and women, this was an enormous concentration of British military power on an island of only 3,572 square miles. Yet British might failed to defeat EOKA. As British author Victoria Nolan observed: "From a military point of view, EOKA were never defeated."⁷⁹

Prevailing over EOKA was not feasible, for three major reasons. The EOKA movement, under the leadership of George Grivas-Digenis, a Cypriot-born retired Greek army officer, followed guerrilla tactics that made it extremely difficult for the British army to prevail, at least in the short run. Second and critically important was the fact that the EOKA movement enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Greek population that sheltered the EOKA guerrillas. Third, the Greek population engaged in continuous acts of mass civil disobedience that British force could not suppress. Confronted with such dilemmas, Britain reverted to the ploy of "divide and rule." In this ploy, the threat of

partition, especially after 1956, became central to British policy “as a means of intimidating the Greek Cypriot leadership.”⁸⁰

The tactic of injecting the idea of a Cyprus partition by Britain was not going to go down well diplomatically, especially with the United States that considered the whole idea “schizophrenic.” This is the term used by Raymond Courtney, American Consul in Nicosia. In an August 15, 1956, report to the State Department Courtney wrote, “We should deal with the idea of partition as impractical should again raise its schizophrenic head.” As a result, the Conservative government of Anthony Eden came up with the formula of “double self-determination” which offered a different path leading to partition. In other words, if the Greek majority had the right to self-determination, it could not impose its will on the Turkish minority which should have the same right. This was pronounced officially by Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd. Speaking before the British House of Commons on December 19, 1956, Lennox-Boyd stated that given the “peculiar conditions prevailing in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community should be granted the same right to self-determination as the Greek community. . . In other words, Her Majesty’s Government acknowledges that the application of the principle of self-determination in a mixed population should include *partition* among other options.”⁸¹ Only three days earlier, on December 16, 1956, Lennox-Boyd was in Ankara where he held secretive talks with the Menders government in which talks Britain and Turkey found common ground on Cyprus whereby partition, under the disguise of “separate self-determination” for the Turkish Cypriots, was to be pursued at international diplomatic forums, including the United Nations. As Holland put it, following his meetings in Ankara, “the Colonial Secretary [Lennox-Boyd] returned to London in the unlikely role of a Turkish messenger.”⁸²

That the partition of Cyprus had become a major option in British diplomacy is confirmed by recently released Foreign Office Documents. On June 29, 1957, the colonial government’s Administrative Secretary, A. F. J. Reddaway, submitted a memorandum to Governor Sir John Harding. The partition of Cyprus was high on the agenda to the extent that the document went into details on how the island’s partition could be imposed on the Greek population. The June 29, 1957, memorandum examines the complexity of imposing partition because it would require the transfer of a large number of Greeks to the “Greek sector.” Then the memorandum proposes two methods to bring about partition: A) Quick partition within a relatively short period of time. This would require about four years. It would necessitate forceful movement of populations. B) “Gradual polarization” of the two communities through political and economic pressures. This might require five to ten years. The first method represents a carefully planned operation. The second method would require long term planning which would face difficulties. Yet, this second process will be less painful and for sure less costly for Her Majesty’s Government and the government in Cyprus (the colonial administration). The people who find themselves on the wrong side of partition would be subject to

political and economic pressures aiming at forcing them, even against their will, to uproot themselves and settle at the right side of the partition line.⁸³ These Foreign Office documents of July 1957 whereby the partition of Cyprus is presented as a distinct option are consistent with the views of Premier Harold McMillan who succeeded Anthony Eden in January 1957 and in the aftermath of the Suez misadventure. Writing in his memoirs, McMillan states that when he became Prime Minister, he realized that partition might be the way out of the Cyprus imbroglio and gave instructions to the Cyprus Government to “speed up the existing investigation into the modalities of such operation.”⁸⁴

Thus, Foreign Office documents as well McMillan’s memoirs, among others, do confirm that the partition of Cyprus was actively sought by British diplomacy as a means to put maximum pressure on the nationalist leadership under Makarios and the Greek government on the one hand, and as a way to accommodate Turkey on the other. In the process of rendering the threat of partition credible, Britain employed its “divide and rule” policy on the ground in Cyprus, fomenting ethnic discord. The ensuing Greek-Turkish bloodshed from June-August 1958, which bloodshed was initiated by the Turkish side and was by and large condoned by Britain, rendered partition a “reasonable” option to settle the Cyprus dispute once and for all. Yet, Britain was still concerned that partition might not be acceptable to the United States. Mindful of American reaction to the policy of partition, Pierson Dixon, the British Permanent Representative at the United Nations, sent on June 21, 1957, a memorandum to the Foreign Office in London in which he noted among others:

I feel obliged to warn you that the policy of partitioning Cyprus will most likely face difficulties, unless we secure beforehand the agreement of the Americans that they will fully support us. . . I’m afraid that if we proceed with partition before we can demonstrate that we tried all other options [such as independence] and without convincing the Americans that there is no other alternative, we would be faced with enormous difficulties at the United Nations.⁸⁵

Notwithstanding London’s advocacy of partition, it was acknowledged by British diplomats that even their closest ally, the United States, did not appear favorable to partition.” That is why inter-communal conflict on the island, as the one that took place in the summer of 1958, served well the logic and policy of partition. If Greeks and Turks were killing each other, then the separation of the two groups by partitioning the island would indeed appear to be a “reasonable” settlement.

