We Now Have the Tools and Infrastructure to Hold Donors and NGOs in International Development to their Own Legal and Professional Standards

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**Background & Purpose:** This article summarizes and adds to the tools and infrastructure that the author has developed to hold donors and NGOs in international development to their own international, legal and professional standards, following a call in 2008 for organizations to find objective ways to hold those organizations to compliance with international law and professional principles.

**Setting:** Global.

**Intervention:** Not applicable.

**Research Design:** The article presents 12 indicator tools (in the form of legal elements tests) recently published elsewhere and a new litmus test tool presented here for the first time for quick evaluations of projects using an inductive approach (looking at project logic), explaining how these tools relate to each other and how they can be used together. After introducing these indicators, the piece then compiles and summarizes the results for several types of organizations to reveal an overall picture of which donors and NGOs are failing, which are succeeding, and what this now objectively verifies is happening in the world of international development.

**Data Collection and Analysis:** Not applicable.

**Findings:** The piece offers some reflections on the world that we live in where international standards and universal principles are not applied, where legal codifications for international development are not enforced, and where current international development approaches are leading to unsustainability, conflict, and homogenization (suppression of human diversity and adaptation) that the standards were designed to help avoid. The author’s approaches, overall, offer the larger blueprint for an infrastructure of “development” work to promote universal legal principles, as well as a larger set of reforms for changes in social and political institutions and systems in the developed world for making these changes a reality.

**Keywords:** sustainability, dependency, democracy, development, aid, capacity building, international relations, international law, donors, UNDP, World Bank, European Commission, NGOs, foundations.
Introduction

In early 2008 in an online publication called Policy Innovations, I called on professional colleagues and citizens in both wealthy and developing nations that are recipients of aid to join in forming a new type of non-governmental organization for the express purpose of holding international donors and NGOs accountable to international laws and professional standards in “development” (Lempert, 2008). I offered personal observations, expressing the views of colleagues and recipients in countries throughout the world, of the skewed incentives, the lack of professionalism, and the shocking amount of corruption, mismanagement and abuse in development projects, resulting in impacts that were in reverse of stated claims and goals for sustainable development and human adaptation and progress. Though I pointed out several of the areas in which these organizations could be held to laws and standards, I did not outline the specific legal and professional tools that could be used to fulfill the mission of these organizations by enabling them to objectively measure compliance and performance of donors and NGOs. Indeed, few existed. I simply noted that they could be developed and that there was an urgent need for them.

In the several months following publication of that article, I went forward to invent the infrastructure for this monitoring in the form of 12 essential indicators to measure compliance and to hold these organizations accountable to international legal agreements and professional standards. In a separate article that is now published in an international law journal (Lempert, 2018a), I have shown how these indicators form the elements of enforceable law and have organized them as a “treatise” or “codification” of “international development law” based on the laws and treaties signed by nearly the entire community of nations. This work complements my other previous efforts for the certification of organizations and consultants on the basis of their adherence to ethical codes and standards in ways that would protect the public in both donor and recipient countries where interventions occur.

In this article, I offer an additional indicator that can be used as a quick accountability “litmus test” of any new development intervention as well as of donor and implementing organizations (based on their stated missions). This uses an inductive approach to test the internal logic of a project intervention or implementation agency, as a preliminary to the professional measures of impact in specific categories (deductively) in comparison with established standards.

While the approach in “critical development studies” and among development professionals generally goes only as far as offering a set of prescriptions or ideas and calls for action, and voicing opinions noting problems, my approach has been to provide the basis for enforceable legal accountability. In addition to developing a set of key indicators that are based on international laws and agreed professional standards, I have also tested these scoring indicators on several organizations, demonstrating how the indicators can be used. Moreover, I have subjected each of these accountability indicators to rigorous professional review by experts in the specific fields of the indicators to assure that they meet the objective standards of the profession and meet the criteria for scientific, neutral tools.

In short, development professionals and the general public in both donor and recipient countries now have the objective tools and infrastructure to hold donors and NGOs in international development to their own standards in an easy and effective way. These tools are the basic and key indicators of fulfillment of the missions of international “development” (as opposed to “relief” or “charity” or “emergency assistance”) as defined in international treaties. The only similar initiative, that of DARA International in Spain, is developing quantitative standards to measure the achievements of relief agencies, but those are more nuts-and-bolts technical measures of cost-effectiveness rather than a test of consistency of organizational mission, and of work in the development side of assistance as different from relief. That makes this set of tools the one professionally reviewed set of “development” standards, filling a special niche in the area of international development law and accountability.

After introducing these indicators below, the piece then compiles and summarizes the results for several types of organizations to reveal an overall picture of which donors and NGOs are failing, which are succeeding, and what this now objectively verifies is happening in the world of international development. The piece then offers some reflections on the world that we live in where international standards and universal principles are not applied, where legal codifications for international development are not enforced, and where current international development approaches are leading to the very unsustainability, conflict, and homogenization (suppression of human diversity and adaptation) that the standards were designed to help avoid. My approaches,
overall, offer the larger blueprint for an infrastructure of “development” work to promote universal legal principles, as well as a larger set of reforms for changes in social and political institutions and systems in the developed world for making these changes a reality.

The Essential (Categorical) Indicator Tools and Where to Find Them

While development professionals have long sought tools to measure economic or professional impacts of particular interventions, what has long been lacking is a basic set of measures to assure that development interventions are actually meeting the requirements of international law and of the profession for “development.” In recent months, I have invented twelve basic indicators that start with agreed international principles and scientific professional standards for achieving results in “development”. I then tested projects and organizations against a list of requirements in each area to indicate where they are omitting, deviating from, or evading and twisting the established standards. This approach to compliance is deductive and simple. It starts with the established laws, principles or professional requirements and holds projects and actors to those ideals to see where they are succeeding or failing.

These tools, presented below, focus on twelve different performance categories as well as on overall organizational administration of projects by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and on whether the activity of the NGO is consistent with the role of a non-governmental organization (a thirteenth indicator). One compound indicator that can be applied to government or the NGO sector applies simply to project management and focuses on evaluation of projects, testing the institutional capacity and infrastructure of organizations in setting out and achieving results (whether the overall management systems in the “development organization” assure that the system itself is upholding the key criteria of accountability, principles of management control, and professionalism in its operations). Along with this is a “litmus test” offered in this article for quick examination of project design, that is an overall test of the framework for interventions.

