Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany

By: Dr. Witold Mucha

Abstract

The article analyzes the commonalities and differences of counterterrorism (CT) practices applied by governments in France and Germany and their effects on the local ground. Altogether, there has been a qualitative difference of CT responses. Paris has launched more extensive measures than Berlin. Regardless of the differences, the policies of both governments lack attention towards the unintended effects of these specific measures. For instance, the concern raised by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) about the prolongation of the state of emergency in France is one starting point of analysis. AI accused the French authorities of abetting home-grown radicalization as a result of the discriminate repression in marginalized suburbs of Paris. The paper’s argument is twofold: First, decision-makers in Paris and Berlin respond to terrorist threats in a one-sided and linear way. Second, they disregard that the very CT measures are likely to fuel radicalization. In this light, polarization and stigmatization breed radicalization. Based on this discussion, policy recommendations will be presented. Amongst other things, these recommendations include a more symmetric integration of local actors in the overall de-radicalization effort. This refers to the content and tone of public debates as well as to the equal treatment of prison imams.

Keywords: Counterterrorism; Germany, France; Deradicalization; Countering Violent Extremism

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Witold Mucha: Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany
Introduction

With the terrorist attack in Berlin in December 2016, the question of adequate counterterrorism (CT) responses has gained momentum in the German public debate. Beforehand, the German government had shown reservation when it came to CT compared to the French government. Externally, German military support was expanded to the coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante (ISIL). The same held true for an intensified German engagement in Mali at the request of France (Giegerich and Terhalle 2016; Peifer 2016). Domestically, the policy focus was on increased surveillance techniques (e.g. data preservation, closed-circuit television (CCTV), electronic tags etc.) (Bug and Bukow 2016; Dearden 2017). Altogether, there has been a qualitative difference of the CT responses in Germany compared to the gradual erosion of liberty rights in France under the state of emergency: Paris has launched more extensive measures than Berlin. Regardless of the differences, the policies initiated by both governments lack attention towards the unintended effects of these specific measures.

The concern raised by Amnesty International (AI) or Human Rights Watch (HRW) about the prolongation of the state of emergency in France is one starting point of analysis in this regard. The human rights organizations accused the French authorities of abetting home-grown radicalization as a result of the discriminate repression in marginalized suburbs of Paris (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). Similar critique had been issued against French authorities in the context of violent riots in 2005 (Chrisafis 2015; Koff and Duprez 2009). In this light, the paper’s argument is twofold: First, decision-makers in Paris and Berlin respond to terrorist threats in an one-sided and linear way. Second, they disregard that the very CT measures are likely to fuel radicalization. The latter holds particularly true considering the polarizing campaigns for the presidential and parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany in 2017.

This policy paper will shed light on the unintended effects of CT measures in France and Germany. The argument goes that polarization and stigmatization breed radicalization. Based

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**Counterterrorism in France and Germany**

Despite a huge variety of definitions of what terrorism and/or counterterrorism are meant to look like, there is some consensus on what states do to stop, deter, or prevent such threats (Sandler 2015; Shanahan 2016; Rineheart 2010; Boyle 2010). Lindahl (2016) brings together four CT-dimensions that illustrate the commonalities and differences between Paris and Berlin. This overview will help to understand the later analysis of unintended effects.

**Table 1: CT measures compared**

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<tr>
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<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Use of force</strong></td>
<td>Air strikes</td>
<td>Assistance to air strikes</td>
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<td>Military supplies and training</td>
<td>Military supplies and training</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence and policing</strong></td>
<td>Improved interagency cooperation</td>
<td>Improved interagency cooperation</td>
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<td>Increase of personnel strength</td>
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<td><strong>Homeland security</strong></td>
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<td>Increased surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conciliation and dialogue</strong></td>
<td>Prison reforms</td>
<td>Community-based de-radicalization</td>
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Source: Own illustration based on Lindahl 2016; Hellmuth 2015; Sarma 2016.

