missars in trade unions, interest groups, and local organizations, and attempted to elicit their support through the use of force. Moreover, the regime suspended several articles of the Constitution immediately after its approval. These contradictory measures made a mockery of the "liberalization process" and forced the regime to resort to more repression and violence.

4. The military regime failed to create a coherent ideology. Their ideology consisted of an incoherent aggregation of values, borrowed impromptu by Orthodox Christianity and ancient Greek tradition, which did not add up to an adequate political formula. Moreover, the unequivocal rejection of Fascism and military rule, in Europe in the 1960s, deprived the regime of another ideological weapon.  

5. The split between hard-liners and soft-liners further undermined the cohesiveness of the regime.

6. A growing number of acts, which included the student uprising during the first months of 1973, a sharply worded statement by Karamanlis from Paris in April warning of the "grave danger" for Greece if the military regime remained in power, and above all the foiled coup in late May, which prompted the abolition of the monarchy and the proclamation of the republic, consisted of an interconnection of political events that placed the military regime on the defensive and at the same time emboldened its opposition.

Unable to bear the combined strain of liberalization and simultaneous political mobilization, the regime resorted to repression and collapsed a few months later.

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6. The inability of a military regime to consolidate new political patterns of succession, control, and participation, and forge extensive constituencies for its rule as well as its inability to create a degree of "hegemonic acceptance" in society, have been identified from the literature of civil-military relations as the major blocks to the institutionalization of the military regimes. See Alfred Stepan, The State and Society in Peru: Peru in Comparative Perspective. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) p. 292.

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Separate Spheres: An Overview of United States Policy in the Interwar Years Toward Greece and Turkey

S.J. Raphalides

THE COMPLEX OF STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL CONCERNS AND domestic politics in considering the relationship of the United States with Greece and Turkey is properly placed in the post World War II setting. However, even this contemporary triangular relation is affected by the past, by the nexus of the intertwined Greek and Turkish legacies, and by America’s legacy. To what extent these pre-World War II experiences have influenced the contemporary triangular relations of the United States, Greece and Turkey is admittedly a matter of interpretation. Clearly, to focus on the United States and the relevant American policies is one approach in assessing the early contacts involving the three states. But even this focus is dependent upon consideration of the intertwined historical legacies of the Greek and Turkish nations, and the states they have created.

Thus the discord that today affects the relationship of Greece and Turkey is one which antedates America’s emergence as a post World War II superpower with strategic interests in Greece and Turkey. The protracted nature of the discord is a manifestation of conflicting Greek and Turkish interests traced to their intertwined historical legacies to which the United States became a party; first peripherally, as an observer, as one actor in the international system and, then, as the protective patron state attempting to manage the conflict toward a rational end in the interest of collective defense.

The purpose of this brief essay is not to narrate play-by-play events involving the United States, Greece and Turkey in the pre-World War II era, but to develop an overview of United States policy in the years between the two world wars in an attempt to frame the early picture...
of what later was labelled a triangle. In its observer role the United States, had, on two occasions, experienced domestic political pressure which sought direct participation in the affairs between Greeks and Turks: the 1821 Greek struggle for independence and the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922. In each instance the government rejected the pressure, but the experience largely formed the American public’s perception of Greeks and Turks and the reality of linkage.

In this essay, I wish to stress the “doctrine of the separate spheres” as the underpinning of United States policy in the years between the two world wars. Such is the thesis, in its simplest form, advanced in the paragraphs ahead.

To Edmund Burke, the formation of the United States of America was tantamount to the creation of a new and different political species. Its newness was in its republican system — distinct from the polities of Europe — its difference was in the American people’s attitude and belief in their republican system as a portent of the future. For most of American history, that is, until the Second World War, the principal idea that shaped the American mind and the nation’s perception of its place in the international setting was the “doctrine of the separate spheres.” It’s called a doctrine because it became a part of the American mind, a creed separating politically, as well as psychologically, the New World from the Old World and something to be taught to every generation. The doctrine, which George Washington helped define in his Proclamation of Neutrality (1793) and Farewell Address (1796), was incorporated by President James Monroe in his State of the Union Address in 1823. Thereafter it came to be called the Monroe Doctrine, which is, perhaps, the most familiar — if not most celebrated — of all the doctrines named after presidents who have come to symbolize and particularize interests and objectives of United States foreign policy (for example, the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines). Interestingly enough, the Monroe Doctrine was not considered very important at the time and certainly was not taken very seriously beyond America’s borders. Nevertheless, it helped define America’s superintending interest in foreign affairs even if it was little more than expedient to address the diplomatic situation of the moment and the requisites of national politics.