Four of these indicators are designed to measure whether organizations even uphold the key missions of development: the basic test of whether an organization is actually doing “development” at all, as defined by the international community, whether it is doing “sustainable development” that meets the definition established by the world community (in 1992), whether it is doing “poverty reduction” (a pre-requisite to “development”) and whether it meets the key criteria of development that it assure the “independence” of the recipient to maintain its systems without continued “dependence” on the donor. These indicators include the two types of sustainability that are key -- sustainable development and sustainability/independence of the recipient – rather than the often-misused measure of whether project benefits, whatever their purpose, are sustainable/long lasting.

Two indicators focuses on the mechanisms for implementing these interventions, including the set of documents used to set the agenda in recipient countries (action plans and legal documents) along with one of the major forms of development assistance – the key input/modality of development; “capacity building”. The examination of agenda setting and capacity building tests whether development is being distorted by the use of tools that have full professional expectations in their use.

Several sector applications deal with areas seemingly difficult to measure such as democracy and rights, as well as market interventions. An eighth indicator is in an area where there is an agreed mission that is central not only to development but to any relationship in the international system. It is in one of the areas that is said to be non-quantifiable; that of democracy building; the protection and promotion of “democracy” as understood universally in treaties of the world community, in actions within the recipient cultures and communities. The ninth indicator combines the mission of democracy as defined by international laws, with the tool/modality of education, in the specific area of human rights. This is another area deemed “too difficult” or “too qualitative” to measure, but where the indicator is proof that the validity and quality of even qualitative interventions can be effectively scored and evaluated in terms of compliance with universal principles and with professional standards. A tenth indicator, on gender mainstreaming and equity, looks at a specific area of rights and tests whether gender projects actually seek to achieve equality in a way that is consistent with other international rights goals and development frameworks. An eleventh indicator also looks at a category of democracy and governance that is a growing area of interventions; that of “decentralization.” The final indicator examines an emerging category of development interventions that is increasingly taking over the
development portfolio; that of market-type interventions aimed at either copying standard business practices and models (credit and lending institutions, productivity and value chains) or in building or transforming entire industries or parts of an economy for the purposes of “income generation” and “productivity.”

These indicators, where they can be found in the public domain (all placed accessibly on the Internet), and a brief overview of what they revealed is as follows:

**The Compound Indicator: Management Oversight**

**Evaluation Systems (basic management structures in place for all interventions).** The overall test of whether development organizations even have the ability to practice what they preach is whether they apply the basic core of professionalism, oversight, accountability, transparency, and efficiency in the use of funds. Note that this is the toughest indicator to use. The measures that are used in this indicator come out of the literature on business, management, accounting, law and policy. It is also mostly geared to large organizations since small organizations do not have the resources for professionalization in so many areas. But the basic concepts of measurements and objectivity as well as oversight by recipient and funding beneficiaries are easy to understand and too often violated. What this indicator reveals is that not only are government agencies in the development field unaccountable, but they actually appear to be corrupted by design, with the subversion of ombuds-person systems, anti-fraud units, and reviews so as to ensure a short-circuiting of any oversight and monitoring that hobbles the ability of development assistance to achieve results. Systems appear to be designed to insulate bureaucrats, increase bureaucratic discretion, cover up errors, hide information, and serve as an advertisement for additional funds rather than to assure good governance and results. This indicator was refereed by a leading journal in evaluation methodology (Lempert, 2009b).

**Four Key Development Tests**

**Development.** Though international “development” agencies, international “development” banks, and multi-lateral organizations like the United Nations system claim to be doing things like promoting the Millennium “Development” Goals, the reality is that none of them are even starting to fulfill the mission of “development” that has been established and agreed upon in the most basic international treaties. Instead of promoting the highest aspirations of humanity, international organizations are promoting the lowest, simply treating humans as animals to temporarily meet their basic needs without individual personality development or cultural development (Lempert, 2014b).

**Sustainable Development.** This indicator offers the essential test of an organization’s mission and whether it is actually doing development or something else. This is also the quickest and easiest indicator to use. The standards come from the Rio Declaration and professional definitions from ecology, anthropology, and law or sustainability and survival of cultures and eco-systems. They also incorporate business principles that any business would use to measure value – increase or maintenance of assets and on a per capita basis, rather than on sales or profits, as those figures do not measure wealth. This is the major failing and hypocrisy of development actors. The standards say one thing but the cultural legacies of colonialism and profiteering (or plundering) say another. This indicator, developed jointly with an expert in environmental policy, was peer-reviewed by a journal setting standards for sustainable development (Lempert & Nguyen, 2008). Recently, to account for the fact that countries and communities can no longer act autonomously but are embedded in the global context and its influences on climate, war, disease, and risk management, all of which can effect sustainable development, the authors have supplemented this indicator with a second indicator (Lempert & Nguyen, 2017). This indicator of eight elements, also reviewed in a journal of sustainability, identifies the external factors required for planning sustainable development in the local context.

**Poverty Reduction.** A prerequisite to “development” is the achievement of long-term, sustainable absolute poverty reduction, while overlapping with “development” are the goals of eliminating relative poverty by assuring equality of cultures (not economic equality but rights equality to maintain their integrity) and individual equality through rights protections within the context of appropriate distributions and opportunities in each culture. The indicator distinguishes between “aid” under the name of “poverty reduction” that is not intended to create sustainability, long-term poverty reduction, or equity, at all, but is designed to treat symptoms, absorb cultures, and create neo-
dependency in a global system where the poor are forced to compete against each other everywhere (most current international interventions) and aid that focuses on root causes of imbalance and inequity with a focus on cultural protection and institutional change (Lempert, 2015a).

Dependency. This indicator offers the corollary to sustainability measures. The measures are easy to understand since they are analogous to that of child rearing and development; whether development leads to a strong, independent and self-sustaining system or whether it builds a hierarchical and dependent relationship with the donors. This indicator also offers a test of the theories of “dependency” that claimed that the world system was not developing independent and diverse cultures and countries but rather a mechanism for control and weakening of the independent, sustainable systems, both as a whole and in the institutional components that received “assistance” from wealthier countries. Unless a developed country is in need of a strong ally, “development” funds appear to be designed to weaken sustainability and to make weaker countries dependent rather than potential competitors. This indicator was reviewed by a journal specializing in applications of international law (Lempert, 2009a).

Implementation Mechanisms

Agenda Setting. This indicator measures whether implementation-agenda setting activities and their outputs – “action plans”, international declarations, “master plans”, “country plans”, “country strategies”, “legal frameworks”, and other documents commonly generated in international “aid” interventions -- meet professional and development standards for truly self-activating, feasible plans. It distinguishes between agenda setting by donors as a means of promoting their own agendas, public relations, and fundraising strategies and those that are truly professional strategic documents with accountability to beneficiaries and direct responsiveness to their interests. It helps to expose plans that are little indication of “action” or “commitment” and are an abuse of processes and a corruption of professionalism by donors and in recipient countries (Lempert, 2014a).

