Policy Paper: The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS)

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Abstract
This policy recommendation proposes the implementation of the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) as an additional measure to Prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom. TREDS represents a viable mechanism for a responsible adult (‘the applicant’) to make a disclosure request to joint local authority and Police Prevent teams where they feel an individual (‘the subject’) may pose a risk to a young or vulnerable person (‘the person at-risk’) in relation to terrorism, radicalisation or extremism. A successful disclosure is intended to empower the ‘applicant’ to take proactive steps to safeguard the ‘person at risk’ from the risk of harm posed by the ‘subject’, and would include, where reasonable, proportionate, and necessary, information about a ‘subject’s terrorism related criminal offending history, including any Police intelligence held relating to terrorist group affiliations, associations or activities. TREDS takes inspiration from disclosure schemes already employed to safeguard and protect children and vulnerable people from other crime types such as The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS), also known as Clare’s Law; and the Child Sexual Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS), known as Sarah’s Law. The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) was designed by the author of this policy recommendation between June 2018 and February 2019 in response to the decline in public or community reporting of concerns related to terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. This decline is evidenced by Home Office statistics, which identify that of the 7,318 total referrals made in 2017/18, just 292 (4%) came from communities (Home Office, 2018). TREDS represents a distinct departure from existing reporting processes, and is underpinned by the principle of two-way information sharing between the public and authorities. This signifies a seismic shift toward a more inclusive and reciprocal relationship, and one which is likely to better empower individuals and communities to report concerns as and when they arise.

Keywords: Terrorism, Radicalisation, Countering Violent Extremism, Disclosure, Prevent, Communities, Public Reporting.

Introduction

The Prevent strategy, published by the Government in 2011, is part of the United Kingdom’s wider counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting...
terrorism. The Prevent strategy has three specific strategic objectives: to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address (HM Government, 2015).

As the frequency of terror attacks perpetrated on British soil increases, with attacks in both London and Manchester in 2017, it becomes ever more crucial that authorities gain the support and cooperation of the British public in the prevention of violent extremism and terrorism. Communities must be empowered to proactively report radicalisation and terrorism related concerns to authorities if and when they arise (Dryden, 2017). Communities play a central role in the prevention of extremism and radicalisation, and their engagement and empowerment needs to be reinforced and supported as a matter of priority. However, community engagement and empowerment continues to be confronted with a variety of challenges, particularly a lack of trust and confidence in the government, police and public authorities (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2018). Extremism and polarisation thrive when communities themselves do not directly challenge those among them who seek to radicalise others (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017). Indeed, within some communities people are afraid to expose their problems because they are concerned as to the impact it may have on others’ perceptions of their community; that it will fuel prejudice and hate; and that the media will portray the issue in an unsympathetic manner that will bring their entire community into disrepute (Casey, 2016).

Speaking at the launch of a new cinema advertisement campaign to improve community reporting of terrorism related concerns, the head of U.K. Counter-Terrorism Policing, Neil Basu stated that more than a fifth of all terrorism related information passed to police from communities helps foil terrorist attacks, but cautioned that the worst case scenario was public complacency, revealing that there had been a dramatic fall in the number of instances whereby any such information was passed to police. More than 31,000 pieces of
information were passed to police in 2017, which has more than halved to 13,093 in 2018 (ITV, 2019).

Discussion

Assessing the causality of low and declining public reporting

The ‘suspect community’ theory identifies Muslims as being disproportionately and unfairly targeted by government Counter-Terrorism policy, a claim which is widely acknowledged as the primary reason for some Muslim communities refusing to engage with Prevent. Originally developed by Hillyard (1993) in relation to the Irish living in Britain at the height of the ‘troubles’, the ‘suspect community’ concept has gained much traction in its application to Muslims living in Post-9/11 and 7/7 Britain (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). The Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report (2011), titled The impact of Counter-Terrorism measures on Muslim communities, states that when it comes to experiences of Counter-Terrorism, Muslim and non-Muslim participants from the same localities appear to live ‘parallel lives’. The report states that Counter-terrorism measures are contributing to a wider sense amongst Muslims that they are being treated as a ‘suspect community’ and targeted by authorities simply on the basis of their religion. Many participants, while not referring to specific laws or policies, felt that Counter-Terrorism law and policy generally was contributing towards a climate of fear and suspicion around Muslims, identifying them as a ‘suspect group’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011).

