GOVERNING WITHOUT COLLABORATION: STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN JAMAICA

Kim Moloney

ABSTRACT

This study finds infrequent collaborative action between state and civil society actors in Jamaica. Jamaica’s predominant institutional structure is authority-based. Relations between state and civil society actors may be considered consultative, at best. The Jamaican case sits in contrast to a collaborative governance scholarship largely focused upon successful collaborative cases. Theoretical development within collaborative governance research might benefit from more developing-country case studies, greater attention to historical explanations, and a broadened collaborative continuum. The presence of a consultative (but not collaborative) relationship may indicate a country’s location at a midway point between authority-based and collaboratively-governed systems. Postulating about why a state has non-collaborative relationship will deepen our understanding of what is required for collaboration to occur.

Keywords - Civil Society, Collaborative Governance, Consultation, Jamaica, Non-governmental Organizations

INTRODUCTION

This paper considers the collaborative governance model in a developing country. With a GNI per capita of US$4980, Jamaica is a poor country with a history of civil society activism, a vibrant contracting culture, and an electorally democratic system. Most collaborative governance scholarship is focused upon North American or Western European case studies. We know little about whether collaborative governance is possible in developing countries. Recent scholarship has focused upon “already collaborative” cases. Relatively little is known about “almost collaborative” or “far from collaborative” cases. To explore these cases, the cooperation, coordination, collaboration and tokenism continuums may help us understand whether Jamaica’s current state – civil society relations are collaboratively governed (Arnstein, 1969; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). The study discovers an authority-based relationship between the state and Jamaican civil society. Despite a vibrant pre-independence civil society history and current politi-
cal rhetoric to the contrary, Jamaica’s state and civil society relationships are not collaborative but may be considered consultative, at best.

**THEORIZING COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE**

Collaborative governance scholarship is frequently based upon single or multi-case analyses within three developed world regions: North America (e.g. Booher, 2004; Getha-Taylor, 2007; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Lasker, Weiss, & Miller, 2001), Western Europe (e.g. Bertels & Vredenburg, 2004; Culpepper, 2003; Gore, 2008), and Australia (e.g. Flynn & Wanna, 2008). We do not know if collaborative governance is unique to Western society or if there may be potential worldwide relevance. Developed countries typically have high levels of democratic consolidation, reasonable oversight frameworks, complex contracting cultures, positive interactions with civil society, and a diversified and capable civil society community. Developing countries may have all, some, or none of these traits. If we desire a collaboratively-governed institutional space then we must consider what factors may influence its creation worldwide.

Theoretical development and a push to generalize the collaborative governance model may face limitations if its application is focused only upon the world’s developed countries. Theory-building requires comparative considerations. If collaborative governance desires to become a theory of relevance, then we must consider the model’s relevance for developing countries. The question, “why they are not like us” must be asked by Western and non-Western scholars. Theory development is strengthened through the appropriate testing of a model’s ideas in multiple contexts. It may be that collaborative governance models have potential-transferability relevance for developing countries. To date only a few scholars have considered collaboration within a developing economy (e.g. Birner & Wittmer, 2006; Mburu & Birner, 2002).

Western governance models are frequently modified and/or have less explanatory power when applied to non-Western contexts. Structural adjustment was a lending package informed by neoclassical economics. One only has to look at the 1980s “lost decade” to understand how the rapidity of structural adjustment’s implementation led to economic contraction and a rise in political instability (Fischer, 1995). On a strictly mathematical basis, the theoretical calculations behind neoclassical economics may not have been miscalculated. But transferring theory into practice is usually unpredictable. Developing country contexts are notoriously difficult and messy arenas. Similar claims were made about New Public Management (NPM) in the late 1980s. Subsequent considerations found that NPM faced challenges specific to the developing world (Bowornwathana, 2000; Schick, 1998).

Governance, by definition, need not exclusively consider the state as society’s most important actor. Civil society, citizens, and even corporate actors might retain dominance (Rhodes, 1997). The so-called “hollowing out” of Western countries like the United Kingdom has led to an increased emphasis on state-society collaboration rather than exclusive state-based authority relationships (Milward & Provan, 2000). To date,
collaborative governance scholarship has largely focused where collaborative govern-
ance already exists. A country’s governance environment does not cease to exist if it is
not collaborative. If collaborative governance is a potential theoretical ideal, then we
must understand the where and why of its existence or non-existence. Moreover, col-
aboration may infrequently be a “yes” (collaborative) or “no” (non-collaborative) prop-
osition. Multiple interactions are possible including tokenistic (placation, consultation,
informing), cooperative, coordinated, and collaborative governance (Arnstein, 1969;
Keast et al., 2007). Certainly theorization is strengthened by confirmatory analyses. But
theorization is also strengthened by reflecting upon non-confirmatory cases.

THE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE CONCEPT

When two or more institutional forms interact, collaborative governance is possible.
Collaborative governance is “a governing arrangement where one or more public agen-
cies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that
is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement pub-
lic policy or management public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 2). Col-
laborative governance outputs include joint efforts, reciprocity and volunteerism (Tang
& Mazmanian, 2009). Benefits are accruable when two or more institutions mutually
reinforce each other (Bryson & Crosby, 2005). Collaborative governance can “resolv[e]
difficult policy problems across agency, jurisdictional and public problem domains” (Rogers & Weber, 2009, p. 1). Collaborative governance is one of at least four institu-
tional mechanisms available to governments. Other mechanisms include authority-based
arrangements, outsourced-based arrangements, and market-based arrangements (Tang &
Mazmanian, 2010). Due to the lack of exclusive market-based or outsource-based ar-
rangements in Jamaica, this study focuses on the collaborative potential within Jama-
ica’s authority-based arrangement.

Collaboratively-governed relationships are not isolated from the policy-making process.
History frames institutional choice and by extension, institutional choices frame gov-
ernance relationships and policy processes. Ansell and Gash’s (2007) collaborative gov-
ernance definition focuses on the “collective decision-making process” between public
agencies (institutions) and non-state stakeholders. The outputs are the policies or pro-
gram. They also emphasized the importance of direct non-state actor engagement in this
process. Direct engagement or the “collective process” is “a two-way communication
and influence between agencies and stakeholders and also opportunities for stakeholders
to talk with each other. Agencies and stakeholders must meet together in a deliberative
and multilateral process” (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 546). This process is not a one-off
opportunity for civil society to provide policy input. Such interactions must be part of a
long-term collaborative effort between state and the non-state actors. Historical experi-
ence may explain collaborative or non-collaborative outputs.
If we initially accept the four system-level arrangements conceptualized by Tang and Mazmanian (2010), then we must ask if there are intermediary steps between authority-based and collaborative governance arrangements. This is important for expanding the theoretical reach of collaborative governance. If, as suggested in this paper’s introduction, collaborative governance is not found within current Jamaican relations, then what concepts may be used to describe Jamaica’s state-civil society relations? How authority-based is the Jamaican system? The simple categorization of Jamaica into an authority-based system does not tell us how to move its arrangements toward a collaboratively governed arena. There may be participatory steps between authority-based and collaboratively governed arrangements.

