The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts

Richard Georgi

Abstract
The paper contributes to the scholarly debate on (de-)radicalization through research on the (de-)securitizing character of human rights invocations by civil society organizations (CSOs) in ethno-political conflicts. The securitization concept provides for an innovative analytical tool for understanding the influence of CSOs on inter-group relationships: A securitizing move asserts an existential threat to a reference object and demanding all necessary means to prevent it. They follow the “logic of war” narrowing windows of opportunity for constructive dialogue. Reversing a conflict’s securitization necessitates de-securitizing communication transferring an issue back from panic politics to the realm of negotiations. The articulation of human rights, however, does not necessarily bear a de-securitizing character and therefore de-radicalizes conflict discourses. In fact, the articulation of a violation of a human right rather opens the scope for securitization: seeking urgent actions to avoid the threat to human life. Asking under which conditions human rights CSOs issue a securitizing or de-securitizing move, puts the interface between contextual factors, organizational behavior, an at the center of interest. The close examination of two organizations operating in Chiapas, Mexico, during the highly securitized conflict period between 1994 and 1996, suggests that the kind of social capital produced by the societal context of the organization and the type of invoked human rights condition the (de-)securitizing character of their statements. Prevailing bridging social capital induces the CSO to invoke rather inclusive, integrational human rights, which are likely to issue a de-securitizing move. Within contexts characterized

Richard Georgi graduates in his major Political Science (Diploma) in summer 2014 at the Freie Universität Berlin. His academic focus is on the juncture between conflict studies and political philosophy. He worked at the Latin America department of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Besides his academic education, Richard Georgi volunteered for several Human Rights organizations in Mexico and is an active member of the Human Rights NGO Peace Brigades International.
by bonding social capital, produced along the conflict divide, CSOs tend to invoke exclusive human rights on behalf of one conflict group, producing securitizing moves.

1 Introduction

The nexus between ethno-political conflicts and civil society is increasingly being recognized by academics as well as international policy makers. In the aftermath of the Cold War, ethno-political conflicts, where the incompatibility is one between different so-called ethnic groups and their political organizations, have become one dominant cause of mass political violence and ignited huge scholarly debate (Gurr 1994: 348, Wimmer 2004: 1, Wimmer et al. 2009, also Figure 1, Annex 1). Conflicts centered on ethnicity seem to be ubiquitous in a world with a majority of states containing different ethnic groups (Galtung 2010) and experiences from the Balkans in the 1990s illustrate that these conflicts sustained over years might become protracted, deeply divide societies, and lead to mass atrocities (Lederach 1997: 14, Belloni 2008: 183, Horowitz 2000: xi).

Civil society organizations (CSOs) have recently been considered key players in the progression of ethno-political conflicts (Marchetti and Tocci 2011a). CSOs are a force to be reckoned since they can fuel discords further – particularly in contexts of nationalism (see i.e. Kaldor and Muro-Ruiz 2003 and Belloni 2008) - , entrench status quo, or even act as peace constituencies facilitating inter-group reconciliation (see Lederach 1997: 94, Forster and Mattner 2006, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 27 pp.). Therefore, international policy-makers attempt to discern which CSOs are conflict-fuelling, and which work towards peaceful transition. Their goal is to mitigate the effects of conflict-fuelling actions and reinforce civic actions that spur peaceful transformation (Pishchikova and Iazzi: 50). The recognition of civil society’s role and its increased importance in peacebuilding initiatives in the last decade has been matched by a growing body of literature (see Paffenholz and Spurk

---

2 For a list of abbreviations see the annex.

3 The term ethnic group is highly contested. For a detailed discussion see chapter 2.1.
2006, Richmond and Carey 2005). The academic debate is centered on the impact of civil society on ethno-political conflicts, the means that strengthen the cooperation between international actors and CSOs to induce peaceful change, and the theoretical underpinnings of ethnic identity and civil society (Marchetti and Tocci 2011a: 1-2, see also Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin 2004: 3-4). Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on the factors and conditions determining civil society’s role in the midst of conflict.

The paper will contribute to the scholarly debate through research on the role of CSOs invoking human rights in ethno-political conflicts between the state and an ethnic minority group. The research objective is to disclose the role of these organizations with regards to the discourses that produce and sustain hostilities. A constructivist perspective on systemic conflict transformation will be applied in framing ethnicity-driven conflicts since it emphasizes the construction of inter-group’s hostile relationship as the key point for transforming violent and destructive conflicts into constructively managed ones (Lederach 1995a, Bonacker 2011: 24, Ramsbotham et al.: 29). The focus is thus not on naturally given causes but rather on clarifying how the other is constructed as a threat to the own existence by the means of communication (Bernshausen and Bonacker 2011: 26, see also Gromes and Bonacker 2007, Burns 2011).

In order to assess the role of civil society organizations with regards to the constructivism-based approach to conflict transformation, the securitization concept provided by the so-called Copenhagen School will be taken into consideration. Securitization points at the invocation of an issue or the other as a threat that needs to be addressed through the adoption of extra-ordinary means (emergency politics). The concept uncovers how identities are socially constructed as threatened identities and can be utilized to portray a conflict’s progression through threat communication (Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 2, Bonacker et al. 2011: 17, Bernshausen and Bonacker 2011). Conflicts escalate due to a securitization process that legitimizes the use of violence. The securitization of conflicts begets a mutual perception as an enemy that needs to be dealt with by all necessary means. Positive conflict transformation, in turn, requires de-securitization so that the other is no longer seen as a threat.

---

4 Kateryna Pishchikova and Valeria Izzi 2011 provide a sound overview of the recent debate on the role of civil society organizations, conflict and peacebuilding.
threat but a partner with diverging interests. This will push the progression of a conflict towards substantial negotiations and the implementation of sustainable non-violent patterns of interaction. The focus on conflict discourses and their influence with regards to group’s behavior provides further a new perspective on the issue of de-radicalization. Hence, the de-securitization concept helps to shed light on the factors that brings about de-radicalization and introduces a more dynamic perception of the process that begets a change of individual orientation.

Human rights have become a central concept employed by civil society engagement working on conflicts (see Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999: 5, also Franklin 2008). The concept of human rights – although multifaceted and sometimes blurry – is perceived as an integral part of conflict transformation since reconciliation of relationships needs the recognition, institutionalization and regularized observance of human rights (Pia and Diez 2007: 19-20). Yet, political claims are increasingly framed in terms of human rights which is partly due to the intrinsic value of these rights, and partly due to instrumental reasons (Marchetti and Tocci 2011a: 2). Human-rights related activities address the conflict progression as such and demand a new orientation of an actor’s relationships according to the invoked norm standards. Thus, it is of interest which conditions may facilitate positive influence of human rights activities on conflict transformation.

Accordingly, the research paper will be guided by the following research question: Under which conditions do civil society organizations invoking human rights issue a securitizing or de-securitizing move in ethno-political conflicts?

The research question builds on the foundations laid by a three-year research project based at LUISS University and involving seven institutions with over 20 researches (see Marchetti and Tocci 2011a: p. 2). The final report edited by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci combines the literature on civil society and conflict in order to provide a sound framework

---

5 SHUR. Human Rights in Conflicts: The Role of Civil Society. STREP project funded by the European Commission. Website: www.luiss.it/shur.
for the analysis of civil society’s impact on ethno-political conflicts through human rights. The research paper draws from these results and will apply the analytical framework to in-depth case analyses in order to shed some light on the conditional mechanism that determines the (de-)securitizing character of civil society organizations. Examining the process by which two CSOs issued a securitizing and a de-securitizing move might therefore provide insights on a generalizable mechanism. Consequently, the research deployed a theory-building research design with variable-guided process tracing at its core. This implies two inferential steps linking empirical material on the cases with literature on theory to conduct a structured analysis (see Beach and Petersen 2013: 16). Here, the case analysis followed a Y-centric path to detect the conditional mechanism whereby civil society organizations issued (de-)securitizing moves. The research’s results shall contribute to mid-range theory-building outside of individual cases.

The empirical scope will be limited on two civil society organizations operating in the ethno-political conflict between the Mexican state and indigenous communities in the federal state of Chiapas. The Zapatista conflict in Southern Mexico is regarded as a prototype for civil society engagement in conflicts (see Mattiace 1997: 32, Collier 2005). Much ink has been spilled over the civil society network that was initiated by the Zapatista movement and its role in keeping the struggle for autonomy alive (see i.e. Olesen 2004b). Yet, emerging human rights activities have not been researched from a securitization perspective. The Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas A.C. (Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, CDHFBC/FrayBa) was founded by the Catholic Diocese in 1989 and its activities issue a de-securitizing move, while Enlace Civil A.C. originated from a community-based initiative in 1996 and its activities resemble a securitizing move. Both organizations have been critically shaped by the conflict context during the time period between the uprising of the Ejército Zapatista Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in 1994 and the final blow of the San Andrés talks in late 1996. Choosing CSOs differing with regards to the character of the issued (de-)securitizing move and operating within the same conflict context, time frame, and region, will help to discuss crucial interaction effects in the mechanism.
In short, the research paper contributes to the development of the field in three ways: It presents an adapted analytical framework that derived from the revision of previously identified factors and subsequent variables. Here, insights from empirical evidence, interviews, and literature on civil society formation in Latin America will be incorporated. The paper adds to further theory-building through tracing the process that links these factors in two specific cases. Finally, the research applies the framework to an ethno-political conflict in the Latin American context which will provide interesting insights on the role of context conditions not yet considered within previous research.

The overall aim is to go beyond the divide labeling civil society actors invoking human rights as either good or bad but rather assess their character with regards to a specific analytical category, namely securitization. Although it is not an exhaustive perspective, securitization is regarded as a useful tool to assess CSOs contribution to the development of inter-group relationships and, therefore, to a social constructivist notion of conflict transformation. Thus, the focus is on the circumstances that produce conflict discourses. Overall, the results shall serve as a starting point for further research, including medium-n and large-n designs, and stimulate debate on the role of civil society actors in the midst of ethno-political conflict.

2

Theoretical Framework

2.1. Ethno-political Conflicts

Starting out from the notion that conflicts denotes the incompatibility of subject positions, there is controversy regarding the nature of these incompatibilities within peace and conflict studies (Bonacker et al. 2011: 14-15, Ramsbotham et al 2005: 25, Glasl 1994). The research paper will adopt the perspective that conflicts are discursive in nature. This position implies that incompatibilities only appear if someone makes a reference to them, so that material issues might be at the core of interest incompatibilities, but they do not constitute a conflict in itself (Bonacker et al. 2011: 16 and Jabri 1996: 93 pp.). They rather need to be discursively
constructed as a conflict affair. The mismatch of interests is, thus, a matter of perception by the actors involved (see also Foucault 1979). Hence, discursive understanding emphasizes the invocation of incompatibilities and is distinguished from positions assuming that conflicts derive from invariable human needs and ensuing negotiable interests on underlying issues (see e.g. Burton 1990).

The denomination ethno-political already points at the incompatibility at the conflict’s core which relates to so-called ethnic groups and their invocation of contesting needs and interests (see Gurr 2000: 53 pp.). In its broadest terms, ethnic group refers to a set of cultural characteristics that separate one group from another (Horowitz 2000: 95). The contested nature of the term relates to the ontology of the cultural characteristics (Pia and Diez 2007: 2). While primordial arguments point out that these characteristics are naturally given and not changeable, the research will adopt the view in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism that perceives cultural characteristics as socially constructed and, therefore, underlines the role of discourse in their construction (Pia and Diez 2007: 3, Fearon and Laitin 2000: 849, Campbell 1998, Gurr 2000: 348). Discourses condition individuals to identify with certain particular ethnic groups which are an effect of continued re-articulation. Thus, ethnicity and hostile inter-ethnic relationships are not transcendentally determined (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 849). As a discursive frame, ethnicity incorporates criteria like language and common ancestry and is referred to in order to create a sense of identity and belonging (Gurr 2000: 53). The frame, however, is not fixed, but likely to change, particularly in periods of economic and political instability (Horowitz 2000: 52, Fearon and Laitin 2000: 851 pp.). Additionally, ethnic identity is just one identity frame of a person, which can be activated or become dominant in situations of discursively invoked threats (Amartya Sen 2006: p. 4). In line with that argument, Gross-Stein points out that ethnic identity can be freely chosen or imposed by others (Gross-Stein 1996: p. 95). Still, although ethnicity is not fixed, it cannot be easily changed, but is a rather stable and deep-

---

8 This position is also referred to as a poststructuralist point of view (see Yashar 1998: 28).
rooted frame that has been reproduced and rearticulated continuously for a long period of time (Bonacker et al. 2011: 16, Gurr 1994: 348).

Consequently, ethno-political conflict arises when identity groups, self-defined in ethnic terms, and their political organizations articulate their respective needs in mutually incompatible ways (Marchetti and Tocci 2011b: 16, Pia and Diez 2007: 3). In the context of nation-states, the articulation of ethnic groups might lead to political demands that pitch the group against the central authority (Bonacker et al. 2011: 16 and Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 17). Ethnic groups invoke cultural characteristics like language, lifestyle, territorial claims, and common ancestry as a frame for identity and use it to claim rights within a state or autonomy from it (Pia and Diez 2007: 3, Gurr 1994: 348). The reasons for the onset and progression of ethnic conflicts remain highly debated. The instrumentalist tradition argues that conflicts originate in the contest between rational agents over scarce resources invoking ethnicity as means to gain political support (Gurr: 1994: 348, Caselli and Coleman II 2012: 6). On the other hand, insights provided by Azar 1991 and Lederach 1997 underline the importance of structural conditions, such as unmet basic human needs, and the vicious dynamics of prolonged conflict cycles on inter-group relationships. Considering the discursive understanding of ethnic identities and conflicts, however, the research paper’s focus will rather be on the construction of groups as ethnics that oppose each other in violent contest. The conflictual discourse invoking the other as a threat to the very own existence and the actions legitimized through such discourse are regarded to be the central dynamic that move conflicts from situations where institutionally binding rules prevail into stages of renewed violence (Waever 1995: 53, Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 2-3).

---

10 For detailed insights into the debate regarding the causes of ethnic conflict see Wimmer (2009): 318 pp.
2.2. Securitization and Conflict Transformation

The accruing body of literature on Conflict Transformation has led to a variety of meanings and conceptualizations\textsuperscript{12} within the field (Dukes 1999: 48, Botes 2003: 2). No universally accepted definition exists and pronouncements are still in flux. Yet principal proponents of the conflict transformation notion propose that conflicts are dynamic and move through certain phases transforming relationships and social organizations (see for example Lederach 1995b: 201, Lederach 1997: 65, Rumpesinghe 1995). Hence, the field is concerned with deeper structural, cultural and long-term-relational aspects that move the societal system producing patterns of violence to a peaceful system (Botes 2003: 4, Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 29, Lederach 1997: 81).

Conflict transformation views conflict as endemic to social systems and is, thus, distinguished from other approaches portraying conflict as finite phenomenon resulting from single conflict issues that can be resolved (Botes 2003: 3, Rupesinghe 1995: 156). In accordance with the discursive understanding of ethno-political conflicts outlined above, a social-constructivist perspective on systemic conflict transformation of conflict actors’ relationships will be applied. In contrast to actor-centered approaches which exclusively focus on actors and their behavior, a systemic approach draws attention to the self-referentiality of conflicts and postulates that they escalate due to effects that the actors cannot understand nor control (Bernshausen and Bonacker 2011: 24). Thus, systemic approaches not only look at conflicts from the perspective of the actor but also incorporate the process perspective, which puts more emphasis on the dynamics of conflicts. The social constructivist view concentrates on how the conflict has been constructed by means of communication.

The securitization concept developed by the so-called Copenhagen School is well-suited to enrich a constructivism-based systemic approach to conflict transformation since it analytically grasps how conflicts escalate due to the invocation of issues or actors as threats (see Bernshausen and Bonacker 2011: 26, Gromes and Bonacker 2007). During the late

\textsuperscript{12} See Botes (2003) for an overview of different conflict transformation definitions and conceptualizations.
1980s and 1990s, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) yielded an innovative understanding of security and made one of the most significant contributions to theorizing on security agenda. Through introducing the concept of societal security as the interplay between specific kinds of threats and vulnerabilities, on the one hand, and the constitution of society and cultural identity as a referent object, on the other hand, identity was brought into the focus of security (Wæver 1993: 23). As opposed to the political sector, in which existential threat concerns a state’s sovereignty and ideology, the societal sector concerns the survival of collective identities (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 5-8). Societal security does not refer to a fixed array of threats but, instead, to a specific security dynamic in which two conceptual elements are decisive: The securitizing agents which act in the name of the referent object and defines the security problem, as well as functional agents who affect the security dynamic in a sector but without defining the security problem (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 35 pp.).