Accusations of the (mis) use of arrest and stop-search powers by the police is cited by critics of Prevent as a further example of Muslims being treated as a ‘suspect community’ and being unfairly targeted by Counter-terrorism policy. Section 43 of the Terrorism Act (2000) allows a constable to stop and search a person whom he/she reasonable suspects to be involved in terrorist activity. Of all the people stopped and searched under S.43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 between 2009/10 and 2016/17 in London: 40% self-defined as white;
29% as Asian or Asian British; and 11% Black or Black British. Most recently, in the year ending 31 December 2017 in the Metropolitan Police Force area, 30% self-defined as white; 27% Asian or Asian British, and 14% Black or Black British (House of Commons, 2018). Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 gives a police constable the power to arrest a person whom they reasonably suspect to be a terrorist. An arrest is Terrorism related if either at the time of arrest, or during any subsequent investigation, a constable suspects the arrested person to be involved in Terrorism. In the year ending 31 December 2017, of those arrested for Terrorism related offences: 41% were reported as being of Asian appearance, 35% white, 9% black, and 14% other. There were falls in the number of arrests across all ethnic groups. The largest decrease was seen for those of Asian ethnic appearance, which decreased by 46% when compared with the previous year (from 197 arrests to 106 arrests). As a result, the proportion of White people arrested exceeded the proportion of Asian people arrested (Home Office, 2018). Home Office statistics evidence that Referrals for concerns related to Islamist extremism actually decreased by 14% (2016/17, 3,704; 2017/18, 3,197), continuing the downward trend seen since 2015/16. Over the same time period a 36% increase has been evident in the number of referrals for concerns related to right wing extremism in 2017/18 (1,312) when compared with 2016/17 (968), continuing the upward trend seen since 2015/16. (Home Office, 2018).

From 1 July 2015, all schools, registered early years childcare providers and registered later years childcare providers are subject to a duty under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (Department for Education, 2015). The introduction of the Prevent Duty has been the source of much criticism, mainly the perception of the ‘securitisation’ of schools and their role as ‘spy’ and ‘police informant’. NUS Connect, the national Union of Students call for Prevent to be repealed, describing it as “fundamentally racist and Islamophobic, targeting the Muslim community whilst eroding civil liberties as part of a clampdown on political dissent and undermining the space for critical discussion in our universities, colleges and schools” (NUS Connect, 2019). The Casey Review, 2016, however,
states that “In order to undermine Prevent, opponents have deliberately distorted and exaggerated cases [of students referred to Prevent] by purporting to evidence how teachers have acted disproportionately” (Casey, 2016). One such case, dubbed the “terrorist house case”, gained widespread media coverage in January 2016. Lancashire Police were reported in the media to have interviewed a pupil referred to Prevent after he had simply misspelled “terraced house” as “terrorist house” in a school creative writing exercise. In fact, the pupil had also written that “I hate it when my uncle hits me”. The teacher quite appropriately and acting in the best interests of the child, therefore raised a concern. No referral to Prevent was ever made. No Prevent officers were involved and Lancashire Police rightly maintain that they and the school acted responsibly and proportionately. Casey states that opponents of the programme do not appear to have any constructive alternative proposals for tackling terrorism and the effect they are having is not to improve the life chances of British Muslims but to make them feel even more alienated and isolated – and therefore more vulnerable to extremists and radicalisers. (Casey, 2016).