This British advocacy for partition as an instrument of diplomatic pressure represented the determination of the retreating British Empire to cling onto Cyprus as its last British outpost in the Middle East. This became evident in the Suez crisis. At the end of October 1956, British leaders, Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Secretary of the Colonies Lennox-Boyd among others, led the retreating Empire into the disastrous

adventure at Suez by launching a joint Anglo-French-Israeli operation aiming at overthrowing Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had earlier nationalized the Suez Canal. The whole operation ended in disaster with British retreat. American opposition to this British-led operation against Nasser's Egypt was a critical reason for the failure of the Suez campaign. Britain embarked onto this misadventure using Cyprus as a major base to launch the Suez invasion. It was these same British leaders, under Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, who led Britain to the Suez adventure, who also advocated partition as a viable option towards a Cyprus settlement.

Summer 1958: Inter-communal Bloodshed and Ethnic Division

In the case of Cyprus, which in terms of demography resembled an ethnic quilt, partition, was “schizophrenic” as the American Consul in Nicosia put it in April 1956. Partition is even more schizophrenic if one also considered the fact that Turkish Cypriots do not constitute a majority in any of the island's region or district. The highest percentage of Turkish Cypriots was found in the Paphos District representing a quarter of the population (24.4%) and as in the case of the rest of Cyprus, they were dispersed throughout the District. Schizophrenic as the idea of partitioning Cyprus might have been, bloodshed between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority would provide “evidence” and, therefore, justification to make partition more palatable to the international community. Such Greek-Turkish bloodshed would go a long way to undermine the Greek demand at the United Nations for self-determination and majority rule and justify the British and Turkish position for separate self-determination for the Turkish minority community. Therefore, ethnic-strife was necessary in order for the idea of partition to gain traction. A catalyst for ethnic-strife, however, required tension between Greeks and Turks that could lead to bloodshed. The British ploy of “divide and rule” led exactly to such an outcome. Hitchens described British policy at the time as follows:

[British] Imperial favoritism towards the Turks did not ‘work’, in the sense that it did not succeed in crushing the Greek Cypriot [EOKA] rebellion. Nor did any policy succeed in this impossible objective. But it did succeed in damaging intercommunal relations very severely and perhaps permanently. It is important to remember that before 1955 there was no history of internal viciousness in Cyprus.⁸⁶

Britain thought that ethnic strife in Cyprus could be controlled by its superior military forces and be contained within certain limits. Total collapse of law and order and ethnic conflict that would result in widespread killing, was not a favorable outcome for Britain

as it would undermine its own position on the island. Limited Greek-Turkish bloodshed on the other hand, initiated by the Turks, was meant for the Greeks to taste the “medicine” of potential partition and come to the negotiating table. In June, July and August 1958, inter-communal strife spread throughout the island to the extent that by the time bloodshed stopped at the end of August, the logic of partition was reinforced. Deliberate Turkish actions became the catalyst for ethnic strife.

The bloodshed that started in the first week of June, 1958, was preceded by a period of ethnic tension that was evident by May 1958. At that time, both Greeks and Turks were maneuvering in anticipation of a British plan which would propose a framework for a Cyprus settlement.⁸⁷ The Turkish side, as it did with the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul during the London Tripartite Conference in early September 1955, wanted to impress upon Great Britain its determination to oppose any form of self-government, let alone self-determination. The most propitious way to pressure Britain, was for the Turkish side to threaten a violent reaction. In Cyprus, TMT, in anticipation of the British plan, issued a statement on May 18, 1958, that was included in a leaflet, “The island would be drowned in blood and fire the very day self- government is announced.”⁸⁸ The TMT leaflet went on to ask the Turkish Cypriots to be ready for action to come within two weeks.⁸⁹ This was a dire warning of things to come. The prospects of violence became even more ominous given the messages coming from Turkey. Turkish Cypriot leaders Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş were visiting Turkey at the end of May, 1958. Speaking on Ankara Radio on May 31, they stated that Britain was about to announce a plan for a Cyprus settlement that would be detrimental to Turkish interests. On June 3, Dr. Küçük gave a press conference at the Istanbul Hilton in which he stated that Britain was prepared to propose a Cyprus settlement based on self-determination which would “meant the extinction of Turkish Cypriots.”⁹⁰ Three days later, on June 6, 1958, Rauf Denktaş, who had returned to Nicosia from Ankara, gave an inflammatory speech also calling for partition as fear swept the Turkish Cypriot community for an impending disaster. Less than 24 hours later, at 10:00 pm on the evening of June 7, 1958, a bomb exploded at the Turkish Information Office in Nicosia. The Turks, who were already agitated because of the TMT warnings and the alarming messages coming out of Turkey, saw this as a great Greek provocation. However, as British Intelligence established later, this bomb has been planted by Turkish *agents provocateurs*.⁹¹ It was later demonstrated that Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş was directly involved in the plan to bomb the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia.⁹² The purpose of the bombing was to serve as signal for a Turkish attack against the Greeks. That evening of June 7, 1958, and in the immediate aftermath the blast at the Turkish Information Office, riots broke out in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Foley described the riots:

Bang went the little bomb in Nicosia—and now the Turks in Istanbul would have the signal they were waiting for. Four out of the side-streets at 11 p.m., when the

town us usually asleep, poured the Turkish youth of Nicosia to play their appointed role. Soon fire calls were coming for all sides, while Turks smashed windows and looted shops. Church bells run with alarm. Refugees were bundling things up into push-carts and wheelbarrows. The rioters attacked with stones and clubs; two Greeks were killed and casualties poured into the clinics.⁹³

The Turkish crowds were attacking the Greek neighborhoods and the commercial district of Nicosia along Hermes and Ledra Streets that were close to the Turkish quarter of the capital. British troops stationed nearby, would need less than ten minutes to intervene to restore order. It took three hours before the troops arrived to the scene. Already, most of the damage against the Greeks had been inflicted by the Turkish rioters.⁹⁴ Two days later, later, on June 9, 1958, the Turkish government declared that the partition of Cyprus was the only acceptable solution.⁹⁵ For the next few weeks a large number of Greek businesses, shops and factories were set on fire while extensive looting of Greek properties took place. Several Greek Orthodox churches were also attacked. This ushered Cyprus to an unprecedented cycle of inter-communal violence that lasted until the end of August 1958.⁹⁶ Following the Turkish rioting in Nicosia during the second week of June and the widespread looting and burning down of Greek businesses by Turkish rioters, British Secretary of State for Colonies, Lennox-Boyd, stated to a journalist, "You could not come down too hard on people [Turkish Cypriots] who had always been so loyal and stable."⁹⁷

During this period, summer of 1958, EOKA demonstrated remarkable restraint. For instance, in several of the mixed villages in the Karpasia region a number of inter-communal killings took place in the summer of 1958. The defense of the Greek population against Turkish attacks orchestrated by TMT was undertaken by EOKA that had deliberately kept the Turkish community out of its conflict with the British. During the height of inter-communal violence between June-August 1958, EOKA adopted the tactic, "Retaliate only when attacked. When you retaliate, retaliate proportionately."⁹⁸ Following this tactic, EOKA retaliated in a very measured way against Turkish attacks. EOKA's restraint was indicated by the fact that even though Greeks outnumbered Turks by five to one, the number of Greeks killed in the summer of 1958 reached 56 while the number of Turkish dead was 53.⁹⁹ Both tactically and strategically EOKA determined that massive retaliation against Turkish Cypriots would only reinforce the Anglo-Turkish argument for partition. Neither the British army nor its ally, TMT, had the capability to prevent EOKA from retaliating against the Turks and inflicting heavy casualties.

EOKA had operatives in every village who submitted regular written reports to the organization's local chief on the evolving situation in each village. In turn, the local chief reported to his regional commander. EOKA needed factual and accurate field reporting in order to plan its military response to a given development, in this case, inter-communal violence which also involved frequent movements by the British army. In these reports by

village operatives to local EOKA chiefs, the Turkish population of mixed villages was referred to either as *Tourtjoi* (Turks) or *Mullaes* or *Mullahs*, the Muslim religious figures. In the village of Rizokarpaso, the local EOKA operative wrote a report to his superior MM, who submitted it to Fotis Papafotis, his regional commander:

There are no *Mullahs* in this area. But on August 1st (1958), *Turks* guarding some of the hills near the village threw a bomb at Greek farmers working in their fields. Half an hour later, a number of *Turks* arrived on the spot *accompanied by two jeeps filled with British soldiers*. We told the soldiers that the bomb was thrown by the *Mullahs*, but we were totally ignored . . .¹⁰⁰ (Emphasis added)

In another EOKA report:

Today, July 7 (1958), Turkish *auxiliary policemen aided by British soldiers* put fire at the home of a *Christian* family in the village of Aghios Theodoros. As soon as the Church bell rung, they disappeared.¹⁰¹ (Emphasis added)

It is evident that the religious term *Mullah*, meaning *Turk*, was in common use among the Greek villagers of the Karpasia region. In other words, Cypriot Turks were identified through their Muslim faith. Even more important is the fact that on a number of occasions, the British army and Turkish auxiliary policemen actively cooperated against the Greeks arresting and humiliating them and burning down their homes and crops.¹⁰² EOKA retaliated proportionately by burning down Turkish homes and crops.¹⁰³

Thus, the mid-1950s was a watershed point as far as peaceful coexistence was concerned. The inter-ethnic bloodshed of June-August 1958 created an atmosphere of fear that was pervasive throughout Cyprus while predictability in relations between Greeks and Turks suffered a most severe, if not irreparable, blow. In mixed villages, Greek villagers feared the worst from their Turkish neighbors and the other way around. In smaller Greek villages there was fear that they would be attacked by Turks from a nearby Turkish village that was larger. This prompted a flight of Greek villagers to the safety of other Greek villages or Greek urban areas. In Nicosia, Greeks fled from areas such as Omorfita that were adjacent to the Turkish quarter of the capital. As Crawshaw put it, "The steady flight of Greek Cypriots from Turkish areas was the first step in the direction of partition."¹⁰⁴ A similar climate of insecurity was felt by Turks in mixed villages as well as in small Turkish villages surrounded by Greek villages. In this environment of fear, TMT encouraged and enforced the movement of Turks from mixed villages to Turkish ones or to the Turkish quarter in urban areas.¹⁰⁵ In this regard, at the end of July 1958, Turkish peasants from the mixed village of Akoursos in the Paphos District, found refuge in the Skylloura area near Nicosia.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, TMT, through a campaign of intimidation, imposed on Turkish Cypriots the policy of severing