Once security was not about specific referent objects, such as states, anymore and not concerned with a specific kind of threat, the concept became in danger of losing its analytical grip. The Copenhagen School, therefore, strived for coherence through searching for the underlying logic of security (Huysmans 1998: 491, Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 2). In Security, A New Framework for Analysis, they finally took a social constructivist turn and started to conceive security as a rhetorical structure (Huysmans 1998: 492). Following John Austin’s philosophy of language, the mere speech act – uttering security – changes the situation and transforms an issue from, e.g. being an economic question, into a security problem (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 23). Consequently, security was now perceived as an inter-subjective practice and not as something that can be defined objectively (ibid: 31, Roe 2004: 281).

“Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a

---

13 The theory-building progressed during the years begetting different and sometimes contradictory conceptualizations. Further, the various researchers differ in their interpretations and application of theory (for an overview see Huysmans 1998). Nevertheless, as Huysmans 1998 formulates, there is sufficient coherence to speak of a School (Huysmans 1998: 480-481).
specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”
(Wæver 1995: 55)

An issue may turn into a security issue, if an actor presents it as an existential threat to a reference object. Security problems are distinguished from other issues since they endanger the self-determination and possibly even the mere existence of a societal unit (Roe 2004: 281). As survival is at stake, the securitizing actor claims that the issue needs to be shifted from normal politics to emergency politics (Jutila 2006: 168). Thus, security is “the move which takes politics beyond the normal rules of the game” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 23). The securitized issue necessitates priority over all others and ordinary means do not suffice to address the threat adequately. Instead, it has to be responded to with emergency measures (Roe 2004: 281, Bernshausen and Bonacker: 27). The use of all necessary means, in turn, breaches the institutionalized rules of normal politics (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 71; Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 2). Security follows the “logic of war” and is about the question to be or not to be (Wæver 1995: 53). Wæver emphasizes that although it is a decision to enter this logic, “once in, one has to play according to the grammar of war” (ibid.: 53). This means entering an unconstrained situation where combatants try to function at maximum efficiency in relation to a clearly defined aim, the “loser is forced to submit and the outcome is defined in polar terms: victory-defeat” (ibid.: 53-54).

However, it is decisive to distinguish between a securitizing move and securitization. While asserting an existential threat and requesting extraordinary measures constitutes a securitizing move, securitization only occurs if an audience accepts the allegation and approves a response by emergency measures14 (Roe 2004: 281). Subsequently, the securitizing move fails when the addressed audience does not agree on the threat and / or the proposal to use extraordinary means. This emphasizes that the impact of securitizing moves is not pre-determined (Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 4). In a nutshell, securitization

---

14 Since the speech act needs to be approved by an audience to bring about securitization, it appears to be rather perlocutionary (see Butler 1996). For a critique regarding the linguistic philosophy of the securitization theory, see Mc Donald 2008.
means that an issue or an actor is framed as threat to a referent object and consists of three components: The mere claim that a threat to survival exists and the demand for extraordinary measures (securitizing move), the adoption of emergency action, and the effects on the relations between the affected units through the violation of rules which otherwise would have been obeyed (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 25, Bonacker, Braun, and Groth 2011: 221). The securitization concept stresses that the main effect of uttering security is its potential to lead an audience to tolerate violations of accepted and binding rules (Stritzel 2007: 361).

Perpetuated threat communication and the subsequent adoption of emergency measures beget the escalation of conflict (Bonacker, Braun and Groth 2011: 223). In ethno-political conflicts, securitization means that the other cannot longer be dealt with within the realm of the political institutions at hand, but needs to be addressed through the adoption of extraordinary measures. In accordance with Wæver’s notion of “logic of war”, an unconstrained situation is created in which all necessary means are legitimizied to accomplish the sole aim to counteract the threat to the group’s own identity and secure survival. This might include legitimizing violence and, in some cases of high escalation, even mass atrocities. The increase in spread and depth of securitization is, thus, a good instrument to portray the progression of a conflict and will indicate to what extent human rights violations are as legitimate (Bonacker et al. 2011: p. 17).

In this regard, securitization indicates the negative transformation of a political discourse into panic politics (see Bonacker, Braun, and Groth 2011: 222). Nevertheless, the securitization concept also provides venues for how conflicts can be positively transformed. Insofar constructivism-based systemic conflict transformation targets at the restructuring of hostile inter-group relations, the key issue is – through the lenses of securitization – how securitized situations become de-securitized. Wæver and Buzan use the term de-securitization to refer to moving issues off the security agenda and back into the realm of public political dispute (see Wæver 1995: 57, Roe 2004: 285 pp. and Williams 2003, 523). De-securitization means the withdrawal of emergency measures and the choice for political negotiation. This requires a change in the perceptions so that the other is not seen as an
existential threat anymore, but as a partner with diverging interests (Bonacker et al. 2011: 224). Similar to securitization, de-securitization is composed of a de-securitizing move—referring to direct interventions aimed at changing the conflict parties’ discursively constructed perceptions and the prevalence of emergency measures—and the approval of an addressed audience which moves back to normal politics. Therefore, de-securitization can only appear if securitization has taken place and the decision to apply extra-ordinary means is still in force. De-securitization of the conflict discourse contributes to reconciling the incompatibility of subject positions (Marchetti and Tocci 2011b: 67).

2.3. The Role of De-securitization in the Process of De-radicalization

Despite increasing interest in the issue of de-radicalization during the last years, the field of research remains largely in its infancy stage. Yet, due to the practical relevance in addressing the extremism of groups trying to impose their ideology on a society as a whole by means of violence and threats, the issue of de-radicalization is of upmost importance for academics as well as policy makers (Köhler 2014: 427). Omar Ashour, John Horgan, and Tore Bjørgo represent the core of a highly promising research area that appears to be essential in terms of societal security (ibid.: 420, see also: Ashour 2009, Bjørgo 2006, Bjørgo and Horgan 2009). At its broadest terms, de-radicalization conceptualizes a process of individual or collective cognitive change from an extremist identity to a moderate psychological state and has to be distinguished from disengagement rather pointing at a behavioral change (Köhler 2014: 420, see also Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009, Dechesne 2011). The literature is pretty much centered on the individual and his or her motivations and the influences to de-radicalize. In this respect, exiting a radical group involves an individual decision centered on the will to lead a ‘normal’ life, which is influenced by a variety of internal and external factors (Köhler 2014: 421, Bjørgo and Horgan 2009, Fink and Haerne, 2008). Internal factors might include a change of the environment, lost confidence, status and position within the group, or negative social sanctions. Possible external factors on the other hand are loss of faith in the ideology and politics of the group or movement, burnout, lost disillusionment with the inner workings and activities of the group (Bjørgo, 2009: 36-40). External and internal factors often
interact in their influence on the individual’s motivation. In this respect, a so-called ‘cognitive opening’ induced by a personal traumatic experience seems to be essential (Fink and Haerne, 2008). However, research on motivation is still insufficient with particularly the process-related aspects of de-radicalization being under-researched (Köhler 2014: 421).

The social-constructivist perspective on systemic conflict transformation emphasizes a shift of attention away from the rather static actor-centered approach towards the dynamic discursive process that constructs the radicalized individual. Not the individual orientation, but the patterns of communication within a self-referential conflict system decide upon the (de-)radicalization of groups and individuals. In this respect, the securitization concept offers an innovative frame on the process of (de-)radicalization. Since securitization means transferring issues from the realm of normal politics to emergency politics where the ‘logic of war’ prevails, securitized conflicts are likely to radicalize individuals that are trapped within these contexts. The perception of the other as a threat to the very own existence legitimizes the adoption of violence and patterns emerge where the own radicalization is justified with the threatening existence of the other. The identity construction of the individual is profoundly shaped by the hostile relationship between self and other. De-securitization in turn refers to moving issues off the security agenda and back into the realm of normal politics. Hence, changing mutual perceptions so that the other is seen as a partner with diverging interests that can be lived with deconstructs the enemy against whom the radical behavior is directed. In the long run, identity construction is produced on the fundament of a shared vision of society or even without the notion of an existing other. De-securitization, thus, appears to be the prerequisite for de-radicalization.

Referring to Huysmans (1995), three strategies might be applied for de-securitizing ethno-political conflict: Within the objectivist strategy an audience is convinced that an identity group is not really a security problem and that the other’s concerns are not threatening. Activities aim at showing that an asserted existential threat never existed, or the existential threat existed but has been avoided (Huysmans 1995: 65). The constructivist strategy focuses on the process of securitization. The aim is to understand, handle and, finally, prevent the process that produces securitization. Activities show that ordinary measures
suffice in order to respond to the existential threat, emergency politics are not effective in addressing the threat, or that the extraordinary measures avoid the existential threat, but their side costs are too high. Finally, the de-constructivist strategy contains telling the story of the other in a way that takes identity groups out of the security drama and de-constructs the existence of different and exclusive identities. Activities articulate that the other is not a cultural alien but a complex being with multiple identities and, therefore, not different from ‘us’ (ibid.: 66-67). If the strategy succeeds, the logic of exclusion and inclusion ends and identity fragmentation dissolves. In ethno-political conflicts where, as an identity marker, the collective is primary, the strategy, however, might lead to renewed securitization since the right to own a distinct collective identity appears as a precondition. Therefore, if such identities were to be de-constructed through reference to the multiplicity of identities of persons, there would be no grounds for specific minority rights. Following Roe (2004), exclusive minority rights cannot be de-securitized at all (see Roe 2004: 287). Yet, this argument is contentious. The research will acknowledge the principal possibility that the invocation of human rights on self-determination might de-construct the other as an enemy and create the opportunity to incorporate different identity groups or ethnicities with distinct ways of life in the quest for an alternative political community. In reference to Jutila (2006), activities which aim at starting a new story or strengthening existing narratives that encourage the sustaining of different societal cultures within the state, counter exclusive narratives that make securitization possible (Jutila 2006: 181). Hence, collective human rights of ethnic groups might be articulated through a narrative of societal unity in difference and, in this way, de-securitize conflict.

Summing up, inaugurating de-securitization to the academic discourse on de-radicalization opens the debate towards a more systemic and constructivist perspective on the process that produces de-radicalization. Apart from enriching the debate, the discursive notion also implies a wholly different set of practical approaches and tools in facilitating the exit from extremist groups.
2.4. Civil Society and its Role in Conflicts

Civil Society resists easy definition, especially when discussed as a global phenomenon. There is no general framework that is agreed upon within the international scientific community which is due to the distinct political contexts and forms of organization, as well as state and economic structures - all of which are central to civil society (Barnes 2005: p. 7, Edwards 2004: 2). In their research on regime transition, Merkel and Lauth (1998) understand civil society as originating from the web of social relations that exist in the space between the societal sectors state (state apparatus and formal authorities), market (activities with the aim of extracting profit), and private life (Merkel and Lauth 1998: 7, also Figure 9.2 Annex 2).

In order to analytically define civil society’s boundaries, the distinction between actor-oriented models and functions models is made. From a function perspective, the work of Merkel and Lauth (1998) and Edwards (2004) are highly influential. In contrast to an actor-oriented approach (see i.e. Diamond and McDonald 1996), they argue that civil society is not a specific historic form or a defined array of actors, but an analytical category. Membership of civil society is determined by function and activity of an actor, rather than its pure organizational form. This perspective puts less emphasis on the organization as such and allows for a broader focus on the functions and roles of informal associations. Decoupled from fixed appreciations, the model highlights functions of civil society as they relate to public institutions (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: p. 7). Finally, function-oriented models appear to be better suited in non-Western contexts since they enable the consideration of a broad spectrum of collective action beyond formal requirements (World Bank 2006: p. 4).

Subsequently, not fixed identity patterns of actors, but the form of activity will be regarded as decisive in framing activities as civil society activities. Civil society functions can be conducted by a variety of actors that move among sectors – or inhabit more than one. The term civil society organization, though, is distinguished as it refers to non-governmental and not-for-profit entities that perform one or more of the outlined functions, have a presence in public life and express the interests or values of either their members or advocate for
others, based on ethical, cultural, or political considerations. Although they bear disintegrative potential, CSOs are generally regarded as essential for stable political systems and integrative societies (see Kurtenbach 2000b, World Bank 2006, Santín del Río 2004, Barnes 2005: p. 9). Yet, the performance of the outlined functions needs an enabling environment. A flourishing civil society depends upon the functioning of all societal sectors. First and foremost, responsive and effective state structures are essential since they create the legal and political realm within which civic engagement occurs (Barnes 2005: 8). Civil society actors improve the interplay of citizens with the state, but cannot replace formal governance structures (Pfaffenholz and Spurk 2006: 14, Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 13).

Violent conflicts dramatically affect the enabling environment for civil society (Lederach 1997: 12-14): Within a securitized situation, characterized by complete or partial lawlessness and suppressed basic human rights, societal networks are destroyed and trust disappears. Formal governance structures to which civil society addresses its activities might either be weakened or become increasingly irresponsible. When independent media is severely restricted, civil society organizations are deprived of one of their main communication channels (Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 13-15, Barnes 2005: 8, Pfaffenholz and Spurk 2006: 11 see also: Birle 2000, Coletta and Cullen 2000, Kammer 2014). Due to the changing environment, Pfaffenholz and Spurk 2006 suggested a slightly different functions-model to capture civil society’s functions in the midst of conflict: Protection, Monitoring and Early Warning, Advocacy, Socialization, Social cohesion and community building, Facilitating contacts and mediating, service delivery (see Table 9.1, Annex 3).

Considerable attention has been drawn to civil society actors and their role in fighting state repression and supporting peaceful change (Kaldor 2001; Forster and Mattner 2006; Risse and Sikkink 2008, Barnes 2005: 9, Tarrow 2005). Recent positions in peacebuilding literature increasingly criticize top-down approaches focusing solely on international actors and ignoring local concerns (Chojnacki and Menzel 2011: 512). They emphasize the involvement of local civil society in peace agreements and post-conflict recovery (Mac Ginty

---

15 This definition follows broadly World Bank 2006: 2.
16 See the debate on civil vs. ‘uncivil’ society (Barnes 2005: 8, Pishchikova and Izzi 2011: 49 pp.).
17 See Chojnacki and Menzel (2011) for an overview of the debate concerning peacebuilding.
2008: 149). On the other hand, empirical studies on ethno-political conflicts indicate that CSOs tend to strengthen bonds to local identity groups as a protective mechanism when the state is unable to guarantee security (i.e. Belloni 2001 on Bosnia, Tocci and Kaliber 2011 on the Turkish-Kurds conflict, see also Bogner 2004). Continued cycles of violence and insecurity support actors who gain people’s support through the invocation of existential threats (Bonacker 2011: 19-20, Kaldor and Muro-Ruiz 2003, Rüb 2000, Bogener 2004). In this manner, these civil society organizations spread bonding social capital and reinforce stereotypes (Marchetti and Tocci 2011a: p. 54, Lederach 1997: 12pp). In securitization terms, identity is reinforced through the invocation of an outside threat to the collective identity (see Wæver 1995: 68). CSOs can, thus, also become securitizing actors, particularly under the conditions of protracted violent conflicts (Kaldor and Muro-Ruiz 2003, Bogener 2004). They can appear as speaker of securitizing moves, audience who approves emergency measures, or even as actors perpetrating violence (Bonacker, Braun and Groth 2011: 224, Pishchikova and Izzi 2011: 49).

Yet, the body of academic publications did not conclude on a general framework in understanding the rather ambivalent subject of civil society’s influence on conflicts (see Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 27). The securitization concept might enrich the debate through providing an applicable tool to understand CSOs’ role in the process of how identities are socially constructed as threatened identities and of how this may lead to an escalation of conflict (Marchetti and Tocci 2011a, Bonacker et al. 2011, Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 2).

2.5. Human Rights and (De-)securitization

While human rights violations are seen as an indicator for conflict escalation, their recognition and institutionalization is a prerequisite for a non-violent societal system (Pia and Diez 2007: 1). From a constructivist perspective, the mutual attribution of universal human rights is crucial for reconciliation where the other is accepted as partner who can be lived with. Therefore, the obedience of a basic human right standard mark the end of emergency measures (Pia and Diez 2007: 11, Lederach 1997: 25, Risse and Sikkink 2008: 9).
The debate on human rights, however, led to controversies concerning their nature, applicability and justification. Concerning ethno-political conflicts, Pia and Diez (2009) introduced an important differentiation between inclusive and exclusive articulations of human rights. Collective rights can be invoked exclusively for one specific group or they can be applied to all collectives within a society. In this respect, secessionist movements or demands for a special status within a state pursue exclusive collective rights. The invocation of special indigenous rights would be portrayed as being rather exclusive since the demanded special autonomy rights to practice cultures and customs can hardly be applied to all of a state’s minority groups. Still, not all exclusive articulations are exclusionist to the same degree. The demand of equal status with other groups bears a less exclusive character than the claim for special privileges implying superiority (Pia and Diez 2009: 3). The line between inclusive and exclusive articulations, however, remains a grey area since the articulation of human rights for a group might implicitly presuppose the rights of other groups as well (Bonacker 2011: 35).

