British Espionage in Greece 1941-1942

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Subversion and sabotage activities in Greece and the Balkans before the Second World War were the responsibility of MIR (Military Intelligence Research) and Section D1 (a department of the British Secret Intelligence Service). MIR was a new department created within the directorate of Military intelligence in 1938 for the purpose of instigating and supporting guerrilla warfare. Section D, on the other hand, was organized by MI62 (the official name of the British Secret Service) to implement and coordinate sabotage and subversion. In July 1940 both departments were merged with Electra House, a propaganda organization of the foreign office to create the Special Operations Executive.3 Although the merger of these departments was successfully accomplished in London the overseas units of MIR and Section D continued to function independently until August of 1941.

The activities of Section D in Greece, initially, focused on using that country as a base for subversive operations against the Italians in Albania. In 1940, Arthur Goodwill was sent to Athens to initiate such operations by setting up an office in the British Legation. Goodwill’s activities and those of Section D were kept secret from the Greek government since the latter were afraid of provoking the Italians and would have objected to British clandestine operations in Greece.4 Goodwill managed to open an office for Section D but between the limited support of the British diplomats in Athens and the efficiency of the Greek police little was accomplished against the Italians in Albania. Indeed, one of the first operatives of Section D, Nicholas

1 Report on SOE Activities in Greece and the Islands of the Aegean Sea, Appendix 1.
2 Military Intelligence, department six.
3 Abbreviated as SOE.
Hammond, arrived in Greece on the 7th of June 1940 for subversive operations in Albania and was refused admission into Greece by the local authorities because they suspected the true nature of his visit. 1

After the Italian attack against Greece, the Greek government was less reticent about receiving British support, at least secretly, for the Metaxas regime was still afraid of antagonizing Germany. 6 In addition to formal contacts between Greek and British military representatives, representatives of MI(R) and Section D began preparations for the organization of clandestine networks in anticipation of a German occupation of Greece. 7 The plans of MI(R) were implemented in cooperation with the Greek General Staff, but the activities of Section D were kept secret from the Greek authorities since it involved the organization of underground cells staffed by Greek subjects hostile to the Metaxas government as well as the monarchy. 8

By the winter of 1941 Section D had established contacts with several individuals and groups and had organized two clandestine cells in Greece, one group composed of conservative Republicans under Zannas in the North and one made up of more liberal Republicans and left-wing individuals under Colonel E. Bakirdzis. 9 The Bakirdzis cell was established by Section D through Elke Koundouriote, the granddaughter of the famous Greek admiral, who had contacts with Republican officers. 10 Shortly after this the Balkan departments of Section D and MIR were taken over by the newly created SOE. The Bakirdzis group, however, did not get much of an opportunity to get organized before the German invasion forced the British to withdraw from Greece.

SOE’s activities during this period were limited to carrying out a number of demolitions by a group sent from Egypt, led by Peter

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6 Part of the rational for the Greeks accepting the presence of British intelligence representatives was their role in organizing secret meetings between British and Greek military authorities, Hickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street*, pp. 61-62.
8 Unfortunately, all the preparations made by MI(R) and the Greek General Staff did not amount to anything as a result of the quick defeat of the allied forces in Greece by the end of April 1941 (Report on SOE Activities in Greece and the Islands of the Aegean Sea, Appendix 1, “Origin and Constitution,” p. 1).
10 With her help representatives of Section D were able to recruit Colonel E. Bakirdzis, Ch. Koutsiogiannopoulos, D Bardopoulos and Ila Dagianni as well as some others, Phoibou N. Grigoriades, *Germano Katoche Andistiasi* vol. 5 (Athens, 1973), p. 217.

Fleming, and the destruction of several bridges near Thebes by another SOE officer, David Pawson. 11 As the front was collapsing SOE representatives in Greece were desperately attempting to equip their embryonic cells with radios, explosives, and small weapons but were only able to organize a few small groups. The speed of the German advance only permitted the most rudimentary plans for the organization of clandestine networks. According to Hickham Sweet-Escott, the SOE managed to ‘bully’ seven wireless transmitters from MI6 but of these only one, left by David Pawson to Bakirdzis, ever made contact with the SOE in Cairo. 12 With the exception of Prometheus, the code name for the wireless transmitter set used by Bakirdzis, 13 all other information concerning Greece for the time being came from escaped British soldiers and Greeks who managed to leave the country by boats or overland to Turkey. 14

The first covert operation organized by British intelligence in Greece took place between October 1941 to January 1942. Interestingly enough it was a continued effort by the SOE, MI6, and section N of MI9 (Escape and Evasion Service) that managed to infiltrate the first agents into the Greek islands. The objectives of this operation was to gather information, to conduct sabotage activity, and to facilitate the escape of British soldiers and Greek nationals to the Middle East.