In the idiosyncratic context of nineteenth century American politics, the doctrine of the separate spheres truly separated the so-called “unregulated” polities of the Old World from the so-called “regulated” polities of the New World. The distinction was predicated on constitutionalism: the regulated state was one with a constitution limiting governmental power and protecting the rights and liberties of its citizens. In practice, this distinction justified the President of the United States declining the invitation of the Czar of Russia (the unregulated polity) to join the Holy Alliance. The declination underscored the principle: European and American polities (the Americas included the newly independent republics of South America) should be kept as separate as possible in political affairs. In 1823, when several American philhellenes suggested direct United States involvement in the Greek struggle for independence, the government declined. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams’ implacable advice to President Monroe: “Make an American course (of neutrality) and adhere inflexibly to that” supporting the declination became the dictum upon which the nation’s superintending interest was carried into the twentieth century.

The American experience in the First World War moved the nation from unconcern with Europe’s troubles through economic involvement to military participation. And participation as the “associated power,” in contrast to an allied power, was rationalized by the doctrine of the separate spheres. For most Americans, United States entry in the Great War was viewed with a sense of duty rather than enthusiasm. To be sure, some viewed participation as an adventure and something of a crusade, most considered the experience as an interference with normal routine. Thus, at the end of the war, most Americans displayed an inutility nurtured by the doctrine making congressional rejection of membership in the League of Nations quite simple. It follows, then, that the doctrine rationalized the government’s rejection of the Armenian mandate; it rationalized non-entanglement in the Greek-Turkish war; it rationalized observer status at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23; and it rationalized a separate Turko-American treaty. In short, United States participation in World War I was viewed as a temporary aberration from the doctrine. Despite the seemingly overall inclination toward isolationism, the several administrations of the interwar years succeeded in avoiding outright policies of parochialism.

It was within this context that the question of the Greco-Turkish war (1919-22) became an issue that the government faced in tandem with two broader Near East considerations: the Eastern Question and the resumption of Turkish-American relations. The doctrine placed both Greece and Turkey within the old sphere of Europe and, therefore,

1See Theodore A. Coulombe, The United States, Greece and Turkey (New York, 1983).


3Ibid. p. 199.

4S. J. Raphalides, "The United States and the Question of the Greco-Turkish War, 1919-1922," Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 8 (1982-83) 177-89.
separated them from the political interests of the United States. Their relations and tribulations were characteristic of Balkan and European politics. In principle, relations with each state were governed largely by American economic and humanitarian interests. Turkey attracted the interest of the business community because of its economic potential. Religious and educational groups were attracted too by the potentiality offered them in Turkey’s heterogeneous population. Comparatively Turkey was the focus of most of America’s economic and humanitarian interests in the region.

Yet of the two states Greece occupied the special place in the American mind. During its conflict with Turkey, for example, an influential editorial hailed the “great opportunity” the Greeks had to attain national unity and that for the “first time in eight or nine centuries the world will see a Hellas really new and truly great.” 5 In May of 1920, the Senate of the United States adopted a resolution calling upon the Paris peace conference to award Greece not only the twelve islands of the Aegean and the Greek portion of the western coast of Asia Minor, but also Northern Epirus. 6 The apogee of public sentiment in behalf of the Greeks was reached with the burning of Smyrna in September of 1922 and the revelation of atrocities committed by the Turks against the largely Greek and Christian population in Asia Minor, especially after the retreat of the Greek forces. 7

But neither the special regard for Greece, ancient or modern, nor the economic and humanitarian interest in Turkey was sufficient enough to override the American disposition for separation. The United States extended sympathy and humanitarian assistance to the Greeks, and other minorities in the Ottoman state, and provided diplomacy in their behalf. But it maintained the “American course” and adhered inflexibly to it even as it practiced a curious blend of traditional idealism and pragmatism. Consider, for example, the Harding Administration’s goals at the Lausanne Conference: 1) capitulations; 2) protection of American educational, philanthropic and religious institutions; 3) protection of American commercial interests; 4) claims and damages.