From a securitization point of view, human rights invocations do not always have a de-securitizing effect, but can also contribute to securitization. Here, Pia and Diez draw attention to the fact that human rights-related activities bear the potential for securitization as they articulate the transgression of the border that separates the acceptable and the unacceptable. Denouncing the excessive interference by authorities gives rise to a threatening situation (Pia and Diez 2009: 20). Hence, securitization can also have positive consequences as it helps to uncover former neglected injustice and initiate a process of social change. Within the realm of violent ethno-political conflicts, securitization supports the perception of the other as a threat and, therefore, fuels escalation. Even if the overall goal is the institutionalized guarantee of human rights, the articulation may have immediately securitizing consequences (Bonacker et al. 2011: 38-39).
3

Analytical Framework

3.1. Conceptualization of (De-)securitizing moves

The paper researches the invocation of securitizing and de-securitizing moves in ethno-political conflicts. The focus will be on the speaker-role (see Bonacker, Braun and Groth 2011: 224) being concerned with published communication addressed to an audience consisting of decisions-makers, national and international civil society, or the wider population. Statements by civil society organizations invoking human rights activities in the midst of ethno-political conflict are, thus, the dependent variable coded binary according to the discursive frames: securitizing move/de-securitizing move.

Civil society organizations refer to non-governmental and non-for-profit entities that do not belong to an armed fraction, perform one or more of the outlined civil society functions during conflicts (see section 2.4, and Table 9.1, Annex 3.), have a presence in public life, and express the interests or values of either their members or advocate for others, based on ethical, cultural, or political considerations.

Civil society organizations invoke human rights when their statements refer to a human right as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Since the conflict looked at will be between the Mexican state and indigenous communities in Chiapas, the research will further consider statements referring to ILO convention 169 concerning the basic rights of “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries” (ILO 1989).

A securitizing move is understood as the articulation of an existential threat to a referent object and the subsequent call for extraordinary measures. In ethno-political conflicts, the research distinguishes three essential components: Articulation of an irreconcilable self-other relationship, invocation of the other as an existential threat, and demanding emergency measures to address the threat.

---

18 The definition roughly follows World Bank 2006, see section 2.4.
As outlined in section 2.3., the exact conceptualization of threat and emergency measures within the Copenhagen school remains vague. The research paper will apply the notion that the invocation of an existential threat is the articulation of phrases and clauses that concern not only the mere existence of the referent object but also its self-determination and core values (Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 16). In ethno-political conflicts, threats often target the group’s collective identity in the sense that its core characteristics are endangered: The ability to maintain language, practice behavioral customs, and inhabit certain territory. Survival is not only concerned with physical survival, but also with threats that will impede the identity group’s existence as a distinguished collective (see Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24, Wæver 1995). Here, the Copenhagen school provides a list of key words like “survival” or “to be or not to be”. Since rhetorical patterns are highly context-dependent it cannot be expected that actors always use the exact words. Thus, equivalent or related notions and statements will also be considered (see Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 16-17, see also table 2). Phrases close to the survival at stake are death, annihilation, genocide, massacre and other key words that refer to such incidences. Endangered self-determination refers to key phrases like “loss of freedom”, “slaves”, or “oppression”. When securitizing moves claim a threat to the habitat they typically mention “loss of homes” or “roots” of the reference object. Phrases such as “everything else would be irrelevant”, or “the threat alters the premises for all other questions” serve to stress the severe character of the threat (see Bonacker and Gromes 2007: 17).

A securitizing move further follows the grammar of exclusion and does not only construct an existential threat, but establishes an exclusive “us against them” where the own existence can only be saved against the other. The portrayal of the other as a threat to the own existence and the alleged urgency justifies the subsequent demand for extraordinary measures. This is described by Wæver’s “logic of war” (Wæver 1995: 65). In this respect, articulations of exclusive identities portray a polar situation in which a certain group or state authorities are generally considered as “bad” or “evil”. Consequently, the expression “we have to continue the fight”, or terms like “resistance”, “struggle”, “not surrender”, will indicate the claim for emergency measures in addressing the threat.
A de-securitizing move can only occur if a situation is securitized and extraordinary measures like the systematic violation of human rights are in force. Again, the definitions provided by the Copenhagen school remain fuzzy. Due to their high context dependency, a general understanding does not appear to be feasible either. Concerning the focus on human rights invocations in highly securitized ethno-political conflicts, the demand to withdraw emergency measures and return to normal politics will be primarily conceptualized as the demand to respect and obey human rights standards addressed to all involved actors. Further, de-securitizing moves try to counter threat communication through the claim for political debate and propose starting points for political process in order to reconcile positions.

In reference to the de-securitization typology by Huysmans (1998) and the insights provided by Gromes and Bonacker (2007), de-securitizing moves may present three types of arguments (see section 2.3., also Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 19): the asserted existential threat never existed, the existential threat has been avoided (objectivist strategy); ordinary measures suffice to address the threat while emergency measures are not effective, the extraordinary measures might avoid the existential threat, but their side-costs are too high (constructivist strategy); the other is not a threatening cultural alien, but a partner who can be lived with within the realm of mutual recognition (de-constructivist strategy).

Table 3.1 Conceptualization of securitizing and de-securitizing move

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character of published statements</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Key phrases/Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securitizing move</td>
<td>Articulation of an irreconcilable self-other relationship</td>
<td>Evil, bad, a threat to survival, genocide, extinction,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 Human rights standards as codified in the UDHR, the two conventions ICCPR and ICESCR, and the ILO covenant 169 (see above).
3.2. Explanatory Factors

CSO identity, Framework of Action and Political Opportunity Structure (POS) will be regarded as forming a conditional pattern where each part creates structural constraints and opportunities for the following: The overall conflict’s context determines the landscape of operating civil society organizations and their identities. CSOs identities determine the organization’s goals and, therefore, condition the applied frameworks of action. The political opportunity structure, finally, must be understood as a filter that decides upon the viability of certain activities.
Civil society is regarded as both an independent agent for change and a dependent product of existing structures (Portantiero 2000: 33 pp., Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 12, also: Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin 2004). Consequently, the analytical framework will consider the implications of specific contexts as the first explanatory factor. Here, nature of existing state (C1), state-civil society relationship (C2), level of human rights development (C3), societal fragmentation (C4), and dependence on international donors (C5) are regarded as important contextual features.

C1 will ask for the nature of existing state structures since core civil society functions like monitoring or advocacy cannot be carried out without state presence. Civil society essentially depends on the security of an effective state that is controlled by a government that ensures the rule of law (World Bank 2006: 3). A flourishing civil society does not only require the mere existence of state structures, but also necessitates responsive authorities creating an enabling environment for civic engagement (Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 14, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 14). The assessment of civil society activities must also concern the relationship between civil society and state authorities. If basic rights and freedoms of association are curtailed, civil engagement is conducted beyond legal boundaries, often turned against the state rather than interacting with it (Marchetti and Tocci 2011b: 50). In the Latin American context, authoritarian regimes with patrimonial and corporatist characteristics significantly shaped the character of emerging civil societies setting well-

C3 focuses on the level of human rights development and assesses to the degree to which formally granted human rights are respected. The human rights situation marks the point of departure for human-rights activities. The gravity and kinds of violations are expected to influence the agenda of local CSOs and the mobilization of transnational advocacy networks (Franklin 2008, Brockett 2005: 37 pp., Tarrow 2005: 120 pp.). If human rights are not even formally granted and the violation of even basic standards prevails, the security situation scarcely allows human rights organizations to operate and severely confines the scope of their activities (Kammer 2014, Fingscheidt 2014, also Risse and Sikkink 2008: 22).

In the case of ethno-political conflicts, the social fragmentation (C4) of the society along ethnic lines significantly determines the political landscape of operating civil society organizations. The segregation of ethnic groups and the prevalence of bonding social capital are likely to favor the work of CSOs with a clear ethnicist agenda and aggravate the work of CSOs trying to build up inter-groups relationships (Belloni 2008, Tocci and Kaliber 2011). The polarization along identity lines might further reinforce hostile relationships (Lederach 1997: 13).

C5 is finally considered with the state’s dependency on international donors. In this regard, states are expected to be more vulnerable to human rights pressure when they receive economic aid and other financial revenues from international actors. The dependency on international donors, therefore, appears to be a precondition for CSOs to operate within authoritarian regimes (Risse and Sikkink 2008: 24, Franklin 2008: 203, Krain 2012: 575, Maihold 2014, Fingscheidt 2014).
3.2.2. CSO identity

Context conditions influence the identity of operating civil society organizations which is the second key factor of the analytical framework. The research paper considers organizational characteristics (I1) and the political identity (I2) as central identity features. I1 asks first for the societal context of the CSO. The societal context refers to the relationship of CSOs with societal actors and the kind of social capital these actors produce. Bridging social capital20 is expected to facilitate an integrative organizational identity, while bonding social capital rather induces an exclusive agenda. The cooperation with societal actors provide resources for local collective action, transfers voice and leverage, and might reduce the costs that armed actors threaten to impose (Fox 1996: 1098, Fingscheid 2014, Olesen 2004a and 2004b). Apart from the societal context, the composition of membership is another important identity feature, since the constituency of an organization has repercussions on the political identity (Baehr 2009: 11). Finally I1 will assess to what extent CSOs are affiliated with armed conflict actors. The close relationship to an armed fraction is therefore expected to have an influence on self-perception of the own role within the conflict and the consequent self/other narrative expressed in public statements (see Bob 2005).

I2 refers to a matrix proposed by Marchetti and Tocci 2011b where a CSO’s political identity is measured along the characteristics of exclusive/inclusive and egalitarian/non-egalitarian. Exclusive CSOs are only open to a limited section of the population while inclusive organizations are open to the needs of all members of society. The egalitarian characteristic points at a CSO’s perception of all individuals as equal, whereas non-egalitarian associations proclaim the primacy of one group of individuals over another. Those characteristics combined, an agenda can either be labeled as multiculturalist (exclusive/egalitarian), civic (inclusive/egalitarian), assimilationist (inclusive/non-egalitarian) or ethnicist (exclusive/ non-egalitarian) (Marchetti and Tocci 2011b: 54).

---

20 Regarding the terms bridging/bonding social capital, see section 2.4. (p. 20).
3.2.3. Framework of Action

The framework of action factor involves the human rights related activities conducted (FoA1), the corresponding civil society functions (FoA2), and the types of invoked rights (FoA3). Drawing on section 2.4. (see also Table 9.1 Annex 3), the analytical framework considers seven civil society functions in the midst of conflict: protection, monitoring and early warning, advocacy and communication, socialization, social cohesion and community building, intermediation, and service delivery. Identified activities and functions serve different purposes with distinct audiences and are, therefore, expected to influence to (de-)securitizing character of the CSO. Published statements will then be analyzed with regards to the type of invoked human right. According to Pia and Diez (2011), the paper will differentiate between universal rights (individual/inclusive), group rights (individual/exclusively for one group), integrational rights (collective/inclusive), and exclusionist (collective/exclusive) (Pia and Diez 2011: 209).

3.2.4. Political Opportunity Structure

The political opportunity structure (POS) acts as a filter that facilitates certain activities, aggravates others, and emphasizes certain conditional features (Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 31). Important POS features are the timing of activity with regards to the conflict stage (POS1), the framing of human rights within society (POS2), and the strategy of conflict actors towards civil society (POS3). The viability and effectiveness of certain types of activities addressing the conflict changes in accordance with the different stages (see so-called hour glass model by Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 14, Marchetti and Tocci 2011c: 31-32). In phases of escalating ethno-political conflict where subject positions are highly polarized, the environment tends to be more conducive for the conflict intensifying potential of an ethnicist agenda and the space for maneuver increasingly narrows for civil society organizations working for cross-ethnic reconciliation (Marchetti and Tocci 2011b: 63, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 12). The acceptance of human rights as universal standards within the society further shapes the landscape of human rights invocations. When human rights are rather perceived as a tool to legitimate political claims or even oppression rather
than a universal code for human interaction, the invocation of human rights might even be considered as a provocation (Speed and Collier 2000: 901). POS3 focuses on conflict actors’ strategy towards civil society. If the conflict actor wins the heart and minds of civil society organizations and succeeds in establishing a narrative of fighting for a good cause, civic engagement is more likely to take sides and to re-articulate the rhetoric of the established narrative (Bob 2005: 4-6). On the other hand, if all armed actors are portrayed as being perpetrators and destroying social peace, civic engagement is more likely to demand all actors to withdraw violence, and, thus, de-securitize conflicts (see Bob 2005: p. 26 pp.).

4
Methodological Reflections

The research paper attempts to contribute to development in the research area through an in-depth, within-case analysis (George and Bennett 2005: 18). Insights provided by the case analysis shall serve to conduct further theory-building.

In order to shed light on the conditions under which CSOs issue securitizing or de-securitizing moves, the paper will adopt variable-guided process tracing. According to George and Bennett (2005), variable-guided process tracing frames social mechanisms as a sequence of variables with the aim to identify a series of covering-law explanations (George and Bennett 2005: 225–227). A Y-centric and theory building process-tracing type includes two inferential steps: Empirical material in combination with theoretical insights is used to build an analytical framework inferring systematic parts of an underlying causal mechanism. The close examination of cases serves to identify empirical manifestations of the systematic parts. A secondary leap will then infer from these observed manifestations the underlying causal mechanism that links the previously conceptualized parts (Beach and Petersen 2013: p. 16).

The Y-centric and theory building variant of process tracing is applied in situations when a certain outcome is known, but its causes have not yet been deciphered, and serves well the
purpose of the research (Beach and Petersen 2013: 16). Preliminary research indicates that no condition alone can contribute for the influence of CSOs on ethno-political conflict. The strength of the methodological approach is that it allows the designing of a series of explanatory factors as parts of a process in which these factors are individually necessary but insufficient to account for the outcome (see George and Bennett 2005: 213-214). Empirical data was gathered through the review of secondary literature and the analysis of primary sources. Account evidence was further provided by expert interviews, following semi-structured and open interview designs, that have been conducted with six civil society representatives and two academics researching on the field (see Table 9.3, Annex 4).

5

Case Analysis

5.1. The Zapatista uprising – “making ourselves heard”

The EZLN surprised Mexico and the world by taking over four municipal capitals in Chiapas on January 1, 1994. The first communiqués issued by the Committee of Clandestine Indigenous Revolution – General Command (CCRI - CG) – the EZLN’s supreme command structure – pronounced that the indigenous peoples of Chiapas took up arms to call attention to the severe living conditions they faced and in the hope that their struggle would help to create a more democratic Mexico including all Mexican people (Mattiace 1997: 32, Huffschmid 2014). The Zapatista uprising has been framed by its leadership and supporters as the final revolt of the marginalized indigenous people calling “Ya basta” (engl. enough) and finally demanding the rights they have been refused for so long (Huffschmid 2014, Kammer 2014, Bob 2005: 117). Thus, the public appearance of the EZLN and the establishment of the Zapatista movement22 in 1994 will be framed as the intensification and

22Social movement is a debated term. The research paper will roughly follow Olvera and define social movements as a loose association of organizations and collective engagement centered on and pushing forward values, identities, or cultural paradigms (Olvera 1997: 106, see also Olvera 2003). Thus, Zapatista movement includes the various international supporter organizations as well. The paper subsumes under the more narrow term Zapatistas the EZLN as well as the Zapatista supporter communities.
transformation of the conflict that developed between the Mexican state and indigenous communities in Chiapas, having its roots back in the Mexican history (see also Stephen 1997, Mattiace 1997).

In this regard, Article 1 of the ILO convention 169, refers to indigenous people as
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
(ILO 1989: Convention 169: Article 1)

Indigenous communities have a historical continuity with pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories and consider themselves as distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing (UN 2004). The historical continuity may consist of the continuation of occupation of ancestral lands, language, or cultural characteristics such as religion, living under a tribal system, dress, means of livelihood, and lifestyle (UN 2004, see also Yoshioka 2010: 7 pp.). Indigenous peoples are determined to preserve and transmit their ancestral territories, their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system (UN 2008: 9). Here, “self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion” (ILO 1989: Article 1). Accordingly, an indigenous person is one who belongs to indigenous populations through self-identification and is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (UN 2004).

Although they hold a relatively small share of the nation’s total population23, indigenous people in Mexico represent, with approximately ten million persons, 29 percent of Latin

---

23 Indigenous people represented 12.4 percent of Mexico’s total population in 1996 (Yashar 1998:24-25).
America’s total indigenous population24 (Yashar 1998: 25). Yet the national ideology of mestizaje (engl. racial mixing or miscegenation) has served to neglect25 the existence of living indigenous peoples who maintain distinctive languages, cultures, and communities as well as underpinning a system of political and societal exclusion (Speed and Collier 2000: 883). Not until 1992, two years after Mexico ratified ILO Convention 169, the Mexican Constitution was reformed to recognize the existence of cultural minorities. The constitutional reform, however, contributed little to the recognition and inclusion of indigenous communities, since it was not followed by effective legislation and focused only on cultural rights omitting political participation, self-determination and autonomy rights (Speed and Collier 2000: 883).