The operation began in October 1941 when a submarine disembarked two men, John Atkinson and Harry Grammatikakis, at the island of Antiparos. 15 Atkinson had himself been a prisoner of war after the

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11 Hickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street*, p. 64.
15 Military Intelligence department nine, Escape and Evasion Service.
16 According to Foot and Langley, *MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945* (London, 1979) p. 92, Atkinson’s first name was not John but they only provide the initials of G. D. The Greek sources covering this particular episode all use the name of John (see: Alexandros Zouzoues, *Oi Dyo Ochthes 1939: Mia Prosphoria gia Ethnikes Sympiose*, Part B(I), p. 73; Athens 1987; Dimitris Gatsopoulos, *Istoria tes Katoche* (Athens, 1949), pp. 207-16; G. B. Ioannides, *Ellenes kai Xenoi Katochou sten Ellada* (Athens, 1952), pp. 25-45; Alexander Zannas, *E Katoche: Anamneses–Epiptoles* (Athens, 1964), p. 73ff. The sources dealing with Atkinson and his activities at Antiparos disagree not only concerning his role in Greece but even what period of time he spent there. According to the Greek sources listed above Atkinson arrived in Greece in October 1941 and was captured by the Italians in January 1942. The British accounts refer to Atkinson’s presence in Greece and his capture but do not provide any additional details. Foot and Langley, *MI9* (p. 92) state that Atkinson’s mission was to assist twenty-two escaped British soldiers.
British withdrawal from Greece in April but had managed to escape with the help of Alexander Zannas, the head of the Greek Red Cross, and made his way by boat (Caique) to Alexandria. Shortly after his arrival he volunteered to work for section N of M19. From Antiparos Atkinson attempted to establish escape routes for British soldiers and Greeks to the Middle East. In this endeavor he made contact with those who had assisted in his own escape and with their support he organized the escape routes. By coming into contact with these groups Atkinson became one of the few links between the rudimentary underground groups forming in Athens and British intelligence in Cairo. In late October or November Atkinson went to Athens and made contact with Alexander Zannas and through him acquired access to other clandestine groups; initially set up to help escaped British soldiers but by now they were getting involved with espionage and sabotage. During the course of the meeting Zannas informed Atkinson about the various sabotage activities accomplished by some groups, and made a strong appeal for British support regarding the famine that was ravaging the population of Athens. With Zannas’ help Atkinson set up an escape route that ran from Athens to Evia and onwards by submarine to Egypt. Indeed, shortly after, twenty-two British and five Greeks were able to leave Greece by that route. During their discussion, however, Zannas noticed that Atkinson made notes of everything he heard from Zannas including the names of those involved with clandestine activities, but Atkinson promised that later he would destroy his papers. Zannas, in addition to his role in assisting British soldiers, was involved with supporting other individuals involved with sabotage work and was in contact with newly formed groups concentrating in intelligence gathering. As a member of Athletic society Zannas was able to use his influence and position to support these groups as well as recruit other prominent individuals to work against the occupation forces. It is not certain why, or if indeed it was part of his orders, but Atkinson became involved with the collection of intelligence and shortly after with sabotage. His first breakthrough came when he acquired the services of an Italian sergeant, Bero Likeri, who was part of the Italian garrison at Paros. Likeri was able to give Atkinson and his group advance warning of any Italian or German search parties arriving on the island as well as provide information concerning the garrison on the island of Milos. Atkinson with the help of the Zannas group and through contacts with local fishermen and small ship owners, all anxious to do something against the occupying forces, was able to establish an intelligence network that provided information about Axis naval movements in the region of the Cyclades islands.