For decades, French CT policies have been primarily based on repression and prosecution: “(…) [Until] 2014 France did not view Jihadi radicalization as an issue that ought to be tackled separately and by means of also soft counterradicalization measures (Hellmuth 2015, 986).” This operational imbalance proved true after the attacks in January and November

Witold Mucha: Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany
2015. French authorities quickly responded with declaring states of emergency, while intensifying aerial military engagement and training against ISIL on Iraqi and Syrian territory (Lequesne 2016). Berlin’s response was different as each terrorist incident abroad (e.g. Paris, Brussels) sparked public debate over increased surveillance. Basically, data preservation and CCTV were on top of that agenda. After Anis Amri’s attack in December 2016, the discussion went further capitalizing on the need for electronic tags against potential terrorists (Huggler 2017). Given Berlin’s limited external engagement against ISIL (i.e. assistance and supplies), policies and discussions primarily focused on homeland security. For the sake of the comparative framework, the following analysis will exclusively look into the domestic policies and their intended effects and unintended effects in France and Germany.

What Lindahl (2016) coins “conciliation and dialogue” can be applied to measures of countering violent extremism (CVE). In the present research context, CVE is equivalent to de-radicalization: “[A] process of individual or collective cognitive change from criminal, radical or extremist identities to a non-criminal or moderate psychological state (Koehler 2015a, 121-122)”.

There is some consensus in academia on the need for differentiating ‘de-radicalization’ (i.e. focus on extremist beliefs and ideas) from ‘disengagement’ (i.e. focus on behavioral role change only) (Neumann 2013; Horgan 2009; Borum 2011). Still, such a theoretical differentiation comes with challenges with regard to real life experiences as “(…) not all violent extremists hold strong, extreme beliefs, and not all extreme ideas lead to violent behavior (Hellmuth 2015, 986-987)”.

Despite that consensus, however, similar to terrorism research there is a huge variety of measures and objectives that have been advocated for de-radicalization. These range from amnesty, counselling, or dialogue to reconciliation and reintegration. While the concept and use of de-radicalization measures is not new from an academic’s or practitioner’s perspective, the strategic relevance to CT still is. It is therefore not surprising that many CVE studies have dealt with de-radicalization programs from a practitioner’s point of view (Dechesne 2011, 2; Koehler 2015a, 121-122). According to the UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), states have applied two kind of de-radicalization efforts that resemble the aforementioned distinction: individual ideological de-radicalization, using psychological and religious counselling to lead to a change of mind, and collective de-radicalization, using political negotiations to obtain a type of change
of behavior (UN/CTITF 2008, 5). Furthermore, there have been nine types of national programs and foci: prison programs, education, inter-cultural dialogues, economic and social inequality, global programs, the internet, legislation reforms, information campaigns, training and qualification of local agencies (UN/CTITF 2008, 6). In sum, it is striking that despite the huge amount of CT and CVE studies in the aftermath of 9/11, research on de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs is still in its infancy (Fink and Hearne 2008, 1).

With homegrown terrorist perpetrators committing attacks in Paris, Nice, Brussels, and Berlin during the last two years, policymakers and researchers in the West have increasingly acknowledged the strategic link between CVE and CT (El-Said 2015; Cherney 2016; Lake 2002; Brimley 2006). Indeed, similar to CT research CVE literature has focused on policy-oriented strategies that aim to respond to or prevent violence. Less attention has been paid to the questions of how CVE is constituted and how it emerges in a variety of ways. There are four research interests where scholars have linked CVE and CT in particular (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011, 16-18). First, shaped by post-9/11 discourses and policies the dominant frame for understanding violent extremism has been that of (transnational) Islamist networks. This singular attention towards extremist Islam has been criticized by scholars for excluding the analysis of non-Islam related forms such as right- or left-wing extremism (Kundnani 2009, 40). Second, the focus on transnational networks has positioned violent extremism and terrorism as a global phenomenon. In light of the recent terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany the call for better transnational cooperation and multilateral solutions is an ongoing feature in the literature (Renard 2016; Guild and Geyer 2016; Pollard 2007, 237; Crelinsten 2007, 212). Third, closely related to the call for transnational cooperation, the literature has emphasized collaborative and multi-disciplinary approaches through partnerships within and between governments, non-government organizations, and civil society. This is in line with the aforementioned CVE literature that stresses the benefits of local and decentralized de-radicalization programs. Incorporating private non-state actors has been discussed as key tenet in this regard. Fourth, a comprehensive CVE/CT approach calls for a multifaceted toolkit that counters extremism based on reactive/short-term (e.g. policing) and preventive/long-term (e.g. capacity building) measures (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011, 18; Brimley 2006).
De-radicalization programs have been launched in France and Germany in spite of homeland security issues being primarily discussed under the (more visible) rubric of state of emergency measures and/or increased surveillance (see table 2). Similar to CT there has been a qualitative difference with regard to CVE, both in terms of timing and scope. While Paris started to introduce CVE as a first time ever after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015, there has been a longer tradition of countering (right-wing) extremism in Germany since the early 1990s (Koehler 2013, 2015a). As a consequence, Berlin started the first wide-reaching CVE policies directed against the extreme right (Wagner 2013). There are two non-state-organized programs that have been particularly heralded in the literature: EXIT-Germany and HAYAT. The former counsels highly radicalized individuals who want to leave the extreme right-wing scene. The latter is a family counselling program for the relatives of Jihadists and Foreign Fighters (Koehler 2015b, 137-139). In a comparative perspective, France has applied a very centralized and security-oriented CVE approach. This is in contrast to Germany that is best described as following a diverse and decentralized model. Moreover, the scope and number of programs in Germany is significantly greater. The table below illustrates the recent CVE agendas in both countries.