The politics of exclusion had severe consequences for living conditions, particularly in Southern Mexico, which has long been one of the country’s most poverty-stricken regions (Bob 2005: 120-121, Stephen 1997: 87). In the federal state of Chiapas26, indigenous communities have accounted for a disproportionate share of those that face grievous social and economic conditions (Map 9.1, Annex 5). A core issue in this context is the uneven land distribution resulting from Mexico’s colonial legacy. Large landholders, who accumulated economic and political power, established patrimonial structures (Olvera 1997: 107, Bob 2005: 121, Maihold 2014). The conflicts resulting from the domination of small farmers previously fueled the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Therefore, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution stipulated the re-distribution of land and the establishment of permanent communal land (ejido) (Yashar 1998: 35). But due to the lack of an effective agrarian reform, power structures remained and conflicts between large landholders (ladino) and indigenous communities about land titles continued (Stephen 1997: 88-89, Kammer 2014). Local elites used fraud, repression and intimidation to oppress indigenous and peasant communities who invoked Article 27 to claim their right for land. But official state authorities cooperated

24 Therefore, Mexico has one of the largest indigenous populations in the Americas with 56 recognized ethno-linguistic groups. Only Peru has an indigenous population of comparable size to Mexico’s (Speed and Collier 2000: 883, Fox 1996: 1093, see also Table 9.3, Annex 6.

25 From the 1917 Constitution to 1992, the word indigenous was never mentioned, either in the Constitution itself or in constitutional jurisprudence (Speed and Collier 2000: 883, de la Peña 2008: 282 pp.).

26 Chiapas has the third largest share of reported indigenous people, after the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz (Speed and Collier 2000: 883), see also table 9.3, Annex 6.
with landholders to maintain control of the rural areas and largely ignored the needs of indigenous communities (Speed and Collier 2000: 886, Fox 1996: 1093).

Referring to the Copenhagen School’s concept of societal security, discriminatory state policies, denied recognition, and structural exclusion created an environment where indigenous communities perceived themselves as threatened in their identity. Particularly, the sale of ancestral land to large landholders was perceived as endangering an essential characteristic of the identity framework. During the 1980s, indigenous people increasingly mobilized on regional and national level striving for their recognition as an ethnic minority within the Mexican nation and demanding rights of self-determination and formal representation. The preservation of cultural characteristics and, thus, the existence as a distinct ethnic group became the core of the developing conflict between indigenous communities in Chiapas and state authorities.

By the early 1990s, a myriad of factors intensified the conflict and triggered its escalation and the armed uprising of the EZLN significantly transformed the ethno-political conflict (Bob 2005: 124). The conquest of four cities and the resulting violent confrontations with the Mexican authorities during the first days of January marked the transition into an overt armed conflict (UCDP 2014).

The government realized that the rebels did not pose a significant danger as an armed force but constituted a rather unexpected political challenge. Media reports transmitted indigenous living conditions and placed the government in a difficult position. Although the rebels had declared war on the Mexican state and its army, public opinion increasingly framed Zapatistas as victims of state repression (García de León 2005: 515, Huffschmid 2014). The insurgents justified their actions with Article 139 of the 1917 Constitution enshrining the right to rebel against an illegitimate government. The reference to Emiliano Zapata – a symbol of the revolution in which the Mexican nation state grounded its ideological legitimacy – further emphasized that the EZLN portrayed the Mexican government and its politics as betrayal of the revolution and national heroes (ibid: 516, Huffschmid 2014).
In Chiapas, the indigenous supporter base of the EZLN invaded large landholdings, ejected the landholding elite, and started to develop autonomy structures (Stahler-Sholk 2010: 271, Mattiace 1997: 45). On December 8, 1994, the Zapatistas communicated the start of the campaign Paz con Justicia y Dignidad para los Pueblos Indios27 declaring the creation of 32 so-called Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities (MAREZ) under the protection of the EZLN. Therefore, Zapatistas enforced the indigenous demand to exercise autonomously their own cultural tradition and self-determination on a municipal and regional level against the federal government (Zibechi 2008: 136, EZLN 1995).

5.2. Context

(C1) Nature of existing state

The United Mexican States were constituted as a federal republic28 in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution lasting from 1910 to 1917 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 3). During the course of the 20th century, the Mexican Republic became internationally integrated and recognized for its stable state structures which appeared to be uncommon in the Latin American context (Maihold 1996: 13, Maihold 2014). On the fundament of formal democratic institutions29 prescribed in the constitution, a rather integrative authoritarian state developed that provided for the stability of Mexico’s political system (Maihold 2014, Horn 2004: 121). In this regard, the hegemonic state party Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), founded in 1929, governed the country for roughly 70 years by means of a corporatist structure maintained through co-optation, patronage, and repression. Herein, the president serves as the primary political agent controlling all important political actors, such as parliament, governors, social organizations,

27 Engl.: Peace with Justice and Dignity for the indigenous people
28 The United Mexican States consist of 31 states and a federal district (Mexico City)
29 The 1917 Constitution of Mexico was characterized by remarkably liberal, democratic, federal and republican stipulations: Each federal state has elected governors and posses their own legislation. The president is directly elected to a six-year term. A bicameral congress consists of a senate and a chamber of deputies (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 3, see also Horn 2004).
the army, and the judiciary, through channels of the PRI (Moksnes 2004: 116, Olvera 1997: 108-109, Horn 2004: 123, Gonzáles Saravia 2014, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 3-4). The legitimacy of the PRI rule was primarily rooted in a strong revolutionary founding myth. The narrative of Mexico’s revolutionary legacy integrated large parts of the society into the nation state and served as the ideological basis for the one-party regime claiming its political representation (Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 23). Well-established economic ties with its most important trading partner, the USA, facilitated economic development in the first decades30, secured popular support, and further stabilized the authoritarian regime (Olvera 1997: 113 and 122, Tobler 2004: 77, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 3). In the resource-rich southern Mexican states, however, pre-revolutionary structures concentrating economic and political power in the hands of the landowning oligarchy were kept largely intact. The PRI regime did not enforce agrarian reforms promised in the constitution but rather formed clientelist coalitions with the land elites as a strategy to maintain political hegemony and to consolidate the nation-state (Dietz 1996: 70-71, Horn 2004: 125, Neil 1998, Neil 2005). In this vein, the state successfully managed to integrate Mexican’s elites and gain control over most parts of the vast Mexican territory. The well-equipped Mexican armed forces, which had been loyal to PRI and ultimately to the president, as well as social-interventionist policies ensured societal control and bolstered the regime’s stability (Benítez Manaut 2005: 59 pp., Olvera 1997: 108-109, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 7)

Nevertheless, basic social services and administrative structures in remote areas were severely deficient in many respects. Large portions of southern Mexican society, like small farmer and the landless population, therefore, faced harsh living conditions and remained at the margins of society (Kurtenbach 1996: 90-91, Dietz 1996: 74-75, Fox 1995: 2 pp.). Indigenous communities had been structurally excluded from political, societal, and economic institutions and, therefore, practiced local forms of social organization (Speed and Collier 2000: 883, Stephen 1997: 87). Still, Chiapas represents one of Mexico’s most authoritarian states and elites managed to systematically block autonomous regional organization-building (Fox 1996: 1093, Collier 1994: 107 pp., Braig 2004: 274).

30The period 1940-1970 is also called milagro mexicano (Mexican miracle). During this period the Mexican economy grew at an average of 6.8% a year (Tobler 2004: 77, Olvera 1997: 122).
The liberalization of the Mexican economy that has been promoted by the government since the 1980s in order to address economic recession, however, led to tensions with economic elites benefitting from former subsidies, aggravated the economic conditions of the agricultural sector, and endangered the alliances that kept the PRI system in charge. Further, patronage and entrenched interests within the regime created resistance to reforms that failed to show results in terms of substantial economic growth (Maihold 2014, García De Leon 2005: 511, Olvera 1997: 113). As a result, the regime increasingly lost its capability to integrate different fractions of the Mexican society. In order to maintain political power, the PRI decided to rely upon clientelistic practices, but concessions to the landholding oligarchy and economic elites rather polarized the political environment (Maihold 1996: 21-22). The violent reaction to post-electoral protests emerging around the systematic electoral fraud that marked the presidential election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988 demonstrated that the PRI-system needed to rely increasingly on oppression and coercion (Bob 2005: 124-125, Olvera 1997: 112). The severe decrease in legitimacy prolonged the crisis of the Mexican regime which ultimately weakened the stability of state structures (Maihold 2014).

In the period between 1994 and 1996, economic recession prevailed and corruption reached unparalleled proportions. The sudden devaluation of the peso in December 1994 led to the collapse of the economy and the subsequent need to impose austere economic policy further decreased the PRI’s popular support (Faust 1996: 43, García De Leon 2005: 510). As consequence, the PRI regime started to disintegrate internally. The political weakness of president Zedillo, who could not build an internal coalition integrating the different cliques and tendencies within the PRI, induced overt internal conflicts over the party’s fate (Maihold 1996: 24-25). Additionally, growing public opposition pressured for political reforms. Prevalence of authoritarian structures on the one hand, electoral defeats and the growth of public opposition on the other hand, created tensions and political violence in many Mexican states (Olvera 2010: 83, Maihold 2014).

(C2) State – civil society relationship

31 Internal fights within the PRI leadership peaked in political assassinations in 1994: Here, president Salinas’s handpicked successor Luis Donaldo Colosio was shot in March 1994 and Francisco Ruiz Massieu, Zedillo’s main political broker, was killed six months later because of internal feuds (Olvera 1997: 116).

Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts
The contours of Mexican civil society were profoundly shaped by the corporatist state. Thus, post-revolutionary Mexico developed on the premises of the state being the nexus for social and political integration steering the country’s modernization. Clientelistic and paternalistic practices served to exclude popular political participation which was exclusively channeled through the structures of the PRI (Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 23, Olvera 1997: 108). Restrictions on freedoms of expression and the strict demarcation of permissible action constrained the conditions for mobilization and organization outside of state controlled venues. The regime reacted to autonomous forms of civic engagement with co-optation or repression and, therefore, severely aggravated the development of an independent civil society (Bizberg 2003: 147-149). Here, political and civil rights – cornerstones of an enabling environment – were only applied in a selective fashion, rather than constituting a defensive mechanism against state interventions (Olvera 2003: 48). Beyond limiting the space for associational life, the irreponsive and repressive character of the authoritarian regime also circumscribed the prospects of the nature and functions of developing civil society activities (Olvera 2001: 30 pp, Olvera 2003: 45).

Fundamental changes in the late 1980s altered the conditions for the establishment of civil society. The adoption of liberal economic policies and the decreased capacity of the state to intervene in the reproduction of society facilitated the differentiation of the state, economy, and society (Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 29). Besides, the ongoing economic crises and pressure from international donors caused the federal government to partially open the political system (Maihold 1996: 21). A plural party system consolidated and democratic regime transition appeared to be a possible prospect (Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 31, Olvera 2010: 83). Yet, the scope of liberal economic changes was not matched by profound political reforms. Even if some opening was pursued in the political sphere, substantial reforms aiming at political limitations of the sovereign state, and citizen oversight of the economic transformation had been circumvented (Maihold 2014, Maihold 1996: 20). The overt discrepancy between legal foundations stipulated in the Mexican Constitution and the PRI’s authoritarian system that governed the country now became the focal point of public action. New social movements centered on political and civil human
rights mobilized aspiring democratic transitions (Bizberg 2003: 160). Drawing on the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s, they formed networks and alliances on a local and regional level to extend their action without formal institutionalization (Olvera 1997: 113). These movements appealed to the public sphere, challenged the regime’s exclusive claim for conducting societal policies, and, therefore, facilitated the consolidation of genuine civil society (Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 30, Olvera 2010: 80).

During the mid-1990s, establishing civil society engaged primarily in two functions: Monitoring of the national electoral process to ensure some degree of legal and fair elections. Second, human-rights centered activities became engaged with protection and advocacy functions. In this respect, organizations and deputies from opposition parties pressed for federal legislation accepting and recognizing CSOs campaigning for public interest. Human rights groups began to mushroom throughout country32 (Bizberg 2003: 163-164, Olvera 1997: 119, Gonzáles Saravia 2014). While human rights centered activities played no role in Chiapas before the 1990s, by 1994 there were at least thirteen non-governmental human rights organizations active in the state. During the first days of the EZLN uprising, a majority arrived in Chiapas to observe the combatants’ behavior and offer protection to communities affected by the violent clashes (Stavenhagen 2003: 113, Moksnes 2004: 120). A solidarity movement grew to massive proportions assisting EZLN’s indigenous supporter communities, advocating for an end to the federal army’s campaign in Chiapas, and promoting indigenous rights. President Salinas’ call for negotiations with the EZLN, leaving it in the possession of some autonomous territories, was perceived as a massive success of civil society activities (Stavenhagen 2003: 112, Bob 2005: 139 pp.). Consequently, the emergence of civil society in Mexico is inextricably tied to the claim for political rights and democratic transition. In this light, civic mobilization was directed against the illiberal features of the authoritarian regime (Olvera 2003: 42 pp., Fox 1996: 1095, Fox, Rivera, and Stephen 1999, Gonzáles Saravia 2014). In the 1990s, CSOs focused on watchdog activities monitoring state’s interventions and protecting the local population from repression. In response, the state securitized civil society activities as they perceived them as

32 Between January 1990 and November 1994, 121 new human rights groups were created (Olvera 1997: 115). Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts
Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts

a challenge to the PRI hegemony governing Mexican society. Substantial critique on the human rights situation and the push for democracy was framed in terms of treason toward the Mexican national project (Bizberg 2003: 155 pp., Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 30). Although the political elite increasingly realized the urgent need for concessions and cooperation, resistances within the PRI to a substantial opening towards civil society prevailed (Maihold 2014). State structure remained highly irresponsible and repressive, although its capability to profoundly co-opt civil society structures vanished.

(C3) Human rights situation

Even though the Mexican Constitution provides for fundamental rights33 and the Mexican state has ratified various international conventions34, the human rights situation throughout Mexico during the time period 1994-1996 was devastating (Bernecker 2004: 218 pp., Anaya Muñoz 2009: 37). Individual universal human rights were largely disregarded with hundreds of arbitrary detentions, widespread torture, scores of extrajudicial executions, and a number of forced disappearances reported (Amnesty International (AI) 1995: 356, AI 1997: 368, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 1995, HRW 1996). According to international non-governmental organizations, there is compelling evidence that systematic human rights violations were perpetrated by state authorities, such as military and police, as well as paramilitary groups associated with the landholding oligarchy (AI 1995: 389, AI 1997: 372, HRW 1995).

Civic liberties and political rights were severely restricted by the authoritarian regime. Mexican state authorities resorted to systematic violations of fundamental individual rights and paramilitary actions, particularly in the southern states, as means for societal control and repression against oppositional forces (HRW 1997, Bizberg 2003: 148, Bernecker 2004: 218-220). Hence, growing civil society engagement was subject to various forms of intimidation ranging from warnings by government authorities, death threats, and unwarranted detentions. In rural southern Mexico, the federal government frequently took repressive measures against left-wing opposition, peasant organizations, and indigenous

33 Chapter 1 of the Mexican constitution provides for human rights and their warranties (Anaya Muñoz 2009: 36).
34 Mexico recognizes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and signed the ICCPR, ICESCR as well as ratified ILO convention 169 (see Anaya Muñoz 2009: 37 pp. and ILO 2014).
groups. Independent unions and peasant organizations were blacklisted and dozens of their leaders were killed in ongoing land disputes (AI 1995: 388, 390, AI 1996: 358, AI 1997: 373, HRW 1995, HRW 1997). In these cases, citizens have little or no ability to obtain compensation or be defended by the judicial system so that perpetrators of human rights violations have largely enjoyed impunity (HRW 1995, HRW 1996, AI 1996: 361, Bernecker 2005: 226-227, Anaya Muñoz 2009: 39).