Ostracism and backlash remain significant barriers to community reporting for concerns relating to terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. The 2017 report, Community Reporting Thresholds; Sharing information with authorities concerning violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict (2017) identifies ‘backlash’ as perhaps the primary concern for individuals when deciding whether or not to make a referral over concerns relating to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. The report states that much of the public discourse around community reporting focuses upon the lack thereof, with much less focus upon what happens after a referral is made, and the potential implications thereafter. Much concern is expressed about the negative, collective impacts of reporting, including various forms of backlash against those concerned. Concerns around the potential backlash from extremist groups or their members and supporters are substantial, although the most significant concern is around the referrer receiving a negative reaction, open hostility or even ostracism from members of their own community. Furthermore, many Muslim communities remain concerned over potential backlash from wider society and the media, fearing reporting
of concerns over radicalisation, extremism and terrorism in their communities may add to existing negative stereotypes of Muslim communities. The emotional challenges associated with ‘referring’ or ‘reporting’ a close family member or ‘intimate’ are undoubtedly a significant barrier to reporting. The Community Reporting Thresholds report uses the term ‘intimate’ to describe the ‘referred individual’ as being a child or close family member of the referrer, as is often the case in the context of the existing reporting mechanism employed under the Prevent/Channel process. The individual choosing to ‘refer’ or ‘report’ their child or close family member is understandably regarded as being a particularly troublesome decision to make, even when they know it is in that person’s best interests. The report identifies how in such cases, referrers will often take time to attempt to discuss their concerns with the individual in question, exhausting all other alternatives before eventually making a referral (Thomas et al., 2017).

The existing Prevent/Channel referral process

If a member of the public or a frontline worker has a concern about an individual who they think might be vulnerable to radicalisation, they can refer them for appropriate support or intervention. Referrals from the general public can be made to their local authority or local police force. Public sector staff are encouraged to use their existing safeguarding mechanisms in the first instance to deal with such concerns, which oftentimes can be managed informally and without the need for onward referral. All referrals are received by the Police to consider whether the individual in question is already under investigation, if there is a genuine vulnerability, and if that vulnerability is related to terrorism. If the vulnerability is assessed as not being related to terrorism, the individual will be referred to mainstream services. If the vulnerability is assessed as being terrorism related, the individual in question will be referred onward to the Channel process (HM Government, 2018). Channel is a programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by: identifying individuals at risk; assessing the nature and extent of...
that risk; and developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned. Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism, and before they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity (HM Government, 2015).

**Figure 1: Prevent/Channel referral process map**

Source: Home Office (2018a)
In 2017/18, a total of 7,318 individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns regarding their vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism. Of the 7,318 total referrals made, just **292 (4%) came from communities** (Home Office, 2018). When compared to previous years, an initial stagnation is evident in referral percentages, with 226 (4%) for the period 2016/17 (Home Office, 2018), and a decline when compared with 398 (5%) for 2015/16 (Home Office, 2017).

**Figure 2: Breakdown of referrals by sector**

Source: Home Office (2018b)
What is the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS)?

The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) has been created as an additional measure to help Prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom. TREDS represents a viable mechanism for a responsible adult (‘the applicant’) to make a disclosure request to joint local authority and Police Prevent teams where they feel an individual (‘the subject’) may pose a risk to a young or vulnerable person (‘the person at-risk’) in relation to terrorism, radicalisation or extremism. A disclosure is intended to empower the ‘applicant’ to take proactive steps to safeguard the ‘person at risk’ from the risk of harm posed by the ‘subject’. A successful disclosure would consist of information about a ‘subject’s’ terrorism related criminal offending history, including any Police intelligence held relating to extremist or terrorist group affiliations, associations or activities. TREDS takes inspiration from disclosure schemes already employed to safeguard and protect children and vulnerable people from other crime types such as The Domestic Abuse Disclosure Scheme (DADS), also known as Clare’s Law; and the Child Sexual Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS), known as Sarah’s Law.

The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) has been designed in response to the decline in public or community reporting of issues related to terrorism, radicalisation and extremism, a decline evidenced by Home Office statistics, which identify that of the 7,318 total referrals made in 2017/18, just 292 (4%) came from communities (Home Office, 2018). TREDS reframes the debate around public reporting, offering communities a mechanism whereby action can be taken to proactively safeguard children and vulnerable people from individuals they believe may be intent on exploiting them for purposes pertaining to extremism and terrorism. This represents a distinct departure from existing reporting processes, whereby the focus of such measures has historically been a one-way movement of information from the public to the authorities. TREDS instead represents a two-way information sharing mechanism between the public and authorities,
which signifies a seismic shift toward a more inclusive and reciprocal relationship, and one which is likely to better empower individuals and communities to report concerns as and when they arise.