Table 2: State-led CVE measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France (since 2015)</th>
<th>Germany (since 1992)</th>
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<tr>
<td>De-radicalization wings in prisons</td>
<td>Political education (national and subnational)</td>
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<tr>
<td>De-radicalization centers</td>
<td>Funding of civil society engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence surveillance of jihadist webpages</td>
<td>Training of partner institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family support hotline</td>
<td>Extremism research</td>
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Source: Own illustration based on Koehler 2016; Lützinger, Gruber, and Kemmesis 2016.

Practitioners (and scholars) hope for effects of CVE measures that CT policies can benefit from: First, every individual leaving radical milieus is likely to reduce the manpower of radical groups. This in turn prevents that person from radicalizing further. Second, such an individual pullout can have a weakening effect on the radical milieu. Third, regardless of
success the measures can yield relevant empirical basis and knowledge for further improving the CVE toolkit. Fourth, de-radicalization measures might also yield valuable intelligence of radical groups (Koehler 2015a, 134-135). According to these desired effects, the German de-radicalization efforts have been heralded in the literature (Butt and Tuck 2014; Koehler 2015b, 133-134). The situation in France has been quite the opposite. A cross-party senate committee criticized the CVE measures since 2015 as a “total fiasco” and concluded that there was need for a complete overhaul of the very measures (Samuel 2017; McAuley 2017). For instance, the only de-radicalization center currently running and fully staffed is in fact empty, while twelve other centers slated to be set up have not been opened yet. The committee also found that many local associations supposed to help families deal with radicalized members lacked the expertise and often signed up simply to obtain public funding. One previously heralded program to reintegrate radicalized inmates had to be scrapped after a prisoner duped the authorities into believing that he had reformed before seeking to murder guards (Samuel 2017; McAuley 2017).

These shortcomings are certainly proof of CVE ineffectiveness. However, such palpable observations are not the rule. The theoretical differentiation between cognitive and behavioral radicalization has shed light on the difficulty to definitely know whether an individual has begun to refrain from radical thoughts or not. CT research faces similar challenges in analyzing the causal link between a specific measure and its specific outcome. When talking about counterterrorism effectiveness (CTE), there are two issues worth to be reminded of: On the one hand, there is a blatant gap between the resources that are being spent by states for CT and the academic knowledge about the “success” of the precise measure. On the other hand, the little scholars’ knowledge about CT effectiveness is highly disputed in the literature. As to the first, estimates for the United States suggest that administrations have spent more than one trillion US dollars for measures related to the fight against terrorism between 2001 and 2011 (Mueller and Stewart 2012, 103). Given this, an effectiveness assessment appears necessary. However, according to Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley (2006), out of 20,000 studies on terrorism, only seven dealt with the effectiveness of CT policies: “There has been a proliferation of anti-terrorism programs and policies as well as massive increases in expenditures toward combating terrorism. Yet, we currently know almost nothing about the
effectiveness of any of these programs (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006, 510).” Moreover, those seven CT studies contradict with each other in respect to the measurement of success. For instance, various indicators are used and weighed differently. Even more controversially, there is a case selection bias on CT policies by governments in the US, UK, and Israel. On top of that, critics stressed the so-called “attribution problem” basically referring to the uncertainty whether a CT policy or something else led to the specific outcome such as less terrorism (Van Um and Pisoiu 2015, 233-234). In the light of this academic lack of consensus on CTE, it does not come as surprise that the question of unintended effects went entirely under the radar.