their economic ties with the Greeks. This was done under the TMT directive of *Vatandas Türklerden Mal Aliniz*, or Patriots buy from Turks, and came to be known as “from Turk to Turk.” In this way, TMT was ordering the Turkish Cypriots to buy from and sell only to fellow Turks and stop any economic transactions with the Greeks. By and large, Turkish Cypriots complied as they stopped trading with Greeks, stopped smoking Greek cigarettes and stopped visiting their Greek neighbors. Those Turks who disobeyed the TMT line were punished.¹⁰⁷ In this way, the horizontal linkages that connected Greeks and Turks through commerce, trade and labor unions, and agriculture were being severed.¹⁰⁸ The population movements due to inter-communal bloodshed, along with the increasing economic separation of the two communities, dealt peaceful coexistence a most serious blow as trust between the two communities was badly shaken while the logic of partition was reinforced.

De Facto Partition

The widespread inter-communal violence of the summer of 1958 bode ill for the future as it offered an argument to Turkey in its support for partition.¹⁰⁹ For Britain, inter-communal bloodshed was an expedient tool to pressure the Greek side to compromise by invoking the threat of partition. It is within this environment that Makarios, faced with the specter of partition, accepted the Zurich-London Agreements in February 1959 even though they granted Cyprus a quasi-independent status.¹¹⁰ The Cypriot constitution included highly divisive provisions in which the seeds of partition had been planted.¹¹¹ The Turkish minority community even though it represented 18% of the population was granted veto power for all important executive and legislative decisions. Furthermore, the Zurich-London Agreements assigned Britain, Turkey and Greece as guarantor powers with the right to intervene militarily, something unheard of for any other newly independent country. As for Britain, it secured two major sovereign bases on the island in perpetuity. In this way, Cyprus acquired the distinct and odious characteristic among the newly independent countries that waged an anti-colonial struggle to be granted a neo-colonial status both internally and externally with Britain, the former colonial master, maintaining a permanent military foothold on the island and for the purpose of projecting British power in the Middle East. Thus, Cyprus is the only former colony where Britain maintains military bases which are sovereign British territory.

The mistrust that was built up during the period of 1955-1959 and especially in the aftermath of the inter-communal conflict of the summer of 1958, did not disappear after Cypriot independence in 1960. Instead, it was combined with the politically divisive constitution to foment ethnic tensions. By the end of 1963, the constitution collapsed like a house of cards and a new round inter-communal violence erupted, much worse this time.¹¹² Ethnic violence swept the island resulting in wide population movements. For the

period of the most serious bloodshed (December 1963-August 1964), 350 Turkish Cypriots and 200 Greek Cypriots were killed, with the Greeks gaining, temporarily, the upper hand.¹¹³ It was during this period that the greatest population movements occurred among the Turkish Cypriot population. By the summer of 1964, 60% of Turkish Cypriots lived in territorial enclaves controlled by their own administrative apparatus and under the ultimate control of Turkish military officers. There were 39 Turkish Cypriot enclaves around the island representing 4% of Cyprus territory. The largest and most important enclave was the one between Nicosia and Kyrenia placing under control the strategic mountain road linking Kyrenia and the capital. The thrust of the Turkish invasion in 1974 was that, after landing near Kyrenia, occupy the port city and surrounding areas and link it to the enclave leading to Nicosia.

A UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was introduced to the island in the Spring of 1964, with Canada being a major participant. While UNFICYP prevented large scale bloodshed, it did leave the territorial situation frozen with Cyprus being dotted with Turkish-controlled enclaves that formed the core of a territorially-based entity, small as it were, but separate nonetheless. In 1967, the Turkish Cypriots declared this entity as “The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). This represented a step towards partition on a small scale, albeit. Again, UNFICYP did not have the authority or the means to oppose this further encroachment towards partition.

The late Richard Patrick was a young Canadian officer who served in UNFICYP in 1964 and later wrote his dissertation at the University of Waterloo. It was later published in a book form as *The Political Geography of the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971*. Patrick’s conclusion was that the general trends of the December 1963-August 1964 period were that armed confrontation and ethnic segregation interacted to form fields of communally controlled territory. Subsequently, a Turkish Cypriot civil and military administration was developed in the enclaves under its control. The result was “the de facto partition of the Republic of Cyprus” by mid-1964.¹¹⁴ This, however, was partition on a very limited scale. The Turkish invasion in the summer of 1974 brought about the de facto partition of the island on a grand scale placing 38% of the Cyprus Republic, the northern part, under Turkey’s control. The invasion which commenced on July 20, 1974, was triggered by the July 15, 1974 overthrow of President Makarios by the Greek military junta in Athens. The Greek junta used the Cypriot National Guard that was led by Greek military officers to stage the anti-Makarios coup. The Turkish invasion took place five days later and resulted in the largest known population movement in Cypriot history. Through the force of Turkish arms, the demographic segregation of the island along Greek Christian and Turkish Muslim lines was reflected in the south-north territorial division of the island. The Greek Cypriot population residing in the northern part of the island was forced to flee their ancestral homes before the advancing Turkish army. Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island were transferred to the occupied northern part. In this way,

Cyprus was partitioned along ethnic lines, Muslim Turks in Turkish occupied north and Christian Greeks in the government controlled south. The Turkish objective of *taksim*, the de facto partition of Cyprus, had been accomplished.