*The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) process*

The TREDS process consists of six stages, and has been developed through significant research of the two existing disclosure schemes and their policy documents; The Child Sex Offended (CSO) Disclosure Scheme (2010); and The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) Guidance (2016).

1) **Initial Contact**: A concerned adult (‘the applicant’) would make initial contact to register their interest as an applicant. Historically, for other disclosure schemes this has been to Police, either via their local Police force website or in person at a Police station. However, in light of recent pilots and plans to roll out the principles proposed in operation Dovetail, namely the de-securitisation of Prevent and Channel processes, it is advised that an initial application would be made directly to the joint local authority and police Prevent team via an online form hosted on the local authority website. This maximises accessibility of the scheme to the applicant, and breaks down any barriers they may have perceived to exist by making an application directly to Police. It would, however remain possible for an applicant to make their initial contact in person to their local police force, a desire expressed by respondents in the Community Reporting Thresholds (2017) research into community reporting mechanisms. Following initial contact, preliminary checks will be conducted to establish whether there is any imminent or immediate risk of harm posed to the ‘person at risk’ and whether the ‘subject’ is already under investigation. These initial checks should be completed as soon as possible, but **no later than 24 hours after the initial contact**. If information is identified during these initial checks which indicates an immediate or imminent risk of harm is posed to the ‘person at risk’ then the
TREDS process would terminate at this point, and immediate action must be taken through existing police and local authority safeguarding procedures.

2) **Face to Face Meeting:** Once no imminent or immediate risk of harm has been identified, a member of the joint local authority and police Prevent team will review the initial application and contact the applicant to arrange a face to face meeting about the application. The face to face meeting should take place as soon as practicable, but **no later than 10 days after the initial contact.** The face to face meeting is designed to assess the motivation behind, and suitability of the application. The applicant must provide photo identification and confirmation of address. Acceptable photo identification would include a passport or drivers licence, and adequate proof of address being a utility bill or bank statement. However, it is accepted that some vulnerable individuals may not possess any of the above forms of identification. In this situation it would be acceptable to contact another agency or professional such as a health visitor or social worker in order to confirm the identity of the applicant. All applicants are required to sign a legal undertaking, indicating that they should not discuss their application unnecessarily with any other party, and that misuse of any disclosure information would render them liable to prosecution. Failure of the applicant to sign the legal agreement may result in the withdrawal of the application at this stage.

3) **Empowerment/Education:** During the face to face meeting the applicant is provided with an information pack about the disclosure scheme, which will include details of how they can protect and safeguard the ‘person at risk’ during the interim period prior to the disclosure or non-disclosure decision. The information pack will be available both in physical booklet form, and online.
4) **Threat/Risk Assessment:** Police officers or authorised staff in the joint local authority and police Prevent team will conduct intelligence and criminal record checks on the ‘subject’, which will include Police National Computer (PNC), Police National Database (PND), various intelligence databases, and social care records. If at any point during this process it is identified that the ‘subject’ is already under investigation for terrorism related offences, the TREDIS process would end here and the information gathered up to this point would be passed through appropriate channels to Counter-Terrorism police. In light of recent pilots and plans to roll out the principles proposed in ‘Dovetail’, namely the de-securitisation of Prevent and Channel processes, the police role in conducting Police criminal record and and intelligence checks will remain, however the information should, where possible then be handed to local authority Prevent staff to proceed with the application process.

Although the TREDIS is focussed entirely upon Terrorism, Radicalisation and extremism, information discovered regarding threats of a different nature posed by the ‘subject’ to children or vulnerable people will be shared with the ‘applicant’ or ‘person at risk’ where appropriate, and with any other relevant agencies. For example, the discovery of the existence of previous convictions or significant police intelligence suggesting ‘the subject’s’ involvement in offences relating to child sexual abuse or domestic abuse may need to be disclosed to the ‘applicant’ or ‘person at risk’. In such instances, any intelligence gathered by police would be passed appropriately to the relevant police department who administer disclosure requests for that respective crime type. This will likely be their force’s local Protecting Vulnerable People department or public protection unit. Of equal note are instances whereby police checks reveal no identified threat posed to the ‘person at risk’ by the ‘subject’. On such occasions, which may be frequent, the ‘applicant’ is afforded peace of mind regarding the safety of the child or vulnerable person. The nature of the TREDIS process, and other existing disclosure schemes in this regard means that the ‘subject’ need not ever know they were in fact the subject of a disclosure application, which in
turn negates any potential hostility or repercussion from ‘subject’ to ‘applicant’, or indeed the ‘person at risk’.