The overt rebellion in 1994 with 145 confirmed dead in the first weeks deteriorated the human rights situation in Chiapas. Particularly in the beginning of January, combatants of the EZLN and its indigenous supporter base were alleged to perpetrate human rights violations (Bob 2005: 145, 172 HRW/Americas 1994: 12-13, Physicians for Human Rights and HRW/Americas 1994: 39). The federal army’s military campaign, however, was denounced as being responsible for the major share of the widespread human rights violations against the unarmed local population during the following months. Reportedly, the army conducted systematic detentions, torturing, and extra-juridical killings of civilians being suspected of supporting the EZLN or belonging to political opposition (HRW 1994/Americas: 7-8, AI 1995: 391-392, AI 1996: 359, AI: 1997: 368). The growing militarization of Chiapas and enforced displacements further contributed to grave human rights problems (Schulz 2011, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2008: 18-24). The official human rights commission refused to investigate cases of reported violations by the military and the exclusively military legal jurisdiction exacerbated a culture of impunity in rights prosecutions (Bernecker 2004: 227, HRW 1996, HRW 1997). CSOs and individuals working on the conflict – ranging from representatives of the Catholic diocese to grassroots organizations – were subject to intimidations and death threats (HRW 1995, HRW 1996, AI 1995: 388, AI 1996: 358). Hence, an environment characterized by threats, intimidation and systematic human rights violations severely aggravated the conditions for operating civil society (HRW 1994/Americas: 21). Finally, the criminalization of indigenous communities and independent peasant organizations in the course of the Zapatista uprising exacerbated their social and political conditions. Particularly indigenous communities living in contested areas in Chiapas
were denied basic social, economic, and cultural rights (HRW 1994/Americas: 6 pp., Salazar 2014, Gonzáles Saravia 2014).

(C4) Societal fragmentation

The structural exclusion of the indigenous population from the political system and broader society has facilitated profound societal fragmentation (Braig 2004: 272-273). Indigenous concerns were exclusively dealt with by white-mestizo agencies within the PRI structure. The perception of indigenous traditions as inferior and pre-modern impeding Mexico’s modernization was mirrored in the assimilationist indigenismo policy of the Mexican post-revolutionary state, which sought to integrate indigenous groups into a mestizo national culture (Mattiace 1997: 37-38, Dietz 1996: 71, Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 27, Mattiace 1997: 63, de la Peña 2008: 283). The rights as a distinct ethnicity were not recognized and legal demands for land had been denied by landholders (de la Peña 2006: 282 pp.). The ethno-political conflict became increasingly securitized in the late 1970s, when the government’s cultural policy of assimilation began to come under heavy criticism from academics and an emerging national indigenous movement which mobilized in the burgeoning peasant organizations advocating for land reforms (Bizberg 2003: 158, Mattiace 1997: 35). During the late 1980s and 1990s, the growing Mexican indigenous movement separated from the peasant organizations and acquired a clear ethnic profile. Independent indigenous organizations, like the newly formed Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas (National Coordinaton of Indigenous Peoples, CNPI), made distinct indigenous rather than generically peasant demands for bilingual and bicultural education, the protection of traditional practices, and the promotion of indigenous participation in municipalities (Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 27). The adoption of ethnical positions and distinct identity created tensions with the establishing left-wing Party of the

---

35 As Braig (2004) argues, the Mexican modernization since the revolution induced significant societal fragmentation between urban metropolitan regions and peripheral, rural areas (Braig 2004:271).

36 *Indigenismo* is defined by Shannan Mattiace 1997 as state policy toward the indigenous in which official Latin American white-mestizo agencies construct and analyze indigenous identity. While indigenismo has had different forms and expressions, it consistently excludes the indigenous as participants who can construct their own identity (Mattiace 1997: 63).
Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD) and peasant movement so that indigenous organizations became increasingly isolated (Mattiace 1997: 39, Yashar 1998: 24, Dietz 1996: 76). Therefore, national indigenous networks in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s produced rather bonding social capital along ethnic lines.

On a local level, indigenous communities are geographically concentrated in rural areas in the southern Mexican states and rather isolated from the non-indigenous population. Paternalistic political structures, the lack of basic services like education and health, structural discrimination, and the failure of policies designed to increase prosperity in rural Mexico contributed to their devastating economic and social living conditions (Dietz 1996: 70-71, Gonzáles de Alba 2010, García de León 2005: 514). Particular in Chiapas, the state with the third highest indigenous population in Mexico, political representation is exclusively channeled through mestizo PRI agencies. The lack of administrative structures in remote areas inhabited by indigenous communities has led to the formation of de facto autonomy and parallel structures (Fox 1996: 1093). Therefore, a dense concentration of bonding social capital in Chiapas segmented across spatial and ethnic divides developed. Despite conflicts between different indigenous identity groups as well as differences provoked by Guatemalan immigration, the development of social capital is quite remarkable. Communities have reproduced longstanding traditions of horizontal cooperation and reciprocity (Fox 1996: 1097, Dietz 1996: 78-79, Skoufias, Lunde, Patrinos 2010, Kammer 2014). However, the communities in Chiapas remained dominated by authoritarian clientelism reacting with severe repression to organizational attempts beyond the local village level. Indigenous mobilization was therefore directed against the mestizo state structures and landholding oligarchy that reinforced their structural exclusion (Fox 1996: 1094).

The EZLN opened political spaces as they invited members of Mexican civil society to encounters in Chiapas trying to forge broad alliances with Mexican CSOs and linking indigenous concerns with issues of democratization and inequality (Olesen 2004b: 261, Mattiace 1997: 36, Kurtenbach 1996: 92). The Zapatista revolt managed to counter the

---

37 Here, Díaz-Polanco speaks of laissez-faire autonomy in which indigenous people have more or less permission to retain their own customs but highly depend on the approval of power holders. Laissez-faire autonomy is distinguished from autonomy as a political-juridical regime where a “political collectivity within national society” is established (Díaz-Polanco 1997: 96 pp.).
neglect of indigenous issues – also among newly emerging civil movements – and brought their demands onto international agenda. Their uprising was, thus, not directed against non-indigenous people in Mexico nor targeted at secession, but rather aspired profound change of the national political structure including all Mexican identity groups38 (Salazar 2014, Stahler-Sholk 2010: 270-271). Alliances with different societal groups that began to operate during that early 1990s seeking democratic change were forged in order to break the isolation of indigenous positions without subsuming the indigenous question39 under broader class issues (Bob 2005: 140-141). National and international CSOs increasingly started to cooperate with indigenous communities which induced the production of bridging social capital. Still, even though the EZLN’s strategy managed to break the isolation of the indigenous movement to some extent and triggered the formation of new alliances, civic engagement was still largely organized along ethnic lines (Mattiace 1997: 52 pp., Grammont, Mackinlay, and Stoller 2009: 32, Stephen 1997: 95).

(C5) Dependency on international actors

The economic crises that struck Mexico in the 1980s necessitated foreign capital and increased the dependency on international actors (Angeles Villarreal 2012: 12, Olvera 1997: 109). In this regard, the pressure of international financial institutions and the USA induced the Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982 – 1988) to initiate substantial liberalization of the Mexican economy and to retreat from economic and social interventionism. The governments that followed, under Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo continued this liberal economic course in order to counter recession and attract international donors (Maihold 2014, Faust 1996: 39). The signing of NAFTA in 1994 finally anchored Mexico’s open economy and market orientation in an international treaty. As a consequence, the PRI regime lost significant economic steering capacity to international investors and donor agencies.

Economic reforms were inextricably tied to significant political change (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 17-18). The state’s retreat from economic interventions decreased its capability for

38 Mexico ampliado (amplified Mexico) became a core Zapatista demand in the 1990s (Huffschmid 2014).
39 The Zapatistas tried to break the image of the passive and deferential indigenous and made use of strong metaphorical. The world’s first Women’s Revolutionary Law presented by female revolutionary leader Comandante Ramona can be taken as an example (Mattiace 1997: 36).

Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts
clientelistic bargaining with entrepreneurs and unions. Financial credits were not only coupled with the urge for reforms concerning economic opening, but required political reform as well. In this context, the partial political opening in the late 1980s, marked by PRI’s recognition of the PRD and oppositional victories in federal Mexican states, resulted also from concessions made in multi-lateral negotiations preceding NAFTA (Franke 2004: 182, Preston and Dillon 2004: 149 pp., Maihold 2014).

The economic crises however did not vanish with the adoption of liberal economic policies. The devaluation of the Mexican currency in December 1994 occurred only three weeks after the Zedillo administration had taken office. The impending economic collapse was avoided through emergency financial intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States government. The massive support in the form of credits and guarantees helped to avert a crisis like that of 1982, but the conditions they imposed were drastic and marked a significant loss of sovereignty over economic policymaking (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 4, Faust 1996: 41 pp., Olvera 1997: 116-117). Mexico became highly dependent on foreign capital40 which provided the USA with a major influence on Mexican politics (Angeles Villarreal 2012: 7, 8). Further, the implementation of NAFTA in 1994 did not only signify an important step concerning international economic integration, but was also considered by the government as the peak of a wide-ranging public relations campaign heralding the transition of Mexico to a “First World” country. In this context, the PRI administration strived for international recognition and stronger political influence within the international community (Bob 2005: 125).

The public opposition that accompanied the EZLN uprising challenged the PRI portrayal of Mexico as Central America’s stabile leading power. Thus, the government came under pressure to calm the situation. Although few public US statements regarding the Mexican army’s counter-insurgency campaign in Chiapas were issued by the US government, President Clinton and Congressional Democrats had consistently urged the Mexican administrations to achieve human rights improvements since NAFTA negotiations (HRW/Amercas 1994: 23-24, Franklin 2008: 203). Beyond, international non-governmental

---

40 Mexico’s foreign direct investment increased 140 percent from 1993 to 1994. In addition, the financial crises of December 1994 required an emergency $20 billion loan from the United States (Franklin 2008: 203).
organizations consistently lobbied the US administration and the international community to pressure the Mexican authorities to comply with international human rights standards, allow CSO’s to operate in Chiapas, and end its military campaign (Bob 2005: 129, Franklin 2008: 203, Maihold 2014).

5.3. Political Opportunity Structure

(POSI) Timing

On January 1, 1994, 2500 armed Zapatista soldiers41 captured San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas’ largest city, the nearby towns of Ocosingo, Altamirano, and Las Magaritas, and smaller villages. The federal government immediately reacted with grave counterattacks forcing the EZLN combatants to retreat to the Chiapanecan highlands. Violent clashes during the first days of 1994 left 145 confirmed dead, hundreds wounded, and 20,000-35,000 people displaced (Bob 2005: 125, SíPaz 2000a, Physicians for Human Rights and HRW/Americas 1994: 7). The armed uprising of the previously clandestine EZLN, thus, induced the transformation of the conflict between indigenous communities and the Mexican state into armed conflict (UCDP 2014, Kurtenbach 1996: 93). The rhetoric mirrored the highly securitized environment: The establishing EZLN declared war on the Mexican president, the ruling political elite and the army (EZLN 1993). Indigenous organizations throughout the land declared solidarity with the call for nation-wide rebellion while the government’s reaction was to accuse EZLN for being professional foreign mercenaries manipulating indigenous people and terrorizing the Mexican state (Bob 2005: 154, Nash 1997: 263, Krøvel 2013: 26).

Civil society engagement and international attention exerted tremendous pressure on the government so that, by January 11, the army suspended its attacks. President Salinas declared a unilateral cease-fire on January 12 allowing the Zapatistas to retain their arms and territorial base in Lacandón Forest (García de León 2005: 515, SíPaz 2000a, Olesen 2004: 261). Negotiations on diverse social, economic, and political issues concluded with a tentative agreement, but secret consultation with its supporter communities resulted in the

41 The exact numbers vary. The numbers referred to are taken from Bob 2005: 117.
EZLN’s rejection (Bob 2005: 125, Kurtenbach 1996: 98). The upcoming national elections in August 1994 and increased national and international observance, however, prompted the government to avoid another military escalation. The Zapatistas, for their part, tried to use the growing civil mobilization in Mexico around the 1994 elections and invited thousands of CSOs to the National Democratic Convention with the aim of discussing and formulating alternatives to the political system dominating the nation (Bob 2005: 133-134, Collins 2010: 781). Yet, Zedillo’s election demonstrated that the PRI still inhabited sufficient support to maintain power in Mexico and disillusioned the Zapatistas.

Although the presidential election in 1994 had been a factor in partly de-securitizing the conflict, levels of violence in Chiapas remained high. The indigenous supporter base of the EZLN and landless peasants seized the opportunity created by rebellion and invaded large landholdings. In the course of 1994, the ruling party mayors from more than one-third of the state’s municipalities were ejected and replaced with newly formed councils including representatives of human rights organizations, cooperatives and ethnic rights groups (Dietz 1996: 82, Bob 2005: 126, Nash 1997: 264-265). These councils formed so-called autonomous regional multi-ethnic governments to unify positions in negotiations with federal authorities (Fox 2007b: 60 pp., Fox 1996: 1094, Gabbert 2004: 375 pp.).

In late 1994, the conflict started to face a new period of securitization as the ELZN rejected the installation of Robledo Rincón as the new Chiapanecan governor and declared the creation of 32 autonomous municipalities (Dietz 1996: 68-69, Mattiace 1997: 45). The EZLN fortified positions around their indigenous supporter communities and issued the Third Declaration of the Lacandón Forest reaffirming its revolutionary goals, but also declaring nationwide autonomy for indigenous people (EZLN 1995). In February 1995, the newly established federal government issued arrest warrants for Zapatista leaders and began a new military offensive. The renewed military escalation was again responded to by massive civil society mobilization which caused the government to halt its campaign after few days without substantial military success.
The new peace talks that followed finally resulted in official negotiations in San Andrés Larrainzar (Nash 1997: 270 pp.). Accompanied by representatives of indigenous communities and civil society organizations, the Mexican federal government and the EZLN settled on Indigenous Rights and Culture, as the first of several subjects, in February 1996. The accords were supposed to be the first stage of a negotiation process addressing core issues of the indigenous population (González Saravia 2014, Nash 1997: 271). The government’s concessions on self-determination including autonomous political, social and economic organization opened an opportunity for further reconciliation and substantial de-securitization (Salazar 2014, Stephen 1997: 75). Still, despite the initial success, the Mexican federal government did not comply with the stipulation in the accords as it refused to pass corresponding legislation and resume talks for a second round of discussions. In August 1996, the EZLN, thus, proclaimed not to negotiate with them anymore unless previously agreed provisions were met by the government (Salazar 2014, Collins 2010: 782, SíPaz 2000b, Nash 1997: 270). As negotiation attempts failed and the national revolution remained absent, the strategy now became increasingly centered on the consolidation and development of the civilian Zapatista autonomy project (Salazar 2014, Mattiace 1997: 45, Bob 2005: 126).

Since February 1995, no major military campaigns against the EZLN have been launched by the federal government. Nevertheless, the army tightened its grip around Zapatista areas through a major militarization of Chiapas during 1995 and 1996. Due to a shift of violence from overt clashes between EZLN and Mexican state combatants towards aggressions by loosely organized paramilitary groups targeting civilians suspected to cooperate with Zapatistas, the conflict situation remained highly securitized and intense (SíPaz 2000c, SíPaz 2000d, HRW 1997, Anaya Muñoz 2009: 37). The growing presence of paramilitaries associated with state authorities and landowners further exacerbated the human rights situation peaking in the killing of 45 unarmed civilians in Acteal on December 22, 1997. Under these circumstances direct dialogue with the government did not resume until the end of the PRI presidency in November 2000 (Bob 2005: 127, Hufschmid 2014).

---

42 Between cease fire in 1994 and the massacre in Acteal 1997, reportedly 1.500 people in Chiapas were killed due to conflict (Gabbert 2004: 363).
(POS2) Acceptance of Human Rights

The Mexican state and indigenous communities have both invoked human rights in order to legitimize their demands and political actions. In line with classical indigenismo, Mexican authorities have long tried to urge indigenous communities to enforce state law and eradicate customary norms (Mattiace 1997: 37, Hernández Díaz 2010: 140). The amendment of the national constitution recognizing the cultural rights of indigenous peoples and the signing of the ILO convention 169 in 1990 necessitated a change in the underlying discourse justifying these policies (Speed and Collier 2000: 881); Article 8 of the ILO convention states: “peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.”

(ILO 1989: Convention 169: Article 8)

States were encouraged to endorse the right of indigenous peoples to practice their customs and traditions, but have the right to intervene if universal human or constitutional rights are violated. Since the authority is in charge of deciding what constitutes a violation, the Mexican government had retained its ability to distinguish between allowed and prohibited indigenous customs. Consequently, PRI elites repeatedly invoked individual human rights to limit indigenous self-governance (Speed and Collier 2000: 882, Salazar 2014). Here, particularly customs concerning autonomous organization and political self-determination, such as the selection of their own authorities, were perceived as conflicting with human and constitutional rights (Salazar 2014, Speed and Collier 2000: 883, 888). Federal and state authorities, thus, tried to adopt – and co-opt – the human rights discourse that has been increasingly referred to by oppositional forces to limit state power. The indigenous population condemned the use of human and constitutional rights to restrict autonomy as a continuation of colonialist practices designed to civilize indigenous culture according to Western standards (Speed and Collier 2000: 878).