In 1983, there was a Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Turkish occupied territory in the north with the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” or TRNC. It is recognized only by Turkey, which, after all, created TRNC in its own image as the name “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” signifies. Due to systematic and massive colonization of the occupied territory by Anatolian settlers, Turkish Cypriots constitute the minority population, 60-70,000, while the settlers have formed the overwhelming majority estimated at 200,000.¹¹⁵

UNFICYP is still stationed in the de facto partitioned Republic of Cyprus which, since 2004, is a member of the European Union. One of the longest UN Peacekeeping missions, (1964-2013) has not been able to prevent Cyprus from sliding towards de facto partition. This constitutes an ultimate irony for a European Union country (Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004) and the European Union as a whole, especially considering that Turkey, the military occupier of the northern part of Cyprus, aspires to become an EU member too. What transpired, therefore, regarding developments on the ground, is that the de facto partition of a European Union member, Cyprus, has undergone several phases from the mid-1950s onward. However, this gradualism towards partition maintained a momentum because it had seeds sown on fertile ground prepared by British colonialism in the 1950s.

Notes

¹ See the census results in: Great Britain, *Cyprus Annual Reports* (under varying titles) (Colonial Office, Census 1879-1959). Also, Great Britain, *Census Reports* (Colonial Office, 1881, 1891, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1939, 1946). In 1960, the year of Cypriot independence, the census was carried out jointly by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot civil servants following British methodology and guidelines. See, Republic of Cyprus, *Demographic Reports* (under varying titles) (Nicosia: Department of Statistics and Research, 1960-1988).

² Great Britain, *Cyprus Annual Reports* (Colonial Office, Census Report, 1946).

^{3 3} See Alexander Melamid, “The Geographical Distribution of Communities in Cyprus,” *Geographical Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1956, p. 360.

⁴ Statistics regarding the population of Nicosia in 1946 varied. For instance, if in the Nicosia population one includes suburbs then, its population in 1946 has been estimated at 53,324. See D. A. Perceival, “Some Features of a Peasant Population in the Middle East: Drawn from the Results of the Census of Cyprus,” *Population Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, September 1949, p. 193. Other estimates on Nicosia’s population in 1946, that evidently excluded its suburbs that had very distinct rural characteristics, put it at 34,485. See Melamid, “The Geographical Distribution,”

p. 360. Both studies rely on the official census carried out by the colonial administration in 1946.

⁵ In the aftermath of the July-August 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of 38% of Cypriot territory (its northern part), the Turkish Muslim population residing in Turkish and mixed villages in the government controlled area in the southern part of the island, moved into the Turkish occupied area. As for the Greek population in the occupied northern part, it was forced to leave by the advancing Turkish army, finding

refuge in the government-controlled south. It is estimated that as a result of the Turkish invasion, 39% of the total Greek population became refugees. As a consequence, there are no villages inhabited by Greeks in the occupied northern part of the Republic of Cyprus. On the same token, there are no villages inhabited by Turks in the government controlled part. The exception is a small area in the Karpasia peninsula where a tiny number of Greeks were allowed to remain but their number has been dwindling because of Turkish pressures including the settlement of colonists from Turkey. Since 1974, Turkey embarked on the systematic colonization of the occupied territory. At the present, colonists from Turkey are estimated to 200,000, outnumbering the Turkish Cypriots by far, as the latter have been reduced to 60-70,000. Since the Turkish invasion, an estimated 55,000 Turkish Cypriots immigrated to England, Australia and other countries. These figures, however, are estimates since the Turkish side does not allow a census to be carried out under the supervision of an independent body. On the systematic colonization of the occupied territory by Turkey, see Christos P. Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province* (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas Publisher, 1992), especially chapter 3, "Turkish Colonization of Occupied Cyprus," pp. 27-48.

⁶ C. F. Bekingham, "The Turks of Cyprus," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (July-December 1957), p. 166. Also Dudley L. H. Buxton, "The Anthropology of Cyprus," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol. 50 (January-June 1920), p. 192.

⁷ According to Bernard Lewis, a prominent scholar on Islam and Turkey: "Another characteristic of Turkish Islam, of a rather different kind but of similar significance, is the social segregation of the non-Muslim communities. The Ottoman Empire was tolerant to other religions, in accordance with Islamic law and tradition, and its Christian and Jewish subjects lived, on the whole, in peace and security. But they were strictly segregated from the Muslims, in their own separate communities. Never there were able to mix freely in Muslim society, as they had once done in Baghdad and Cairo—not to make contribution worth the mention to the intellectual life of the Ottomans." See, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1969), pp. 14-15.

⁸ On patterns of peaceful coexistence, especially among Greek and Turkish peasants, see Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979), pp. 80-83.

⁹ See the Greek Cypriot folk song, *Asma tou Christofi ke tis Emine* (Song of Christofi and Emine), in Menelaos Christodoulou, ed., *Kypriaka Demodi Asmata* (Cypriot Folk Songs) (Nicosia: Center for Scientific Research, 1987), pp. 399-407.

¹⁰ Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 81.

¹¹ See M.A. Ramady, "The Role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal Relations," in Van Coufoudakis, editor, *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 5-6. Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 81.

¹² Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 81.

