The Rise and Fall of the Greek Military Regime: 1967-1974

CONSTANTINE ARVANITOPULOS

THE DEMISE OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE IN the 1970s generated a substantial body of research and scholarly interest on the causes, dynamics, and probable outcomes of such crises of authoritarianism. This body of research became increasingly relevant in the 1990s when Eastern European scholars and practitioners looked upon the Southern European experiences to draw lessons applicable to their own transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.

Although a bewildering number of suggestions, hypotheses, and variables have been put forward to analyze the political problems that led these regimes to crisis, two main types of research can be identified. One has attributed significance to the regimes' internal contradictions. Spain represents the archetypal example of this category. The longevity of the Francoist regime and its successful institutionalization have oriented scholarly analysis in the internal dynamics of the constellation of forces that shaped and sustained this regime and the contradictions that eventually forced it to initiate the process of a "guided transition" to democracy. The other type of research has focused on external crises as the determining cause of such regime failures. Greece represents the archetypal example of this category. Indeed, the short life of the Greek dictatorship has propelled analysts writing on the subject to focus on the July 1974 Cyprus crisis as the single most important factor for the fall of the military regime. Despite its proclaimed theoretical significance and comparative validity, however, most of the literature on the Greek military regime has been descriptive.

This article will offer an analysis of the Greek military regime as a system of government and will examine the political problems which eventually forced it to withdraw to the barracks and initiate the process
of transition towards civilian rule. I do accept that the Cyprus crisis represents the most catalytic factor "directly and decisively influencing the actions of protagonists, limiting choices, imposing certain courses of action and precluding others." It is the major contention of this article, however, that the military regime's failure to institutionalize and legitimize itself had severely limited its options even before the Cyprus crisis and had posed major obstacles to the continuation of its rule.

In the first part of this article I will substantiate my claim that the Greek military regime in 1967 was a praetorian military regime of the ruler type. I contend that the Greek regime, far from maintaining the status quo, attempted to deeply penetrate and change significant aspects of the political, economic, and social system. The effort took place in three phases. The first phase (April 21-December 13, 1967) was a reactive phase where the military regime successfully destroyed the institutions and practices of its predecessor civilian regime. It dissolved the Parliament, all political parties, the institution of the monarchy, and it upheld articles of the Constitution. Also, the military made clear that it had no intention of returning to the barracks.

The second phase (December 14, 1967-November 25, 1973) was foundational in the sense that the Greek military attempted to institutionalize. The institutionalization process took the form of two successive Constitutional efforts, which aimed at creating new political patterns of succession, control and participation. The regime also tried to formulate a coherent ideology, in its attempt to create a significant degree of Gramscian "hegemonic acceptance" in civil society. I will analyze those two phases focusing on the regime's governmental performance and its efforts to institutionalize and legitimize itself.

In the last phase (November 25, 1973-July 23, 1974) I will focus on the gradual process of the regime's demise.

The Three Phases of the Military Regime
1. The Reactive Phase: Undermining the institutions of the pre-

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2 To classify the Greek military regime I have used Nordin's taxonomy, which identifies guardian, moderator, and ruler type military regimes based on two criteria: the extent to which the military control the major policies of the society and the degree of overtness with which they do so. See Eric Nordin, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood NJ, 1971). Similar typologies have been proposed by Huntington in "Political Order in Changing Societies" (New Haven, 1968); and Finer in "The Man on Horseback-1974" Armed Forces and Society vol. 1, no. 1, November 1974.


4 Details of this plot were never made public. Moreover, wide searches of Communist headquarters and the houses of Communist members never substantiated the colonels' allegations that the Communists had accumulated large amounts of weapons to use in subversive activities. In their interviews by the author, conducted during the summer of 1988 in Athens, Colonels Mexia, Lekas, Gordanos, and Kambiris, close to the triumvirate (Papadopoulos, Parikos, and Makarezos) openly acknowledged that the Communist plot did not exist. However, justifying the military's intervention, they argued that the parliamentary right could no longer contain the political pendulum, which had swung to the left.