Capacity Building. This indicator scores the development modality that has become the major input in the global knowledge economy but that is poorly defined; building the “capacity” of systems in developing countries so they can be self-sustaining. What the indicator reveals when tested on several “development” organizations, is that rather than build capacity, the overall thrust is actually to prolong incapacity as a way to ensure dependency, frustrating the development of effective management and training systems, or of an educated, skilled public. Capacity building is largely used to transfer funds for the purchase of government bureaucrats or for the use of dependent civil society organizations to serve the interests of donor countries. This indicator was peer reviewed by a journal in public administration and economics (Lempert, 2015b).

Sector Applications, Seemingly Difficult to Measure (Democracy, Rights, Market Interventions)

Democratization. Like the indicators used for sustainable development and dependency, this is also a legal test of compliance with universally agreed standards – in this case, for democratization as established in several international treaties, using the treaties rather than any specific country interpretations of inputs as the true international measure of compliance. Though political scientists have been stymied at how to measure whether countries are democratic, this indicator offers a simple way to test whether interventions are actually designed to move countries or cultures towards those definitions of democracy as defined by the world system. The key measure here is the change in power relations in ways that protect the free choice of communities and individuals, not whether systems all move to one type. The results of this indicator show that organizations geared towards empowerment understand and promote the standard while most major international organizations actually undermine democratic goals to extend their own influence. This indicator was reviewed by specialists in law and governance (Lempert, 2011).

Human Rights Promotion through Education. This indicator demonstrates the impact measurement of a combined type of input (in this case, education) and an outcome (rights promotion). Inputs – whether they be education or social marketing campaigns or other behavior change approaches – certainly are measured by professionals in the business sector and these measures can be applied in the public sector combined with public missions to test compliance and performance. The indicator unmasks those organizations that simply repeat slogans but hide other agendas that actually thwart
international missions on the pretext that outcomes cannot be measured. This indicator was peer reviewed by the leading journal in applications of human rights and democratic education (Lempert, 2010a).

**Gender Mainstreaming and Equality.** This indicator focuses on a specific area of rights and tests whether gender projects actually seek to achieve equality in a way that is consistent with other international rights goals and development frameworks. The indicator distinguishes between approaches that are designed to either promote one gender at the expense of the other (including projects that only symbolically promote women’s rights while actually undermining them) or that seek to transform cultures for a specific international agenda, and projects that actually seek to build sustainable, peaceful societies in which both genders balance their roles and benefit from greater opportunities. The indicator reveals that most current approaches to gender outside of industrial societies are actually undermining those societies and long-term prospects for gender equity by failing to apply principles of gender mainstreaming. The indicator is tested directly on UNIFEM, the United Nations Development Fund for Women. The indicator was peer reviewed by a journal on human rights (Lempert, 2016a).

**Decentralization.** This indicator focuses on a specific area of governance that has been promoted by the international community in an attempt to improve accountability and responsiveness but that has lost site of development and sustainability objectives. The indicator reveals that rather than promote democratic oversight and cultural sustainability within eco-systems, the approach has been used for top-down administration and for manipulating governmental agendas by international organizations, while also weakening the ability of local constituencies to assert regulatory control and assure accountability of international private and public organizations and foreign governments (Lempert, 2016b).

**Income Generation and Sustainable Business and Market Intervention Projects.** This indicator demonstrates how to measure the impact of several kinds of market interventions that are usually justified in terms of “income generation” or “productivity.” Inputs ranging from small business training and support and small credit projects to trade promotion, privatization, and value chain analysis, can be subject to professional standards in two categories: whether they represent an appropriate government function that offers public safeguards in the context of sustainable development AND whether they meet professional standards of business for an intervention that addresses a market imperfection and correctly addresses the services and institutions that need to be repaired, as well as whether it effectively promotes sustainable, competitive businesses and industries. The indicator unmasks those organizations that simply throw money at an ideology – that of the “market” – as well as those that are acting to promote modern forms of predatory colonial businesses, stealing resources, breaking local economies, and putting people to work producing for foreign interests, rather than actually correcting market failures and promoting sustainable local economies. This indicator was peer reviewed by an international journal on ecomonocs and society (Lempert, 2012).

The same approach that applies for income generation projects, in general, can also be targeted with specialized indicators to specific sectors. An example of an eight-element indicator in the fast-growing tourism sector also demonstrates how government interventions in tourism can be held accountable to standards for cultural, environmental, and heritage protection (the keys of “sustainable tourism”) to distinguish those that follow international law and standards from those that promote colonial exploitation of peoples and environments. This indicator was peer reviewed by a leading journal in tourism research (Lempert, 2016d).

A Five-Minute “Litmus” Test of Development Projects: An Inductive Test of Project Logic and Practices

While the tools above can be used for detailed analysis of projects in the key areas of development, it is also possible to directly and quickly troubleshoot any development project. A trained development professional understanding the professional standards and principles of development as well as the logic of development intervention can actually read a standard project document and determine in the scope of five minutes whether or not that projected is a worthwhile expenditure of funds or is a corrupted misuse of donor money for other ends. While it may seem like it would take a career of experience to develop the skill of screening projects, in fact it is possible to extract the key questions that any development expert should ask in scanning a
project proposal, and to offer them as a checklist for anyone to use.

The typical failures that the indicators, above, help to detect and score in detail are how projects that claim to be doing “sustainable development,” promoting “democracy,” building “capacity” or promoting “independence” are actually using funds to buy off a Ministry (or prepare for future favors), groom future elites, buy influence in a country through foreign-supported NGOs, or offer “charity” in the form of “tribute” (kickbacks or subsidies) to leaders or pacification fees to communities for resources stolen and for other long-term harms, or to shovel funds to the “poor” for the fun of playing Santa Claus and for proselytizing the way of life of the givers, or simply giving money to a slogan (like “human rights”) for public relations purpose with an actual intent that the project achieve nothing more than transfer funds to those who mouth the slogan. However, it is also possible to detect the same problems quickly through an inductive process that simply examines how a project is set up and where its internal processes are corrupted.

A properly managed sustainable development intervention will model sustainability, identify what has gone wrong, identify the underlying behaviors that need to be changed and their sequence and relationship to put the society back to sustainability (either after a disaster where relief is needed, or through a development intervention that rebalances consumption and production in an overall cultural system), fit inputs correctly to the problem, and then measure progress towards achieving that balance. In five minutes, one can examine a project paper, identify if that is being done, and see, if it isn’t, what is being done in its place, that will quickly reveal how a project has been rigged (either consciously or subconsciously, even robotically) and what its real outcome will be.