His early success, according to one account made him anxious to expand his activities and he agreed to attempt the destruction of two German tankers that had arrived at the island of Milos. In November 1941, Atkinson with the assistance of a local fishing boat captain, Anyphandes, and two of his men arrived in Milos and planted explosive charges against the hulls of the ships. In the early hours of the morning the explosives went off and both ships were sunk. The

and that all were captured in January 1942, in addition the submarine Triumph sent to facilitate the rescue was lost at Antiparos. According to Roskill The War at Sea vol. 3 (London, 1954) p. 443, the submarine Triumph was sunk by a mine on the 14th of January 1942 at the Gulf of Athens (presumably the Saronic Gulf), whereas James Fighting Ships 1944-1945 (New York, 1945) lists the submarine lost on the 16th January 1942 in the Aegean. Bickham Sweet-Escott (Baker Street, p. 119) that this event took place in the spring of 1942 and its purpose was to make contact with Greeks willing to work for the British. Sweet-Escott further adds that the group was brought to Antiparos by submarine but he does not suggest that it was lost. In a later account, Sweet-Escott (SOE in the Balkans, p. 9) only mentions that a single British officer was captured at Antiparos in February 1942. Woodhouse (Apple of Discord) p. 38 refers to the capture of a British officer at Antiparos but does not provide any other information.

According to Zannas, his brother, Sotirios had been an agent of Section D in 1940-41 but was forced to leave Greece because of his involvement with the Malets group, another organization that hid and assisted allied soldiers [Alexander Levidis, Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, unpublished manuscript, p. 20].

In the summer of 1941, Zannas purchased four bombs from a communist organization (for 280,000 drachmas) which he turned over to Nikos Nikolaides and Stavros Margaritis. Both of these men had found employment at the Eleusina airport which was used by the German air force and wished to try their hand at sabotage. After they acquired the bombs they planted the first two in German aircraft bound for Crete or North Africa and set them to explode one hour after the planes were in the air. The third bomb, however, exploded on the ground next to a loaded bomber which caused the destruction of several aircraft (Zannas, Katoche, pp. 76-77).

According to Spyro Kotos, Midas 614 (Athens, 1976, p. 127), the explosives were timed to go off at 9:00 a.m. At that time the ships were usually five hundred meters from
destruction of the German ships increased Atkinson's prestige with the islanders and attracted more volunteers to help with information and escape work, but the increasing level of activity also attracted the attention of the Italian garrison at Paros.

In early January 1942 the Italians sent a patrol to Antiparos and despite the warning of Likeri Atkinson delayed leaving the island.28 On the 6th of January the Italians surrounded the house where Atkinson was staying and after a gun battle, whereupon one Italian officer was killed and Atkinson wounded, the entire group was taken prisoner.29 To make matters worse the Italians also captured Atkinson's code book, a list of current and potential agents indicated by their initials, a seventeen-page report of possible contacts in Athens prepared by the Greek Embassy in Cairo, $10,000 and £500, his notes from the meeting with Zannas, and a diary of his activities in Greece.30

During the subsequent interrogation, Atkinson broke down and provided his captors with the complete names of those listed by their initials on the list as well as any other contacts he had made and with whom he had worked.31 The impact of Atkinson’s disclosures was a severe blow to the Athenian underground groups and to those who had been involved with Atkinson's network in the Cyclades.32 As a result of Atkinson's confession, at least fifty individuals were arrested by the Italians including some of the most prominent Athenians who were involved with the underground or who had given refuge to Atkinson in the course of his first escape. Many others, including Panagiotis Kanelopoulos, were forced to go into hiding and leave the country in the harbor according to Atkinson's calculations they would sink in deeper water.

**Footnotes:**

27 Fortunately, for the population of Milos the German and Italian authorities assumed the attack against the ships was the work of British commandos and did not exact retribution against the inhabitants of the island (Ioannides, *Hellenes*, p. 26; Kotses, *Hellenes*, p. 127).

28 In the version provided by Zannas (Katoche, pp. 78-80), Atkinson had returned from Egypt by submarine in mid-December 1941 in order to organize the escape of twenty British and four Greeks. The group in Athens had already transported the twenty-four escapees to Anavysos and later to Antiparos just in time to be re-captured by the Italians. Shortly after the British submarine was also sunk.

29 According to Ioannides (Hellenes, p. 26) Atkinson and his associates were betrayed because someone affiliated with the group was disenchanted over a failed affair with a German and informed the Italians as an act of revenge. Kotses (Midias, p. 127), on the other hand, suggests that it was the activities of the group which attracted the attention of the Italian garrison.


32 Many received long prison sentences but Atkinson and his immediate associates were condemned to death and executed some months later.