5 IDEA stands for Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axioamathiokon (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers). The organization was founded in 1944 and its purpose became the protection of the nation against Communist penetration. IDEA expanded rapidly after the end of the Civil War in 1949, as well as the military's victory against the Communists. It dominated the military, by controlling the recruitment of the officer corps, and in the control of the political and social policies of the Greek state, like KYP (State Intelligence Agency) and TEA (Battalions of National Security). IDEA's grievances were ideological rather than corporate and as explicitly stated in its Constitution, "the organization should establish a dictatorship if the political leaders were unable to protect the country's national interests, namely to contain communism."
April 18, 1967, however, that they finalized the leadership, its responsibilities, and the hierarchy of the group. It was then agreed that the coup would be led by the triumvirate of Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos. The three would become Minister under the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Co-ordination, respectively. At the base was the so-called "Revolutionary Council," whose exact number was never established. Indeed, its very existence is questionable, for Papadopoulos considered it a hindrance and never convened it. The only organ that functioned was the "Revolutionary Group," which numbered about fifteen colonels, and included the triumvirate at the top.

Once the military was in power, it proclaimed martial law and suspended articles of the Constitution guaranteeing human rights. Special courts martial were created, political parties and trade unions were abolished, strikes and public or private assemblies were prohibited, the media was censored, arrest and preventive detention without cause were authorized, searches in private houses were authorized, the leading political figures were imprisoned, and thousands of people with leftist political views were exiled to remote islands of the Aegean.

To justify the measures, Papadopoulos used his own variant of the medical metaphor, during an international press conference on April 27, 1967:

... we have here a sick man, whom we have on the operating table, and if the surgeon does not strap him down for the duration of the operation on the operating table, there is a possibility instead of the operation giving him the restoration of his health, it may lead to his death.

Having successfully strapped the "patient," the military started the operation. The "iron surgeons" would first extract from the "patient's" body the unhealthy institutions, and replace them with new healthy, comparable structures. The regime's intentions to penetrate polity, economy, and society became immediately obvious as well as its inten-...
tion for its coup, but nothing was found. The other two main political parties, Center Union and the rightist EARE together with their youth organizations were abolished. Their leaders, the elder Papandreou and Kanellopoulos, were placed under house arrest. Andreas Papandreou, the leader of Center Union’s left wing, following his release, went abroad. The abolition of the political parties and the discrediting of their leaders was followed by the natural destruction of all bonds of personal connections and patron-client relationships that existed in Greek politics.12

The military remained ambivalent toward the institution of the monarchy. The King’s residual popularity in the armed forces discouraged the Colonels from deposing him. Moreover, the legitimacy and recognition that his presence provided to the new regime, both at home and abroad, made him temporarily useful to the military regime. For those reasons the Colonels initially expressed the willingness to cooperate with the King, however, on their own terms. The King, when presented with a fait accompli, rejected the urgings of his last constitutional Prime Minister to resist the conspirators.13 Instead, he reluctantly acquiesced to the establishment of the dictatorship apparently hoping to exert a moderating influence. The only concession he received was the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister, Constantine Kollias, a chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, instead of a general. It soon became apparent, however, that the new civilian Prime Minister was a mere puppet; the real power lay in the hands of the triumvirate.14

When the King realized that he had been stripped of every power and that he could exert very little, if any, influence, he chose a posture of disguised hostility toward the junta while aiming to restore his lost popularity.15 He toured the countryside alone referring to “the government,” while conspicuously refraining from calling it “my government.” His strategy was to temporarily yield to the colonels in order to buy time and organize some form of counter-attack. He did

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12 Keith Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, pp. 322-33; C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, pp. 33-40; Solon Grigoriadis, I Istoria tis Diktatiorias, pp. 100-22.

13 The King demanded to see his last Constitutional Prime Minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, before making any decision. Kanellopoulos, who was detained by the junta in the Greek Pentagon, urged him to resist the colonels before they consolidated their power. He thought that if the King was very popular among the military and he could generate a lot of support against the conspirators. See Kanellopoulos, Istoria Dokimia, p. 183; The King’s account of the meeting is similar. See his interview by Cyrus Sulzberger in The New York Times, May 3, 1967.


15 See King Constantine’s interview by Cyrus Sulzberger in The New York Times on May 3, 1967.

16 These were: Lieutenant-General C. Kollias (unrelated to the then Prime Minister), who commanded the First Army in Larissa; Lieutenant-General G. Peridis, commanding III Corps; Brigadier O. Vasilis, who was still Chief of Staff at III Corps; and Brigadier A. Evangelis, commanding 20 Armoured Division at Komotini. The King also tried to solicit the support of former politicians. Papandreou and Kanellopoulos promised to support the King and so did Averoff and Mavros. Karamanlis from his exile in Paris told him not to attempt the coup.