¹³ H. D. Purcell, *Cyprus*, (London: Ernest Bevin Ltd., 1969), p. 245.

¹⁴ Based on 1960 census. See Richard Patrick, *The Political Geography of Cyprus 1963-1971* (Waterloo University Press, 1976), p. 13.

¹⁵ For a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of Linomavakoi, see Phaeton Papadopoulos, "Λινοβαμβακοί: Τούρκοι, Μουσουλμάνοι ή Κρυπτοχριστιανοί (Linovamvakoi: Turks, Muslims or Cryptochristians) posted at the website of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus under "Theological Articles," www.churchofcyprus.org.cy/index

See also, "Stavro Skendi, "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans" *Slavic Review* Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 230-231. Costas Kyrris, *Peaceful Co-existence in Cyprus under British Rule (1878-1959) and after Independence* (Nicosia: Public Information Office, 1977), pp. 9-11. Sir John Hackett, *Istoria tes Ellinikis Orthodoxou Ekklesias tes Kyprou* (A History of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus) Vol III. Translated and Annotated by Ch. Papaioannou (Athens: Sakellarios Press, 1923), pp. 78-79. Theodoros Papadopoulos, *Text and Studies of the History of Cyprus: Social and Historical Data on Population (1571-1881)* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 1965), pp. 35, 81-82, 94.

¹⁶ On the importance of panegyri in the Cypriot agricultural economy, see Theodoros Kanthos, "Ε Kathimerini Zoe ton Kypriou kata ton 18 and 19 Aiona" (The Daily Life of Cypriots during the 18th and 19th centuries), in *E Zoe sten Kypro kata ton 18 kai 19 Aiona* (Life in Cyprus during the eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries). (Lecture Series at the Popular University, Nicosia: The Municipality of Nicosia and the Cyprus Popular Bank, 1984), pp. 213-214.

¹⁷ In the mid-1930s there was very popular song in Greece that was also heard in Cyprus. It was titled *Feretze Foro* (I wear the veil). It was performed by Rita Abatzi (1914-1969) one of the most famous female singers of *Rebetika* songs. She was born in Smyrna and her *Smyrneika* songs became legendary.

¹⁸ See, for instance, the work of a noted British author who emphasized the secular character of Cypriot Turks. Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: The Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 22.

¹⁹ By and large, post-Second World War western and especially American historiography on Turkey and Iran, as well as American foreign policy, emphasized “westernization” and the “success” of the secular reforms of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. This approach tended to ignore the undercurrents prevailing among the masses, in the countryside especially. These masses clinked tenaciously to Islam and lived their lives according to Islamic ethos. In the case of Iran, the Pahlavi regime was swept away in February 1979 by Iran’s Islamic revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini. As for Turkey, since 2003, there emerged a government under Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party that has been steering the country towards an Islamic-oriented path. The tenacity of Islam in the Middle East has also been demonstrated by the “Arab Spring,” the Islamic-oriented revolutions that swept away the secular and American-supported authoritarian rulers of Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt in 2011 and 2012. In Libya, Islamic groups played a major role in the revolution of 2011 that overthrew the dictatorial regime of Muammar Qaddafi. In Syria, a brutal civil war has been raging since March 2011. An array of Sunni Muslim groups (Sunnis constitute 74% of the Syrian population), have been waging war against the secular- oriented and Alawite-controlled regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

²⁰ For example, in the early mid-1950s, in the Morphou region, the town of Morphou had a population of 6,500 Greeks and 123 Turks representing 1.8% of the population. The large village of Lefka had a population of 3,580 Turks and 88 Greeks representing 2.4% of the population.

²¹ Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 45.

²² John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Archives, Speeches: Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Fourth Annual Rockhurst College in Kansas City, Missouri, Saturday, June 2, 1956.

²³ John F. Kennedy, “Imperialism: The Enemy of Freedom,” July 2, 1957, *Congressional Record* 1957, Washington, DC, pp. 10873-10874.

²⁴ On Kennedy’s speeches in support of Cypriot struggle for self-determination and *enosis* see *Apanta Archiepiskopou Makariou III.*, Vol. III, January 1963-March 1964 (Nicosia: The Makarios III Foundation, January 1966) p. 283.

²⁵ British author Stanley Mayes argues that by 1955, the two main Turkish Cypriot leaders, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who at the time was representing the Turkish Cypriot community, and Rauf Denktaş, who later succeeded Dr. Küçük, “were its [Turkey’s] obedient servants.” See Stanley Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios* (London: Putnam, 1960), p. 101.

²⁶ Editorial written by Dr. Fazıl Küçük in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Halkın Sesi*, Nicosia, August 17, 1954.

²⁷ Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus* (London: Quarter Books, 1984), p. 42.

²⁸ On the Britain’s divide and rule policy, see Van Coufoudakis, “The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multi-religious Societies: The Case of Cyprus,” in Coufoudakis, editor, *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, pp. 33-35.

²⁸ William Mallinson, *Partition through Foreign Aggression: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, XX, University of Minnesota, 2010), pp. 17-18. Also, Hans Richter, *Istoria tes Kyprou 1878-1949* (History of Cyprus, 1878-1949), (Athens: Estia, 2007) p. 317.

²⁹ Hitchens, *Cyprus*, pp. 43-44.