Indigenous movements in late 1980s and 1990s, themselves, started to draw upon the stipulations provided by international covenants on basic rights to legitimize their claim for recognition of ethnicity (Anaya Muñoz 2009: 46, Mattiace 1997: 49, Gonzáles Saravia 2014).
Social, economic and cultural rights – which Mexico has agreed upon in various treaties – had been invoked to attract international attention to the severe marginalization of indigenous people. Here, Mexico’s ratification of ILO convention 169 was perceived as major step for effectively pressuring the PRI regime to grant substantial concessions regarding self-determination, autonomy rights, and political representation (Krøvel 2009: 31). The EZLN built on this strategy as it justified the insurgency through reference to the Constitution of Mexico enshrining the right to resist illegitimate government (García de León 2005: 515). Therefore, Zapatistas declared war on the Mexican president and army, but pledged loyalty to the Mexican constitution and repeatedly emphasized that their rebellion simply demands the rights granted to ethnic minorities by international law (Bob 2005: 117, 152). The EZLN portrayed the Mexican government as a perpetrator of human rights violations breaking basic international standards in order to dispute its overall legitimacy (Zapf 2014). The growing alliances of the Zapatistas with Mexican human rights CSOs, which started to have intense international activity in the framework of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Sub-Commission for the Protection of Minorities and the Prevention of Discrimination, contributed to the entrenchment of indigenous demands in the discourse on human rights (Anaya Muñoz 2009: 46-47). Appeals to universal human rights have played a vital role in justifying violent actions against a norm violating regime and activating receptive audiences in Mexico and abroad (Olesen 2004a: 260, Stahler-Sholk 2007: 192, Zapf 2014, Gonzáles Saravia 2014).

Consequently, the applicability and interpretation of human rights was highly contested within the conflict. The human rights discourse was adopted by both conflict parties to enhance public support and international legitimacy. While indigenous communities primarily framed their demands in the language of collective social, economic, and cultural rights, state authorities utilized individual civil rights to legitimize restrictions on the demands for self-determination. Instead of being a universally accepted standard for co-existence within society, both conflict parties applied human rights as instruments to frame political claims.

(POS3) Conflict Actor’s Strategy towards Civil Society
Although rumors about guerilla attacks had circulated, the EZLN’s New Years attacks struck the Mexican state without warning. The public statements alleging that the Mexican government was waging “genocidal war” (EZLN 1994) against the indigenous population found broad resonance and evoked broad interest in the societal and economic conflicts in Chiapas (Bob 2005: 165). The Mexican government, however, showed little interest in responding to public statements of the EZLN, but rather impugned their representativeness condemning the group as foreign terrorists manipulating indigenous people (Bob 2005: 154, García de León 2005: 517).

The Mexican army immediately responded with a heavy military offense to annihilate the insurgency. The fighting that by January 12 had cost hundreds of lives, displaced thousands of people and caused major damage, however, came to portray the Zapatistas as less violent than the government. While poorly armed Zapatista soldiers carefully targeted only military and government installations, the army’s massive counterinsurgency campaign including indiscriminate bombardments conveyed the image of a vengeful government (García de León 2005: 515, 516). The media coverage of violence in Chiapas broadcasting the pictures of executed indigenous civilians induced vigorous civil society involvement in Mexico and abroad (see Inclán 2009). The dismay over disproportionate government response rose and Zapatistas had come to be perceived as victims, not only of long-term societal oppression, but more importantly of excessive government reprisals. Media, NGO, and foreign government statements during the first weeks increasingly framed the rebellion as an understandable result of gross government neglect and abuse over many decades (García de León 2005: 517, Bob 2004: 144, Salazar 2014).

In the face of growing civil society engagement, the PRI regime resorted to its strategy of co-optation and repression (Gonzáles Saravia 2014). Hence, authorities banned reporters from conflict zones, and tried to aggravate the work of local CSOs (Bob 2005: 129, Kammer 2014). Additionally, organizations, which publicly demonstrated solidarity with the Zapatista cause, have been criminalized and alleged for supporting terrorism. In the vein of counterinsurgency attacks, representatives of indigenous organizations were arrested or

As the EZLN retreated to the Lacandón Forest and military attacks became one-sided, supporter organizations mounted massive protests in Mexico City, as well as major cities in Europe and Latin America (Collins 2010: 281). Under tremendous pressure, the Mexican state changed the counterinsurgent strategy. Large military operation ceased in 1996 and the government began to act with little overt violence so that public attention and civil society activities started to decay (Bob 2005: 135, Salazar 2014).

On the contrary, Zapatistas’ strategy essentially depended on civil society involvement. The EZLN command realized that radical economic and political change in Mexico was well beyond their capabilities. Only alliances with growing movements for political reforms in Mexico would help them to achieve these ends and protect them from government repression (Bob 2005: 127-128, Gabbert 2004: 369). Central to activating a receptive audience in Mexico and abroad was a myriad of strategic decisions. First, the EZLN’s military operations in 1994 occupying major Chiapanecan cities served the primary objective to gain broad national and international attention. The General Command used the opportunity and appealed to public opinion in order to provide information about the grievous conditions of indigenous people and spread their narrative of a just revolution against illegitimate oppression (Bob 2005: 129, Andrews 2010: 104 pp.). Until fighting intensified and the Mexican army banned journalists, the Zapatista had already succeeded in establishing their framing of the conflict. The retreat and willingness to negotiate, as well as disproportionate government reprisals against EZLN and the nearby population supported their strategy. A vast body of material, among them declarations, poetry, and fairy tales, was handed to various media channels to maintain press coverage, gain prominence, and convince potential supporters (García de León 2005: 517, Hufschmid 2014). Finally, the personality of Subcomandante Marcos, who appeared to be the EZLN’s spokesperson during the first years, and his imaginative writing helped to spread a revolutionary myth worldwide (Bob 2005: 161, Andrews 2011: 142, Hufschmid 2014).
Once, the EZLN had raised awareness, they actively utilized the opportunity and forged alliances with civil society organizations and international networks. Here, Zapatistas organized major events in Chiapas like the National Democratic Convention in August 1994 and the Continental Encounter for Humanity and against Neoliberalism in 1996 inviting organizations from different backgrounds to discuss political alternatives (Olesen 2004a: 90, Salazar 2014). In maintaining civil society support, a shift in tactics from overt military confrontation to what Bob 2005 describes as “armed non-violence” was crucial (Bob 2005: 139). After it became obvious that the EZLN was not capable of confronting the Mexican army in frontal assaults, the gradual transformation into a social movement facilitated its cooperation with civil society actors in Mexico. Although the Zapatistas retained their guns, they abandoned offensive military means and organized under a civilian autonomy structure (Maihold 2014, Kurtenbach 1996: 97-98). The strategic turn now emphasized a vibrant civil society integrating diverse movements as a vessel for democratic regime change instead of military-induced rebellion. This deepened and broadened domestic as well as foreign backing providing for its survival. In this vein, Zapatistas also facilitated the thickening of local social capital in Chiapas (Huffschmid 2014, Garcá de León 2007, Gonzáles Saravia 2014).

5.4. Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas

5.4.1. Identity of the CDHFBC

(II) Organizational Characteristics

The Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (FrayBa/ CDHFBC) was founded in 1989 on the initiative of Samuel Ruíz García, catholic Bishop of the Diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas. Although FrayBa was established on the fundament of Christian ecumenical convictions, the non-governmental and non-profit organization works independent of any political ideology or religious creed (CDHFBC 2014a43, CDHFBC 1994, Kammer 2014).

The societal context of FrayBa has been characterized by the bishop and the work of his diocese. The patron of FrayBa, Samuel Ruíz García, ordained as bishop in 1960, was strongly influenced by the II Vatican council current of Liberation Theology. His diocese, with its
sustained institutional legitimacy and resources, became deeply involved with indigenous concerns in Chiapas and evolved to become a major external ally in their efforts to develop autonomous organizations. The diocese convened the first state-wide public indigenous forum, trained lay activists and promoted local self-empowerment projects (Kurtenbach 2000a: 228, Kurtenbach 2009: 450 pp., Kurtenbach 2008: 270). In this regard, deeply rooted Catholicism in Chiapas provided for major societal influence (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 7, Kurtenbach 2008: 270-272). Days after the Zapatista revolt had started, Samuel Ruíz confirmed the gravity of problems and verified the legitimacy of the grievances, but criticized military means adopted by Zapatistas. Although he was widely known for his sympathies for the indigenous population, his integrity and knowledge were highly respected44 (Bob 2005: 167). Thus, he became a key gatekeeper among human rights organizations and international press in Mexico. Further, Bishop Ruíz was appointed as chairman of the National Commission of Intermediation (Comisión Nacional de Intermediación, CONAI) mediating in peace talks by the government and the EZLN in 1994 (Kurtenbach 2000a: 226). The diocese, therefore, produced bridging social capital across the ethnic divide between mestizo and indigenous identities (Gonzáles Saravia 2014, Maihold 2014).

In 1989, CDHFBC was established on the initiative of Bishop Ruíz to monitor human rights in Chiapas and advocate for their promotion. Staffed with professionals, FrayBa is not working for a rigorously defined membership, but is rather dedicated to support all citizens in Chiapas suffering from human rights violations (CDHFBC 2014a, Zapf 2014). Therefore, the Human Rights Center provided significant assistance for many government oppositional organizations and indigenous groups facing repression by authorities in Chiapas (Kammer 2014, Moksnes 2004: 120).

Even though it has long been known for sympathy and assistance to the indigenous populations of Chiapas, FrayBa maintained independence from the Zapatistas after the 1994 uprising (Zapf 2014). Therefore, the Human Rights Center did not coordinate its work with the EZLN and has been accorded status as a neutral party to the conflict by the Zapatistas.

44 Here, Ruíz was honored for its work with the Letelier-Moffitt Human Rights Award, an annual prize from the Washington D.C.-based Robert F. Kennedy Memorial (Bob 2005: 166).

Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts

(I2) Political Identity

Despite the fact that the CDHFBC works primarily with indigenous people in Chiapas, it is still open to receive agents from all those that suffer from the conflict. Thus, their reports have investigated all kinds of human rights violation without differentiating sources. The Center “attends all cases of violation of human rights that are presented, regardless of creed or political orientation, giving preference to those in which the victims are marginalized in society because of their poverty”\(^{45}\)

(CDHFBC 1994: 1)

The civil society organization pursues an inclusive approach with the overall aim to develop inter-group dialogue, a culture of tolerance, and reconciliation between fractions (FrayBa 2014a). In this regard, FrayBa has well-established ties to all actors in the conflict and tries to promote the respect of an integral vision of human rights for all people, particularly but not exclusively of indigenous communities (Kammer 2014, Zapf 2014, CDHFBC 1995b). Consequently the Center is egalitarian in its work accepting all actors across the conflict divide as equal. Accordingly, CDHFBC “binds to the just demands of the civil society to develop a democratic, participatory, pluralistic system in which there is no social discrimination”\(^{45}\)

(CDHFBC 1994: 3)

On the foundation of its funding principles, the Center acknowledges and fosters multiple identities – such as mestizo or indigenous – freely chosen by each individual and wants them to be recognized in a pluri-ethnic society (CDHFBC 1994: 1-3). Combining the inclusive and egalitarian outlook, FrayBa adopts a civic identity emphasizing inalienable human rights of

\(^{45}\) Quotes from CDHFBC 1994: *En la Ausencia de Justicia, Informe Semestral Julio A Diciembre de 1993* are translated by Author.
each individual. Therefore, the CDHFBC does not take a stance for one conflict party, but advocates for a non-violent solution to the Chiapas conflict and condemns all kinds of rights violations (Gonzáles Saravia 2014, Kammer 2014, Bob 2005: 171).

5.4.2. Framework of Action of the CDHFBC

(FOA1) Human Rights related Activities

The CDHFBC’s work was primarily concerned with monitoring and documenting human rights violations in the state of Chiapas, particularly in the indigenous territory (CDHFBC 2014a). Due to the intensified conflict and growing militarization, however, the CSO’s mission changed and extended well beyond the pure monitoring of human rights violations. In 1994, Samuel Ruiz called for international observers to accompany communities which were situated in the combat zone to prevent mass atrocities against civilians in the wake of military hostilities (Kammer 2014). FrayBa was in charge of coordinating the Civil Brigades of Human Rights Observation (Brigadas Civiles de Observación, BRICO) and gradually extended its activities (CDHFBC 2014a, CDHFBC 1995a, Kammer 2014).

CDHFBC runs activities in five core areas: First, FrayBa maintains close ties with Chiapanecan communities and reacts to their requests for immediate intervention. Urgent action warnings to an international human rights network46 and public denunciations are supposed to put pressure on responsible actors and prevent or stop possible human rights violations that risk the life, physical integrity, or other irreparable damage to individuals or groups (Zapf 2014, CDHF 1995c, 1995d, CDHFBC 2014b47). The continuous accompaniment of communities at risk of suffering aggressions due to armed conflict provides for effective monitoring and seeks to dissuade potential aggressions in threatened communities. The observation brigades also demonstrate national and international solidarity with civilians (Kammer 2014, FrayBa 2014b). A connected area of activity focuses on processing and interpreting data on human rights generated by FrayBa directly and other sources. The


CDHFBC inhabits an institutional position as a reliable monitoring agency through publishing internationally recognized reports on the situation in Chiapas. The channels to various media platforms are further utilized to position human rights topics in the scope of public awareness and to keep indigenous concerns on agenda (Bob 2005: 171, IDMC 2008: 31, Collins 2010: 782). Further, the CDHFBC investigates, documents, and verifies alleged human rights violations. The documentation of verified cases serves the advocacy branch of FrayBa. Therefore, the Center uses its connections with all armed actors to advocate for the restitution of human rights focusing on the most acute symptoms or non-confrontational aspects of the Chiapas conflict (CDHFBC 2014b, CDHFBC 1995a). Finally, FrayBa also supports the strengthening of social processes in communities. Legal advice and human rights workshops are supposed to contribute to the empowerment of communities to exercise their rights and induce structural changes that allow for the protection of human rights. These activities have slowly gained importance within the organization, but still remain, in comparison with other activities, rather secondary. FrayBa also assumes legal representation in cases where people have had their human rights violated in order for their cases to be litigated in national or international instances (CDHFBC 2014b, Zapf 2014).

(FoA2) Civil Society Functions

In reference to section 2.4 (see also Table 9.1, Annex 3), the identified activities can be subsumed under the following civil society functions: Human rights accompaniment within the realm of the civil brigades and urgent action activities in international networks are of importance with regards to the protection function. The provided human rights data, recognized by governmental and non-governmental actors, serve the monitoring and early warning function. In addition, the advocacy and communication function was inhabited by the Center articulating an issue-based human rights agenda. FrayBa finally provided services to communities through assuming legal assistance.

(FoA3) Types of invoked Rights

In the reports of the CDHFBC, special attention was directed towards universal individual human rights as to the subjects of executions, torture, arbitrary detentions, disappearances and forced displacement (CDHFBC 2014a, CDHFBC 1996, CDHFBC 1995c, 1995d). The
organization invokes universal human rights stipulated in the UDHR applicable to every civilian in the conflict context. Nevertheless, FrayBa pursued an integrative human rights approach which also emphasizes the role of structural and cultural violence in the progression of the conflict.

"Structural violence generates new violence"; “Impunity is structural violence, as well as unmet basic needs”48.
(CDHFBC 1995a: 32)

In this context, publications continuously invoke the right to self-determination and autonomy of indigenous villages through access to land and territory and the freedom to exercise group own systems of justice and government. FrayBa actively supports the empowerment of communities in their demand for collective cultural human rights as stipulated in ILO convention 169 and the ICESCR. According to the organization’s creed, the solution to the conflict in Chiapas must address the demands of marginalized people, particularly of indigenous populations (CDHFBC 1996a: 5 pp., 26pp. 1996b: 136 pp.).

Still, the articulations of collective rights bear rather inclusive character. Therefore, FrayBa claims integrational rights underlining the equal status of all Mexican identity groups and urging the conflict parties to grant human rights to all Mexican people. Here, recommendations demand the full provision of Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution acknowledging different cultural groups. CDHFBC advocates not for social exclusion, but for inclusion of all societal groups into the Mexican society without cultural assimilation, but through recognition of the plurality of customs and traditions (CDHFBC 1995a: 31 pp., 1995b: 10-11, CDHFBC 1994: 3). FrayBa repeatedly requested the Mexican state to “respect and ensure the existing cultural and ecological diversity in our country” (CDHFBC 1995a: 32)

5.4.3. De-securitizing move

The CDHFBC’s human rights invocations issued a de-securitizing move, since published reports and statements demanded all involved actors to comply with internationally

48 Quotes from CDHFBC 1995a: Informe de Zona Norte – El Otro Cerco, are translated by Author.
Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts
acknowledged human rights and to find negotiated solutions on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance.

“Only creativity and the search for alternative and democratic proposals will make the emergence of favourable conditions for the respect for human rights possible.”