17 Solon Grigoriadis, I Istoria tis Diktatiorias, pp. 149-90; C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, pp. 43-48; Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, pp. 188-89; Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, pp. 230-32; The King’s account of the coup was given in an interview to Cyrus S. Sulzberger, published in The New York Times on February 13, 1968.

launch a counter-coup on December 13, 1967, with the help of his few supporters remaining in the military.16 The plan was so badly organized that it had little chance of success. The junta, as it came to be known, was aware of the King’s plans and was able to design counter-measures. The Colonels had carefully isolated him, gradually removing most of his loyal officers. Moreover, the operation was not a surgical strike designed to capture the most important centers of power, surprise and paralyze the regime. It was an operation that aimed to capture Northern Greece and then capture the capital. That was a fatal strategic mistake which gave the colonels enough time to prepare and also made clear to the King that his coup could only succeed if he were prepared to countenance bloodshed. In view of this, the King flew to Rome with his family and prime minister Kollias. His counter-coup had collapsed.17

The failed royal counter-coup and King’s escape made the colonels’ efforts toward consolidation much easier. The abortive counter-coup was followed by further purges in the armed forces. The junta retained the monopolial institutions, installing a general, Zoitakis, as a regent. Papadopoulos, one of the triumvirate, became prime minister and gradually emerged as the strong man of the regime.

By then, the colonels felt confident enough to cast off the facade of the civilian government. They made clear that their intention was to stay in power for a long time. In this respect, the 1967 coup differed significantly from the prewar short military interventions. This regime was not operating in favor of any political group. It was a ruler military regime with no intentions of handing power over to civilians.

The Civil Society

Having concentrated power, by destroying the Monarchy and the parliamentary institutions, the dictators continued to decimate the democratic institutions, which they had inherited. They carried out wide purges in the civil sector. These purges affected primarily government offices, education, and the judicial system. Civil servants were deprived
of their security of tenure by decree. The educational system was decimated, especially at the higher levels; nearly sixty professors and associate professors were dismissed under the dictatorship. Officers, loyal to the junta, infiltrated government departments at the rank of Security-General, and retired officers were appointed as Commissioners (epitropoi) in every institute of higher education. The Commissioners’ function was to monitor what was taught and report on the political views of professors and students. Moreover, a list of 760 forbidden books (including works by Sophocles, Aristophanes and Shakespeare) was published. Similarly, in the judicial body, incompetent judges and prosecutors were dismissed.  

In the Church, Archbishop Chrysostomos was forced to resign. He was replaced by the Archimandrite Ieronymos, who carried out an ecclesiastical purge of his own.  

On May 4, 1967, 270 organizations, three federations, and three labor centers were abolished. Trade unions were dissolved and their assets confiscated. The dictatorship found a legalistic method to get rid of the leadership of the syndicalist organizations. Through the legislative decree no. 185/1969, every leader of a syndicalist organization should have accumulated a record of at least 600 days’ wages in the last six years, besides his administrative duties. Since most syndicalist leaders were unable to provide such a record they were forced to resign and were replaced by junta loyalists. The dictatorship, however, did not touch the Association of Greek Industries and the Union of the Greek Shipowners. All representative institutions at the lower levels of the state were eliminated. Intermediate organizations, such as the Union of Comunes and Municipalities, were disbanded and all local officials were suspended. Local elections were prohibited. The country was divided into seven administrative regions and a governor with the rank of undersecretary was appointed to each district. This was an attempt to ensure supervision of the entire apparatus of public administration operating in a given region. Most of these governors were selected from the group of the initial twelve members of the “Revolutionary Council.”  

The press was severely censored. The newspapers had to submit in advance anything they published. Numerous times they were forced to publish positive commentaries about the regime and its activities. For the editors who did not succumb to the pressure the penalty was severe; closing down of the newspaper. By May 1967 six newspapers were banned. Leading members of the Union of journalists were also detained or exiled.  


Until then the governing junta had managed to concentrate power. At the level of relations between the state and civil society, the system of mediation and representation had been eliminated without being replaced by a new order; the vacuum was filled by mechanisms of repression and social control. The dictators exercised power by ignoring all juridical limits and basing their claims to legitimacy on the permanent threat of Communist subversion. They realized, however, that repression and political control could not for long continue to be the only elements of relations between the state and civil society. A form of institutional legitimacy was needed; one, however, that would not do totally away with repression.  