33 Other sources included: Captain Theodoros Koundouriotis, the son of one of Greece's most famous admirals and one of those who helped set up the Bakirdzis cell; Leon Polymenakos, a distinguished physician and Kanelopoulos' doctor; Panagiotis Klapaes, a well-known lawyer; two senior officers, Aristides Palles and Basilis Aggelopoulos (Kotses, Midias, pp. 128-29). In addition to Kanelopoulos, Col. Bakirdzis was mentioned in Atkinson's papers and he too had to leave Greece but he was succeeded by a naval officer, Chalalambos Koutsogiannopoulos who had the code name of Prometheus II (Zaouses, *Oi Dyo Ochthes*, p. 75).


35 The new leadership of Prometheus included: Chalalambos Koutsogiannopoulos, Dimitris Bardopoulos and Ilia Degganis. All three were dismissed from the armed forces for their part in the republican coup of 1939 (Zaouses, *Oi Dyo Ochthes*, p. 76).

36 During the December uprising Bakirdzis was commander of the ELAS forces in Macedonia and this was one of the few regions that remained tranquil during the rebellion of the left.
them on to Prometheus II.\textsuperscript{37} Prometheus II was then able to transmit to Cairo that the eight new submarines were French and had been turned over to the Germans by the Vichy government.\textsuperscript{38}

Other groups formed on their own and attempted to establish contact with the British or the Greek government-in-exile. In the beginning these groups formed spontaneously to assist Allied soldiers left in Greece and it was this experience that had initiated them in clandestine work. Hundreds of people in Greece took enormous risks by hiding British soldiers and in the early stages of occupation it provided a means of defying the Axis forces.

The MI6 station in Smyrna as well as MI9 were able to get some idea of the situation in Greece through the debriefings of allied soldiers who had managed to escape from Greece. Since the majority of these men were given refuge and assisted in leaving Greece by groups and individuals determined to continue the war they represented a potential source of recruits for British intelligence.

Throughout the autumn and winter of 1941-42, MI6 and MI9 sent their agents to Greece in order to set up espionage networks and organize the transportation of Allied personnel from Greece to the Middle East. The swiftness of the German advance had caught MI6 completely unprepared and there was no opportunity to establish any networks in Greece before the British withdrew. SOE had the Prometheus organization in Athens, but refrained from any other activity until the spring of 1942. In the beginning the efforts of MI6 and MI9 were plagued by organizational difficulties and lack of equipment, as well as trained operatives in the field and competent officers with an expertise in secret work. Slowly, however, contact was established with several groups, while in some cases MI6 was sought out by the groups themselves, and by the autumn of 1942 several networks were reporting on Axis military activity in Greece.

One of the more successful of these networks was organized by Alexandros Levides. Levides was a pro-Venetian naval officer who was forced to leave the Greek navy in 1932. At the beginning of the occupation he was determined to do something against the Germans and

\textsuperscript{37}K. Bastia, Bradoyne 17-21 April 1945, "Prometheus."

\textsuperscript{38}Psilaidakis acquired the documents in a rather simple manner. He noticed that four new German officers had been holding meetings with the senior base officers in a particular room. After one of these meetings he persuaded the guard to let him enter the room on the pretext that he had to get the place ready for the next meeting. Since Psilaidakis was well known by the personnel of the base the guard did not find his request unusual. Once inside Psilaidakis was able to take the appropriate documents by hiding them in a loaf of bread. The Germans quickly realized that the documents were missing and ordered all the Greek personnel of the base to be searched. When it came to Psilaidakis' turn the base commander excused him on the grounds that he was a loyal employee (Zaoutis, Ol Dyo Ochoites, p. 77).

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Italians but he had no contacts with the British or the Greek government in the Middle East. His only resort was to help hide British soldiers and assist them in escaping from Greece not only to participate against the Axis, but as he states:

Such an endeavor was not only a debt owed to an ally, whose people had supported us, but if successful, it would have been appreciated by Great Britain and provided another reason for her energetic support of Greece after the war.\textsuperscript{39}

He began with the assistance of several retired officers such as himself, and after raising money and acquiring safe houses he started to collect British soldiers hiding out in the homes of ordinary people. The name of the organization was Maleas and in a short time they had developed a string of safe houses as well as a considerable list of families who had the means to put up British soldiers. At first everyone was willing to help, but as the occupation authorities tightened their grip on the country and imposed a death sentence for anyone hiding allied soldiers people became less enthusiastic. Another important factor was the scarcity of food, and soaring prices made the feeding of extra guests a considerable if not impossible burden on the average Greek family. In time Levides and his friends as well as other organized groups had to step in and take over the hiding and feeding of British soldiers from families that no longer had the means to look after them.