In asking these seven questions by looking at the key sections of a project paper, problems (or hidden goals) can be quickly exposed.

1. Project Goals and Objectives: Does the goals statement have a real link to sustainability (rebalancing) of cultures in their environments or is development just given as a euphemism not linked to these? (If sustainable development isn’t the real goal, this section can reveal the real goal or ideology of the project.) If the focus is on “increasing productivity” or giving foreign technology to “relieve poverty” it is almost certain that the real purpose is to industrialize and break a local system for some reason of self-interest to the donor and a partner organization (extracting a resource, producing an export product, exploiting cheap labor, introducing consumption of foreign products, making the locals mimic the donor products, making the locals mimic the donor in consumption or gender relations or some other claimed “need” based on a difference). If measures are in GDP or relative consumption (“poverty”) rather than sustainability, the project has been corrupted.

2. Problem Statement: Does the problem statement identify a chain of root causes and behaviors to be changed, or describe mechanisms for restoring losses and re-establishing sustainability, or does the project simply treat symptoms and/or offer a fake (asserted) “problem” (in the eyes of the donor) requiring behavior change or transfers for another purpose? If the focus is on “poverty” or “lack of … capacity/awareness/competence/information/foreign technology” is it clear that the problem statement has been written to support a pre-determined input rather than to solve a real development problem?

3. Risks: If there is a “risks” statement, does it list truly uncontrollable events beyond human behaviors or is it just a list of the actual problems that the project should address but the donor won’t touch (revealing the groups whose behaviors need to change but who are actually being bought off by the project)? Typically, risk statements like “Leaders are not committed to … enforcing the law/ helping the poor/promoting democracy/etc.” or “The public won’t follow project recommendations,” reveal that the project has no intent to actually address the actors and behaviors that need to be changed to solve the problem and the project has a hidden motive.

4. Inputs Linked to Root Causes: Are each of the development inputs designed to change specific behaviors listed as part of a chain of root causes of unsustainability or are the inputs offered on their own, disconnected to the problem statement (thus, suggesting that the project is driven by the specific transfer itself as the real project goal)? Here, you can often reveal a corrupt project that is offering a specific payoff or trying to benefit a particular recipient. The inputs
can identify either the beneficiary recipients or the insiders who are benefitting on the donor side from pushing a specific input, or both.

5. "Stakeholders" versus Public Beneficiaries: Are citizen beneficiaries the primary stakeholders (the cultures and communities in the developing country and the funding public in developed countries) with government agencies and/or non-profit organizations or businesses merely implementers subject to public control or have the implementing agents become the primary beneficiary group? In a corrupted project, if the beneficiaries are listed as the implementing stakeholders like Ministries or government officials or "NGOs" it is almost always the case that the project is really seeking to buy influence rather than to promote development. A simple question to ask here is whether the skill or benefit can be and is being given to every citizen through the existing education system, or whether real experts are going to be hired by the public to do what is needed, if the society or the institutions are missing some belief or skill. If either of those approaches makes long-term sense and the project has not chosen this approach first, almost always the project is trying to buy off a particular group or to make the system dependent on perpetual support. If it isn’t clear before, this reveals the recipient receiving a disguised payoff in a rigged project.

6. Inputs Compared to Outputs and Outcomes (in a Logical Framework (Log-Frame)): Are inputs directly linked to root causes and designed to change behaviors or return a system to stability (after a disaster) or can they easily be described as “give-aways” where the receipt of the input is the desired goal? Outputs that are just rephrased inputs and not behavior changes are easy to spot in the list of “outcomes” in a project logframe. They will be things like, “people attend conferences/training,” “X is built with the funds,” “awareness advertisements reach people.” “Moneyshoveling” or “technology transfer” projects will have outputs such as “new hospital used,” “new computerized courts,” or “higher productivity from transferred technology and training” without any measure of how local funding makes the input sustainable or restores a cultural system to sustainability. Secrecy clauses in the project document to hide public information from the public are also a quick give-away that something nefarious is at work between the donors and recipients.

7. Project Rationale and Justification of Modality: If there is a project rationale statement, does it explain both the purpose and the form of the intervention on the basis of restoring cultures and institutions after some event that disrupted them (such as colonialism) and helping to re-establish them as viable in ways that can be self-supporting, that they are prevented from doing on their own as a result of outside pressures or disrupted belief systems, or does the project simply blame “poverty” and put the donor in the position of generous savior and benefactor to uplift the beneficiaries with the implication that they are “primitive,” hooking them on loans, subsidizing elites who could tax themselves, or subsidizing wasteful spending or consumption? The real underlying question here is, “Why can’t the recipients solve their problems on their own? What is stopping them other than “poverty”? Why is a donor offering money and support and not the country’s elites or its business community or its own NGOs or its own people in a form of social organization, in ways that indicate self-help, social solidarity, and autonomy?” If the project does not even ask this question and try to leverage self-help while also taking direct responsibility in addressing the root causes in developing countries of whatever problems the developed countries may have caused, this is already evidence of a hidden agenda. That agenda can be revealed by asking what the project is not doing that it could be doing, within the donor countries or among elites in both donor and recipient countries.

This indicator does not result in a score. It only raises suspicions and shows how projects are short-circuited. So, how can the information from this test result in change? Confronting projects with the truth of what they are doing on the basis of this test is useful for public oversight (civil society, citizen media) but risky for individual consultants.
The solution here is not only to expose what is going on, but to force the projects to follow the professional standard in these seven areas of project design. Below in this piece is a discussion of a reworked log-frame for the U.N. system and E.C. that incorporates the requirement that a log-frame respond to these questions and puts back in what has been stripped from the frameworks in those organizations (and others like them) (Lempert, 2016c).

The Aggregate Results of the Essential Indicator Tools: What is Really Happening in Development and What Needs to Change

How do different development organizations do when held to professional standards? Actual scores using six of the indicators in some key areas where there are results for several organizations (overall professionalism of evaluation systems, sustainable development, dependency and capacity building, and two of the rights areas, democracy and democratic education) seem to prove development critics right. Most of the major international organizations appear to be violating international laws and professionalism, substituting their own agendas in the name of “development.” Since most NGOs rely on them for funding and for setting the agenda, many of these have also had their missions and oversight corrupted. Best are NGOs that are self-financed and focused on their missions, with a professional commitment to sustainable development and international principles.

The tables here essentially confirm what previous articles for the two most basic indicators in the field – the one on “development” and on the pre-requisite for development, “poverty reduction” – suggested. Almost none of the organizations working internationally were doing anything remotely related to development or poverty reduction with the exception of one or two independent NGOs that had set sustainability or cultural protection as their missions. Indeed, we found the only real “development” and “poverty reduction” to be occurring in the donor countries themselves, in communities where there was some democratic control over spending and outcomes and where community members felt some solidarity with their neighbors. But even that may be weakening in developed countries. Here, we can test the results on some of the specifics, rather than just at the general level.