7 There exists a plethora of eyewitness accounts (as well as heresay) about the burning of Smyrna, the looting and atrocities committed against the Greek and Christian population, and the “violation” of American property and institutions. For example, see George Horton, The Blight of Asia (New York, 1926), pp. 126-54 and 272-7; V. Dabney, Dry Messiah: The Life of Bishop Cannon (New York, 1949).

5) protection of minorities; 6) freedom of the Straits; 7) international control; and 8) archeological research. 8 In short, the focus of American policy in the 1920s was fixed on one question: How can its humanitarian and economic interests in the Near East be protected without assuming correlative political responsibilities or entanglements?

Although the United States emerged from World War I as recognized power in the world, its foreign policy of the interwar years was of the unilateral approach to international responsibility. For example, on one occasion, in 1924, an American delegation participating in a League of Nations conference aimed at restricting the world-wide opium traffic, walked out of a committee meeting to avoid implying United States recognition of the League. This “independent internationalism,” as Joan Hoff Wilson describes the blend of traditional idealism and pragmatism, underscored the general climate of distrust of Europe while it permitted several administrations to demonstrate that the United States was capable of fulfilling its moral and ethical concepts in international affairs. 9 The United States practiced its independent internationalism selectively and at different levels of economic and political activity, as it scrupulously avoided the entanglements of the greater problems of international affairs.

Given the refusal to participate in the League of Nations, the United States sought to conduct its foreign relations through a series of conferences and bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties. They were grounded in a formula developed earlier by Secretary of State Elihu Root (1905-9). However, they were not very effective as instruments of diplomacy. Among the more notable activities which engaged American sentiment was the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva (1926-32), and the question of whether the United States should join the Permanent Court of International Justice (World Court). Less notable was participation in conferences for the regulation of international traffic in arms (1925); communications and transit (1927); economic statistics (1928); countefeiting currency (1929); codification of international law (1930); and buoyage and lighting of coasts (1930). In sum, the United States championed neutralism, unilateralism and economic growth as its contribution to international stability.

Concentrating on its economic interests, the United States favored the Open Door policy in Asia (with the exception of the Philippines) and the Near East, even as it vigorously pursued trade and investments...
in near monopoly fashion in Latin America, the separate sphere. With widespread interests of a nonpolitical and nonmilitary nature, relations with Greece and Turkey were largely limited to various bilateral matters affecting private interests directly. Given United States policy, there were, clearly, no overarching issues seriously linking the three states in the interwar years. In the context of international politics, for example, United States interest in Turkey was limited to two issues of modest concern: the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the question of passage through the Turkish Straits. In each case, neutralism (grounded in the doctrine of the separate spheres) was the guiding principle in American policy.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) was the United States’ greatest contribution to peace in the interwar years. Along with the bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties, it formed the “American substitutes for the League.” The effort to secure Turkey’s ratification of the pact was part of the diplomatic goal to internationalize the accord and compensate for the American rejection of the League of Nations. Public sentiment of the accord was very favorable because the United States “once more had put its weight in the scales of righteousness.” On July 24, 1929, the representatives of Greece and Turkey joined with their counterparts of the other signatory states in a much publicized White House ceremony.