For Levides the opportunity to play a greater role in the war came when he was contacted by a British agent in October 1941. His activities had become known to the intelligence services in the Middle East and an agent was sent to help him organize an escape and intelligence network. The agent, who used the name Kriekoykias, handed Levides a letter from Noel Rees of the MI6 branch at Smyrna.\textsuperscript{40} The letter contained a list of families who were hiding British soldiers and Rees asked Levides if he would be willing to help them escape to Turkey.

Rees did not provide any financial support or offer any suggestions as to how these men would be transported and on which part of the Turkish coastline they could be disembarked. In addition, Rees inquired if Levides was interested in establishing an intelligence network to supply MI6 with information on the Axis military and naval movements. Again, according to Levides, there was no support offered for these activities. For his part Levides informed Kriekoykias that he was willing to work for allied intelligence but he was apprehensive at the

\textsuperscript{39}Alexander Levides, Unpublished Manuscript, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{40}ibid.
haphazard manner the initial contact took place and the fact that an M16 agent would be carrying a list of names that if caught would jeopardize dozens of people.41

A little later Levides made contact with a representative from the Greek Information Service in Cairo and received the same offer from them, once again he replied that he was willing to do what he could but he requested the delivery of a wireless radio as well as funds, weapons, etc.42 In November, Levides received another letter, this time from the head of M19 in Smyrna, Michael Parish, but unlike the previous contact with British intelligence the letter only instructed him to get in touch with an agent named Trypanis.

This contact led Levides to a British agent, Lt. Colonel Macaskie,43 who in turn brought him in contact with a group called “Daskalos” set up by E. Tsellos and Th. Koundouriotes. Levides was instructed by Macaskie to take over the information gathering part of that organization and forward any relevant intelligence to Smyrna by whatever means possible, until the arrival of a wireless set for which Macaskie would arrange once he returned to the Middle East. Before his departure Macaskie gave Levides 800,000 drachmas (approximately the equivalent of forty pounds) to help with the expenses of his organization but most of the money was actually used to pay for Macaskie’s transportation. Unfortunately for Levides, Macaskie was captured by the Italians on the island of Kea, while Koundouriotes was also arrested and Tsellos was forced to leave Greece because their names were on Atkinson’s list.44

Just before Christmas Levides was summoned to the Hotel Plaza by the Consul of Finland at Constantinople. Levides was apprehensive because the hotel was under German control and was afraid that it may have been a trap. The state of his organization was near collapse from lack of funds and low morale due to the failure of establishing contact with the Middle East so that Levides decided to take a chance. At the hotel Levides was quickly reassured because the Consul of Finland gave him one hundred and thirty pounds and informed him that he will soon receive further instructions.45

A few days later Levides was contacted by another representative of M16 and told to turn over half the money to an organization in Thessaloniki, Y. B. E. (defenders of northern Greece)46 and keep the rest for the expenses of his group. The Maleas organization was able to increase their support of British soldiers in hiding as well as expand their espionage activities. With some of the funds they received they purchased a small boat which was used to transport individuals to the Middle East and maintain contact with M16 in Smyrna. Indeed, it was only in October 1942 that the organization received a wireless transmitter.

The few examples cited from this period illustrate both difficulties and the erratic manner that characterized the development of British intelligence in Greece. For the most part British espionage activities, during the first year of occupation, evolved on an ad hoc basis, with only a limited degree of coordination amongst the principal intelligence services.

Furthermore, it is not clear from the extant sources what were the priorities of British espionage in Greece? We can surmise that in 1941-1942 information on Axis naval forces was certainly in demand as well as the re-patriation of British soldiers trapped in Greece. This would certainly have given precedence to the efforts of M16 and M19 respectively and not to the SOE, whose mandate was sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Ultimately, the SOE had greater difficulties in procuring resources not as the result of strategic prerogatives but because it was the junior member of the intelligence community.