Papadopoulos’ total lack of charisma precluded a legitimation strategy along the lines of Weber’s charismatic formula. Unlike other charismatic dictators, Papadopoulos never attained a popular following. The rest of the military officers involved in the coup were rarely visible and none of them was known to possess any extraordinary qualities to set him apart from ordinary men. Juan J. Linz’s observation  

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18See Keith Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, p. 234; Solon Gregoriadis, I Istoria tis Diktatouras, pp. 100-22; C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, p. 34.  

19See C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, pp. 115-18; C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, p. 34.  

20Among them were the Greek Organization for Peace and Detente; the Youth Organization for Nuclear Disarmament; and the Greek Movement for Balkan Co-operation. See the report produced by the Antidictatorial Labor Front, Erga kai Imera tis Houndas sto Horo tou Ellenikou Syndikatismou [Deeds and Days of the Junta in the Area of Greek Syndicalism], 1969.  


society had rendered the extreme aspects of anti-communism unappealing. On the other hand, the Parliamentary Right, the only political force that could support the military in its effort to sustain such an ideology, refused to do so. Consequently, instead of the hoped-for polarization of the society along "Communist" versus "non-Communist" lines, the society split between those who supported a constitutional form of government and those who supported paraconstitutional arrangements and military rule. This development resulted in the isolation of the military and posed an insuperable obstacle to the regime's legitimation efforts.29

Change of Legitimation Strategy

After the praetorians had failed to legitimize themselves with a traditional formula, they attempted to elicit legitimacy for their regime by fabricating a "constitutional-democratic" structure. They created formal institutions and arrangements to give the impression that the people were able to articulate and press their demands upon the government. They drafted a constitution, and they held plebiscites in which the government "received" the approval of more than 90 percent of those who cast their ballots. They also civilianized the regime in order to look more like a constitutional government. Finally, the regime called for the eventual restoration of a "healthy" and "regenerated" political system.30

The junta's promises for the eventual reestablishment of democratic political institutions is partly related to the international context within which the regime had to seek its legitimacy. In the 1930s, the crisis of liberal institutions gave Franco the opportunity to use fascism as an alternative model of political organization, which made his legitimation strategy easier. The prevailing international climate of the 1960s and 1970s however, in Europe and the Western World, was one of unequivocal rejection of fascism and military rule.31 Moreover, foreign governments and a large number of international organizations of which

29Kanellopoulos, the last Constitutional Prime Minister, in an interview with the author, in the summer of 1986, claimed that he felt imperative his party (the rightist ERE) did not support the military regime even in its anti-communist pronouncements. This signified a major blow for the military's legitimation strategy. Most of the higher military offices, whom I interviewed throughout 1988, admitted that the Right's outright rejection of the military regime proved detrimental to its legitimacy. On that point see Diamantouris, "Regime Change and Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983," p. 147.
Greece was a member reacted strongly to the imposition of military rule in the country. For example, the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland lodged complaints with the Council of Europe. The European Commission of Human Rights produced, in 1969, a well documented report showing that no threat to the Greek nation existed on the eve of April 21, 1967 to justify the imposition of dictatorship. In 1969, Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe just hours before a meeting of the Council of Ministers, during which Greece would almost certainly have been expelled. The international pressure and the failure of the traditional formula of legitimacy led the regime to adopt a rational-legal legitimation strategy by fabricating a constitutional facade.

The first constitution was drafted in 1968 by a committee of jurists, rather than a constituent assembly. The new constitution was a carefully formulated document which aimed to marshall the support of the two other groups that constituted the Greek Right, namely the Crown and the Parliamentary Right. Having secured its predominance in the triarchy, through its intervention, the military realized that it needed the legitimacy, which derived from the support of those two groups. The Constitution was, in effect, an attempt to placate those two groups by maintaining the so-called fundamental clauses of the 1952 Constitution intact. For this reason, the new Constitution retained the monarchical aspects of the old Constitution and it also offered the Parliamentary Right the familiar trappings of constitutional government, the reinstitution of parliamentary rule, and elections at the local level of communes and municipalities.