5) **Decision making and supervisory review:** In light of recent pilots and plans for the ‘de-securitisation’ of Prevent and Channel processes, the police inspector’s role as ultimate decision maker in the equivalent process for other disclosure schemes may be assigned instead to their local authority equivalent, such as a Prevent coordinator. In this context, the member of local authority Prevent staff processing the application would, at this stage, submit their disclosure/non-disclosure decision rationale to a senior member of the joint local authority and police Prevent team such as a Prevent coordinator or Police Inspector (or whoever the individual force designates) for review and ultimate decision making.

6) **The delivery of the disclosure/non-disclosure decision:** The entire TREDS process should be completed **within 30 days from initial contact.** Other disclosure schemes operate within 35-45 day timeframes, however, owing to the seriousness of the potential threat and risk involved, appropriate resourcing should be committed to expedite this process. The officer will contact the parent/carer of the ‘person at risk’ and either disclose as appropriate, or notify of the decision not to disclose. Disclosure should only take place face to face with the ‘applicant’ or parent/guardian if the ‘person at risk’ is under 18 years old, or the ‘person at risk’ directly if over 18 and they have capacity. The disclosure would be delivered verbally only. No written disclosure will be made under any circumstances, in order to prevent the information falling into the wrong hands or being used inappropriately or maliciously. The applicant will again be asked to confirm their understanding of and commitment to the sensitive and appropriate use of the disclosure information, and that inappropriate use may render them liable to prosecution.
Figure 3. TREDs Process Map

A concerned adult ('The Applicant') makes an initial application through either the TREDs online form, or in person to the local police.

Police conduct initial checks to identify any imminent or immediate risk/threat.

Imminent or immediate risk/threat identified?

Yes: Any imminent or immediate risk/threat to be dealt with by existing police/local authority safeguarding procedure.

No: Face to face meeting with 'The Applicant' conducted to ensure their motivation is genuine and not malicious, and to verify their identity.

In-depth risk/threat assessment completed. Does 'The Subject' represent a genuine risk/threat to 'The Person At Risk' in relation to Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism?

Yes: 'Disclosure' decision made. Disclosure made in person to 'The Applicant', or the person best placed to safeguard 'The Person At Risk'.

No: 'Non-Disclosure' decision made. Onward referrals made to mainstream services as appropriate.
Hypothetical Case Study Examples

Below are three hypothetical case study examples, which highlight a variety of situations whereby a Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) application may be used effectively. These examples are not exhaustive, but are intended to add clarity as to its purpose and scope.

Case study 1.

Louise is a single parent of Alfie, 14. Louise has recently begun a relationship with Jay, but has heard rumours in the community that Jay is involved with a Far-Right group and may have previous convictions for Islamophobic hate crimes. Louise finds the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism disclosure scheme (TREDS) online application form on her local authority’s website and completes an initial application.

Louise subsequently receives disclosure regarding Jay, highlighting a previous conviction for a religiously motivated hate crime, and intelligence linking him to active involvement with a Far-Right group in the area. Louise uses this information to make the decision to end her relationship with Jay, citing other reasons, allowing her to protect her son and herself without Jay knowing she has made the application. Due to receiving disclosure through the TREDS process, Louise was able to take proactive steps to ensure that her son would not be influenced by an individual like Jay, who holds extreme views and has engaged in extremist violence.

Case study 2.