In the case of the Turkish Straits, the Treaty of Lausanne mandated an international zone and commission for the strategic waterway. Never satisfied with the provisions of the treaty since its ratification, Turkey persistently sought revisions. The increase in tension in the international arena of the 1930s provided the Turks with the diplomatic opportunity to press the international community for revisions. Mussolini’s “indiscreet remarks concerning the Mediterranean as ‘mare nostrum’ and his undisguised ambitions in the Near East, together with the Italian possession of the strategic Dodecanese Islands just off the Turkish coast filled Turkish leaders with grave anxiety.” Alarmed by the failure of the collective security system under the League of Nations, Turkey sought to receive “definite support” for its request to revise the treaty from the Balkan Entente. Since the Greeks were equally alarmed about Italian designs in the region, Greece strongly supported the position taken by the Balkan Entente. As a result, in the summer of 1936, both Greece and Turkey began to initiate cautiously pragmatic diplomatic moves toward securing their mutual security interests in the region.

The revision of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Montreux Convention, in July of 1936, was a major achievement for the Turks, since it restored full control over the Straits to Turkey. Regaining the right to remilitarize the Straits, Turkey strengthened its position in the Aegean littoral and Black Sea region. The Convention also granted Greece the right to remilitarize the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. (It is interesting to note that the remilitarization of the two Greek islands only became a point of contention with Turkey in 1974, in conjunction with its Aegean dispute with Greece an invasion of the Republic of Cyprus.) When Italy refused to sign the Montreux Convention, Greek and Turkish apprehensions increased, thus facilitating a period of reconcilia
tion between them. In sum, Italy’s behavior strongly influenced the mutuality of Greek and Turkish security interests; a treaty of friendship and neutrality between the two states was signed in 1938.

United States interest in the Montreux Convention was limited to the principles of the 1830 Constantinople Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and those of the 1923 Lausanne Convention. In the Constantinople accord, the commercial passage of the Turkish Straits, and the Black Sea for United States merchant vessels was secured. In the Lausanne Convention, the international community’s freedom of commerce and navigation of the Turkish Straits were reaffirmed. Although the United States was not a signatory state to the multilateral treaty, it did sign a separate agreement with Turkey, in August of 1923. Through Article X of the Turkish-American accord, commercial vessels and aircraft and war vessels and aircraft of the United States enjoyed “complete liberty of navigation and passage in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus, on a basis of equality with similar vessels and aircraft of the most favored-nation upon conforming to the rules relative to such navigation and passage established by the convention signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923.”

To safeguard its interests, as well as its unilateral position in international affairs, the United States sought from Turkey assurances that the privileges contained in the Montreux Convention of 1936 were extended to all states — signatory and nonsignatory. As a result of Turkey’s positive response to American concerns, the United States ambassador notified the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, that the United States “need feel no anxiety about the continued enjoyment by our
shipping of the benefits of the regime."118

American concerns in Greece, beyond the strictly humanitarian and cultural interests, were limited to Greece’s World War I debt to the United States — which was part of the larger problem of interallied war debt — and the question of naturalization.

In the aftermath of World War I, the issue of the interallied governmental war debt became a point of considerable discord between the United States and the debtor states of Europe. As a debtor state, Greece’s obligation was small compared to that of Great Britain and France. Nevertheless Greece was part of the overall problem. During the war years of 1914-17, the allied powers borrowed heavily from private sources in the United States. With United States entry into the war, in 1917, the government provided additional loans to the Europeans through its liberty and victory bond programs. Approximately seven billion dollars was borrowed during the conflict and an additional three billion after the war’s end. What had earlier appeared as an understanding for repayment between creditor and debtor was, by the mid-1920s, reinterpreted by the major allied powers, causing the issue “to raise a wall of antagonism between the United States and its debtor nations.”119

Because of the severe economic problems of the debtor states, they ceased paying the interest on the governmental (public) loans until the rates were reduced from the five percent level. The United States attempted to deal with the problem by creating the World Foreign Debt Commission (1923-30) and by holding to the position that all nations must honor their obligations. In the American mind, the sanctity of a contract was inviolate, to be abided by as a matter of a nation’s honor and good will. Subsequently interest rates were renegotiated and readjusted to an average 2.135 percent, with the principal loan payable over a sixty-two year period. In all, the principal and interest would have come to over 22 billion dollars.20

The general problem of the war debts was compounded for all the parties because of its linkage to German reparations under the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the League of Nations. Raising more than 10 billion dollars, largely by the sale of victory and liberty bonds, meant that the burden would fall upon the American taxpayer through the increase of the public debt. That was considered politically unacceptable, as was illustrated by President Coolidge’s rejoinder to the United States’ reparation delegation: “Remember you are Americans.”21 Not until the summer of 1931 did the United States accept a limited moratorium on both reparations and war debts, while the allied powers remained adamant in linking the two. As a consequence, with the expiration of the American moratorium on the semiannual debt installment, due in December of 1932, several states defaulted. Only Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania paid the installment. And, after 1933, only Finland continued paying its debt.