The liberal provisions of the Constitution, however, were counterbalanced by more authoritarian elements. The Constitution gave the military complete autonomy from the civilian government, which was rendered incapable of intervening in the internal affairs of the armed forces, including the promotion of officers at the highest levels. Moreover, the Constitution embodied a vastly expanded definition of "national security" giving the military the right to safeguard not only the independence and territorial integrity of the country, but the existing political and social order as well. Specifically, the Constitution declared the military the "guardian of the nation" with the right to intervene in areas outside of their domain when it perceived a threat to the existing political and social order. The intent was to grant the military a preponderant role in the political organization of civil society and to ensure the institutionalization of the Greek authoritarian regime.

A referendum was organized in September 1968 and the new Constitution was approved by 92% of the population. Immediately after the plebiscites, the colonels indefinitely suspended Article 138 of the Constitution regarding civil liberties and rights, the election of the new parliament, and the elections of municipal and communal authorities. The legislative branch was to be replaced by the government. Placing the Constitution in suspended animation the colonels bought themselves time in order to reconcile with the parliamentary Right and the Crown. Their effort was aimed at finding allies and formulating acceptable civilian parties to place the new system in operation, an act that would contribute decisively to the regime's chances of institutionalization and legitimation.

By 1973, however, the colonels found themselves isolated. The steady refusal of the King, from his exile in Rome, and the overwhelming majority of the Right to co-operate dealt the regime's legitimation a severe blow. Since these two conservative political sources were the only sources through which the military could elicit some support, their continuing refusal to make peace with the regime left the military with no mass following. More importantly, resistance at home and abroad against the military had increased. Because of the activities of exiled opponents and following their "withdrawal" from the Council of Europe, international pressure had increased. Andreas Papandreou had created an important resistance movement (PAK), which was very active against the regime. Constantine Karamanlis' few but strongly worded

33Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, p. 192. Although many members of the Council of Europe were also Greece's partners in NATO and members of the EEC, with which Greece had an association agreement, the EEC and NATO were not as critical of the regime as the Council of Europe.

34See fn. 239.

35Colonels Karameris and Mesis told me during an interview in the summer of 1988, that in the meetings of the "Revolutionary Group" Papadopoulos argued that in order for the regime to "survive it needs, if not the support at least the tacit tolerance of the Right and the King."
statements from Paris had further isolated the regime. In the United States, Elias P. Demetracopulos, a prominent Greek journalist, who escaped from Greece after the dictatorship had become a crusader against the Greek regime and its supporters in the States. Within Greece there were also notable instances of organized resistance. There was also an unsuccessful coup organized by proroyalist officers in the Navy in May 1973. The naval officers had the political backing of the exiled Karamanlis, the King, and a former ERE deputy and Karamanlis' confidante, E. Averoff. The plot signaled to Papadopoulos that he could no longer hope for the support of the parliamentary Right or of the King. The coup pointed out to the existence of dissident officers in the armed forces, who included not only the surviving loyalists to the old regime, but also, as it soon became evident, a group of hardliners loyal to Brigadier-General Dimitrios Ioannidis, leader of the powerful Military Police (ESM).

Frustrated by the steady refusal of the political figures to co-operate and faced with increasing opposition, home and abroad, George Papadopoulos, the regime's strongman, launched his last bid for legitimacy by presenting a new constitution that abolished the monarchy and prescribed a 'presidential-parliamentary republic.' Through the new Constitution, the dictator attempted to derive legitimacy by the repudiation of the monarchy. Papadopoulos hoped that since the monarchy had always been an intense and divisive issue of Greek politics, its repudiation would elicit the support of the staunch anti-monarchists and thus provide the regime with some form of legitimacy. Also, the new Constitution provided for the concentration of power in the hands of the President of the new Republic, a post that Papadopoulos himself filled. Most political figures, in Greece and abroad, denounced the proceeding, and promised that the Constitution would be submitted to a genuine plebiscite upon the removal of the junta. Spyros Markozinis, however, the leader of the tiny Progressive Party, announced that he would vote in favor of the new Constitution.

Papadopoulos' Constitution won a substantial majority. Under the new Constitution, the President of the Republic, elected for seven years, was vested with both legislative and executive powers in the areas of national defense, national security, public order, and foreign affairs. According to the Constitution, the Ministers were named by the President and were responsible only to him and not to the Parliament. The President was also the "Chief of the Armed Forces." In effect, through the Constitution of 1973 Papadopoulos created for himself a post of a superpresident before whom the elected representative of the country, in case elections did take place, would be practically powerless.