The chimera of success

Following the heads of state and the ministers of the interior both in France and Germany, it seems that the CT policies which were launched as response to terrorist attacks and future threats worked out well (Dworkin 2016; Daniels 2017). The case of Germany is more obvious in this regard. Except for the 2011 Arid Uka attack at the Frankfurt Airport where two US soldiers were killed, the December 2016 incident in Berlin constituted the first jihadist terrorist attack on German soil after 9/11 (Hemmingby and Bjørøg 2016; Nesser 2014). In contrast, major incidents in Paris in November 2015 as well as in Nice in July 2016 were not prevented despite the expanding of CT measures by the Hollande government.
Graph 1: Terrorist casualties after 9/11

Source: Own illustration based on Conflict Barometer 2001-2016.

Explaining the variance between the number and scope of terrorist attacks in Germany and France is difficult without relying on counterfactual analysis and, therefore, is strongly relying on speculation. For instance, some explain the deviance based on the level of external engagement, the asylum policies, or socio-ethnic grievances (Daniels 2017; The Economist 2016). Regardless of the variety of (competing) explanations, when it comes to homeland security EU member states have come to believe in the effectiveness of technology and surveillance as a tool for crucial information gathering. The more security services know the more likely potential terrorists can be apprehended beforehand. This rationale has been the major argument brought forward by administrations in favor of more sweeping surveillance (Stutzer and Zehnder 2013; Clarke 2015). However, while the call for more personal data has been voiced very loudly throughout European metropoles during the last two years, the usefulness has only been questioned seldom. This is striking given the apparent futility of surveillance and data preservation in preventing terrorist attacks on European soil. Between

Witold Mucha: Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany
2014 and 2016 there have been eight deadly jihadist terrorist attacks in the European Union (EU): those attacks were perpetrated at a Jewish museum in Brussels, at Charlie Hebdo and a supermarket in Paris, at a Synagogue in Copenhagen, at the Bataclan and surroundings in Paris, at the airport and a metro station in Brussels, at a police officer’s home in Paris, at a Bastille Days’ celebration in Nice, and at a Christmas market in Berlin. 20 terrorists were involved in these eight attacks. 19 were known by the authorities, 15 were on terrorist lists of at least one EU member state, 15 were classified as likely to resort to violence, 15 were known to have direct contact to radical Islamists, 13 had travelled to ISIL in Iraq, Syria, or Yemen, twelve were previously convicted, and eight had been wanted by search warrant for years (Lobo 2016; Lutz and Leubecher 2016; Kewitz 2017). In other words, authorities had plenty information on the perpetrators. Nevertheless, this data did not help them in preventing the attacks. There is no guarantee that even more data would yield better results.

The question of proportionality is also raised when analyzing the outcome of the state of emergency in France. According to the Parliamentary Commission in charge of overseeing the application of the state of emergency, since November 2015 law enforcement officials have relied on the state of emergency to conduct 4,292 warrantless raids, 612 house arrests, and 1,657 identity and vehicle control stops (Breeden 2016; Vinocur 2016). These measures resulted in 61 terrorism-related criminal investigations, including only 20 under France’s broadly defined offense of “criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking”. The other 41 cases were filed with lesser offenses such as glorifying terrorism (Amnesty International 2016). In other words, the number of judicial procedures enacted as a consequence of the state of emergency prerogatives is small in comparison with regular judicial procedures.

These two anecdotes question the effectiveness of the homeland security-related measures that have been launched by administrations in Berlin and Paris. Apparently, the number of apprehended terrorists and/or prevented attacks is low compared to the huge resources invested and the erosion of civil liberties hazarded in the process. Particularly the latter aspects point to the often ignored question of unintended effects of CT in France and Germany.
Unintended effects