The reaction of the Congress was swift: the passage of the Johnson Debt Default Act (1934), which barred defaulting war debt states from floating loans in the United States.22 Thus Greece, as a defaulting state over the war debt, would have been prohibited from floating any additional loans until it complied with the terms of a repayment settlement mutually agreed upon, in 1927, by the representatives of the American and Greek governments. Approval by the Greek Parliament and the Congress of the United States was required, however.

As a signatory state to the Tripartite Loan Agreement of Paris (1918), Greece was subjected to the authority of the International Financial Commission (IFC), which functioned as a political instrument for British and French interests. To the Greeks, a settlement with the United States was viewed as a means of countering traditional great power interference in their domestic affairs.23 An earlier financial arrangement between Poland and American financiers was considered a model by the Greeks. A comparable arrangement, they believed would replace the IFC as the comptroller, relieving French and British political pressure on Greece and “greatly simplifying the tasks of the Government, and result in considerable economy as well.”24 According to the American Minister in Greece, if the private sector were permitted to float an issue of refunding bonds for Greece, American interest in the Aegean region would be enhanced. In addition to opening a new field of investment for American capital, the undertaking “would bring varied resources of the United States more conspicuously to the attention of the people of Greece than is now the case, and by removing Hellenic finances entirely from the domain of European politics, would prevent the granting of concessions and the like from being dealt with hereafter on other than strictly economical grounds.”25

On February 6, 1928, President Coolidge approved the plan of

20Ibid. p. 510.
21Ibid. pp. 511-12.
23USFR, 1928, 3, p. 2.
24Ibid. pp. 2-3.
settlement. He recommended to the Congress that it provide the requisite legislation authorizing the repayment settlement and new loans. According to the President, the funds were "to be used exclusively for construction work of great humanitarian as well as economic value." The loan to Greece, he declared, "discharges what the Greek Government has consistently contended is a legal and moral commitment of our Government."

The $12,167,000 loan proposed by Greece was to be turned over to the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) in carrying out its work with the Greek refugees of Asia Minor, the victims of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-22. Despite its humanitarian purpose, the support of prominent citizens (for example, Charles B. Eddy, Chairman of the RCS, Henry Morethau and Charles P. Howland, a well as American business interests lobbying "their friends in Congress," and the recommendation of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, there was some sentiment in the Congress in opposition to the proposed settlement plan. After considerable delay, the House of Representatives approved the Greek war settlement, on December 10, 1928. The Senate passed the measure on February 9, 1929. It was signed in Washington, on May 10, 1929, by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Greek Minister, Charalambos Simopoulos.

In tandem with the issue of the Greek war debt was the difference that emerged between the United States and Greece over American citizens of Greek ethnic origin who acquired American naturalization subsequent to January 14, 1914. In 1927, the Greek government regarded as Greek citizens "all persons of Greek origin born in Turkish territory" or territory annexed by Greece. And "persons born in the United States of Greek parentage whose fathers were not regarded as American citizens at the time of their children's birth (were also) held to be Greek citizens." In short, the government of Greece was impressing men into their military service who, under its law, were Greek citizens and, under American law, were citizens of the United States.

The issue nearly disrupted the normally good relations between the United States and Greece when two naturalized Americans of Greek ethnic origin who were born in Turkey, and a native of New York City of Greek parentage, were prohibited from leaving Greece after their brief visits. Part of the problem was attributable to the lack of a naturalization treaty between the United States and Greece. In addition, there was the complication of the (Orthodox) Greek refugees from Asia Minor, whose nationality was governed by the convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations and the protocol of January 30, 1923, signed at Lausanne.