To strengthen the "evidence" that the "liberalization" process was genuine and to demonstrate that he was leading the country back to normalcy, Papadopoulos lifted the state of siege, gave a broad amnesty to political prisoners, put into effect some constitutional provisions of civil liberties, and declared that elections would be held no later than 1974. At the same time, Papadopoulos started negotiations with Markozinis, the only political figure to have voted in favor of the new Constitution, on the possibility of forming a quasi-political government. Markozinis, an ambitious conservative politician, finally accepted Papadopoulos' offer to form a government and lead the country to elections, within 1974. For a moment it seemed that Papadopoulos' search of legitimacy had received a major boost. The Markozinis government that was sworn in on October 8, 1973 represented the most serious achievement of the military regime in its efforts to attain legitimacy through liberalization and to institutionalize itself.

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39 Demetracopulos had been very instrumental convincing the Congress to impose an embargo against the dictatorship which lasted for three years. In fact he had become an "agitator" for Papadopoulos that the dictator openly attacked him by name
31 DA (Democratic Defense) and the Free Greeks were the most important groups of organized resistance. There were, however, other important isolated instances of resistance. Panayotis Kandopoulos, the last democratic premier, had made strong statements against the regime. Alexender Panagoulis, a layman-supporter of the Center Union, unsuccessfully tried to assassinate Papadopoulos. Finally, the most significant act of resistance became the student uprising in 1973, which was brutally repressed by the junta.
32 C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and the Fall of the Colonels, p. 112.
33 The plebiscite on Papadopoulos' new constitution was held on July 29, 1973. The question was presented in such a way that to vote "Yes" was not merely to accept a republican regime, but also to approve Papadopoulos as the first President. Papadopoulos had barred any opposition candidates. C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and the Fall of the Greek Colonels, p. 119; Solon Grigoriadis, I Istoria tis Diktatioras, vol. 2, pp. 260-75.
Following his appointment, Markezinis attempted to convince the civilian political elite about the genuineness of the "liberalization process" and the military's intentions to hold "impeccable elections." Most of the politicians, however, refused all contact, making clear that they were not prepared to tolerate a move towards a "guided" democracy, in which real power would still be held by Papadopoulos and the military. At the same time university students occupied university buildings in the cities of Athens, Salonica, and Patras. The students' grievances were initially centered around education and free student elections, but they soon acquired a broader political scope. The uprising soon started to attract popular sympathy and support. When the students started broadcasting appeals on a clandestine radio for a worker-student alliance to overthrow the dictatorship, Papadopoulos sent in troops and tanks to crush the students. The operation was carried out on November 17, with extreme brutality, and many students died, several hundred wounded, and thousands arrested. The student uprising coming at this delicate moment, shook the regime to its foundations, and obliged it to resort to even greater force.

This ruthless demonstration of violence in the center of Athens had a devastating effect on the regime's "liberalization process" and its legitimation strategy. The military, attributing the student revolt to a conspiracy by former politicians, reimposed martial law, and placed a number of them under house arrest.

The military regime had proved incapable of solving the classic dilemma that the "liberalization process" poses to most military regimes: "how to proceed with it so as to ensure the adherence of those segments of the population, which would contribute to the regime's legitimation; and, at the same time, contain it in such a way that regime consolidation would not be endangered, and its long-term prospects not undermined." The Polytechnic events showed the limits of this "liberalization process." The Polytechnic events sharpened the rift between the hard-liners and the military regime.


The Polytechnic events sharpened the rift between the soft-liners and the hard-liners in the Greek military. The rift had started in July 1973 with the introduction of the new Constitution. The hard-liners under Ioannidis, objected to the "liberalization" process and the introduction of the new Constitution for two reasons: the Constitution elevated Papadopoulos to supreme power and established the prospects of free elections. According to them, the "liberalization process" had led to the destabilizing student uprising and it was further leading to an electoral adventure. On November 25, 1973 they overthrew Papadopoulos and his government through a bloodless coup on the grounds that he had deviated from the principles of the "Revolution of 21 April 1967." Lieutenant-General Phaedon Gizikis was installed as President and a new government led by Adamantios Androulopoulos was formed. The strong man of the regime, however, was Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, the commander of the Military Police (ESA), which had acquired a fearsome and notorious reputation for its brutal treatment of the regime's opponents.