An early treatment of what is or is not participative activity was Sherry Arnstein’s citizen-focused “ladder of participation” (Arnstein, 1969). This study exchanges the citizen focus for civil society. At the non-participative end of her eight-step scale between participation and non-participation were manipulation and therapy. At the other end was citizen (or civil society) control which was preceded by delegated power and partnership. Tokenism was an intermediary space between non-participation and citizen control and consisted of three steps: informing, consultation, and placation. The partnership concept equates to the collaboration concept within collaborative governance studies. Other scholars have relabeled and shortened the participatory continuum. In a study of the Jamaican Social Investment Fund, collaboration was the midway point between cooperation and partnership (Bowen, 2005). Other iterations of this continuum exist (e.g. Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Donohue, 2004) and today there is little consensus on which stages to include and how each should be defined. On the assumption of an equivalency between partnership and collaboration, then the cooperation, coordination and collaboration continuum can be combined with tokenism to create a six-point continuum. This continuum can be used to evaluate Jamaica’s state and civil society relations. Since Jamaica has neither the participatory (full citizen participation, delegated power) nor non-participatory (full citizen nonparticipation, manipulation, therapy) ends of the participatory spectrum, Jamaica’s range of relevance includes informing, consultation, placation, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration (partnership).

According to Keast, et al (2007) cooperation is a low-level activity with low risk and minimal connectivity between partners. Each partner (e.g. state, civil society) will “take each other’s goals into account and try to accommodate those goals,” and in doing so it need not be as “active and intense” as collaboration (Keast et al., 2007, p. 17). Cooperative relationships are “short-term” and “informal” with information sharing focused on the cooperative task rather than an integrated exercise (Keast et al., 2007, p. 25). Even if the interaction is minimal, cooperative arrangements create opportunities for future coordination and collaboration.

In contrast, the three tokenism sub-categories imply a state less interested in participatory activities. Tokenistic states might inform (or remind) citizens of their participatory rights via news reports or other avenues. They may hold citizen meetings in which citizens are told they can “participate” even if the act of participation does not modify the
state’s policy conclusion. More than informing, consultation occurs when the state actively seeks citizen or NGO input. The policy conclusion may also be foregone but citizen input may occur through surveys or even a neighborhood meeting. We must be careful to not confuse consultation with the deeper participatory activities of interactive governance’s highest levels. Participatory activity cannot be built upon just one neighborhood meeting (or even a dozen) but instead multiple methods of engagement, frequent interaction across vertical, horizontal, and diagonal relationships, and mutual reflection at each stage of the policy process.

When compared to the tokenistic participation, coordination and collaboration are altogether higher levels of participatory activity. Coordination has a “strong task orientation” and exists in an arena with prior relationships between the involved actors” (Keast et al., 2007, pp. 12, 17-18). Goals are often shared by group members although coordination need “not require a loss of individual autonomy” (Keast et al., 2007, p. 18). Collaboration, in contrast, “require[s] much closer relationships, connections and resources and even a blurring of boundaries between agencies” (Keast et al., 2007, p. 19). Each level of participatory activity is related to power and its distribution. Citizen and civil society powers are important in a democracy. It is especially important in societies with socioeconomic inequalities. Obtaining power vis-à-vis the state becomes an endeavor with historical importance in countries like Jamaica.

**HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST FRAMEWORK**

A nation-state’s institutional history is an important intervening variable when explaining state - civil society relations. Jamaica is no different. Historical institutionalism helps scholars place Jamaica’s governance relations (whether collaborative or not) within its historical trajectory. Institutionalist approaches trace back to Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). Skocpol asserted that social revolutions do not occur overnight. The assumed cataclysmic bang of revolution was perhaps rarer than previously considered. In her view, revolutions grew out of structural contradictions within the old regimes rather than the influence of exogenous factors upon the regime. One can extend this observation to collaborative governance studies. Just as authority-based arrangements may arise out of historical circumstance, so too may collaboratively-governed arrangements.

By the mid-1990s, there were at least three competing approaches to institutional study: sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and historical institutionalism (P. Hall & Taylor, 1998; P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hay & Wincott, 1998). Collaborative governance scholars have identified sociological institutionalism (as well as other theories1) as potential frameworks for understanding collaborative governance (Tang & Mazmanian, 2009). This paper will not specifically comment upon each option other than to observe their rather ahistorical nature. Administrative study is not an ahistorical exercise. Political and socioeconomic histories frame institutional choices. Certainly these institutional choices may help us understand, or predict, where collaborative governance may arise. These choices also help us discover which intermediate steps may lead to greater collaboration.
Historical institutionalism is one option. Historical institutionalism evolved from the group theory and structural-functionalists theories of the 1950s and 1960s. Today’s historical-institutionalist framework has four features:

First, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in relatively broad terms. Second, they emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions. Third, they tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences. Fourth, they are especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 17).

This framework allows public management scholars to combine context-dependent and historically-based circumstances into an overarching analysis. This analysis can still incorporate important analytical units like bureaucracy, the policy process, and external stakeholder influence. Historical institutionalism helps scholars answer one of collaborative governance’s most important research questions: “What motivating factors may induce the formalization of informal relations and networks into formalized collaborative arrangements for public problem solving” (Tang & Mazmanian, 2009, p. 29)? The next two sections are a historical preview to the current collaborative interest. State paternalism, socialist-leaning economic models, garrison politics, criminality, and low economic growth frame current state-civil society relations in Jamaica.

JAMAICA’S PRESENT: SECURITY CONCERNS AND FISCAL DISREPAIR

Jamaica is known for beautiful beaches, deep musicality, and national heroes like Usain Bolt, Shelly-Ann Fraser, and Bob Marley. But there is another side. With just 2.8 million inhabitants, Jamaica’s per capita homicide rate was the world’s fourth highest in 2010 (UNODC, 2011). Security concerns influence national life on a daily basis. Political strife has a long history in Jamaica. The first major rise in Jamaica’s homicide rate occurred as its political parties sought to control West Kingston in the mid-1960s. Politically-motivated violence accelerated with the 1976 and 1980 elections. The third rise began in the mid-1980s with drug-running and gun-smuggling, and as the criminal networks who controlled those illegal activities, strengthened (Harriot, 2004). As violence rose, some questioned whether the state or the “dons” controlled the political space. Today certain Jamaica enclaves could be classified as “stateless” with infrequent or low-quality public service delivery and an allegedly cooperative relationship among the state, political parties, and criminal elements. The dons provide services traditionally provided by a state. They may buy citizen allegiance in exchange for school fees, the occasional labor contract, and/or the “right” to extort businesses operating within their “territory”. For the don-obedient, these enclaves are zones of relative safety. The stateless enclaves are financially fuelled by allegations of drug-smuggling and gun-running.