To confirm these results on the key areas for “development”, I have also recently tested the international community’s “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” and its earlier “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” on development, sustainable development, and poverty reduction to show how the set of international development actors together, under the United Nations, international development banks (like the World Bank and regional banks) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are also failing to uphold international laws and professionalism in these areas (Lempert, 2017a).

The five tables below examine five different categories of organizations -- four types that work in the development field, with the final table offering organizational comparisons -- showing how they score on the six indicators that apply to them as organizations or to specific projects that are identified with those organizations. (The two indicators that apply to specific categories – gender projects and sustainable business/ market intervention projects – are not included in these tables given their limited applicability.) The groups are: multi-lateral organizations acting in development; country donors; civil society organizations of various types not including foundations; and foundations. The comparisons are with domestic government agencies in developed countries and with business (for those categories where comparisons are possible).

In many cases, the indicator articles carefully scored a diverse range of organizations and those scores have simply been inserted into the tables below. In other cases, new scoring is provided following the directions and calibrations used for the original scoring presented in those articles. Note that in the table some scores are presented for the organization as a whole, looking at the aggregate of their mission, spending, and projects. For other organizations or for other indicators, a range is presented that applies to the variety of different projects that an organization runs. For example, many international organizations run projects that empower women, which in some societies score as a positive democratic intervention, whereas in other places or in other types of projects, it may undermine cultures. If the organization’s mission is haphazard and allows for these different results, or if a full analysis was not conducted, a range is presented here in place of a single score.

The organizations are presented in terms of spending in the area of “development.” The results suggest that the larger the organization (from
international multi-lateral donors to country donors), the more they are motivated by self-interest and actually undermine “development” and international treaties that they have signed or are the basis for their operations, at the very time they claim they are fulfilling them.

World Bank, United Nations Organizations (Table 1). Despite protests to the contrary, claiming that they have reformed and are now doing real development, the scoring of the World Bank (and similarly for other regional banks) demonstrates that they have little or no commitment to sustainable development or to independence of recipients, nor do they follow any of the principles of democracy or of professionalism. The World Bank remains a bank promoting profits of donor countries. Similarly, though it is not a bank, the United Nations shows a blatant disregard for its own international laws and treaties and for international standards. U.N. organizations appear to have been co-opted by donors using it to serve their national interests with the U.N. as a lobbyist for hire and a servant of government elite interests rather than a protector of citizens to promote international agreed missions of sustainable development, democracy, human rights, diversity, or independence. The data not only confirm that these organizations are substituting another agenda for development but it also makes clear that they are in violation of the very laws and professional doctrines they espouse, not merely in one area but systematically and across the board. They appear to be failing by design, using international laws as no more than lip service to justify missions that work to undermine international law, universal human values, and the future of our planet and species. These organizations are outlaws. Given the systematic failures, the question is not “improving” them but whether they can be brought under control of their own laws and reconstituted in a way that is law-abiding. In reviewing these results, it appears that the dependency theorists are correct in their critique that something in these organizations and in the global system has gone terribly wrong.

Country Donor Organizations (Table 2). Though the long-term interest of every country is to adhere to universal human standards and law to protect diversity, independence, sustainability and sovereignty of the world’s 6,000 remaining, living cultures, and individual peoples, the indicator scores of donor country programs reveal that they almost universally place national, short-term, self-interest of country elites and implementing agents over the interests of the planet or those of recipients. Though they claim that the era of colonialism is something of the past, countries still appear to be using development as a cover for buying influence among recipient country elites and governments for resource extractions and product sales, with little change from the colonial past. It is ironic that the only real success shown by the indicators (though it didn’t promote sustainable development) was the U.S. Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe after World War II. It appears that it was only when the U.S. was rebuilding other developed countries to serve as allies in the Cold War, did it actually seek to apply most of the principles of development so that its allies would be strong and (mostly) independent.

Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organizations (not including Foundations) (Table 3). The variation in scores among NGOs reveals the large spectrum of civil society organization goals and performance. These also seem to directly reflect their funding and support/oversight. Some NGOs are clearly the models of sustainable development and professionalism, responding to universal humanitarian principles. Others, seeking funding from governments or international organizations, have been corrupted by those agendas. Missionary organizations largely begin with agendas that contradict the basis of development and promote the interests of donors and extension of their systems rather than the strengthening of diversity and sustainability in fulfilling principles of democracy and rights.

Foundations (Table 4). Major international foundations also show mixed results when tested on the indicators. Sometimes they act to promote democratization and may also introduce (partially) concepts and approaches to sustainable development, if that is their stated mission. The key failing of foundations that the indicators reveal is they are also generally unaccountable to anyone other than themselves and they like to see beneficiaries dependant on their largesse rather than on a path to self-sustaining independence.

Comparisons: Domestic Government in Developed Countries; Private Business (Table 5). Comparison scores of developed country governments and private businesses are presented to demonstrate that there are professional applications of evaluation systems in organizations where there is oversight from the direct beneficiaries (direct in business where the owners are defined as the beneficiaries, less direct but partly effective in...
domestic government). The particular failure that occurs in development, and that these comparisons help reveal, is that the feedback and oversight links between beneficiaries and donor organizations are non-existent. Meanwhile, most development organizations, whether they are government or private, are so far from taxpayers (and from citizens funding them) that there is also no real oversight to ensure compliance with international laws or with fulfillment of their missions. Of course, both private business and governments in developed countries largely fail in sustainable development and in promoting democracy; indicating both the inability of business to protect societies without government oversight and the corruption of most contemporary governments when it comes to promoting equality and sustainability.

Reflection on the Results: What Some Theory Tells us About Our World

While it is comforting to have a set of tools for holding organizations to international laws and professional standards in the development field, the reality that most international organizations and countries demonstrate indifference to such standards is a cause for alarm for those of us who think beyond our own lifespan and are concerned about the future of the species and planet. Leaders of the developed and developing world, and citizens in the developed world appear to have little concept of global stewardship and remain focused on short-term interests and gains. Given that countries have been able to agree on universal principles as long-term goals, where is the logic in short-term actions that are self-destructive rather than on long-term solutions that are in everyone’s best interests? Why can we not change our individual psychology or our cultural psychology? Is there a way out?

Recently, a colleague and I sought to get to the bottom of some of this paradox by looking at behaviors of countries in regard to global warming, a recognized planetary problem, as well as to the behaviors of developed and developing countries where leaders have also put their systems on clear paths to unsustainability.