Greece was influenced in its behavior by the general climate of insecurity of the 1920s. In the context of Balkan (and European) politics, the Greek government's concerns were not limited to its adversary, Turkey. They included Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (with Bulgaria, friction over the exchange of populations in the disputed region of Macedonia). In October of 1925, for example, Greek forces entered Bulgarian territory over the Macedonian population issue. Because of the intervention of the League of Nations, the Greeks were forced to withdraw and pay an indemnity.

For the United States, the controversy with Greece was a minor irritant largely because earlier proposals made by the government regarding a naturalization treaty "had not been seriously considered . . . and . . . the suggestion had been turned aside without adequate explanation." However, as a result of the lobbying efforts of individual Greek-Americans and Greek-American societies, the Department of State decided to act before the matter became "disastrous to good relations."

In keeping within the framework of American policy during this period, the government looked initially to a bilateral naturalization treaty with Greece. In the American proposal, persons who were born in Turkey and who were Turkish subjects and renounced allegiance to Turkey at the time of their naturalization as citizens of the United States were excluded. In his remarks to the American Minister in Greece, Secretary of State Kellogg reasoned that it did "not seem appropriate to include such cases in a treaty concerning persons who were admitted nationals of either country before their naturalization in the other." However, the effort to persuade the Greek government to

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26 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Doc. No. 51, "Funding of the Greek War Debt to the United States" (1928), p. 2501; 70th Congress, 1st Session, House, "Greek War Debt Settlement," Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, HR 10760.
27 USFR, 1928, 3, pp. 4-8.
28 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
29 As of February, 1928, Secretary of State Kellogg was unable to gauge the strength of Congressional opposition to the settlement plan and so informed Robert Skinner, the United States Minister in Greece. Skinner responded with concern. Failure, he believed, the United States Minister in Greece. Skinner directed Kellogg to give the Greek government assurances that the executive branch remained committed to the agreement and only "the domestic political situation (was) solely responsible for the delay of Congress in acting on the settlement." USFR, 1928, 3, pp. 8-10, passim.
31 Ibid., p. 27.
32 Ibid., p. 30.
change its policy failed. The problem was the absence of a consensus in the Greek government, with the military adamantly opposed to any change in policy for reasons of security.\textsuperscript{34}

As a result of the stalemate, the United States looked to the Hague Conference of International Law (March-April, 1930) because both Greece and the United States had signed its Protocol (Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality). According to Article 1 of the Protocol, “a person possessing two or more nationalities who habitually resides in one of the countries whose nationality he possesses, and who is in fact most closely connected with that country, shall be exempt from all military obligations in the other country or countries.” It seemed the Protocol eliminated the major points of difference between Greece and the United States. However, the accord was not to take effect “until ninety days after the date on which ratifications or accessions on behalf of ten members of the League of Nations or non-members has been deposited.” From May through December of 1930, there were no ratifications or accessions. Despite that fact the United States was encouraged by the common ground and assumed that the Greek government was, “in principle, in agreement with the American point of view on the question of military service” and looked toward alternative arrangements until the Protocol came into force.\textsuperscript{35}

However, it was not until May 25, 1937 that the Protocol was registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. In an interim arrangement, the Greek government extended its unilateral policy of “amnesty” (first granted on March 1, 1929) for the remainder of 1930.\textsuperscript{36} Encouraged the United States requested the exemption be extended to include 1931. Greece complied. A similar request was denied for 1932, in which case the State Department issued a travel advisory warning to all American citizens of Greek origin and all naturalized citizens born in territory that became part of Greece to inquire at a Greek consular office in the United States about “information as to their exact status with respect to alleged Greek military obligations.”

To be sure, change in the international arena was occurring swiftly. Alarmed by the turn of events and the idea that Germany and Japan were contemplating a military alliance, President Franklin Roosevelt, in 1938, requested and received from the Congress a billion dollar naval appropriation to develop a two-ocean navy. Despite the administration’s concern, most Americans continued to be preoccupied by the depression. Enveloped by the effects of it in their personal hardships, few ordinary Americans could afford the time or had the inclination to follow the course of international affairs.