In mid-2009, the U.S. Government requested Jamaica’s extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke. The Jamaican government’s handling of Coke request bucked a tradition of cooperative extradition without public fanfare. In this case, Jamaica alleged that the
Americans had improperly obtained their evidence. Jamaica asked for information about the informant whose testimony was used to implicate Coke. Perhaps due to Coke’s importance and the perception of a “fi inform fi dead” (“if you inform, you are dead”) mentality in Jamaica, the United States refused Jamaica’s request. Coke was no small fish. As one of Jamaica’s most feared dons, he had a well-known family history (e.g. Blake, 2007). Prime Minister Bruce Golding’s concurrent position as the electoral representative of the area which Coke “ruled” only fueled mistrust among the Jamaican population and between Jamaica and the United States.

The decision to extradite Coke came after nine months of editorials, national discussions, and private worries. The opposition party publicly called for Coke’s extradition despite allegations its own party had similar “entanglements”. But when it was discovered that Golding’s Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) had hired an American firm to lobby the Obama Administration on the extradition, the issue exploded. Within weeks Golding would agree to extradite Coke. Prior to his arrest, many worried the extradition could not occur without violence. The predictions were accurate. Within minutes of the decision to extradite and to concurrently call Jamaica’s first state of emergency since the 1980s, phone lines became overloaded as citizens warned their loved ones. Downtown Kingston businesses closed their doors. Key entrance and exit points into Kingston and nearby Spanish Town were blocked and cars were searched. Coke’s Tivoli Garden stronghold barricaded their community with tires, wood, metal, and nearby objects. Tivoli gunmen monitored the entrance against an intervention by the Jamaican Defence Force and Jamaican Constabulary Force. Gun battles erupted in parts of Kingston as the state battled criminal elements for control. Just over 70 lives were lost in the ensuing weeks. With his arrest outside Kingston in mid-July 2010, Coke waived his rights to a hearing in Jamaica and was extradited to the United States.

In 1996, Jamaica paid its obligations to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and vowed to never again borrow from the IMF. Between 1990 and 2010, economic growth averaged just over one percent a year. In a country with demanding socioeconomic needs and multiple Jamaica-specific internal financial crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s, fiscal discipline remained a struggle. As a consequence, Jamaica borrowed heavily from domestic and international commercial banks. By January 2010, Jamaica could no longer pay some of its short-term debts. Officially, the government had committed a “technical default” on its debt obligations. With donor assistance (including the IMF), Jamaica restructured some of its financial obligations in January 2010. But this overspending legacy remains. Today, Jamaica’s debt-to-GDP ratio is one of the world’s highest at 132% of GDP. Nearly four in ten revenue-earned dollars pays just the interest on government debts.

In such an environment, civil society could assist the Jamaican state in collaborative public service delivery. Civil society plays this role in many other countries. But in Jamaica, high debt payments constrain any and all government expenditures, including contracted services. Tight fiscal spaces create an impression that the state and civil society are in competition regardless of whether the funding comes from the state or a foreign donor. Societal insecurity when built upon a history of state paternalism further
hampers collaborative opportunities. The following section discusses this paternalistic tendency in greater detail.

**Jamaica’s Past and its Influence on the Present**

Jamaica gained independence in August 1962 from the United Kingdom. Similar to other newly-independent states, Jamaica’s citizens wanted to re-imagine their national development. Shaping this psyche were gross inequalities left from a history of slavery and colonialism. In the immediate post-independence years, state-led national development was an important characteristic of Jamaican development. The enormity of the development project reinforced the paternalistic tendencies of Jamaica’s two major political parties.

Civil society was not a new innovation for post-colonial Jamaica. From the time of slavery, Jamaican community groups were key societal actors. One of the oldest was the Kingston Charity Organization Society. This Society along with various “Friendly Societies” provided important social services (Nicholson, n.d.). One of the most influential pre-independence civil society actors was Jamaica Welfare. Created twenty-five years before independence by Norman Manley, Jamaica Welfare’s mission was largely funded by an export tax imposed upon the United Fruit Company. As a trade union leader (and later, Premier during Jamaica’s last pre-independence years), Manley also founded the left-leaning People’s National Party (PNP) in 1938. Jamaica Welfare’s purpose was to redistribute export tax earnings to local community projects. Within a few years, Jamaica Welfare had become an important model of national development. Its leaders organized people into cooperatives, focused on education initiatives, encouraged cultural development, built community centers, and prioritized community management (Henry, 2009). By 1948, Jamaica Welfare was working in “236 villages, with 77 village communities, 51 community councils and 346 groups” (Robotham, 1998).

Shortly after independence, however, Jamaica Welfare was incorporated into the newly-independent state by Edward Seaga, the then-Minister for Development and Welfare and member of the right-leaning JLP. Jamaica Welfare was renamed the Social Development Commission (SDC) and was transformed into governmental body. Within a few years, the SDC lost much of its pre-independence Jamaica Welfare luster. Jamaica Welfare’s incorporation was an important signal: social service provision would be state-led and state-controlled. The state was society’s major benefactor. Votes were earned by those who delivered the social service. The vibrancy commonly ascribed to Jamaica Welfare was not transferred to other civil society organizations. The state and its two political parties were Jamaica’s new social movements. Everyone, or so it seemed, had bought into the state’s role as society’s great equalizer.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Edward Seaga of the JLP and Michael Manley of the PNP (Norman Manley’s son) battled for political control. As Jamaica’s politics became heated, civil society’s subversion into the state only increased. Civil society organizations became vehicles for political leaders to mobilize voters. Patronage and clientelism were on the rise. As the rural and unemployed poor filtered into post-independence Kingston, “political identity was established on the territorial principle, by the manipu-
loration of the carrot of public housing and the stick of violence to ensure party-homogenous communities” (Harriot, 2004, p. 92). This perversion of state-society relationships extended to the alleged handing out of guns by political leaders to supportive community leaders. One of my interviewees noted that guns were provided so community leaders could fight for us to get power”.

Jamaica is not beset by significant ethnic or religious differences. Instead, “political tribalism” is a phrase oft-used to describe Jamaica’s garrison politics. At the peak of violence in the late 1970s and early 1980s, scores of innocent civilians were killed. Sometimes the reason might be as simple as wearing the wrong shirt color or drinking a beer emblematic of the other political party. By the early 1980s, civil society’s pre-independence heyday was officially over. Political divisiveness was fuelled by internal migration, political party paternalism, and a rise in criminality. Although these events have constrained Jamaica’s development of an independent civil society, they have not constrained its proliferation. We should not confuse a large civil society with an empowered society. Jamaica’s civil society organizations struggle to negotiate, in equality, with their state.