In the area of global warming, we found that behind the rhetoric of concern for the planet, developed countries were actually pursuing strategies in which they want global warming for the benefits it will bring them. They appear to be hiding calculations on their short term interests (Lempert & Nguyen, 2009). The same colleague recently completed a study of developed countries that are claimed to be sustainable in themselves, and found that the claims for sustainability in the development world are also mostly “hype.” The reliance on consumerism (mass consumption) to promote hard work and to invest in and stimulate scientific productivity, still does not lead to a balance in which science can lead to enough productivity on existing resources to keep modern industrial systems sustainable. In other words, sustainability in the developed world with current levels of consumption is also a myth (Nguyen, 2008).

Perhaps the best model of the apparent law-breaking of international agreements and disregard for principles, occurring both in the developed and undeveloped world, is the political science game theoretical model of the “prisoners’ dilemma.” With sustainability a myth, individual nations and ethnic groups are the prisoners of a global competition to take scarce (or easily removable) resources. Rather than protect their cultures and promote sustainability, they find, paradoxically, that the best means of “protecting” their resources is to overuse them now in ways that destroy their cultures and their potentials to be sustainable, so that they have the weaponry and wealth to protect their resources from those (more developed countries) who are scheming to take them. What we have found is a paradox where the global system is actually undermining its own sustainability by destabilizing potentially sustainable systems (Lempert & Nguyen, 2011).

It seems that what has gone wrong, or remains at the root of the problem, is that we are unable to link sustainable development with concerns about security. Whether it is in our nature or a result of memories of recent wars, or both, fears remain deeply embedded within leaders and mass publics that lead to aggrandizement and competition. Essentially there is collusion among leaders, and perhaps among all of us, for competition and mistrust that frustrates global standards. We do not promote real development because in reality, no one really wants it. If there is a need to change incentives, that means there is a need for an even firmer infrastructure for development to enforce long-term standards on developed and developed countries.

More recently, I have suggested that there may even be a logic at work of societal “suicide” (Lempert, 2017b).
Table 1  
How International Organizations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism: World Bank and United Nations Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Evaluation Systems Score on basis of three categories: Management Control; Accountability; Professionalism</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Score</th>
<th>Dependency versus Autonomy/ Sustainability Score</th>
<th>Capacity Building Score</th>
<th>Democracy Promotion Score</th>
<th>Democratic Education Promotion Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Low) Failure Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Low) Partial Solution Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>Weak or partial (or questionable) solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Vulnerable) Failure Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using “human rights” to promote a hidden agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Vulnerable) Partial Solution Dependency creating failure [Generally follows UNDP]</td>
<td>Range from Partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group to Anti-Democratic Failures, depending on projects and group</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using “human rights” to promote a hidden agenda</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Vulnerable) Failure Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Vulnerable) Failure Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using “human rights” to promote a hidden agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
How Country Donor Organizations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Evaluation Systems Score on basis of three categories: Management Control; Accountability; Professionalism</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Score</th>
<th>Dependency versus Autonomy/ Sustainability Score</th>
<th>Capacity Score</th>
<th>Building Score</th>
<th>Democracy Promotion Score</th>
<th>Democratic Education Promotion Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Low)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using &quot;human rights&quot; to promote a hidden agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Vulnerable, Low)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-Democratic Failure, depending on project</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using &quot;human rights&quot; to promote a hidden agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Peace Corps</td>
<td>[Assumed similar to USAID]</td>
<td>Partial Solution</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Probably now similar to USAID but may vary by project</td>
<td>Range from Partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group to Anti-Democratic Failures, depending on projects and group</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Aid</td>
<td>[Not rated]</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Not tested but probably no different from USAID and EC</td>
<td>Not a concern</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Aid</td>
<td>Corrupted (Low, Low, Low)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Not tested but probably no different from USAID and EC</td>
<td>Not a concern</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British, French Establishment of Administration Schools in Colonies</td>
<td>[Historical. Not rated]</td>
<td>Partial Solution</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Minimally competent approach to capacity building</td>
<td>Anti-Democratic Failure</td>
<td>[Historical. Not rated]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
How Non-Governmental Civil Society Organizations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Evaluation Systems Score on basis of three categories: Management Control; Accountability; Professionalism</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Score</th>
<th>Dependency versus Autonomy/Sustainability Score</th>
<th>Capacity Building Score</th>
<th>Democracy Promotion Score</th>
<th>Democratic Education Promotion Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Low)</td>
<td>Generally partial Solutions but also include models of sustainability</td>
<td>Range from Positive Models of Independence to Dependency Creating Failures depending on organization’s mission and approach</td>
<td>Large variation from corrupted, donor driven projects with hidden agendas to models of comprehensive capacity building depending on the NGO, clarity of its mission and safeguards</td>
<td>Range from Partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group to Anti-Democratic Failures, depending on projects and group</td>
<td>Range from a comprehensive approach to rights education and democratization (democratic experiential education approaches) to failures that are proselytizing and promote a hidden agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Survival; Focus on Global South; Terralingua and other Minority Culture Empowerment</td>
<td>[Not rated but assumed to follow pattern of Foundations or International NGOs]</td>
<td>Model of sustainability</td>
<td>Positive Model of Independence</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Partly sustainable solutions that promote specific groups</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated and Sustainable Community Development Approach such as AFAP Project</td>
<td>[Not rated but assumed to follow pattern of Foundations or International NGOs]</td>
<td>Model of sustainability</td>
<td>Positive Model of Independence</td>
<td>Model of comprehensive capacity building (with user groups)</td>
<td>Partial solution</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grameen Bank</td>
<td>[Not rated but assumed to follow pattern of Foundations or International NGOs, though it may be partly effective in competency given its business measures]</td>
<td>Potential model of sustainability</td>
<td>Positive Model of Independence IF original model is followed, but colonial if it follows an export driven approach and subsidizes failed credit systems</td>
<td>Model of comprehensive capacity building</td>
<td>Partial solution IF original model is followed but a Failure if it promotes consumption and resource exploitation without grass roots empowerment and sustainability</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accion International and other kinds of SME</td>
<td>[See above]</td>
<td>Partial solution or failure depending on safeguards and assumptions</td>
<td>Partial solution or failure depending on commitment to “BDS”</td>
<td>Narrow or Weak</td>
<td>[See above]</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion and Development Projects</td>
<td>[Not rated but assumed to follow pattern of Foundations or International NGOs]</td>
<td>Partial Solution</td>
<td>safeguards and assumptions</td>
<td>(business development services) approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF, IUCN, FFI alternative income or eco-tourism projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Prosperity Initiative, CARE and other relief organizations doing development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Neutral or failures promoting dependency</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Un可持续 Quick Fix or Failure, depending on project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helvetas, SNV, CIDSE, Minority Area “Integrated Development”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Promoting dependency</td>
<td>Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project</td>
<td>Unsustainable Quick Fix or Failure, depending on project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision and Religious donors</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using “human rights” to promote a hidden agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Law Civic Education Project; Transparency International; PIRGs; Common Cause</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial solution</td>
<td>Comprehensive Solution towards building an independent and sustainable system in line with international principles</td>
<td>Model of comprehensive capacity building</td>
<td>Partly sustainable solutions that promote specific groups</td>
<td>Strong and/or partly sustainable solution that promotes specific groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Domestic Empowerment NGO Approach (for comparison)**