Paul and Alison live with their 16 year old daughter, Skye in Devon. The family are keen environmentalists and animal rights activists. The family recently attended a demonstration against animal cruelty, where their daughter, Skye met a 19 year old male named Dylan. Since the demonstration, Dylan and Skye have remained in contact and are planning to meet up. Paul and Alison decide to conduct an internet search of Dylan, as they
are interested in the high-profile animal rights work he claims to have been involved in. During the internet search information is found to suggest that Dylan has been involved in violent clashes with police during demonstrations. Paul and Alison oppose violence in all forms and do not wish for their daughter to be exposed in any way to it. Paul and Alison continue searching the internet and come across the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) on their local authority’s website and decide to submit an application regarding Dylan. The subsequent application process is completed, and the decision is made to disclose to Paul and Alison. The disclosure highlights that Dylan has served a short custodial sentence for causing significant criminal damage to an animal testing facility, and the assault of its staff members.

Paul and Alison spoke with Skye and relayed the information provided to them by police. Skye was shocked that Dylan had been in trouble with the police and had a criminal record. Skye was understandably upset but was grateful to be made aware, and subsequently ended her relationship with Dylan. Skye has ambitions to go to university and work peacefully to end animal cruelty, and knew that continuing to be associated with Dylan could be harmful to her future.

Case study 3.

Junaid is 16 years old and lives with his elderly grandmother and maternal aunty. Junaid has poor school attendance, and although he sets off to school most days, he does not always arrive there. A local resident and a friend of Junaid’s mother and father has noticed him recently arrive at the bus stop in uniform with other pupils every Monday, but get into a car with an older male instead. The family friend recognised the male as being known locally as ‘Zed’, who is rumoured to be known to Police in relation to Terrorism related offences.

The family friend saw this pattern emerge over a number of weeks and became increasingly concerned for Junaid’s safety. Fearing for the safety of Junaid, the family friend decides to submit a Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) application via their local authority website. Upon conducting police checks it emerged that
‘Zed’ was at the time subject to strict supervision, which imposed various prohibitions upon his interaction with others, following his serving of a prison sentence for committing a terrorism related offence. This information was disclosed to Junaid’s grandmother and aunty, who were able to implement more stringent measures to protect Junaid, and relay to him that ‘Zed’ is not an appropriate individual with whom to associate. ‘Zed’ was subsequently arrested by Police and found in possession of an unauthorised mobile phone, contrary to his licence conditions. ‘Zed’ was later recalled to prison.

Learning From Existing Disclosure Schemes: The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS); and the Child Sexual Offence Disclosure Scheme (CSODS) Pilot Reviews.

In 2012/13, a 14 month pilot to test a national Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) took place across Four Police force areas. The review of that pilot process highlighted the perceptions of those involved, both public and professional, providing feedback on its efficacy and areas for improvement. Overall those involved were positive about the process. The major perceived benefit of the scheme was that it gives individuals information that may assist them in making a more informed choice about the suitability of their relationships. The process was considered fit for purpose, and those who used the scheme were generally satisfied with the experience. There were two main areas for improvement identified by those involved, both public and professional; That the scheme was not adequately publicised, resulting in a significant degree of misunderstanding and a lack of awareness of the scheme’s existence and purpose; and the significant level of bureaucracy of the process, primarily in relation to the lengthy paperwork and repetition involved. During the pilot period, 386 initial applications were received, of which almost one-third (29%, 111 applications) resulted in a disclosure (Home Office, 2016). The most recent available data on the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme identifies that for the 40 forces that were able to supply data on both applications and disclosures under the DVDS, 57% of the 6,313 “right to know” applications made resulted in disclosures (3,594) in the year ending March 2018. A lower proportion
(44%) of the 4,655 “right to ask” applications resulted in disclosures in the same year (2,055 based on 41 forces providing both figures (Office for National Statistics, 2018). These statistics represent 5,649 individuals safeguarded and protected from harm in the year ending March 2018 who may not have otherwise been in the absence of the DVDS.