Early post-9/11 CT policies such as in Spain (2004) or in the United Kingdom (2005) were launched in a different public environment compared to the situation in 2017. Back then, terrorism was perceived as an external threat first (Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Marcuse 2006). Huntington’s (1996) “clash of civilizations” and its ambivalent implications slowly became mainstream pop culture along with rising Islamophobia (Saeed 2007; Bottici and Challand 2006). However, at that time the rift between the so-called West on the one hand and the Muslim world on the other was not as wide as it is in 2017. What changed were crucial global developments beginning with the 2008 financial crisis, the Arab Spring in 2011, the rise of ISIL in 2014, and the European refugee crisis peaking in 2015. While the financial crisis brought domestic socioeconomic inequality back on top of political agendas, failed revolutions in the Middle East and the emergence of ISIL consolidated Islamophobia in the West. In light of these events, the increasing public resistance against refugees migrating to Europe did not come as a surprise. In particular, commingling the terrorism debate with the refugee debate has made Islamophobia socially respectable and allowed right-wing populism to enter national parliaments (Zunes 2017; Nail 2016) – regardless of official statistics disproving a causal relationship between terrorism and/or crime on the one hand and refugee status on the other (Morgan and Poynting 2016; Žižek 2016). In sum, the 2008 fueled social polarization of societies in European countries has been added yet another polarization layer after the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 which has been defined by liberalism versus anti-Islamism. Thus, launching homeland security-related CT measures in the early 2000s had a different societal impact and resonance than in 2017.

Major concern against increased surveillance and the (prolongation of a) state of emergency deals with the erosion of civil liberties (Neocleous 2007; O’Brien 2016). While these risks certainly need to be taken seriously, they distract from the risks of further radicalization. The French and German contexts very well illustrate the dynamics. Human rights organizations such as AI and HRW have criticized French authorities for carrying out abusive and discriminatory raids and house arrests against Muslims under its sweeping state of emergency law. Apparently, the measures created economic hardship and stigmatization of those targeted (Human Rights Watch 2016). Endowed with very broad powers (e.g. house arrest, warrantless

Witold Mucha: Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany
searches, prohibition of meetings etc.), the state of emergency has been criticized for “(...) [imposing] excessive and disproportionate restrictions on fundamental freedoms” (Human Rights Watch 2016). In particular, given the vague language of the provisions there is too much room left for abuse. For instance, house arrests are applicable to anyone suspected of posing a threat to public security. Moreover, warrantless searches can be conducted at any place suspected to be frequented by an individual posing such a threat (Boutin and Paulussen 2016, 2). Indeed, according to HRW, house arrests have been mandated on the basis of sometimes inaccurate intelligence notes, thus raising the concern that they are being decided on arbitrary basis. AI and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) criticized the use of state of emergency powers against events and/or individuals that lack any connection with the terrorist threat that had led to the declaration of the state of emergency in the first place (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). For instance, ecological activists had been put under arrest during the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in December 2015 and protesters were prevented from attending demonstrations against a labor law reform in May 2016 (Boutin and Paulussen 2016, 2).

Most problematic concerning CT is the discriminatory interpretation by the authorities. The vast majority of people placed under house arrest and whose homes were raided are Muslims and of North African descent. According to HRW, all CT measures targeted Muslim individuals, establishments, or restaurants. The critique against French authorities for ethnic profiling was not only voiced by affected communities but also the Council of Europe commissioner for human rights (Human Rights Watch 2016). There are counterproductive effects that fundamentally question the CT effort as a whole: On the one hand, the discriminate practices alienate French Muslims and undermine cooperation between the Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies. As such, radicalization and local terrorism threats are less likely to be reported to authorities. On the other hand, the state’s discriminatory practice widens the aforementioned gap between Muslim and non-Muslim groups in society. The extending polarization perpetuates the lack of cooperation and trust among different segments of society. Hatred and islamophobia become socially respected. The majority of the marginalized Muslim youth turns away from the French state and is thus given legitimacy for (self-)radicalization in the process. For instance, more fuel was added by
Paris’ long-debated bill proposal that would enable the government to strip French-born dual nationals of their French citizenship if they are convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Given high rates of dual nationality among French citizens of migrant background, the measure raised concerns that Muslim native-born French citizens were being treated as second-class citizens (Human Rights Watch 2016; Amnesty International 2016).

The situation in Germany is less unambiguous regarding the causal link between polarization, stigmatization, and radicalization. As mentioned earlier, the number and scope of terrorist attacks have been lower and no state of emergency regime has been in place. Nevertheless, the public and societal dynamics are similar. Regardless of the overarching refugee debate, there are at least two anecdotes that reveal a worrying trend that is similar to the French recent status quo: First, against the backdrop of the 2016 New Year’s Eve sex assaults in Cologne, on 2017 New Year’s Eve police and authorities have been criticized for racially profiling hundreds of North Africans and referring to them as “Nafris” (Mortimer 2017a; Schuhmacher 2017). Second, after Anis Amri’s terror attack in Berlin, the former Social Democrats leader and German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel called for tougher measures against Islamist trends in Germany. Most worrisome was his undifferentiated call for banning Islamist mosques (Mortimer 2017b; Deutsche Welle 2017). What is most revealing about these two seemingly unrelated issues is the fact that there was no public outcry or noteworthy critique by oppositional groups among the media, civil society, or politics. Indeed, the police was complimented on their proceeding at New Year’s Eve in contrast to the year before (i.e. number of personnel, overcautious intervention), Gabriel’s controversial proposal was mostly met with consent.