(CDHFBC 1996b: 27)

With regards to Table 3.1, FrayBa has adopted a rather constructivist strategy acknowledging the threatening environment in Chiapas, but arguing that military strategies are not suited to counter these threats adequately, but rather escalate the situation and harm civilians. FrayBa has repeatedly indicated that it condemns every form military action no matter which side instigates it and calls for all actors to go back within the realm of dialogue and negotiation on the fundament of human rights, societal inclusion and mutual recognition in order to initiate reconciliation (FrayBa 1994, Kamm er 2014). Their reports avoid a securitizing language separating identities, but frame all individuals as potential victims of aggressions.

“The Mexican nation has opposed this war since January 1994 and, therefore, has considered the destruction of the enemy as unacceptable, because the enemy is the other, our brother, our compatriot, a human being.”49

(CDHFBC 1996a: 141)

FrayBa argues against cultural monism, but to enter a sustained dialogue where differences are acknowledged in order to realize an equal and participatory society in which many worlds exist in cooperation and coordination with each other. In this vein, FrayBa depicts a de-constructivist strategy as it argues for a pluri-cultural Mexican nation where mestizo and indigenous identity groups cooperate with each other and do not consider each other as mutual threats. Human rights have been demanded for all identity-groups, while special collective indigenous rights were framed in accordance with the Mexican Constitution. The CDHFBC calls to stop all kinds of discrimination and cultural supremacy. In this vein, the CSO demands that the authorities commit to:

“ensure all Mexicans the satisfaction of their basic needs”

49 Quotes from CDHFBC 1996a: Ni Paz ni Justicia, Informe general y amplio acerca de la guerra civil que sufren los Ch’oles en la zona norte de Chiapas are translated by Author.
"The strengthening of traditional customs and practices of indigenous groups, acknowledged in the Constitution of the country, in order to find solutions to internal conflicts"

(CDHFBC 1995a: 34)

The work of FrayBa is designed to enhance the capacity and visibility of the victims of the conflict. Thus, a profound solution requires the incorporation of their needs and the:

“Respect for the physical and psychological integrity of all Mexicans [...] especially those who do not sympathize with the official positions or the party in power”

(FrayBa 1995a: 34)

The CDHFBC has sympathies with indigenous communities and acknowledges the cause of the Zapatista uprising, but does not direct its statements against authorities, but tries to show venues for cooperation and negotiation. Here, authorities are invited to start their own investigations on reported allegations in order to counter a culture of impunity and to start substantial dialogue to sustainably improve the human rights situations (CDHFBC 1994: 57 pp., 1995a: 34, 1996b: 26-27).

5.5. Enlace Civil

5.5.1. Identity of Enlace Civil

(I1) Organizational Characteristics

Enlace Civil was founded in 1996 in response to the demands by Chiapanecan indigenous communities to support the consolidation of the Zapatista autonomy project. Staffed with a multidisciplinary team of professionals with experience in Mexican civil society organizations, Enlace Civil is a non-governmental and non-for-profit organization whose primary mission is to link national and international solidarity organizations with the MAREZ (Bob 2005: 173, Enlace Civil 2014a50).

The societal context of Enlace Civil is characterized by autonomous indigenous organization in Chiapas. The declaration of Zapatista municipalities in December 1994 has been a key part
of the Zapatista strategy to improve the living conditions of indigenous communities and provide for their self-determination (Zibechi 2008: 136, Díaz-Poanco 1997: 171). Within the authoritarian federal state of Chiapas, indigenous self-governance strongly depended on the landholding oligarchy and PRI elites’ concessions. In the wake of the EZLN uprising, however, indigenous people seized the opportunity, occupied large landholdings and founded the MAREZ that became the centers of the non-armed, civilian supporter base of the EZLN (Fox 1996: 1093-1094, Fox 2007a, Mattiace 1997: 45). Starting from 32 municipalities, the Zapatista autonomy project established governance structures on communal, municipal and regional levels. Communities stopped utilizing official services and established a new political structure challenging the state’s sovereignty in some Chiapanecan territories51 (Zibechi 2008: 137, Gabbert 2004: 377). In Zapatista view, the creation of the MAREZ was justified by convention 169 of the ILO, recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to live according to their customs, and Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution stipulating municipal freedoms (Salazar 2014, Hernández-Díaz 2010: 144). Notwithstanding the independence of Zapatista municipal councils, the EZLN has still been of major importance. In this regard, command structures were highly intertwined and the armed forces provided for the protection of Zapatista territories against aggressions by landholders and paramilitaries. The MAREZ featured a clear indigenous profile and politically supported the struggle of the EZLN. Thus, the societal context of Enlace Civil spread bonding social capital along ethnic and political conflict divides.

In Mexico, Enlace Civil evolved to become the most important hub in the Zapatista solidarity network serving as a gatekeeper that channels and coordinates solidarity activities in support of Zapatista communities (Bob 2005: 173, Andrews 2010: 107, Salazar 2014). The organization was founded on the principle to respect the decisions of the communities, their customs and ways of organizing so as to foster an equal partnership instead of paternalism (Enlace Civil 2014a). Projects that were accompanied and promoted by Enlace Civil had been initiated by the Zapatistas and respond to their very own needs. The overall aim of the CSO is to support the strengthening of alternative governance in order to improve the living

51 In the view of Jonathan Fox (1996), the indigenous Chiapas started to experience “Dual political power” in the mid-1990s (Fox 1996: 1094).
conditions of indigenous communities. Since Enlace Civil considers its activities at the service of the Zapatista autonomy project, the organization works for a well-defined constituency. In this vein, the CSO overtly takes the Zapatista side in the conflict, declares solidarity with the rebellion, and maintains strong connections with EZLN commanders (Bob 2005: 173, Stahler-Sholk 2007: 194, Zapf 2014, Enlace Civil 2014b52).

(I2) Political Identity

As a solidarity organization, Enlace Civil pursues a rather exclusivist approach. Activities focus only on a particular section of the population in Chiapas demarcated by ethnic and political boundaries. Although its particular projects are wide-ranging, the overall goals mirror key aspects of the Zapatistas’: Constructing an alternative to the existing economic and political systems that in their view neglect and destroy the indigenous population (Bob 2005: 173, Enlace Civil 2014a, Gonzáles Saravia 2014).

“Currently the Chiapanecan indigenous communities face the challenge of building an alternative to an economic and political model which does not only not recognize them, but seeks their disappearance through the contempt for culture and organization, plunder of natural resources and various forms of repression.”

(Enlace Civil 2014a53)

Yet, the CSO has an egalitarian outlook accepting all actors across the conflict divide as equal. Enlace Civil does not proclaim the primacy of indigenous concerns, but aims at transferring them the rights that, in their view, had been granted by the constitution and various international treaties (Enlace Civil 1999). According to this view, the Zapatista rebellion and the subsequent declaration of the MAREZ are legitimate reactions to decades of marginalization and repression (Enlace Civil 1998b). The resulting multicultural political identity of Enlace Civil emphasizes the right of all actors to an equal footing and values different cultural identities. Enlace Civil’s approach is to strengthen existing forms of organization along ethno-political divides, instead of seeking opportunities for inter-group reconciliation. Thus, the organizational focus is merely on equal treatment and recognition

---

53 Quotes from Enlace Civil 2014a: Inicio are translated by Author.
of segregated structures and co-existence, rather than on transcending boundaries in a pluri-ethnic society (Enlace Civil 1998a).

5.5.2. Framework of Action of Enlace Civil

(FoA1) Human Rights related Activities

Enlace Civil’s activities became primarily concerned with the structural underpinnings that perpetuate the conflict (Enlace Civil 2014b). Here, the organization’s support of autonomous Zapatista municipalities has the overall goal to sustainably improve indigenous living conditions. Representing the link to the global solidarity network, Enlace Civil’s activities can be distinguished according to their outwardly and inwardly oriented purpose: Outwardly oriented activities entail activating the Zapatista solidarity network in the case of growing aggressions against Zapatista municipalities and maintaining international support. In this regard, Enlace Civil also organized human rights accompaniment by national and international solidarity activists in order to deter potential aggressors and monitor the human rights situation in Zapatista communities (Enlace Civil 1998b, 1998c, Stahler-Sholk 2007: 194). Urgent action requests from Zapatista municipal councils are forwarded to the global supporter network. International public campaigns shall then raise awareness and generate pressure on the Mexican authorities to stop repressive means (Kerkeling 2014). Additionally, Enlace Civil distributes Zapatista material, such as EZLN communiqués, declarations, and reports on the progression of MAREZ, through the communication channels of the network to raise awareness, advocate for Zapatista demands, solidify alliances, and gain new supporters (Enlace Civil 2014a, Olesen 2006: 192). Finally, solidarity organizations from North America and Europe contact Enlace Civil before travelling to Chiapas and remain in close contact while conducting activities on the ground. These visits are supposed to give hands-on experiences in building a new social system and, hereby, to strengthen the network (Bob 2005: 173, Andrews 2010: 108 pp., Kerkeling 2014).

Inward oriented activities, on the other hand, are centered on the coordination of material aid to ensure their effective use in supporting communities. In this vein, Enlace Civil does not offer projects to communities, but communicates their demands to potential supporters.
Further, Enlace Civil seeks to strengthen the autonomous projects through administering resources and offering cooperation in training activities (Enlace Civil 2014b, Collier 2005: 184, 198-199). Here, the organization supports projects in four areas: Education, Health, Production, and Communication (Enlace Civil 2014a).

(FoA2) Civil Society Functions

The activities of Enlace Civil serve four civil society functions: Human rights accompaniment and emergency requests to the international supporter networks corresponds to the protection as well as the monitoring and early warning function. Enlace Civil assumes the advocacy and communication function through publishing Zapatista material and advocating for demands of the municipalities. Finally, the focus of Enlace Civil’s inwardly oriented activities is on the provision of services function.

(FoA3) Types of invoked rights

Enlace Civil denounces human rights violations by the Mexican state on the Zapatista territory. Reports and urgent action requests frequently invoke political and civil rights as provided by the UDHR and the ICCPR to condemn the actions of Mexican authorities such as restriction on freedom of association, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests (Olesen 2006: 192, Enlace Civil 1998a, 1998b). Enlace Civil articulates group rights as individual rights have been exclusively invoked on behalf of members of Zapatista communities.

The emphasis of published statements concerns the violation of collective social, economic, and cultural rights. Here, state policies towards indigenous communities are alleged to violate the rights of self-determination and autonomy, as provided by the ILO convention, the Mexican Constitution and the ICESCR. Authorities are accused of denying basic services to indigenous communities and structurally destroying their livelihood which necessitates resistance.

“[…] however, indigenous peoples, based on their ancestral rights over their territory and culture, have established resistance which has enabled their survival.”

(Enlace Civil 2014c54)
Even though Enlace Civil commits to the equal status of all Mexican identity groups, the invocation of collective human rights on behalf of the indigenous population is exclusionist in character (see Enlace Civil 2014b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).

5.5.3. Securitizing move

Enlace Civil’s human rights invocations issue a securitizing move as their published statements reproduce the narrative of the EZLN constructing the “evil” or “bad” government in opposition to the repressed indigenous people fighting for good (Enlace Civil 2014a, 2014c). The organization has been vocal in underlying the state’s responsibility in the persistence of violence in Chiapas in a securitized manner.

“Since the late twentieth century, the dispute over the territory has been configured as a clear tension between the interest for the commodification and control of the territory, and, on the other side, the territory inhabited as a source of life, of struggle and hope for a better future.

(Enlace Civil 2014c)

"For over 500 years we lived exploited by bad government, […] and we are becoming poorer. This is because large traders are taking advantage of all our products while we, who work the land from sunrise to sunset, have nothing.”

(Enlace Civil 2014c)

Mexican authorities are not perceived as potential partners who can be lived with cooperatively, but rather as opponents against whom existence must be saved. Therefore, the government appears as an aggressor threatening the mere existence of indigenous people (see Enlace Civil 2014a, Enlace Civil 1998c, also Enlace Civil 1998d). Enlace Civil repeatedly speaks about unilateral war waged by the Mexican government against civilians.

“The police, military and immigration operations against the autonomous municipalities have been accompanied by flagrant human rights violations, against the people and the towns, leaving terrible consequences, which speak to the war which has been unleashed in Chiapas against the indigenous poor: deaths, imprisonments, thefts, lootings, rapes, destruction of harvests, displacement of populations.”
In the face of this war, possible opportunities for the reconciliation of inter-group relationships seem to have vanished and resistance appears to be the only option for indigenous people (Enlace Civil 2014c). The exclusionist human rights invocations serve the purpose to reinforce the position of one conflict party (see e.g. Enlace Civil 2014b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). In spite of Enlace Civil’s strict commitment to peaceful means, extraordinary measures are claimed as necessary to respond to threats. In this regard, Enlace Civil encouraged all forms of resistance to governmental activities and legitimized the rebellion as a just fight against repression.

“Repression is not the means for ending the rebellion of the indigenous of Chiapas, who have found no other path than self-organization and resistance, in response to the cruel war being waged against them.”
(Enlace Civil 1998a)

“We will not surrender, nor will we will sell ourselves, we are here and we will continue resisting.”
(Enlace Civil 1999a)

5.6. Conditional Mechanism
The following section will now make inference on the conditional mechanism linking the four factors and accounting for the de-securitizing and securitizing move in the respective cases. The organizations operated in a conflict context characterized by a consolidated and authoritarian Mexican state. The PRI regime has been highly irresponsible to human rights invocations of civil society actors that increasingly started to mobilize against the regime outside the corporatist channels since the late 1980s. Beyond restrictions on freedom of association and freedom of speech, the militarization as well as the deteriorated human rights situation severely aggravated the working environment of civil society organizations in Chiapas. The prevalence of societal fragmentation between mestizo-dominated society and
indigenous communities contributed to high levels of bonding social capital with only little cross-ethnic organizational activism.

Jonathan Fox emphasizes that under authoritarian conditions, such as in rural Mexico, the collaboration between local and external civil society organizations is an important causal pathway in accumulating social capital (Fox 1996: 1094, Fox 2007b: 61 pp.). According to his view, external non-governmental actors can provide positive and so-called anti-negative incentives to local and regional organizing efforts: Positive incentives include direct material inducements, enabling institutional frameworks and ideological resources. Anti-negative resources reduce the costs that repressive authorities may threaten to impose on those engaged in constructing autonomous social capital (ibid: 1092, Fox 2007b: 68, 70 pp.). The importance of external allies for local CSOs is also emphasized by scholars arguing for the role of transnational advocacy networks in inducing policy change (see i.e. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 2008, Tarrow 2005, Bob 2005, Keck and Sikkink 1998). In their view, the change of a state’s repressive behavior crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors to alert Western public opinion and Western governments (Risse and Sikkink 2008: 5). Transnational advocacy networks include those relevant actors working on an issue, “who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Risse and Sikkink 2008: 18, see also Keck and Sikkink 1998, also Tarrow 2005: 163).

(1) FrayBa

The societal context of the CDHFBC provided well-established links to international human rights organizations and policy-makers. In this regard, the Catholic diocese in San Cristóbal under Bishop Samuel Ruíz had long been recognized for its work with marginalized people in Chiapas which did not only provoke conflicts with Chiapanecan elites, but also within the Catholic Church (Kurtenbach 2000a: 226, 227, also Loaeza Tovar 1996: 124 pp.). The international reputation of Ruíz as a defender of human rights, particularly of indigenous rights, has been important for FrayBa to establish transnational cooperation with Human Rights Watch Americas, Amnesty International, and governmental international organizations, as well as to gain the trust of Chiapanecan oppositional groups (Zapf 2014,

As the conflict intensified and international pressure induced Salina’s willingness to negotiate with EZLN leadership, the Catholic diocese appeared to be the only remaining actor able to serve as an intermediary between the conflict parties. In this regard, the Catholic diocese has traditionally been one of the few organizations in Chiapas providing for bridging social capital within the highly fragmented society and was, therefore, accepted as a mestizo authority by indigenous communities (Maihold 2014, Gonzáles Saravia 2014). Further, Catholicism is particularly deep-rooted and widespread in rural Southern Mexico vesting the Catholic Church with legitimacy and repute within large parts of society (Kurtenbach 2008: 270pp., also Kurtenbach 2009: 280, Kurtenbach and Paffenholz 1994). Ruiz mediated in the peace talks in 1994 in San Cristóbal and the human rights center FrayBa became acknowledged by the government and the Zapatista as a neutral monitoring source. This in turn reinforced the organization’s importance as a local hub for verified information on the conflict for international human rights organizations and foreign governments, particularly for those who could not send their own observer. Thus, the societal context, producing bridging social capital in the conflict, did not only provide for crucial organizational resources but also shaped the identity of the CSO. FrayBa adopted a strictly civic agenda and remained distant towards the EZLN in order to reinforce the position as an acknowledged observer, whose information can be trusted, and to maintain its channels to Mexican authorities and (Kammer 2014, Zapf 2014, see also Fingscheidt 2014). The status as a neutral organization enabled the CSO to effectively discharge its functions. International observers working for FrayBa have been permitted and recognized by Mexican authorities, monitoring teams were granted access to conflict territories, and combatants from both conflict parties respected the work of international accompaniment enabling its protective function. Here, activities served the overall goal to create and maintain centers of peace for civilians amidst violent conflict (Kammer 2014).
The political opportunity structure enhanced the importance of FrayBa’s activities, but aggravated their operating conditions. Verified and independent information provided by FrayBa gained significance for international observers and policy-makers as the political landscape polarized. On the other hand, FrayBa highly depended on its international network and the support of the diocese in providing security for its own members. Here, the international network and the church background provided some level of protection to carry out activities in the face of systematic human rights violations and death threats (Kammer 2014, Zapf 2014). Consequently, FrayBa’s activities on the Zapatista conflict issued a de-securitizing move. The organization did not charge their human rights activities with political statements, reinforcing the position of one conflict actor over another. The human rights discourse has been adopted to demand all armed actors to comply with basic standards.