| Women’s rights movement in developed countries [Similarly, civil rights movement] | - | Partial solution | Partial Solution | Model of comprehensive capacity building (but less when grafted into developing countries without considering cultural context) | Partly sustainable solutions that promote specific groups | Strong and/or partly sustainable solution that promotes specific groups |
| University Service Learning Movement | - | Partial solution | Partial Solution | Corrupted, Incompetent, Hidden Agenda Project | Un可持续 quick fix or failure | Weak or partial (or questionable) solutions |
Table 4
How Foundations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Evaluation Systems Score on basis of three categories: Management Control; Accountability; Professionalism</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Score</th>
<th>Dependency versus Autonomy/ Sustainability Score</th>
<th>Capacity Building Score</th>
<th>Democracy Promotion Score</th>
<th>Democratic Education Promotion Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Foundations</td>
<td>Corrupted: (Low, Low, Potentially effective)</td>
<td>Partial Solution</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Range from Narrow or Weak to Minimally Competent to potential Models if they fund basic skills and build institutions in ways that promote sustainability and full accountability</td>
<td>Range from Partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group to Anti-Democratic Failures, depending on projects and group</td>
<td>Range from weak or partly questionable solutions to partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soros Foundation</td>
<td>[Not rated but assumed to follow pattern of Foundations or International NGOs]</td>
<td>Partial Solution</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Minimally Competent approach to capacity building</td>
<td>Range from Partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group to Failures, depending on projects and group</td>
<td>Range from weak or partly questionable solutions to partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>[Not rated but assumed to follow pattern of Foundations or International NGOs]</td>
<td>Partial Solution</td>
<td>Dependency creating failure</td>
<td>Minimally Competent approach to capacity building</td>
<td>Range from Partly sustainable solutions that promote a specific group to Failures, depending on projects and group</td>
<td>[Not rated]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5
How Domestic Government and Private Businesses Score on Professionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Evaluation Systems Score on basis of three categories: Management Control; Accountability; Professionalism</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Score</th>
<th>Dependency versus Autonomy/ Sustainability Score</th>
<th>Capacity Building Score</th>
<th>Democracy Promotion Score</th>
<th>Democratic Education Promotion Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Domestic Policy Departments</td>
<td>Partly Effective (Partly Effective; Partly Effective; Partly Effective)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A. [Donor country governments do not build capacity of their own governments.]</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Failure that appears to be proselytizing using “human rights” and “democracy” to promote a hidden agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Businesses</td>
<td>Effective (Effective, Effective, Effective)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A. [Indicator questions are designed for public purpose]</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other Parts of the Infrastructure of Accountability in Development

If leaders are unable to adhere to international agreements and professional standards, it is incumbent upon professionals to stand behind their ethics codes and professionalism rather than to stand idly by when such standards are stripped away. Among the mechanisms to do that are for professionals to codify our work and require that anyone practicing in the field adhere to such standards, certification of simple tools like development logframes to assure that public organizations apply the standard practices, and professional contribution to monitoring organizations that highlight results. This approach has partly worked in other fields but has not yet emerged in development. At the same time, the standardization that donors are seeking may be of the type that “harmonizes” the politicization and undermining of professional standards. Four types of tools that professionals can develop as part of the missing infrastructure, with concrete examples I have developed are as follows.

Legal Tools to Hold Governments and NGOs to their Legal Missions

Government agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations are, in theory, subject to laws on their operations. Before even examining their specific activities in international development interventions, there are questions as to whether they are actually performing their legitimate functions under international law. One can devise legal tests to hold them to these missions, both for governments (Lempert, 2016e) and NGOs (Lempert, 2016c).

Certification and Unionization of Development Professionals to Uphold Professional Codes as Applied to Development, Even with Development Professionals Coming from Multiple Fields. There is no need for specific professional degrees in development and that may even be counterproductive. Lawyers building democracy, environmentalists working on sustainable development, doctors designing health projects, and others might actually find their standards eroded were they forced to train, instead, in “international development.” Whatever the field professionals learn, what is important is that they are also held to specific codes of professionalism by their professions when they work on development projects.

It was my hope that consultants would unionize, starting with sub-fields, to protect their professionalism and to assure the public and donor agencies that those who were being hired were bound by the highest standards. There already are ethics codes for lawyers, accountants, public managers, and a number of social sciences. Further, some professional specializations that train bureaucrats for the development field (the new degree programs in Development Studies or NGO management) could also seek to license or codify some aspects of the profession. But they have not.

Some two decades ago, I began to work with existing ethics codes in a number of sub-fields. I also then sought to enforce those codes against members who were in the development community in practice and wished to hold their licenses – lawyers working for the World Bank and violating codes, political scientists working for USAID, and so on. I also sought to persuade these associations to create lists of organizational outlaws/violators and others praising best practices as a way to help monitor donor organizations (Lempert, 1997).

Thus far, without any public organization advocating for such codes or seeking sanctions against violators, there has been little progress in their use. With no outside monitoring, major donors have been able to politicize hiring and firing of development practitioners (through mechanisms described and measured in the various indictors) and to undermine standards as well as attempts by professionals to unionize. With more people in part-time or self-employed work who are struggling to survive, even those professions where there were clear standards – such as audits and accounting – have been easily corrupted in such huge contract areas as military spending, that no one pays any attention to violations of standards in aid. However, this approach merely awaits public enforcement pressure to become a reality.

Required, Standardized Best Practice Tools such as Professional Project Logframes. Some development tools are so universal that there is no excuse for not requiring that they be used in public spending in development and that professionals be subject to sanction and required to report on their non-use. Although development organizations claim they need to be “flexible,” there are international laws and professional practices that are universally recognized as the basic standards of legality and competence.
In another piece, I analyzed the failure of logframes and organizational administration in NGOs today and have redesigned the standard logframe to remedy the current failures (Lempert, 2016c).