METHODS

Any attempt to explain the presence or non-presence of collaborative governance in Jamaica must be considered exploratory. This is a qualitative case study that evaluates whether relations between Jamaica’s state and civil society are collaborative and if not, why not. The broadest definition of civil society was utilized. This civil society organization (CSO) definition includes non-government organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations, church groups, professional associations, providential societies, parent-teacher associations, friendly societies, cooperatives, and beneficiary societies. Gathering data on Jamaica’s civil society organizations was not a simple task. There was no single best Jamaican source. The author compiled a list from multiple government, non-government, and donor sources. The difficulty of the task is perhaps emblematic of a relationship in disarray. The most comprehensive source for information on Jamaica’s civil society organizations was not from a government ministry but from a 2008 USAID publication (Laurent, 2008). USAID identified 210 “development organizations”. Additional organization names came from the Ministry of Finance, the Tax Administration Office, the Department of Cooperatives and Friendly Societies, and the websites of several umbrella organizations. The final list had over 1200 organization names.

To evaluate state–civil society collaboration, two methods were employed. The first was a simple query of the 33,000+ Government of Jamaica contracts awarded between January 2006 and September 2009. Contract data was obtained from the Office of the Contractor-General (OCG) and the National Contracts Commission (NCC). Information on contract date, contract value, contracting agency, and contracting partner were utilized. The purpose of this query was to determine whether Jamaica’s vibrant civil society history had translated into service provision contracts. A state’s willingness to contract social service delivery may be an indicator of collaborative governance. A simple
calculation determined the percentage of contracts won by CSOs versus private sector recipient. No contract had more than one recipient.

The second method was to conduct nearly two dozen semi-structured interviews with government, NGO, and donor elites. Elite interviews allow local experts the freedom to suggest the key factors influencing a particular situation (Dexter, 2008). By starting the interviews with two questions about the nature of CSO – state relations in Jamaica, interviewees were free to draw upon their civil society experiences. All interviews were not for attribution.

Interviewees were identified via a “snowball” identification technique (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). If we can characterize Jamaica’s professional class as small, then its CSO class is even smaller. Just because a CSO “exists” does not mean it is registered, tax compliant, has an active Board (or even has a Board), and paid staff. The answer to “who should I interview next” began to repeat after the fourth interview. Even though a snowball identification technique may create its own bias, it is a useful technique for exploring an understudied terrain.

Despite an initially broad and inclusionary civil society definition for calculating the number of government contracts awarded to civil society actors, CSO interviews were limited to the directors of professional NGOs with a staff, a Board, and a legal history. This decision was based on several important realities. The first was that outside of the NGOs, many CSOs are one-person entities without a website and/or irregular phone or e-mail access. Second, the non-NGOs are frequently “staffed” by volunteers who may or may not have another job and/or may infrequently activate the organization. Third, most NGOs are based in Kingston, the capital city in which the fieldwork was based. Future research will need to overcome telecommunication, logistical, and transport obstacles to interview a more comprehensive group of actors. At a minimum, this paper’s amalgamated CSO list may be Jamaica’s most comprehensive.

The original interview period was March and April 2010. Interviewees were initially asked two structured questions. The first asked the interviewee to comment upon the low percentage of Jamaican government contracts awarded to civil society members. The second question reflected the interviewee’s assessment about whether civil society interactions, outside of the aforementioned government contracts, were collaborative. Shortly after the first tranche of interviews was completed, the Government of Jamaica called a two-month state of emergency. Since many NGO leaders work and/or live where the tensions were high, interviews were halted. Interviews resumed in August 2010 and continued into 2011. For post-emergency interviews, a third question was added. This question asked whether the May to July 2010 state of emergency altered the relationship between civil society and the state. This question was added because of local press reports indicating certain church leaders had publicly called for Coke’s extradition. Given this paper’s initially inclusionary definition of civil society (which included the church), this question was important.

Finally, it cannot be claimed that what may be discoverable in Jamaica is generalizable to other countries. Similar limitations face the many Western-focused collaborative governance case studies. Case studies allow researchers to explore a topic in depth and
where possible, compare across countries. By exploring collaborative governance in a
developing country context, we may find characteristics specific to collaborative gov-
ernance which makes its appearance more common in developed countries or discover
that certain collaborative governance characteristics may struggle to take hold in coun-
tries with other developmental goals.

MEASURING COLLABORATION

Understanding who receives government contracts helps empirically highlight state-
civil society relations. If collaborative governance arrangements value state – civil soci-
ety interaction, then collaborative states will contract with CSOs. Contracting occurs
“where specific organizational characteristics and contributions - determined by one
organization - are sought in another, based on organization identity, to fulfill predeter-
mined ends and means” (J. M. Brinkerhoff, 2002, p. 25). Contracts have instrumental
and symbolic purposes. A contract may simply be the instrumental allocation of public
monies to a non-state actor to serve a public good. Contracts may also reflect the sym-
bolic nature of the relationship between the state and civil society.

Between January 2006 and December 2009, the Government of Jamaica approved more
than 33,000 contracts valued at J$33.8 billion (US$397 million). The contracts were
valued between J$250,000 and J$29,999,999 (US$2,809 to US$337,079). Contracts
with values greater than J$10,000,000 and J$30,000,000 require National Contract
Commission and Cabinet approval, respectively. At no point between January 2006
and December 2009 was more than one-third of one percent of government contracts
won by civil society. Of the 197 unique governmental entities with at least one contract
activity, less than 10 percent of those ministries contracted one or more times with at
least one civil society member.

These 197 public sector bodies were further sifted into a smaller group of fifty-one public
entities with a social or environmental purpose. The 51 entities awarded J$9,836,577,134 (~US$110 million) in contracts over the reviewed period. By value, the
51 public entities awarded 26.6 percent of all contracts to non-state actors (corporate or
civil society). Sixty-seven CSOs received only J$74,723,888 (US$839,000) across 116
contracts. Of this amount, NGOs and CBOs (as a subset of CSOs) received
J$21,524,587 (US$241,655) in contracts or just 0.219 percent of the nearly J$9.8 billion
awarded by the 51 public entities. More than 99% of the contracts awarded by 51 public
bodies with a social or environmental purpose were awarded to the private sector.

The Jamaican Social Investment Fund (JSIF) was the largest single provider of con-
tracts to civil society. Between January 2006 and September 2009, JSIF awarded 238
contracts valued at J$324,319,368 (US$3.6 million). Using the broadest CSO definition,
fifty-nine contracts valued at J$32,689,244 (US$367,000) were awarded. This meant
that while 24% of JSIF contracts went to CSOs, only ten percent of awarded contracts
(by J$ value) were won by CSOs. CSOs often received small-value contracts. Despite a
key JSIF mission to funnel donor monies via the state to non-state actors, few CSOs
benefit from JSIF contracts. With typical JSIF projects focused on building community
centers, schools, libraries and/or funding repairs following a natural disaster, there is little room for the traditional CSO-oriented social service delivery.