Regardless of the anecdotal nature of these incidents, the commonalities with the French case are striking. Apparently, one-time racial profiling of people of North African descent is legitimated as less evil than the lack of public control and sex assaults as seen during 2016 New Year’s Eve. However, it is likely that the public consent with the handling of 2017 New Year’s Eve is not an exception of a general police approach. What if it is a moment where the threshold towards public’s tacit consent of general racial profiling has been crossed? This might lead to the aforementioned vicious circle of radicalization by stigmatization: People with North African and/or Muslim background feel alienated by the German state, while the
non-Muslim community approves of the authorities’ discriminatory actions. Gabriel’s statement holds similar implications. In an interview with Der Spiegel, he said that “Salafist mosques must be banned, communities dissolved, and the preachers should be expelled as soon as possible. (...) Those who encourage violence do not enjoy the protection of religious freedom. (...) If we are serious about the fight against Islamism and terrorism, then it must also be a cultural fight (Gabriel in Deutsche Welle 2017).” By labelling the fight against Salafism a cultural fight he prepares the ground for thinking in groups and segments (i.e. polarization). Certainly, he assures readers that his proposals have got nothing to do with religious affiliation. However, how is religion to be left out when he is calling for the banning of Salafist mosques or the expelling of preachers? Such a proposal would effectively deny extremist religious interpretations the right to the freedom of religion and faith (Geyer 2017). Willingly or not, Gabriel’s undifferentiated call for a cultural fight feels more as cheap or naïve propaganda in the 2017 election year rather than an elaborate strategy to drying-out breeding grounds of Islamist radicalization.

Policy recommendations

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in France and Germany, parliamentary commissions were established to investigate why the attacks had not been prevented and what kind of CT lessons were to be learnt. Most critique was directed against the lack of interagency trust and cooperation – both on horizontal (i.e. local/national) and vertical level (i.e. European/international). In France, a total overhaul of the intelligence services and the creation of a single, US-style national counter-terrorism agency were recommended (Vinocur 2016; Breeden 2016). While the discussion in Germany went into the same direction, particularly after the experiences with the National Socialist Underground (NSU), the call for a centralization of intelligence agencies sparked substantial resistance by the federal states (Eddy 2017). There is no doubt that an enhanced interagency cooperation within and beyond national borders is a crucial CT pillar. However, this kind of policy reform allows for improving operative measures only. States might be better able to apprehend and deter terrorist activities on a short-term basis – just as more CCTV or related measures might help to make airports a safer place. Nevertheless, these operative responses do not properly get to
the origin of why terrorists would take up arms against the state in the first place. In fact, operative CT measures do not get to the root causes of terrorism. Against this backdrop, Schneckener (2006) argues in favor of a balance between operative and structural CT policies. Structural measures are understood as policies that tackle the breeding ground of radicalism and terrorism. They range from macro-policies such as statebuilding and development programs to micro-policies such as de-radicalization initiatives on local ground (Schneckener 2006, 215). The latter perspective is what this paper will address in particular.

1. **Increase the number of prison imams and improve their training and formal status.** After the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks in 2015, Paris launched two initiatives in an effort to better control and counter radicalization among the prison population: radicalized inmates will be isolated from common criminals and the number of prison imams will be increased (Hellmuth 2015, 989). Apparently, two of the three January 2015 terrorists (Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly) had spent time in prison (Callimachi and Yardley 2015). In Germany, legislation has not come that far yet while the need for more prison imams has become a broad consensus. Still, that kind of reform does not come without challenges. First, the selected imams need to be qualified, they need to be cosmopolitan enough to understand and manage social media, and they also have to be moderate, willing, and capable of engaging in political debates. Second, prison imams do not hold an official and professional status similar to that which exists for hospital and military chaplains. Prison imams do not receive a pension or social security and they are merely reimbursed for travel expenses (Hellmuth 2015, 991). Improving their status and, thus, legitimacy would certainly mitigate the aforementioned polarization. Therefore, while their numerical increase into a comprehensive CT effort is paramount, the financial implications for a state such as Germany or France pose a challenge.