NGO Monitoring of Development and Progress in Sustainable Development. While the failing development agents have no end of statistics on current incomes and lifestyles, they have yet to invest in any real indicator on internationally agreed end-goals for sustainability of the world’s cultures and communities. Without any real idea of the point of progress and protections, the development agenda is left flailing. While some environmental organizations can now tell us which eco-systems are failing and which species are going extinct, we have no similar measure of which human cultural systems are failing and going extinct (often as a result of failed development policies). Recently, I have worked to invent the infrastructure for two such initiatives, in ways that closely follow the international law for cultural protections, in ways that link this protection to development; an initiative for a Red Book for Endangered cultures and a private sector “certification” scheme to certify products and services as benign (or toxic) in their impact on cultures.

My hope is that civil society will continue to generate organizations that are real monitors, including one that monitors all 6,000 of the world’s remaining human cultures in terms of their sustainability and whether they are threatened, endangered, critically endangered, or now extinct. Such a measure is also a means of generating legal standing for enforcement of protections and development in ways that comply with international genocide laws. These are not the only such approaches. The organization, Terralingua, is now developing better measures for biocultural/linguistic diversity, though mostly of small groups still living in natural habitats. Some of the excellent organizations mentioned in individual indicator articles as fulfilling missions – State of the World; IUCN’s Red Book of Endangered Species; can capture some of the overall issues on the level of eco-systems and human cultural systems that are the units for development. We need to promote these measures rather than the false measures of “development” that are based on GDP (sales and productivity, based on what foreigners will pay for what a country has) rather than sustainability, cultural survival, and wealth/per capita assets (Lempert, 2010b).

Larger System Changes Needed for Accountability and Transformation to Institutions that Follow the “Universal” Human Principles Over the Long Term:

How to Use these Tools to Go Further

Though these approaches above focus on professional tools, part of the obstacle to development is that we need to change our way of thinking about our world and about each other as much as we have to have the tools ready for life in such a world. We cannot just create the legal and professional tools. We also need to re-socialize ourselves and our young (recreating our culture in the developed world) and rebalance political interests for long-term survival. Alongside legal reforms, I have set out with others in generating approaches to design those systems and to offer the measures and mechanisms for those as well, in books and articles for alternative sustainable development plans, for democratic-experiential education approaches throughout the social science curriculum, and for political and constitutional reform in the full design of alternative, workable, constitutional systems. Much of this work that I have also presented in the form of legal solutions and solutions complementary to legal reforms has also been scholarly reviewed and published. However, since it has been published in a variety of disciplines, it has not been clearly linked as part of a single approach in development. A brief review of the linkages and the complement to legal reforms is as follows:

Alternative, Sustainable Development Planning

If we are going to move towards sustainable development, we need to be able to develop plans to achieve it at the country level and at the level of each culture (and some communities) within a country. The reality is that the World Bank and other development banks, the UN and other development agencies approach countries as businesses to be used for increasing profitability and production, and their plans show no attempt to balance consumption with resources or to maintain cultural identity. Some development textbooks introduce this critique, and anthropologists and environmentalists measure carrying capacity, but there are few models of how to actually do the planning. In 1988, I organized a group of students to design an alternative plan for a small country;
Ecuador. Though an early prototype with flaws, we presented it to the President of Ecuador and on national Ecuadorian television. We were then able to publish it as a textbook in alternative development planning, to demonstrate that it could be done and how (Lempert, Mitchell, & McCartney, 1995).

**Building Democracy and Citizen Oversight through Redesigned Educational Systems: Democratic Experiential Education**

The ability to use indicators to hold governments accountable to laws and professionalism requires that universities and basic education train people in the skills that are required. Educational systems today claim that the factory method of education training personnel for obedience in the workplaces of industrial society is the only efficient method of teaching skills with the existing resources. As a university student, I tested that assumption by laying out the principles of education for skilled, empowered citizens who would learn everything in the basic curricula and then much more through experiential approaches and democratic forms of education. Major universities accredited these courses that they found were not only more effective but were also cheaper than existing education. I then formed an NGO to promote this approach and to spin-off the approach at the secondary school level and at the professional school level as well as internationally. The tools for measuring educational systems and transforming curricula, with tested models at major universities, were published in a volume several years ago with the leading U.S. education publisher. Since then, I have produced a sequel, for transforming professional schools globally, on the basis of consulting work done with universities on four continents (Lempert, Briggs, & Others, 1995).

**Remaking Constitutional Systems for a “Return to Democracy” and a “Return to Community”**

No real political progress appears possible in the developed world without restructured political systems that incorporate full citizen oversight mechanisms that protect individuals and communities from the arbitrary actions of the bureaucratic systems of military, police and economic power that have developed in modern times. There are plenty of contemporary slogans and ideologies for such controls, but most of these mechanisms have failed. My doctoral work in the Soviet Union during its transition, and several comparisons of major industrial societies (in the form of published books and articles, not cited here), examined the cultural and structural basis for these systems and where oversight mechanisms were stripped away, allowing systems to run themselves and to run amok. In a trilogy of works on constitutional systems, I actually redesigned the U.S. constitution to take the cultural principles of oversight that existed in an agrarian, federal system, and to reapply them in modern forms in the industrial state. The approach combines law, anthropology, political science and economics, and takes citizen powers like private attorneys general and jury oversight, for application in military, business, and government bureaucracies. Paradoxically, it fits no single discipline where there is a competence to review it, though colleagues have used it in teaching in places like Yale Law School. One set of the proposals is presented briefly in a published piece several years ago showing how they could be applied in Ukraine (Lempert, 1994).

**Measuring Overall Progress**

We have the universal principles of U.N. treaties as a guide, but do we have any real measures of whether we are going forward and what it means beyond the simple measures of “development goals” that are part of the political checklists of the U.N.? Along with a lack of tools for measuring the state of the world’s cultures in terms of sustainable development, we also seem out of measures (or interest) for determining whether we are even progressing anymore as a species. Even if we have indicators for development of “broken” societies to repair them following a history of colonialism, an equally (or more) important question is whether we have any idea or measures of whether developed countries are achieving any real progress (other than scientific technological development) or whether we are regressing or stagnating. Who is devising such measures? Where can they be published? Where are they heard? Is “progress” even possible or are we locked into current patterns? This is another debate that I have worked to reopen alongside the debates of legal accountability and reforms (Lempert, 2016f).

The paradox is that the thinking and skills do not exist for the transformations outlined above. Even so, if I and others can envision and build accountability tools and the infrastructure for promoting their use, that is proof that we have the
capacity to do so, even if our society currently lacks the will. If the capacity exists, the possibility exists that the goals can be realized at some future time.

References


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