The National Housing Trust provided the second largest number of contracts (by J$ value) to civil society with J$16,316,652 (US$183,000) awarded across 11 contracts. These funds were followed by the Social Development Commission (14 contracts valued at J$7,288,740) and the National Environment Protection Agency (9 contracts valued at J$2,951,555). Other CSO contracts were provided via the Heart / National Training Agency and the National Youth Service.7

This result may not be a surprise. Earlier research on the relationships between developing country civil societies and the state found that a “distinctive feature of nonprofit finance in the developing world may not be relatively higher levels of outside aid so much as the relatively smaller levels of government support” (Salamon & Anheier, 1997, p. 12). At least on the government side (via contracts), Jamaica appears little different. Where contracts are awarded, the private sector is the most frequent recipient. As noted in a subsequent section, private sector awardees do the “hardware” of government whether it is the provision of a photocopier or building a road. The state appears to favor its self-preserving role as the country’s leading social service provider. Collaborative governance between the private sector and the state may exist. But such collaboration appears to not occur, at least via contract awards, with civil society. Is there something unique about Jamaica’s state and civil society relationship which explains this outcome?

ANALYZING JAMAICA’S “COLLABORATIVE” GOVERNANCE

To answer this question, the following sections are structured using a framework designed to understand which situational variables influence relations between state and non-state actors in developing countries. These variables include regime type, trust, legal/regulatory framework, and policy type (D. W. Brinkerhoff, 1999a, 1999b). In this Jamaican study, the non-relevance of policy type for this study required its exclusion.8 This is an exploratory study in which specific observations about policy-type are not currently possible.

Regime-Type and Trust

A regime classification may be as simple as whether a country is democratic. Democracies are more likely than autocracies to encourage a positive, substantive, and multifaceted relationship with civil society. Jamaica has been a constitutional parliamentary democracy since independence in 1962. Elections are consistently held, Jamaica’s political parties respect the electoral result, and each party willingly transfers power. But an electoral veneer can shade a more complex truth. The first observation will be drawn from this paper’s earlier historical review. Jamaica has faced decades-long political instability fuelled by interactions among the state, political parties, garrison communities, and dons (Harriot, 2004).
This history led most interviewees to observe that the state (regardless of the party in control) is an institution of which their NGO must be wary. This may not be unique to Jamaica. In their study on Brazil, two scholars observed that working within “the associative sector” means “…to be in opposition to the State and to the prevailing political and economic elites, something those engaged in charitable organizations have historically not wanted to convey” (Salamon & Anheier, 1997, p. 14). In the post-independence Jamaica, the state’s authority is the final arbiter. To disagree is to be in opposition. If the state’s historical interaction with civil society has been checkered, then civil society wariness is unsurprising. If pronounced, this oppositional relationship may inhibit trust-building activities. Trust is essential to effective collaboration between civil society and the state. Higher levels of trust or social capital may encourage positive state and civil society relations (e.g. Abom, 2004; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Evans, 1996). Collaborative governance cannot exist in a low trust environment. Networks, like collaborative governance, require minimal trust among partners if their goals are to be achieved (Tang & Mazmanian, 2009).

Interviewee comments echoed prior empirical research on trust in Jamaica. In a 2005 study jointly conducted by USAID and the University of the West Indies, just 14.1 percent of surveyed Jamaicans answered “can be trusted” to the following question: “Would you say that most people can be trusted to keep their promises, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with other people” (Powell, 2006, p. 21). When asked whether “…most people in government can be trusted to keep their promises, or that you can never be too careful in dealing with people in government” just 7.8 percent answered “can be trusted” while 84.8 percent answered “never be too careful” (Powell, 2006, p. 23). When asked which institutions (22 institutions were listed) were most trusted, the family, schools, universities, and churches were the most trusted. The least trusted institutions were parish councils (equivalent to a U.S. state government), political parties, the police, the parliament, and the judiciary. Fewer than 12 percent of respondents were confident in each institution, respectively (Powell, 2006, p. 24).

One donor interviewee suggested that CSOs are distrustful because there is “sense and reality of victimization” and because “everyone is so connected” in Jamaica. This apparent victimization reflects both a historical grievance against power and a more recent trend to think twice before speaking. The fear is that if an organization speaks out, their organization and/or a relative of the organization’s leader will be singled-out and harassed. It is difficult to conclusively determine whether such harassment occurs in Jamaica. Other interviewees disagreed with such assessments. One civil society interviewee recalled how in the late 1970s and early 1980s certain persons were killed over government contracts (e.g. Ted O’Gilvie) but that actual victimization is infrequent. Instead she felt it was only “stylish” to claim victimization. In a small society with a long-term memory, it remains unclear whether it takes one death or a hundred for victimization to switch from “stylish” to real.

Interviewees agreed that there is a culture of corruption in Jamaica. In 2012, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index score for Jamaica was 38 out of 100. This places Jamaica in the bottom half of surveyed countries. NGO interviewees suspected state contracts were awarded based on who you know and/or as a political payoff.
to supporters. Contractor qualifications seemed less important. Others felt the victimization perception may arise from poorly-written Memorandums of Understanding and/or the inability of a contracting partner to effectively negotiate the deliverables. Multiple civil society interviewees underlined that they purposefully avoid involving themselves in situations where conflict may occur. Collaboration, if attempted, must appear to work in-sync with the state. Other interviewees not willing to play that game simply avoid state interaction. Nevertheless, many organizations struggle with the ability to say, as one interviewee put it, “to hell with you” and go home. This dependence may have less to do with finances than a desire to not make enemies.

Other studies of developing country state and civil society relations have considered that economic pressures can become a barrier to reciprocity creation (Abom, 2004). Organizations may emphasize their “developmental” purpose to distance themselves from appearing to carry an oppositional stance to either political party (Salamon & Anheier, 1997). Organization leaders felt that if they took a stance for the party in power and that party lost power, their organization would also lose power. Many organizations prefer to be apolitical. In doing so, they may struggle with their disempowerment as a consequence of their choice. In an environment with few alternative donor dollars this creates a Catch-22. Option one is to succumb to political party patronage and to obtain the resources to fund activities which achieve organizational goals. Option two is to avoid any linkage to political parties in exchange for fewer resources and fewer organizational objectives achieved. Option one is a potentially short-term but developmentally more ambitious choice while option two takes a longer-term perspective even if few short-term developmental objectives are achieved. While this example is focused on internal domestic dependencies, similar dependencies are observable between “northern” and “southern” NGOs (e.g. Lister, 2000).

Many interviewees felt that the best civil society organization will deemphasize advocacy. It is unsurprising that Jamaica has few “formal” advocacy organizations. But others observed we should not be so easily fooled. Advocacy still occurs but through organizations self-classifying themselves as associational, academic, or professional. This veneer allows a CSO to emphasize its apolitical nature when questioned by a distrusting government leader. During election time CSOs may be contacted by political parties or Members of Parliament to tout candidates and/or policy priorities. For one interviewed civil society leader, these requests have become so difficult to handle that the CSO simply shuts down during election season. For one CSO umbrella organization, the problem with political requests was that one member may wish to meet with a political party while another does not want the umbrella organization to be sullied by such contacts.