³⁰ On British policy of drawing the “Turkish factor” deeper into the Cyprus dispute, see Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968) pp. 137-156; Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from rebellion to civil war* (Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1964) pp. 30, 89, 119-129; Thomas Ehrlich, *International Crises and the Rule of Law: Cyprus, 1958-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 19. Stanley Kyriakides, *Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 44, 137-140.

³¹ The British-led Baghdad Pact was part of the “Northern Tier” western strategy of containment of the Soviet Union. Members of the pact were Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.

³²On the charismatic leadership of Makarios, see Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 39-50.

³³Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 43. With regard to the 'assistance' provided by Britain to Turkish-Cypriots during these UN deliberations, Holland cited an official British document: 'Cyprus Turkish' Delegation'. United Kingdom Delegation (New York) to Foreign Office, 5 Oct. 1954, FO371/11868, WG1081.

³⁴Ioannis D. Stephanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* (London: Hearst & Co., 1999), pp. 79, 81.

³⁵Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 332.

³⁶See Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967), p. 12. Stephanidis, *Isle of Discord*, pp. 78, 81, 101.

³⁷That Kashmir was the main reason behind this Indian position at the UN, see Xydis, *Cyprus, Conflict and Conciliation*, pp. 33, 272, 380, 407, 473, 563.

³⁸Since the partition of India in 1947, India and Pakistan fought three wars over Kashmir, in 1947, 1965 and 1999. More recent skirmishes along the "line of control" took place on January 6 and 8, 2013. See "Kashmir Clash with Soldiers from India Kills Pakistani," *New York Times*, January 7, 2013. Also "Two Soldiers Die in Clashes in Kashmir India Says," *New York Times*, January 9, 2013.

³⁹See "Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon's Marathon Speech Lasting for Eight Hours on Kashmir at the United Nation's Security Council 762nd Meeting on 23rd January, 1953," in www.un.int/india/ind29.pdf.

⁴⁰Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 332.

⁴¹Xydis, *Cyprus, Conflict and Conciliation*, pp. 41-42, 50-51.

⁴²Crawshaw, *The Revolt in Cyprus*, pp. 332-333.

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 332-334.

⁴⁴United Nations General Assembly, 8th Session, November 23, 1953: "Resolution 742 (VIII), para. 6," p. 22. On this Resolution, see also Xydis, *Cyprus, Conflict and Conciliation*, p. 9.

⁴⁵United Nations General Assembly, 8th Session, November 23, 1953: "Resolution 742 (VIII), Annex: "Factors indicative of the attainment of independence or of other separate systems of self-government," Second Part, No. 2, p. 22.

⁴⁶Information on the origins and establishment of Kibris Türkütür is drawn primarily from the indictment of key figures of the organization by a military tribunal in the aftermath of the September 6, 1955 anti-Greek riots. See "Request for Indictment Presented to Martial Law Tribunal No. 2." Document No. 1150-955/499, Istanbul, 9 February 1956. The text of the above document was included in a report by the U.S. Consul General in Istanbul: "American Consul General in Istanbul to Department of State." Telegram No. 563. Despatch 306. 20 February, 1956. Heretofore, "Indictment 1150."

⁴⁷On the blessings of the Menderes government to Kibris Türkütür, see the Turkish newspaper *Akis*, Istanbul, February 11, 1956. See also Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image*, esp. the part "The Blessings of the Menderes Government," pp. 80-83.

⁴⁸U.S. Department of State, "American Embassy in Ankara to Department of State. Subject: The Istanbul-Izmir Disturbances of September 6, 1955." Despatch 228. Confidential, 1 December 1955.

⁴⁹See Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image*, pp. 75-76.

⁵⁰Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkish in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1981), p. 132.

⁵¹Indictment, 1150.

⁵²Indictment 1150.

⁵³Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image*, p. 100.

⁵⁴Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 29.

⁵⁵Indictment, 1150.

⁵⁶Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 29.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹On the September 6, 1955 anti-Greek pogrom, the role of the Turkish authorities in fomenting anti-Greek sentiment, and the methodical organizing and carrying out the pogrom, as well as its devastating effects on the Greek minority and its religious and other institutions, see the most authoritative and thoroughly documented study by Spyros Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of*

September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul (New York: Greekworks.com Inc., 2005).

⁶⁰ Within six hours that the pogrom lasted in Istanbul, 90% of Greek Orthodox churches were attacked and gutted. Specifically, 73 churches and eight burial places were destroyed; 26 schools, 1004 homes, 4,212 shops and stores, 21 factories, 12 hotels, 97 restaurants and 23 warehouses were also destroyed. These figures are drawn from the report of the American Embassy in Ankara to the State Department, found in "American Embassy in Ankara, Dispatch 228." A report on the pogrom was also presented in the popular American magazine *Reader's Digest*. See "Frederick Sondern, Jr., 'Istanbul's Night of Terror: An eyewitness Account of one of the Most Destructive Riots of our Times,' *Reader's Digest*, May 1956, pp. 185-192.

⁶¹ Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-74* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies), p. 270.

⁶² On this point, the suspicion that Britain had a certain role in the anti-Greek pogrom, see the work of two British authors: Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, pp. 76-77. Also, Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 22-23.

⁶³ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 250.

⁶⁴ Crashaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 144.

⁶⁵ On the creation of the all-Turkish security force, see *ibid.*, p. 277 and Appendix 5. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 100. Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 40. Also Attallides, *Cyprus*, p. 47.

⁶⁶ Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 46.