(2) Enlace Civil

Enlace Civil emerged from a societal context characterized by bottom-up grassroots mobilization. Indeed, the Zapatista movement and the creation of the MAREZ demonstrated that bonding social capital in authoritarian contexts can thicken quite independently of external allies, through sustained collective action by autonomous, local political movements (Fox 1996: 1094, also Corrochano 2005: 8). Excluded from PRI-dominated institutions, indigenous communities in Chiapas organized within the highly fragmented society against the political elite and large landowners to preserve their ethnic identity independent of mestizo paternalism. Before the uprising, dozens, probably hundreds of villages in Chiapas organized in complete isolation and debated strategies in open assemblies. This process demonstrated the enormous trust and loyalties produced in horizontal associations (Fox 1996: 1097, Kurtenbach 1996: 98).

Whilst the independent mobilization from below was fundamental, representing a second pathway of social capital accumulation (see Fox 1996: 1094), the growth and maintenance of Zapatista structures within the authoritarian state still benefited enormously from external allies. Once the state’s counterinsurgency campaign was launched, the mobilization of external civil society allies at national and international levels was essential to urge the president to declare a unilateral cease-fire after less than two weeks of fighting, rather than
pursuing a militarily dissolution of the rebellion as happened in many Central American countries (Andrews 2011: 140). Thus, external allies turned out to be essential for the bottom-up mobilization in one of Mexico’s most remote indigenous regions (Salazar 2014). The societal capital produced within the global solidarity network, however, remained bonding social capital since networks of civic engagement have been organized along the conflict divide and against the Mexican authorities.

Enlace Civil, as the coordinator of solidarity activities and the voice of Zapatista communities, was thus entrusted with a crucial task in maintaining the capacity of the movement to survive. The growing global solidarity network provided Enlace Civil with prominence and leverage to be heard (Andrews 2011: 141-142, Kerkeling 2014). The close cooperation with the MAREZ did not only vest Enlace Civil with external allies providing for leverage and some degree of protection. The prevailing bonding social capital also influenced the CSO identity. Enlace Civil adopted a multicultural agenda and facilitates civic engagement of indigenous communities along the ethnic and political conflict divide. Further, close coordination with the EZLN has been maintained which provided protection to the MAREZ and, ultimately, for Enlace Civil’s members working in the autonomous territories (Hernández Díaz 2010: 144).

Enlace Civil served the struggle of autonomous communities through the delivery of services, human rights accompaniment in threatened communities, and advocacy on behalf of the Zapatista movement. In this regard, the CSO invoked exclusive human rights to reinforce EZLN claims, portray the Mexican state as illegitimate and justify the existence of the MAREZ.

Enlace Civil’s work has been largely affected by the political opportunity structure. The sharp rhetoric of the EZLN condemning the state for perpetuated violence was mirrored in Enlace Civil’s disseminated statements. Additionally, the ability of the Zapatistas to establish a narrative of just rebellion against a repressive regime strengthened ideological bounds, facilitated Enlace Civil’s close affiliation, and influenced the rhetoric of the published statements (Gonzáles Saravia 2014, Salazar 2014).
Under these conditions, Enlace Civil’s activities resemble a securitizing move. Enlace Civil disseminates the EZLN rhetoric invoking exclusive cultural and social rights to convince the public that the government is a threat to the mere existence of indigenous communities (see Salazar 2014). Here, the organization did not pledge for a reconciliation of positions, but solely reinforced Zapatista claims and portrayed the government as a threat that aims at the extinction of indigenous people. Human rights, therefore, have been understood as a political tool to transfer legitimacy to the Zapatista rebellion, rather than serving as a framework for cooperation and negotiations.

6 Discussion of Results

The conditional mechanisms of the securitizing and de-securitizing move illustrate that context conditions cannot preclude or cause a certain outcome; they rather restrict or enhance the options available to different political actors. The context factor did not solely determine the character of human rights related activities, but provided the working environment and conditioned the operating requirements. Within the authoritarian state, the organizations critically depended on external allies to gain some degree of protection and leverage. Particularly in a fragmented society, where one identity group is marginalized, the cooperation with national and international partners was pivotal for bringing the human rights situation to the national agenda. In the transition from context conditions to the CSO identity, the societal context of the CSO appeared to be a decisive organizational characteristic. Since the context conditions did not provide an enabling environment, both of the considered organizations strongly depended on the societal context, from which they emerged, providing links to external allies and crucial resources. The kind of social capital produced within the respective societal contexts, in turn, critically influenced the remaining organizational characteristics and the political identity of the CSO.
In this regard, prevailing bridging social capital induced issue-centered work, no affiliation with conflict actors, and a civic agenda. Subsequent activities emphasize the importance of an integrational society, where positions are reconciled, bearing a rather de-securitizing character. A societal context characterized by bonding social capital conditioned activism for a clear-cut constituency, ties to one conflict party, and a multicultural agenda. Resulting human rights activities resembled a securitizing move since they re-produced exclusionist self-other narratives and reinforced one conflict position. Thus, the societal context appears to be a first critical juncture in the conditional mechanisms shaping the overall identity of the CSO, and, hereby, conditioning the character of the human rights activities.

The cases of FrayBa and Enlace Civil further prompt the conclusion that the type of activity and the civil society function are not directly related to the issued (de)-securitizing move. Both organizations delivered services, provided protection to communities, monitored the conflict and advocated for human rights. Additionally, both organizations adopt an egalitarian view. Yet, the inclusiveness of the CSO identity and of the subsequent activities appears to be of importance in the transition from the identity factor to the framework of action. In accordance with its inclusive identity, FrayBa advocated for an issue-based agenda and demanded universal and integrational human rights for all Mexican citizens. Enlace Civil rather pursued an exclusive agenda advocating for group and exclusionist human rights solely on behalf of Zapatista communities. Hence, the inclusiveness of human rights invocations represents a second critical juncture.

The reference to universal and integrational rights, applicable to all Chiapanecan citizens, served the purpose to demand the end of all kinds of violations by all armed actors and to find a negotiated solution on the grounds of democratic values and mutual recognition. They implied a rather neutral political view and, therefore, disseminated statements carried a de-securitizing character. The invocation of group rights and exclusionist rights by Enlace Civil, on the other hand, issued a securitizing move. The case analyses affirm prior findings by the SHUR project that the invocation of exclusive rights often serves rather political ends and, thus, contributes to the so-called politicization of human rights (Pia and Diez 2011:205, 217).
The instrumentalization of the human rights discourse by both conflict sides facilitated the securitizing character of exclusive human rights invocations on behalf of indigenous people, since these rights and their applicability are conflict issues themselves. An equally important feature of the political opportunity structure is the strategy of conflict actors towards civil society. In combination with the repressive character of the Mexican state and the civil society mobilization against the PRI regime, the EZLN’s narrative of a just rebellion attracted major support from civil society organizations working on indigenous groups in Chiapas. Therefore, activism on behalf of indigenous peoples has largely tended to politically support the Zapatistas and reproduce their securitizing language.

7 Conclusion

Assessing the role of civil society in conflict transformation is a highly complex, yet crucial research objective. An increasing body of literature asserts the critical importance of civil society actors amidst conflict, but discusses controversially the exact nature of their influence. Among the mushrooming theoretical approaches to the relationship of civil society and conflict, a social-constructivist perspective on systemic conflict transformation is centered on the communication of self and other as well as the construction of the resulting inter-group relationship. This perspective gains particular relevance in ethno-political conflicts resulting from the articulation of political claims that pitch ethnic groups against others and construct their respective positions as incompatible. Positive conflict transformation certainly requires the re-articulation of relationships enabling mutual recognition and cooperation.

The securitization concept provides an innovative analytical tool for understanding the role of civil society organizations in conflict transformation. Successful securitization implies conflict escalation since decisions can be taken that would otherwise not be seen as legitimate, the opposition of self and other is radicalized, and, consequently, options for reconciliation are closed down. Entrenched positions and threatened identities establish the
logic of war narrowing windows of opportunity for constructive dialogue. Reversing this dynamicizing process necessitates de-securitizing communication rearticulating the intergroup relationship. The securitization concept features productive complementarity to the research field of de-radicalization. In this respect, a de-securitized context is perceived to be a central precondition for individuals to de-radicalize in the long run.

The aim of the research was to research under which conditions civil society organizations invoking human rights issue a securitizing or de-securitizing move in ethno-political conflicts. The interface between contextual factors, organizational behavior, and discursive framing has, thus, been at the center of interest.

FrayBa issued a de-securitizing move under the conditions that it emerged from a societal context characterized by the Catholic diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas producing bridging social capital with the overall aim to reconcile the positions of ethnic groups in Chiapas. Thus, FrayBa featured a civic identity, maintained close ties to international human rights organizations, and advocated for an issue-based agenda oriented at the most urgent needs of all citizens in Chiapas. Under these conditions, the invocations of inclusive individual and collective human rights were recognized by all involved conflict parties and served the purpose to demand a negotiated solution based on mutual recognition and the compliance with basic human rights standards. Enlace Civil on the other hand issued a securitizing move under the conditions that the organization evolved from grassroots mobilization against the Mexican state. Within the highly fragmented society in Chiapas, the autonomous Zapatista communities spread bonding social capital. Thus, Enlace Civil adopted a multiculturalist agenda, conducted its activities exclusively on behalf of a clear-cut constituency, and cooperated with the international solidarity network supporting Zapatista rebellion. The invocation of group and exclusionist rights served to legitimize the actions of the EZLN and, hereby, reinforced the conflict divide.

The authoritarian state and the highly securitized context did not provide for an enabling environment for civil society activities so that the human rights CSOs depended on their societal context providing ties to external allies and vesting them with resources. Therefore, the context severely limited the scope of human rights activities and restricted the options
for actions. The POS facilitated the securitizing character of exclusive human rights invocations on behalf of indigenous communities, but did not preclude de-securitizing moves. The discussion of the two conditional mechanisms inferred hypotheses concerning two critical junctures. In the connection from context to the CSO identity, the societal context is crucial. The kind of social capital produced by the societal context of the respective CSO critically shapes the organizational characteristics and the political identity. The inclusiveness of the CSO identity, in turn, influences the adopted framework of action and the overall (de-)securitizing character. Thus, the findings prompt the hypothesis that a societal context characterized by bridging social capital induces rather integrational CSO activities aiming at reconciliation and issuing a de-securitizing move. On the other hand, a societal context spreading bonding social capital along the conflict divide induces exclusive CSO activities reinforcing conflict positions and issuing a securitizing move. The second critical juncture is the type of human rights invocations. The findings suggest that invoking inclusive, universal and integrational rights produces de-securitizing moves as these rights serve the purpose to bridge the conflict divide and to demand the reconciliation of inter-group relationships. Exclusive group or exclusionist rights tend to issue securitizing moves as they reproduce the self-other divide and support the perception of incompatibility of conflict positions. The in-depth case analyses further contributed to theory-development through pointing at the importance of two structural features. First, the level of societal fragmentation influenced the kind of social capital prevailing in society and, thus, influences the (de-)securitizing character of operating human rights organizations. Second, the strategy of conflict actors towards civil society is an important feature of the POS. If one conflict actor wins the hearts and minds of civil society actors, the human rights discourse tends to be politicized and the invocation of exclusive rights on behalf of one conflict party is more likely to produce securitizing moves. The influence of contextual conditions not only on the sheer ability of civil society organizations to get engaged with human rights, but also on the character of their activities should prompt policy-makers to create an enabling environment. In this regard, responsive
state structures, inclusive societal institutions, and de-securitized conflict contexts are expected to provide fertile grounds for flourishing civil society and societal contexts spreading bridging social capital. This, in turn, is expected to facilitate discourses de-radicalizing conflictual relationships. Yet, as context conditions and political opportunity structure alone cannot prevent the production of securitizing moves, civil society organizations play an important role with regards to the construction of inter-group relationships. Advocating for the rights of people suffering from repression is sublime work, but the empirical analysis encourages organizations to pursue their aims carefully. Although no human rights form can be reduced to the other, CSOs can choose from a broad set of strategies and instruments in framing issues and putting forward their claims. The form of the discursive invocation is decisive for the (de-)securitizing character of the CSO and, thus, paramount for the prospects of conflict transformation.
8

Literature


Human Rights Watch (HRW)/Americas (1994): Mexico, the New Year’s rebellion: Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law During the Armed Revolt in Chiapas, Mexico, 6 (3), [Online], [Accessed 15 January 2013], Available from: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/MEXICO943.PDF.


Richard Georgi: The Invocation of Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflicts


Annex 1

Trends by Armed Conflict Type


Annex 2

Civil society as sector and civil society as an intermediate sphere

Annex 3

Table 9.1 Civil society’s functions during conflict and possible human rights related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society Functions in conflicts</th>
<th>Possible human rights related activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Human accompaniment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of zones of peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Early Warning</td>
<td>Observation of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report on human-rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy and Communication</td>
<td>Advocacy for a societal group/members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. ethnic minority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy for an issue-based agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. ban on land mines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Educational work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion/Community Building</td>
<td>Creation of communication networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitating collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediation/ Facilitation between all kind of actors (citizen/state/armed actors)</td>
<td>Facilitating contacts between armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediating between conflict parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitating and Mediating between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>communities and armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Delivery</td>
<td>Workshops and training programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Juridical support
Supporting local population in conducting projects
Build-up of peace constituencies
### Table 9.2 List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heike Kammer</td>
<td>Member of international human rights CSO Peace Brigades International, participant in international monitoring teams in El Salvador, Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former participant in international observer teams in Chiapas (1995-1996), organized by the Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (CDHFBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Thomas Zapf</td>
<td>Representative of the CDHFBC in San Cristóbal. Former Representative of SiPaz, an international human rights CSO situated in Chiapas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Annette Fingscheidt</td>
<td>Head of Advocacy of Peace Brigades International, German section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauricio Salazar</td>
<td>Representative of Serapaz, local human rights CSO working on the conflict with indigenous communities in Chiapas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dolores González Saravia</td>
<td>Director of Serapaz, a human rights CSO in Chiapas. Participated at the San Andrés talks in 1996 as a thematic adviser on local autonomy and indigenous autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luz Kerkeling</td>
<td>Representative of the German Zapatista solidarity organization Gruppe B.A.S.T.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Prof. Dr.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Günther Maihold (SWP)
Member of the Research Center “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” in the Project Transnational Security Governance in Latin America

Dr. Anne Huffschmid
Associate Researcher at the Freie Universität Berlin, Institute for Latin American Studies
Former die Tageszeitung (TAZ) correspondent in Mexico City
Annex 5

9.1 Map – Chiapas

[Map of Chiapas]


Annex 6

Table 9.3 Indigenous Population in Chiapas 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous languages in Chiapas</th>
<th>Number of speakers of indigenous language over 5 years of age</th>
<th>Percentage of total population over 5 years of age in Chiapas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tzeltal</td>
<td>258,153</td>
<td>9.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tzotzil</td>
<td>226,681</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chol</td>
<td>114,460</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tojolobal</td>
<td>35,567</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoque</td>
<td>34,810</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanjobal</td>
<td>10,349</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mame</td>
<td>8,726</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>688,746</td>
<td>25.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations

A.C. asociación civil
BRICO Brigadas Civiles de Observación (Civil Brigades of Human Rights Observation)
CCRI-CG Committee of Clandestine Indigenous Revolution – General Command
CDHFBC/ FrayBa Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas)
CNPI Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas (National Coordinaton of Indigenous Peoples)
CONAI Comisión Nacional de Intermediación (National Commission of Intermediation)
COPRI Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSO civil society organization
EZLN Ejército Zapatista Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
FLN Forces of National Liberation
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
LUISS Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali
MAREZ Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas (Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities)
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
---|---
PBI | Peace Brigades International
POS | Political Opportunity Structure
PRI | Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
PRD | Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution)
QCA | Qualitative Comparative Analysis
SERAPAZ | Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz
TAN | transnational advocacy network
TAZ | die Tageszeitung
UDHR | Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN | United Nations
USA | United States of America.