In February 2008 the Home Secretary announced a 12 month pilot of the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS). The intention was to pilot a process whereby member of the public can register their interest in a names individual in relation to concerns about their history of sexual offending against children. Where concerns are discovered, the presumption is that relevant information will be shared with the appropriate member of the public best placed to protect the person at risk. The review of that process aimed to identify how successfully the pilots have provided members of the public with a formal mechanism for requesting disclosure of information about individuals who have unsupervised access to children, and who may have previous involvement in sexual offending against children. Of the small number of applicants interviewed, most were largely satisfied with the pilot process, valuing timely contact and the professional conduct of staff. On the whole, applicants interviewed thought the pilot contributed to general levels of alertness about risks to, and protection of, children. Police and offender managers interviewed perceived that the disclosure process formalised what they thought should be good practice in child protection. It was seen as providing greater clarity for staff by focusing on risk, focusing on the child, and permitting the sharing of information with members of the public. The two primary areas of improvement to be made were identified as; Marketing and publicity, whereby it was felt that the scheme had failed to reach an adequately significant audience to garner the desired response rate, and; The level and consistency of the training provided to staff, where some report the training as adequate, whereas other describe the training as representing a briefing session rather than actual training. During the pilot period, 585 initial enquiries were made, of which 21 (4%) resulted in disclosure (Home Office, 2007). Unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain up-to-date referral and disclosure statistics for the Child Sexual Offence Disclosure Scheme (CSODS) following its permanent implementation.
The above pilot reviews of the existing disclosure schemes; the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS); and the Child Sexual Offence Disclosure Scheme (CSODS) respectively, provide crucial information regarding their strengths and areas for improvement, which have been considered and applied when creating the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS);

Firstly, a lack of publicity and awareness of the disclosure schemes amongst practitioners and communities was highlighted in the pilot reviews for the DVDS and CSODS; this has been taken into account when creating TREDS, with significant publicity and awareness raising high on the agenda for potential pilot areas. Police forces would receive appropriate training and be provided with information packs and process maps to disseminate to their officers and staff. Awareness raising sessions would be held in local authority settings to raise awareness of TREDS amongst practitioners in relevant services. Television, radio, print, and social media advertisements would be considered as a means of raising awareness amongst communities of the existence of the scheme and its scope.

Secondly, bureaucracy and complicated and repetitive paperwork was highlighted as the other main criticism of the DVDS and CSODS processes; officers or members of staff completing the DVDS and CSODS processes are required to complete each stage of the process either manually by hand, or typed onto the forms in Word format. The forms then need to be printed, signed and scanned back in before being saved onto a computer. Having personally completed both the DVDS and CSODS processes, I can attest to their labour-intensive and archaic nature. Therefore, the TREDS process will be completed within an intuitive online portal, allowing supporting material to be uploaded, and ensuring the safety and security of the information contained within. Supervisors can access the application to complete their supervisory review stage and either authorise disclosure, or conclude the application as a non-disclosure outcome.
The Potential Opposition to TREDs

Critics may point to the sharing of the details of a ‘subject’s’ Terrorism related offending history or relevant police intelligence as representing a further form of social punishment for an offender attempting to reintegrate into society. It is feared that this could result in stigmatisation and potentially the facilitation of further radicalisation. However, as with the most high risk domestic abuse perpetrators and child sex offenders, a terrorist offender or suspect’s right to privacy or anonymity must remain secondary to the safeguarding and protection of children and vulnerable people. The police have common law powers to disclose information about a person’s known history of violence or abuse, normally relating to previous convictions or charges, to the public where there is a pressing need for disclosure of the information in order to prevent further crime (Home Office, 2016). These common law powers inform the entire disclosure and safeguarding principles underpinning TREDs.

Article 8 of The Human Rights Act (1998) states that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2019). The TREDs process should be administered whilst giving due consideration to its impact upon and interaction with the Human Rights Act 1998. The consequences for the ‘subject’ should his details be disclosed, against the nature and extent of the risk the ‘subject’ poses to the ‘person at risk’ should be carefully considered. Critics should be reassured that the threshold for a disclosure under TREDs is necessarily high, and the rigorous application process ensures, as much as is possible, that disclosure data will not be misused. Furthermore, no specific offence details will ever be disclosed, merely that an individual has been convicted of a terrorist offence, or that police hold significant intelligence suggesting their involvement in extremism or terrorism.
Information relating to a person’s previous convictions is sensitive personal data under the Data Protection Act 1998, and therefore Police and other agencies must be satisfied that a decision to disclose is in accordance with the eight principles set out in the Act (The Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme Guidance Document, 2007). Article 17 (The right to be forgotten) of the Data Protection Regulations, Data Protection Act (2018) primarily regulates erasure obligations. Under this legislation, personal data must be erased immediately where the data are no longer needed for their original purpose, or the data subject has withdrawn his consent and there is no other legal ground for processing. However, the Right to be Forgotten is not unreservedly guaranteed. It is limited, especially with the right of freedom of expression and information or where the processing of data is necessary to comply with legal obligations, or where it is in the public interest (General Data Protection Regulation, 2019). Furthermore, The General Data Protection Regulations, Data Protection Act (2018) and Human Rights laws are not barriers to justified information sharing, but provide a framework to ensure personal data is shared appropriately. Under the GDPR and Data Protection Act (2018), personal information may be shared without consent if there is a lawful reason to do so, such as where Safety may be at risk (West Yorkshire Safeguarding Children’s Board, 2019).