This does not mean that civil society leaders are not vocal. Some leaders are quite vocal. One interviewee noted that a few self-professed “loud-mouths” (to which my interviewee included herself) have begun to make noise but that they are the exception. This is because most organization leaders “know their place”. This interviewee noted that these women have decided they no longer care what government thinks. In her view, these leaders only want to speak “truth”. One of the most prominent CSOs is Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ). JFJ is run by an Executive Director who, according to two non-JFJ inter-
viewees, is powerful because she is financially independent, comes from the medical profession and an “upstanding family”. Thus, she allegedly cannot be swayed by either political party. Perhaps somewhat worryingly, a government interviewee believed JFJ can speak because it does not “depend on government” due to its reliance on donor funding.

Reflecting broader societal distrust, NGO-to-NGO interaction remains “haphazard”. Organizations are often “unwilling” to collaborate with each other. The “politics of scarce benefits” means that NGOs are “barely holding their own” and may not trust each other enough to partner. Although many elite interviewees began their civil society career with a passion to improve livelihoods, resource limitations creates a situation where the NGO leader thinks, “you may beat me out of a benefit” and thus “I will not benefit [from the partnership].” Distrust interacts with economic resource constraints to create a barrier to information-sharing. Even donors who fund CSOs acknowledged how more of their program management time is spent on NGO partner harmonization than actual implementation. In one case, the donor waited for six months for a project’s NGO partners to agree upon which local communities would be served by the project. The delay was due to the NGOs being so localized and distrustful that each organization only had contacts within their own communities. Community distrust prohibited multi-community collaboration. The NGOs inability to cross territories might mean that some communities would gain resources and others would not. Distrust delayed project rollout.

Many interviewees believe that until Jamaican NGOs create an effective National Council that civil society will struggle to speak with one voice. The National Council idea is not new. A National NGO Council was briefly operationalized in the 1990s. Key umbrella organizations like the Association of Developing Agencies (AODA), the Association of Women’s Organizations in Jamaica (AWOJA), and the Council of Voluntary Social Services (CVSS) were members. The Council’s governance was arranged so that during its first two years, leadership was shared. The Council sat within AODA’s offices and AODA agreed to commit its resources to run the meetings. The Council was initially funded by international NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid, among others. If a topic appeared within the national policy arena, then the Council assigned one or more of its members to address the issue before the broader Council endorsed the final policy stance.

But within a few years, the Council disbanded. Interviewees discussed four interrelated reasons. The first was that when it was time to transfer leadership after the Council’s first two years, there were alleged administrative failures by the organization whose turn it was to lead. Around the same time, the previously negotiated agreement about how Council members would pay its legal fees fell apart. A third reason was that one of the key organizations apparently “resented” the Council since the organization felt they were the de facto civil society leader. The fourth reason was due to tensions between the development and welfare-oriented members. Development-focused members work to change the system while welfare-focused members focus on improving the welfare of their fellow Jamaicans without taking a “change the system” stance.
Legal and Regulatory Framework

According to Brinkerhoff (1999), “the presence of a supportive legal and regulatory framework is another important factor conditioning state-civil society partnerships” (D. W. Brinkerhoff, 1999a, p. 75). Legal and regulatory frameworks provide a mechanism by which organizations distinguish themselves from private actors or the state, obtain benefits (e.g. tax exemptions), and/or bid on contracts. Jamaica has a formal contract bidding process. If a Jamaican CSO wants to bid on a government contract, the CSO must separately register with the Companies Registrar, National Housing Trust, National Insurance Scheme, and the Tax Office before registering with the National Contracts Commission (NCC). Once the organization is registered with the NCC, they may bid on a government contract. The NCC is a public body that regulates government contracts. The NCC works closely with the Contractor-General to ensure an efficient and transparent contract process. The Contractor-General can, where necessary, investigate and report improper contracting actions.

Civil society registrants to the NCC must hold a Tax Compliance Certificate. This requirement is perhaps due to, and in spite of, an overall low rate of tax compliance in Jamaica. Less than a quarter of the companies listed with Registrar of Companies were also registered with the Tax Office. Of the companies registered with the Tax Office, just 8% had paid tax (Tennant & Tennant, 2007). According to the World Bank’s 2010 “Doing Business” Indicators, the average Jamaican makes 72 tax payments per year. These payments take an average of 414 hours per year. This makes Jamaica one of the most difficult countries in the world in which to pay taxes (WorldBank/IFC, 2010). It is no different for Jamaica’s civil society organizations. Considering how few organizations have full-time paid staff, an operating budget, and a functioning Board, tax compliance is also likely to be quite low for this sector.

To obtain a Tax Compliance Certificate, civil society organizations must register with the Companies Registrar and then obtain the NIS and HHT certificates before arriving at the Tax Office. At this point, CSO’s may apply for an annually-reviewed tax exemption. Every year NGOs should file tax returns. But the decision to provide tax relief to a civil society organization is not automatic. Only the Minister has discretion over which organization is given tax relief. Such appeals need to be made in person. This is an informal process with potential outside-the-law implications. If fear, distrust, and a desire to be apolitical are not enough to deter active civil society engagement, then the registration process is a significant deterrent. For some organizations, it may be easier to not register. Low tax compliance may inhibit collaborative efforts if collaboration is measured solely on government contract attainment. Moreover, if a civil society leader knows their organization is not tax compliant, they may have an amplified fear of speaking out. There are likely interrelated relationships among low tax compliance, government distrust, and contract attainment.

One donor suggested that the registration process should be consolidated into a one-stop shop. At the moment, CSOs face a “cost calculation”: The investment to bid versus the chance of getting the money and then doing the work. Many micro-level organizations (like a Parent-Teacher Association) will not bother to register themselves. The inter-
viewee stated that the micro-organizations may “not recognize in themselves that they are development partners” to the state and will ask “for what purpose” should they register? Other interviewees rationalized their non-registration by asking, “Why register” if by doing so government will be “up in your business”? By registering with the state you open your CSO to potential government cooption.

Among the organizations that have bid for a government contract, many felt that “red tape and bureaucracy” inhibited NGOs from winning contracts. They perceived a certain amount of state-led discrimination in which CSOs were placed at the bottom of the bid pile. Communication failures are also common. When organizations inquired about why they failed to obtain a contract, they were told that their proposal failed to meet particular criteria. Further reasons were infrequently given. According to this interviewee, they would have preferred to hear, “You did not meet the criteria. Can you meet the criteria?”

Further hampering civil society registration with the NCC is that there is no obvious category under which CSOs might register. The Contract Database lists 41 contractor categories and another 35 supplier categories. Nearly 2,100 largely private sector entities have registered. Sample categories include road maintenance works and landscaping on the contractor side or chemicals and pesticides or hardware and haberdashery on the supplier side. A closer look at the NCC’s supplier and contractor categories finds that none of the categories are tasks typically undertaken by civil society. This may lead to an unintentional anti-civil society bias.