The new harsher version of the colonels' regime proved quite incapable of handling the political situation without resorting to increased repression and use of force. Broken, disoriented, and full of economic and political problems the regime drifted on for seven months before an external crisis brought it down for good. The Cyprus crisis, its dismal handling, and the subsequent reaction to it, revealed the ineptitude of the military regime and led to its profound delegitimation and its immediate collapse.

The Governmental Performance of the Military Regime

Besides the regime's failure to institutionalize and legitimize itself, another factor that proved detrimental to its existence was its governmental ineptitude. One of the governmental objectives set by the military regime was the reorganization of the bureaucratic apparatus. Papadopoulos argued that "our purpose is to proceed with the catharsis of the administrative machinery so it can become an organ competent to assist in the realization of the government's program." The

35 Elias P. Demetracopoulos in an interview to UPI immediately after the coup linked Papadopoulos' overthrow to the Watergate scandal and Nixon's and Agnew's fall from power: Markezinis in his memoirs makes the allegation that his overthrow was directly connected with his refusal to provide facilities to the American forces during the Yom Kippur war. Also see Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, p. 199; C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History, p. 303-304.

36 In July 1974, the Greek military regime launched a coup against the Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios. Consequently, Turkey, as a guarantor power, used its right to intervene to protect the Turkish minority and restore the Constitutional order on the island.

37 Papadopoulos, To Pistevo Mas, 1.18.
military's practices, internal structure, and lack of flexibility, however, rendered the bureaucratic machinery to a subservient, inefficient organ of the regime. The Colonels purged the civil service and replaced officials who they considered dangerous. High ministry officials were either overshadowed or replaced by military men or relatives and cronies of the Colonels. In addition, the regime placed a military "watch dog" in every ministry or bureau. These moves alienated the civil servants and deprived the regime of people with technological and communication skills. Without the support and expertise of the nation's administrative apparatus, it is not surprising that the junta's policies lacked efficacy.34

Another area of governmental failure was the regime's economic performance. The regime's five-year development plan, introduced to bring about economic development and just distribution of income, fell far short of its objectives. During the dictatorship the Greek economy experienced a slowdown in both industry and agriculture.35 The general retardation of growth in industry and agriculture aggravated the nation's chronic balance of payments problems. From 1967 to 1974, the average annual deficit rose from 3.6% of the gross domestic product to 7.4%, a figure the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development called "very high by historical standards."36 The public deficit increased significantly, as did tax exemptions for some of the more affluent groups. In 1973, the wholesale price index went up by 48.3%, while wages went up only 16.4%. To satisfy consumer demands, the regime allowed heavy importation of food, automobiles, and other luxury items. In order to pay for the ever-increasing volume of imports, the government was forced to borrow under burdensome terms. In turn, this new borrowing contributed to the deterioration of the balance of payments, increased the country's foreign debt, and brought about a galloping rate of inflation and general economic chaos.37 In short, the rapid economic development promised by the Colonels turned instead into an economic disaster contributing to the regime's delegitimation.38

Concluding Remarks

There can be no doubt that the Cyprus debacle was the immediate cause for the regime's collapse. Yet, it is the major contention of this article that the collapse of the military regime was a direct consequence of its failure to institutionalize and legitimize itself. The regime's institutionalization and legitimation strategy, articulated through the two aforementioned Constitutions, failed for a series of reasons:

1. The staunch antithesis of the two powerful segments of the Greek establishment, the King and the Parliamentary Right, to the military's institutional efforts meant, in effect, that the totality of the political forces in Greece did not accept the institutional framework proposed by the 1968 or the 1973 Constitutions. They rather directed their energies to resisting, eroding, or terminating that framework. Consequently, the regime was unable to establish new political patterns of succession, control, and participation.

2. The lack of support from the conservative segments of the Greek establishment deprived the military regime from extensive constituencies for its rule. Moreover, the Colonels never managed to create their own mass-party or movement, to elicit widespread support for their goals at the grass-roots level.39

3. The military was unwilling to abide by the Constitutional rules that they themselves promulgated. 40 Indeed, the Greek military regime never held elections for national, state, and local offices; elections for the Presidency in 1973 featured only one candidate; it appointed com-


35Efficacy denotes "the extent to which subordinate bodies can make and implement prompt and relevant decisions in response to internal demands and external challenges." See Eckstein and Gurr, Patterns of Authority: 453. As a result of this lack of efficacy and efficiency the military regime signed contracts and agreements, which it frequently proved unable to honor. The economic agreements with Litton Industries and with Greek shipping tycoons were the most obvious examples.