2. **Increase the number and budget of community-based de-radicalization programs.** The traditional response of French authorities to terrorist threats was to rely on classical security measures or even repression. While the prison reforms show Paris’ willingness to make use of a more comprehensive CT approach, community-based de-radicalization programs yet constitute another toolkit of structural terrorism prevention that have been
largely neglected by French authorities in the past (Hellmuth 2015, 988). This is different to Germany where there has been a longer tradition of countering (right-wing) extremism (Koehler 2013, 2015a). While the majority of programs worked as opt-out schemes, with the growing Salafist threat policymakers have begun to also fund programs that focus on the early phase of Salafist radicalization. For instance, in Germany the “Wegweiser”-initiative has been praised for its prevention and de-radicalization efforts. Basically, those initiatives work as collaborating networks based on families, schools, mosques, public authorities, the police and others (Shavit and Andresen 2016). Making mosques and local Muslim authorities part of the network is crucial. At best, they become mediators who are increasingly aware of the dangers of radicalization and more proactive in preventing the emergence of extremism and terrorism. Whatever is done, the implementation is crucial. The major critique against the recent CVE-measures in France has been that the programs had been designed hastily without proper due diligence. In other words, opening up community centers in marginalized French suburbs will not yield de-radicalization results if the personnel is not qualified and funded in an appropriate manner.

3. **Provide law enforcement authorities with better training and additional resources** (i.e. funding, manpower, expertise). This will make them more specific in their targeting. Particularly the French personnel would benefit from additional resources to ensure that policies are effective yet do not restrict the rights of the general public. The same holds true for CCTV or, more generally, data preservation that has been stressed in the German public debate. For instance, it is usually proposed that no more than two screens should be simultaneously watched per control room employee (Stutzer and Zehnder 2013, 9). What is the use of additional footage if there is no police officer to analyze it? Hence, the belief in technological answers for terrorism and the call for broader surveillance need to go hand in hand with more personnel.

4. **Depolarize the public debate.** Salafists as well as right-wing populists benefit from Manichean thinking. In particular, the public commingling of the terrorism debate with the refugee debate has facilitated populists to construct Islamic threats. This stigmatization has probably alienated Muslims who previously did not bear a grudge against the state
and/or the system. As such, recruitment or at least sympathy for radical concepts has been facilitated. Policymakers have to take away the oxygen of extremist narratives on both ends (i.e. Salafists and right-wing populists). In light of the upcoming elections in France and Germany, the best way to do so would be the shift of political issues. Policymakers need to switch from the refugee and terrorism debate to issues such as labor, tax, and/or pension reforms. Compared to the disproportional media focus on terrorism, these are the issues that really affect people’s every day’s lives. Such a thematic shift will mitigate the constructed rift between the West and the Islam and turn it into a rift defined by socio-economic grievances rather than religious affiliation. Interestingly, the separation of religion as a contested issue is very much in line with the CVE-approach of the “Wegweiser”-program. According to the employees, religion is not dealt with in conversations with endangered youth. Rather the focus of such a youth work approach is on the question of perspectives such as school or jobs (Ministerium für Inneres und Kommunales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 2015, 2). At the end of the day, seeking (socio-economic) opportunities in life seems to be the intrinsic issue under the surface of the polarized anti-Islam public debate. The social question reminds of the 2005 riots in Paris and suburbs that had been labelled by then minister of the interior, Nicholas Sarkozy, as fight against “racaille” and “voyous” (Mongin 2006; Peeters 2010; Alzouma 2011). From a CVE-perspective, the crucial question is how did people such as Kouachi, Coulibaly, or others experience the French state back then? Would less repressive police forces and a less racist acting minister of the interior have had less radicalizing effects on future home-grown terrorists?

These policy recommendations are not a universal answer to terrorist threats homeland security architects have to deal with. For instance, integrating more imams at prisons in France and Germany will not stop people from radicalizing. Specifically so as the majority of inmates are radicalized before serving a sentence (Hellmuth 2015, 991). These policy recommendations point to certain gaps state authorities need to better take care of from a comprehensive CT perspective. However, the major obstacle from the state’s point of view is that such a comprehensive approach is expensive. The effectiveness of surveillance techniques and states of emergency depend on the personnel strength as well as the training of...
police and intelligence officers, not on the number of cameras installed or the scope of emergency powers.
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