The current go-around option is for non-categorized entities to bid on government contracts as a “consultant”. But this is a one-off solution rather than a permanent one. In one recent case in which a foreign donor required NCC registration prior to donor fund disbursement, the “NGOs screamed, the project was delayed, and the NGOs asked the NCC to classify them as consultants”. The donor request likely reflected its home-country accountability concerns rather than whether local Jamaican contexts made request fulfillment difficult. The consultant solution has become a temporary fix.

Permanent solutions may be hampered by CSO opinion that the NCC has little understanding of civil society activities. One interviewee was explicit: the NCC “does not know anything” about social service activities. The NCC was “good with things like construction, procurement of equipment” but that spending “half of your life, going back forth” to try and explain one’s work is not worth it. Since the NCC’s technical staffs are unfamiliar with “behavioral change” activities, registration can be delayed indefinitely. Again Jamaica’s experience may not be unique. In a multi-country research effort, two scholars discovered that “the concept of a definable nonprofit sector existed in none of the countries covered… the reality of such a sector was nevertheless very much in evidence” (Salamon & Anheier, 1997, pp. 10, original emphasis). The non-formalization of the Jamaican state’s understanding of civil society can be found in the legal, tax, and contracting arenas.

Similar concerns were raised about Jamaica’s Companies Registrar. The registrar is an important first-stop for organizations desirous of a government contract. One interviewee noted that although the Registrar was quite efficient in registering companies, they
were not knowledgeable about circumstances common to Jamaica’s civil society. In one case, the Registrar delayed a CSO’s registration because Registrar staff expressed disbelief that an organization’s entire Board could turnover. Simple problems like a Companies Registrar form with too few spaces for registering entities to report Board replacements was enough to throw the Registrar into inaction.

**Capacity**

State and civil society capacities need not be similar for collaboration to occur. But collaboration may be hampered if the differentials are too large. In a typical donor - civil society funding relationship, recipient organizations must fulfill multiple “technical demands placed on organizations in the name of donor accountability” (Markowitz & Tice, 2002, p. 947). This may include “elaborate work plans, with time lines and indicators for measuring achievements, and provide regular reports” (Markowitz & Tice, 2002, p. 948). In Brazil, donors looked for positive “signals” from the civil society actor before they would partner. Signals included age, religious orientation, professionalism, and accountability. Organizations that were “legally-registered organizations with high degrees of donor accessibility attract more money than non-registered, inaccessible entities” and organizations with “third-party audits attract more than double the funds of their competitors” (Reinhardt, n.d., p. 4). The prescription appears simple: legally register and audit your books. But registration, as already noted in the Jamaican case, may come with a financial and political cost. Annual audits cost money. Money is earned by winning contracts, obtaining donor funds, and fundraising. Audits also require software and financial capacity along with a fixed expenditure. In a hand-to-mouth environment, the hundreds of Jamaican organizations with no paid staffs will opt out. The capacity to take a chance on a donor or government contract does not exist.

Donor interviewees agreed that Jamaica’s CSO capacity problems are “severe”. Deficiencies include poor project management skills, difficulty putting a budget together, and poor human resource systems. One donor observed that Jamaican CSOs have weak proposal-writing skills and if “we excluded poorly-written proposals, we would have none”. Another donor interviewee concluded that even when University of the West Indies participates in a donor-funded project, project delivery can be “below what is expected”.

NGO interviewees agreed with these donor assessments even if they differed in how they framed the capacity issue. Interviewees noted that to pick up a bid document, the CSO has to pay which starts the process “off on the wrong foot”. The organizations already felt that they are living “hand to mouth” as they struggle to pay the light bills, salaries, and so on. Paying for a bid document was yet another burden. Specifically, they argued that Jamaica’s operational costs are higher than in other countries and thus both donors and the government have cost maximums too low for the Jamaican context.

Other CSO leaders called the capacity issue a “long worn out story” since some organizations do have enough capacity. Instead blame was placed upon the government for “excessive bureaucratization” and for its obsession with “rules and hierarchy”. Donor paperwork was also considered excessive. Interviewees complained that if they win
more than one donor contract that an organization must keep separate contract accounts which posed an administrative and financial challenge.

Even fundraising appeared to pose problems for closing any financial gaps. Interviewees considered organizations like the Jamaican Cancer Society to be a successful fundraiser even if this researcher found no comprehensive source of fundraising data for Jamaica. Interviewees noted that the typical “have a fish fry to raise money” idea earns little revenue and that Jamaica’s fundraising knowledge remains “basic”. In an answer exhibiting Jamaica’s distrust and victimization epidemic, an interviewee complained that once an organization hits upon a unique fundraising idea, the others quickly copy it and within a short period, the idea’s effectiveness is lost. In other words, why bother?

CONCLUSIONS

This paper began with several goals. The first was to defend why we should evaluate the existence of collaborative governance within a developing country. Concepts and theories must be tested through comparative exercises. Comparison allows our discipline an opportunity to learn varying circumstances. This knowledge reframes what we thought we knew and creates a more deeply understood theory or concept. The demand that our discipline should engage in comparison is not new (e.g. Dahl, 1947; Jessup, 1948).

The second goal was to take the collaborative governance concept and place it within a broader continuum of interactive activities between the state and civil society. This expansion does not directly challenge earlier conceptualizations about collaborative governance. Instead, this paper asks scholars to further specify what is meant by “non-collaborative”. At the system level, non-collaboration can imply the prevalence of an authority-based or market-based system model. But once our analyses dig into the system itself, we may wish to consider adding other categories of state and civil society interaction. Collaboration is not an all or nothing affair. This study used the tokenistic component of the Arnstein scale in combination with the cooperation, coordination, and collaboration continuum (Arnstein, 1969; Keast et al., 2007) but other scholars may prefer continuums of shorter or longer length. Depending upon the case study, a scholar’s continuum choice may require extension into Arnstein’s non-participative and citizen control categories.

The third goal was to encourage collaborative governance scholars to consider the historical contexts framing relations between the state and civil society. Meso-history is often overlooked in the typical collaborative governance study in which the relationships being examined come either from similar historical circumstances and/or are already successful examples of collaboration. Tang and Mazmanian (2009) proposed sev-
eral theoretical frames for structuring collaborative governance research. A study purpose was not to reflect upon each theoretical option but instead to question their ahistorical nature. Historical institutionalism offers one option for understanding how historical choices frame institutional outputs and interactions. This third goal is also relatable to the first two. Comparative studies of collaborative governance open to considering a continuum of state-society relations may, by necessity, require short historical expositions. Over time we may learn that particular systems, societies, and institutional structures are more or less likely to encourage collaborative governance.