⁶⁷ Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 276.

⁶⁸ See Halil Ibrahim Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State* (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978), p. 8.

⁶⁹ Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 40.

⁷⁰ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, pp. 68-69.

⁷¹ On the establishment of Volkan and its objectives, see Costas Yennaris, *From the East: Conflict and Partition in Cyprus* (London: Elliot and Thompson, 2003), pp. 81-82. Also Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 46.

⁷² On the establishment and organizational structure of TMT see Yennaris, *From the East*, pp. 82-92, 114-132. In his memoirs, Grivas-Digenis, the leader of EOKA, maintains that British intelligence officers assisted young Turkish officers who came clandestinely to Cyprus and formed *Volkan*, initially, and later TMT. See Georgios Grivas-Digenis, *Apomnimonevmata* (Memoirs) (Athens: 1961), p. 98. On the British role in Turkish clandestine activities in Cyprus see also, Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 203. On the TMT policy of partition and the measures taken to enforce this policy, see Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 285-288, 304. On the political dynamics of partition see Coufoudakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition" in Coufoudakis, *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, pp. 29-49, esp., pp. 32-35.

⁷³ Author's translation. This document can be found in Speros Papageorgiou, *Archeion ton Paranomon Egrafon tou Kypriakou Agonos, 1955-1959* (Archive of Illegal Documents of the Cypriot Struggle, 1955-1959), 2nd ed., (Nicosia: Epifaniou Publishers, 1984), pp. 152-154.

⁷⁴ The leaflet was EOKA's main means of communicating its message to the people. Leaflets were mimeographed and circulated in public places by masked men. Among others, leaflets contained EOKA's instructions to the population. The overwhelming majority of the Greek population obeyed EOKA's instructions.

⁷⁵ See Grivas-Digenis, *Memoirs*, pp. 51-52.

⁷⁶ Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 46.

⁷⁷ On the killing of Greek policemen, civil servant and other civilians by EOKA, see Markides, *The Rise and Fall*, pp. 19-20. The total number of Greeks killed by EOKA is estimated at 210. The total number of Turks killed by EOKA is estimated at 30. These figures do not include those killed during the inter-communal strife of June-August 1958.

There are no precise figures of Greeks, Turks and British who were killed during the EOKA insurgency. A comprehensive casualty table of those killed during the EOKA campaign appears in *Crawshaw*, Appendix 6.

⁷⁸ Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 61

⁷⁹ Victoria Nolan, *Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small Wars since WWII* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); See especially Chapter 5 "The Cyprus Revolt, 1955-60," p. 190.

⁸⁰ Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, pp. 24-25.

⁸¹ On this point, the support of partition by Lennox-Boyd, see Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 166. Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 46

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ The declassified British documents were published in translation in the newspaper *Simerini*, Nicosia, July 30, 2012. These documents are accompanied by the commentary of London based author Fanoula Argyrou, who has been conducting research in British archives related to Cyprus and the EOKA rebellion.

⁸⁴ Harold McMillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959* (London: McMillan, 1971), p. 225. On McMillan's memoirs and his inclination towards partition see also Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 194-195.

⁸⁵ Document published in *Simerini*, Nicosia, July 30, 2012.

⁸⁶ Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 47.

⁸⁷ On this maneuvering by the Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece on the one hand and the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey on the other, see Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 283-286

⁸⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 287.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts IV, 567, 3 June, 1958.

⁹¹ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 252. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 288.

⁹² See Yennaris, *From the East*, pp. 133-136. Yennaris cites, among others, an interview by Denktash to Britain's Granada TV in the summer of 1984. Granada TV produced a 13-part series documentary entitled "Britain's Grim Legacy," that was ran between June and July 1984.

⁹³ Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 119.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 120. Also Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 48.

⁹⁵ BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts IV, 567, 9 June, 1958.

⁹⁶ On the inter-communal strife of June-August 1958, see Crashaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 288-309.

⁹⁷ Quoted by Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 121.

⁹⁸ Interview with Fotis Papafotis, EOKA's regional commander of the Karpasia region, Limassol, July 8, 2012.

⁹⁹ See, Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 408. Also, Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image*, p. 58.

¹⁰⁰ Author's translation. Based on documents with handwritten reports of local Karpasia EOKA operatives to their regional commander, Fotis Papafotis, who rendered these reports available to the author.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Crashaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 302.

¹⁰⁵ Ramadi, "The Role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal Relations," pp. 5-7; Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 304. Yennaris, *From the East*, p. 137.

¹⁰⁶ Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 304.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. pp. 286-287.

¹⁰⁸ See Yennaris, *From the East*, pp. 137-139. Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image*, pp. 128-129. Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 49.

¹⁰⁹ See Mallinson, *Partition Through Foreign Aggression*, pp. 24-25.

¹¹⁰ On the threat of partition as the main reason for Makarios accepting the Zurich-London Agreements, see Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 49.

¹¹¹ On the Cypriot Constitution and its dysfunctional character, see Kyriakides, *Cyprus*, esp. chapter 4, "Major Constitutional Tension Areas," pp. 72-109. Also Hitchens, *Cyprus*, p. 49.

¹¹² Kyriakides, *Cyprus*, pp. 110-112.

¹¹³ Patrick, *The Political Geography of Cyprus*, pp. 46-47.

¹¹⁴ Patrick, *Political Geography*, p. 88.

¹¹⁵ See above, endnote 5.