However, because of the earlier difficulties faced by the British intelligence services in establishing clandestine organizations in Greece, by 1942 it was the SOE that had set up the first networks followed by M19 and M16 respectively. Many of these clandestine groups developed out of the efforts to provide safe refuge for Allied soldiers; in the process the organizers, mostly by chance, had come into contact with representatives of the SOE. Yet the SOE organizations were not intended for information gathering but to prepare for guerrilla warfare in the mountains. Their diversion into espionage was a side-interest and developed spontaneously while laying the ground work for armed resistance.

41Alexander Levides, Unpublished Manuscript, p. 17.
42A radio finally arrived a year later (Alexander Levides, Unpublished Manuscript, p. 18).
43It is not clear to which intelligence organization Macaskie was attached. He was taken prisoner by the Germans in the 1941 campaign in Greece. He escaped to the Middle East and returned to Greece in the autumn of 1941. He was recaptured by the Italians in December and again managed to escape. He was recaptured and escaped several more times; tried in Athens and condemned to death but was saved by the Italian armistice in 1943. He was hidden by the Archbishop of Athens, returned to the Middle East and parachuted into Greece in 1944. In 1947 Macaskie became The Times correspondent in Athens (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 38, p. 323 note).
44Alexander Levides, Unpublished Manuscript, p. 19. Levides was also implicated since Atkinson carried a letter from Sotiris Zannas, who had been a member of Maleas before being forced to leave for the Middle East. The letter fortunately was addressed to Alexander and it did not include a last name, the Italians assumed it was intended for Alexander Zannas the brother of Sotiris (Alexander Levides, Unpublished Manuscript, p. 22).
45The Consul of Finland was shortly arrested by the Germans while attempting to cross into Turkey from Thrace (Alexander Levides, Unpublished Manuscript, p. 22-23).
46Yperapitel Voreiou Ellados.
For the most part the intelligence gathered by the SOE networks in Greece was passed on to the Cairo headquarters, which in turn forwarded the information to the relevant services such as ISLD (MI6's cover name in the Middle East) and SIME as well as to Headquarters Middle East. Accordingly until the SOE sponsored guerrilla war actually took place, information gathering and arranging for the repatriation of British troops were the primary contributions of the SOE toward the subversive war against the Axis in Greece and the justification for the organization's existence.

However, intelligence gathering for the SOE remained a sideline and despite the success of its networks in Greece it did not expand or provide additional resources to espionage activity. At the same time by continuing to participate in information gathering, the SOE inadvertently deprived the use of these groups and individuals by other British intelligence organizations that were in the process of developing their own networks in 1941-42.

The development of British espionage in Greece during the first year of occupation did not reflect a concerted intelligence strategy but was determined by the priorities and contacts of each service. In addition, the competition among the intelligence services for resources and skilled manpower further dissipated and delayed the organization of effective espionage networks. The consequences for the developing Greek underground, particularly in Athens, in some cases was devastating. The first efforts of many Greeks in the subversive and espionage struggle against the Axis ended in death or imprisonment partly as a result of their own inexperience and partly from failure of the British intelligence services to establish a coherent and well-coordinated policy toward occupied Greece.

The Making of Modern Urban Identity: The Transformation of Greek Towns in the Nineteenth Century

V. HASTAOGLOU-MARTINIDIS, K. KAFKOULA, N. PAPAMIHOS

The development of the modern Greek state in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with intensive activity in the sphere of town planning. In what had until recently been the provinces of the Ottoman Empire an endeavor was under way to set up a unified national domain orientated towards the developed West, realm of rationalism and industry. The chief aim endeavor was to create new urban areas capable of receiving, supporting, and expressing the new circumstances. These new circumstances demanded a network of settlements with a new structure and hierarchy, a unified domestic market instead of the self-sufficient, closed, agrarian economy, a central administrative organization to replace the semi-autonomy of the local communities, new production activities attuned to international division of labor and, lastly, the transition from a primitive form of industrial society to a fully industrialized one.

These necessary changes, whose full achievement was long and slow, upset the region's historical structure. The population was redistributed. The region's economic functioning altered, as production, exchange, and the size and manner of allocation of the surplus changed. Traditional centers stagnated or lost their importance completely, and new ones emerged. New polarities appeared and shifted the center of gravity of economic and social activity. At the same time, society itself was transformed. New agents of social, economic, and political authority came to the fore.

It was in this context of profound and all-embracing change that, from 1828 onwards, dozens of town plans were produced at a rapidly