By focusing on the Jamaican case, several other observations were made. The nature of this single case study and the difficulty of interviewing all Jamaican civil society actors emphasize this study’s exploratory nature. Future comparative work may discover that certain Jamaican observations are or are not applicable elsewhere. The applicability of the Brinkerhoff (1999a, 1999b) framework for studying civil society and state relations in Jamaica may imply that the framework could be suitably applied to other developing countries. Future scholars may wish to consider this paper’s addition of capacity constraints to any analysis. The overarching observation specific to Jamaica is that current state and civil society relations appear to be non-collaborative. The envisioned equality between state and civil society found in published collaborative governance case studies does not yet occur in Jamaica. At best, these relationships may be considered consultative.

Since 2002, the Government of Jamaica has explicitly encouraged government consultation with civil society on major policy initiatives. After years of internal government review, the Jamaican government published its plan to reduce the public sector wage bill (GOJ, 2011). Since early 2011, the JLP administration has sought citizen opinion on its modernization plan via various meetings across the country. These meetings reflect an earlier Ministry Paper tabled before Parliament in 2002. Drafted by the former PNP administration, the paper encouraged government leaders to “consult” with affected citizens on major policy shifts (GOJ, 2005). But do these meetings simply sell the completed plan or are citizens allowed to concretely change it? In other words, do NGOs witness consultation, cooperation, or even collaboration? It is too early to know whether such discussions will lead to concrete plan shifts. The December 2011 general election, the PNP’s return to power, a stagnant economy, and new IMF negotiations complicate lesson-drawing activities (Economist, 2012).

There are other observations. Many NGO interviewees conveyed a tone of victimization. The most innocent party in the room was the civil society actor. This may be true. But at the same time, civil society complaints about having to hire auditors or to separately account for funds received are typical requirements for actors seeking to increase outsider perceptions of their accountability. These audit and accounting requirements are common to both developed and developing countries. The burden certainly may be heavier in a low-capacity country but the requirement is not unique. Secondly, without further investigation into actual operational cost limits placed upon civil society by donors or the government, it remains unverified whether the common 10 to 12 percent operational limit is too low. This limit reflects acceptable standards within the United States about how much overhead per dollar donated is acceptable for social service de-
livery activities. Even so, Jamaica is not the United States. Energy costs are easily double the American average. Even the most frugal energy-saver cannot substantially lower Jamaica’s extraordinarily high electric and fuel rates. Operational cost calculations are an issue but perhaps not as prohibiting as other barriers.

The largest barriers to collaborative relationships between the state and civil society are issues of societal distrust, current legal and regulatory structures plus a Jamaican post-independence history non-conducive to fostering collaborative (and non-paternalistic) relations. Collaboration, by its very nature, is not paternalistic. Solving the informal nature of tax exempt status provision, increasing Companies Registrar employee understanding of civil society needs, and reforming the National Contracts Commission are technical and human resource fixes. These fixes are possible given current Jamaican capacities. Any future effort to fix such barriers might benefit less from a state-dominated paternalistic approach to change but instead a highly collaborative engagement with civil society actors.

Nevertheless, a broader structural shift such as encouraging greater CSO provision of social services will not occur overnight. The difficulty of the current efforts to lower the public sector wage bill, the dependence of Jamaican society upon those public sector workers, and the paternalistic nature of the Jamaican state will make change difficult. The movement for independence was built upon the efforts of organizations like Jamaica Welfare. Like other developing countries desirous of controlling their newly-independent state and quickly overcoming colonial inequities, Jamaica chose a state-led path of development. This path effectively circumscribed civil society activism by the mid-to late 1970s. The persistence of a large public sector, the difficulty of lowering the wage bill and cutting excess public sector staffs makes civil society disenfranchisement especially difficult to solve. In the trade-off between state and civil society social service provisioning, the state has won every contest since independence. It is not that greater CSO social service delivery could benefit the state, civil society, and Jamaica’s citizens but that greater CSO social service delivery threatens the state. In a society distrustful of basic state institutions, there appears to be an opportunity for civil society to re-emerge. But along with societal distrust of state institutions there is a general Jamaican societal distrust of each other, as citizens, within the society. This distrust may help retain the state’s role as Jamaica’s default “great equalizer” and keep the prospect of a truly collaborative governance arena a distant one.

NOTES

1 E.g. structural choice politics, the IAD framework, and transaction cost analysis.
2 Golding has been involved with the ruling JLP for most of his political life. But in September 1995, desirous of a third-way between Jamaica’s two main parties, he left the JLP and created the National Democratic Movement (NDM). After NDM’s poor showing in a 1997 general election and 2001 by-election, Golding considered a return to the JLP. Key to this negotiation was an assumption that long-serving JLP Leader Edward Seaga must depart from the JLP if Golding were to become party leader.
leader. To become party leader, Golding needed an electorally-safe constituency. His prior JLP constituency was already taken and so the decision was made for Golding to represent the same West Kingston area in which Coke, its alleged don, “controlled”. This constituency had been Seaga’s constituency before Golding’s return to the JLP.

Coke’s decision was likely influenced by his father’s prior detention history. His father, also an alleged criminal leader, died in an accidental prison fire while awaiting trial in Jamaica.

3 Coke’s decision was likely influenced by his father’s prior detention history. His father, also an alleged criminal leader, died in an accidental prison fire while awaiting trial in Jamaica.

4 Michael Manley was Prime Minister twice: March 1972 to October 1980; February 1989 to March 1992. Seaga was Prime Minister between November 1980 and February 1989.

5 Interviewees were asked if the J$250,000 floor (as provided by the Contractor-General) might ignore lower-value contracts won by CSOs. The interviewees said no contracts would have been missed since a J$250,000 contract is “hardly enough for an organization to do anything” and such amounts were “a waste of time”.

6 Publicly-available information about contracts greater than J$30,000,000 could not be found. Contracts valued at less than J$250,000 are not managed by the Contractor-General or the NCC and are obtainable (at least theoretically) from the Ministries or Agencies procuring the service.

7 The final six civil society contracts were provided by another five public entities: Office of the Children’s Advocate; Southeast Regional Health Authority; Jamaica Library Service; Jamaica Cultural Development Commission; E-Learning Company.

8 The policy component was “the degree of technical expertise required, the time frame within which results and impact occur, the array of interests affected, and their distributive consequence” (D. W. Brinkerhoff, 1999a, p. 76). This paper replaces the policy-type variable with a capacity variable.

9 Contractors are classified by the NCC based on the following characteristics: “financial soundness; technical and managerial competence and experience; general level of expertise; specialization in the supply of the relevant goods or services or in the carrying out of the relevant works; equipment and other resources” (GOJ, 1983/1985/1999). The 2008 Contractor-General Act specifies how government is to procure. The most important definitions cover “prospective contractor” and “consultant”. A “prospective contractor” means “any person, Firm or entity proposing to obtain the award of a Government contract” while “consultant” means a “contractor or prospective contractor service provider whose services are primarily intellectual in nature” (GOJ, 1983/1985/1999). These definitions do not elucidate whether CSOs may bid on a government contract. The consultant category does not appear on paper to qualify a CSO although interviewees noted that the government can designate (at their discretion) a CSO’s services as “consultory” to get around the Contractor-General’s regulations.
REFERENCES