In 1935, those sentiments were echoed in the Congress which moved to try and insulate the United States from the increasingly tense international arena. Louis Ludlow, Democrat of Indiana, introduced a resolution in the House which proposed an amendment to the Constitution: “Except in the event of an invasion of the United States or its territorial possessions, the authority of Congress to declare war should not become effective until confirmed by a majority vote in a national referendum.” In 1938, the Ludlow Amendment was nearly voted out of committee. Only the personal intercession of the President to the Speaker of the House prevented it.\textsuperscript{38} Although most Americans professed a belief in nonentanglement in the affairs of the Old World, the events of 1939 slowly developed sentiment in support of internationalism.

In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was subjected to geopolitical pressures because of its control of the strategic Straits. The international situation was threatening to Greece as well especially with Italy’s occupation of Albania, in 1939, and Germany’s support of Italy and the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of the same year. Turkey’s neutrality was made more difficult. As a result, Turkey moved closer to the western allies especially when, in September of 1939, the Soviet Union demanded a modification of the Montreux Convention for joint control over the Straits. On October 19, 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish alliance was signed even though Turkey continued its nonbelligerent status. In June, 1940, the situation for Turkey grew more precarious with Italy’s attack on Greece, and the German advance into Romania and Bulgaria. By April of 1941, the German armies entered Greece. In early 1941, President Roosevelt sent William J. Donovan to the region as a show of United States concern. Just three days before the American entry into the war, on December 7, 1941, the defense of Turkey was publicly declared as vital to the national interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{39}

We have seen the American idea, the doctrine of the separate spheres, in its functional form in the interwar years. The variety of descriptive terms (chiefly isolationism, neutralism, unilateralism and independent internationalism) used by policymakers at the time, and analysts since, suggests two encompassing facets of the foreign policy...
process: continuity and change. They are rooted in the tension between the demands imposed by the American ethos and legacy, on the one hand, and the exigencies of a circumstantially dynamic world on the other.

When President Harding declared, "We seek no part in directing the destinies of the old World (and) we do not mean to be entangled," he was simply amplifying a very confident, but exaggerated attitude in the nation's ability to shape its own destiny in the international arena. Within two decades President Roosevelt suggested a very different picture, one in which the United States could no longer consider its own problems of security a separate interest. That is why, with the American government declaring Turkey vital to the national interest of the United States and extending Lend-Lease assistance, a new course in policy for the United States in the eastern Mediterranean was made, it laid the foundation for United States political and military involvement with Greece and Turkey. At the time, the coefficient of friction among the three states was negligible but that, as we have come to know, was short lived.

HAGEN FLEISCHER

IT IS NOT WITHOUT HESITATION, THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO BEGIN this lecture with a piece of personal biography. In 1971/72, while preparing my Ph.D on the Fascist occupation in Greece, I encountered the name Waldheim in the records several times. The name in question is not common in the German-speaking world, nevertheless this could have been a coincidence. However, at the same time, I made dozens of interviews with former Greek guerilla leaders as well as with veterans of the Wehrmacht. In the course of discussion, two of the latter confirmed to me that the young intelligence officer of the German General Staff in the Balkans was indeed the same man as the ambitious politician who at that very time was trying to further his career in Austrian politics and then, after a setback in the presidential elections, had jumped back to the international scene, successfully campaigning for the vacant post of UN Secretary-General. From one of these officers, at one time his direct superior, I got a photograph showing Waldheim, together with his staff, in Athens—a picture which, in 1986, would go round the world, since it is to date the only one known from occupied Greece.

However, I 'd made those inquiries rather out of personal curiosity, adding a piece to my personal collection of odd bits of information about the curricula of famous people—just as I had noted that among the Orthodox archbishops of Greece during the last half century one had been a professional wrestler, another an outstanding figure in intelligence work, a third had served in the dubious role of father confessor in civil war concentration camps, while the incumbent dignitary had been a guerilla fighter.

Somewhere in the same category I classified Kurt Waldheim. I was convinced, and my professor, whom I consulted, agreed with me, that