Proof of the Appetite for New Community Reporting Methods

The Home Office is proposing making alterations to the Channel process; aiming to ‘de-securitise’ the process by transferring responsibilities for some elements of Channel from the police to the government, where they would sit more closely with local authorities’ wider safeguarding responsibilities (Local Government Association, 2018). This move by the Home Office suggests their acknowledgement of the need to reassess the efficacy of some elements of the Prevent and Channel processes being police-led, and appreciating that the transference of some functions may be crucial in garnering more trust and support from communities to report their concerns.
In an Open letter on the UK’s ‘Prevent’ Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Amnesty International UK describe Prevent as being developed without a firm evidence base and being rooted in a vague and expansive definition of “extremism”. The open letter urges member of the House of Lords to Support amendments which demand the independent review of Prevent (Amnesty International UK, 2018). Indeed, amendments 57 and 57A of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (2018) call for the independent review of the Government’s Prevent strategy (UK Parliament, 2018). Speaking in a Home Office article, security minister Ben Wallace stated “I have decided that the time is now right to initiate a review of Prevent. Over the last two years the Home Office has built on the solid work of Prevent by releasing annual statistics, which clearly show that Prevent is not about singling out any particular group or ideology. I am proud we have helped divert hundreds of people away from posing a real threat and put them back on the path of living a fulfilling, law abiding life. This review should expect those critics of Prevent, who often use distortions and spin, to produce solid evidence of their allegations” (Home Office, 2019).

The Government’s 2018 Prevent strategy update identifies amongst others, two particular strategic objectives which support the desire for the implementation of new methods to improve community and public reporting:

1) “We will do more to increase the proportion of referrals that come from communities and friends and families of vulnerable individuals – people who are often the first to have concerns”.

2) “We will develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial methods to improve our understanding of those at risk of involvement in terrorism and enable earlier intervention” (Home Office, 2018).

This clearly evidences the appetite for the implementation of new mechanisms for improving public reporting. Furthermore, the recently announced independent review of Matt Dryden: The Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS)
Prevent represents an opportunity for the review of current mechanisms and working practices, and for new and innovative ones like TREDS to be given an opportunity to demonstrate their capability.

**Conclusion**

This policy recommendation is intended to represent a catalyst for the implementation of the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme (TREDS) within the United Kingdom, as an additional mechanism to aid efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. TREDS is not intended to replace current reporting mechanisms, but to compliment them, providing an alternate route by which communities can report concerns relating to terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. The UK Government is urged to duly consider the implementation of TREDS as a pilot for a minimum period of Twelve months in selected local authority areas, and ultimately that TREDS be implemented on a permanent basis in every Prevent priority local authority area within the United Kingdom.

Whether a proponent or opponent of the Prevent strategy and the government’s wider efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism- the current divisiveness in this regard acts only to further marginalise many Muslim communities, and empowers the extremists and terrorists who oppose our shared values. The upcoming review of the Prevent strategy should be welcomed by all who are committed to safeguarding children and vulnerable people from radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Critics of Prevent should remain constructive, and the media should be held to account for inaccurate, misleading or inflammatory reporting, which cynically misrepresents the programme and exacerbates community tensions. Government and civil society must work together tirelessly to improve current processes, working practices, and to strive to develop new and innovative ways to better tackle radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.
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