36The official statistics provided by the military regime showed a healthy annual growth rate over 7%. However, as many economists have argued, the junta juggled figures and reported erroneous statistical data to show that the economy was growing. This assertion is supported by the official statements from the civilian regime that replaced the dictators in 1974. See a report by the New Democracy Party, Apologismos gia Kyriatikis Draitirikotitas [An Account of the Governmental Performance] (Athens: Nea Democratia, 1977). For a good review of the military regime's economic performance see, Ioannis Pesmazoglou, "The Greek Economy Since 1967," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., Greece Under Military Rule.


38According to Eckstein and Gurr, a regime's performance (the ability of a regime to perform noticeably better than the regime it supplanted in economic and social matters) can also serve as a basis of legitimacy. See Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, Patterns of Authority: 115-447.

39One of the reasons for the military's failure to create a large genuine following was its refusal to accord some genuine participatory opportunities, provided with material awards or inspired by an ideology. See G. Mavrogordatos, Oi Epagelmatices Organoseis stin Ellada.

Nordlinger has argued that the unwillingness of most military regimes to abide even by these pseudo-Constitutional structures they create is a major block to their legitimacy. See Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, p. 134.
missars in trade unions, interest groups, and local organizations, and tried to elicit their support through the use of force. Moreover, the regime suspended several articles of the Constitution immediately after its approval. These contradictory measures made a mockery of the "liberalization process" and forced the regime to resort to repression and violence.

4. The military regime failed to create a coherent ideology. Their ideology consisted of an incoherent aggregation of values, borrowed impromptu by Orthodox Christianity and ancient Greek tradition, which did not add up to an adequate political formula. Moreover, the unequivocal rejection of Fascism and military rule, in Europe in the 1960s, deprived the regime of another ideological weapon.\footnote{The inability of a military regime to consolidate new political patterns of succession, control, and participation, and forge extensive constituencies for its rule as well as its inability to create a degree of "hegemonic acceptance" in society, have been identified from the literature of civil-military relations as the major blocks to the institutionalization of the military regimes. See Alfred Stepan, The State and Society in Peru: Peru in Comparative Perspective. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) p. 292.}

5. The split between hard-liners and soft-liners further undermined the cohesiveness of the regime.

6. A growing number of acts, which included the student uprising during the first months of 1973, a sharply worded statement by Karamanlis from Paris in April warning of the "grave dangers" for Greece if the military regime remained in power, and above all the foiled counter-coup in late May, which prompted the abolition of the monarchy and the proclamation of the republican constitution, consisted a series of actions that placed the military regime on the defensive and at the same time it emboldened its opposition.

Unable to bear the combined strain of liberalization and simultaneous political mobilization the regime resorted to repression and collapsed a few months later.

Separate Spheres: An Overview of United States Policy in the Interwar Years Toward Greece and Turkey

S.J. Raphalides

The complex of strategic and regional concerns and domestic politics in considering the relationship of the United States with Greece and Turkey is properly placed in the post World War II setting. However, even this contemporary triangular relation is affected by the past, by the nexus of the intertwined Greek and Turkish legacies, and by America's legacy. To what extent these pre-World War II experiences have influenced the contemporary triangular relations of the United States, Greece and Turkey is admittedly a matter of interpretation. Clearly, to focus on the United States and the relevant American policies is one approach in assessing the early contacts involving the three states. But even this focus is dependent upon consideration of the intertwined historical legacies of the Greek and Turkish nations, and the states they have created.

Thus the discord that today affects the relationship of Greece and Turkey is one which antedates America's emergence as a post World War II superpower with strategic interests in Greece and Turkey. The protracted nature of the discord is a manifestation of conflicting Greek and Turkish interests traced to their intertwined historical legacies to which the United States became a party; first peripherally, as an observer, as one actor in the international system and, then, as the protective patron state attempting to manage the conflict toward a rational end in the interest of collective defense.

The purpose of this brief essay is not to narrate play-by-play events involving the United States, Greece and Turkey in the pre-World War II era, but to develop an overview of United States policy in the years between the two world wars in an attempt to frame the early picture