ABSTRACT
This commentary does not deal with politicians within the university or at the federal or municipal levels, limiting itself to persons, whether elected or appointed, in government office at the provincial level. In addition to the university's "primary" area of interaction with government (Universities Minister, Grants Commission, Premier), there is an important "secondary" area (for example, Health, Agriculture, Energy and Resources, Industry, Labour, etc.) where there must be co-operation but where differing responsibilities imply different objectives. Examples are given to show that on the government side there has in recent years been a diminishing concern to prevent such differences from becoming clashes. In the "primary" sector the direction in which the relationship has moved in recent years has been downward. Public reaction against the universities and disunity within them have combined to invite government infringement upon university autonomy and abridgement of commitments; examples are given. The reasons for the absence of public protest are analyzed. A general conclusion is that a university's relations with government reflect primarily the realities of power and influence of the moment.

RÉSUMÉ
Les présidents d'université et les politiciens
La communication présente ne traite ni de politiciens au sein de l'université, ni de ceux aux niveaux fédéral ou municipal. Elle se limite aux personnes, soit élues soit nommées, détenant des postes au niveau provincial. Outre le domaine "primaire" d'action réciproque entre l'université et le gouvernement (ministre responsable des Universités, commissions de subventions, premier ministre), il existe un domaine "secondaire" (par exemple, la Santé, l'Agriculture, l'Énergie et les Resources, l'Industrie, le Travail) où s'avère essentielle une collaboration entre les deux. Pourtant, ici, il s'agit de diverses responsabilités impliquant des objectifs différents. On donne des exemples pour illustrer que, du côté du gouvernement, les efforts vont en se diminuant pour éviter que de telles différences ne deviennent des conflits. Au secteur "primaire", les rapports université/gouvernement reculent depuis quelques années. La réaction publique défavorable à l'égard des universités et le manque

*Originally a lecture in a series entitled "University Presidents and the Politicians" presented at University College in January and February, 1977, as part of the University of Toronto Sesquicentennial celebrations.

**After service at the University of Toronto and the University of Chicago, Dr. Sirluck served from 1970 to 1976 as President of the University of Manitoba, from which he took his B.A. in 1940.
The title of this series poses an initial question of scope. Taking “politicians” in an only slightly extended sense, the university itself is full of politicians. The university’s favorite metaphor of itself is “a community of scholars,” and as members of a quasi-community the university’s staff and students stand in a quasi-political relation with each other and with the whole. Those with a responsibility on behalf of others—administrators, staff and student leaders—may, from this point of view, be thought of as “politicians”; and the greater such responsibility—vested or voluntary, actual or pursued—the more “political” (other things being equal) will its holder or seeker be. In this sense, every time the president, himself inescapably “political,” deals with a dean or department head, a spokesman for the Faculty Association or the Student’s Union, or a representative of any of the myriad recognizable interests in the university, he is dealing with a “politician.” This is a fascinating story (I’m sometimes unsure whether to think it a comedy with tragic aspects or a tragedy with a comic subplot), instructive and well worth the telling, but it must await its turn. For the present I will take “politicians” only in the sense of persons involved in government.

This still leaves us with far too large a subject to manage in one lecture, so I will set aside federal and municipal politics, although these too constitute stories worth telling, and limit myself wholly to provincial politics. Further, in an act of great self-denial, I will refrain from including politicians in Opposition or private members on the government side, although this means foregoing the comedy of the irresponsible, or rather of those without responsible office (I do not say that it means foregoing the theatre of the absurd). My lecture thus limits the scope of “politicians” to those, whether elected or appointed, in government office at the provincial level.

I think most people, in considering the title “University Presidents and the Politicians” as I’ve just delimited it, would envision university presidents individually or in formed committees interacting with their respective Ministers of University Affairs (or Higher Education, or whatever the nomenclature of the province), and, less frequently, with their provincial premiers. Deputy ministers and other civil servants would be involved, but these are not politicians, are they? In most provinces a committee or commission advisory to government would also be involved, but again these are not supposed to be political. Other politicians might involve themselves from time to time, chiefly when the estimates of the Department of University Affairs are being debated, but their relation to the university president would be occasional and remote. The canvas would not appear very crowded.

This picture, which rises out of the usual constitutional arrangements for universities in Canada, may correspond to the actual situation of some universities of narrow scope. But in most major universities, particularly those which used to be called the “provincial” universities and which still have all or most of the professional faculties in the province, it corresponds to only a part of the situation—albeit the central part—and the university’s (or the
university president's) other interactions with politicians are significant both in their own right and also because they influence this primary or "constitutional" interaction. It will therefore be useful to defer our treatment of the "primary" interaction until we have some sense of the range and nature of these "secondary" interactions. To get the richest mix of implications, let us postulate a situation (true in most provinces) where the "provincial" university comprises the bulk of the pool of research and consulting expertise regularly and locally available to government.

The most obvious of the additional areas of government to interact with such universities is the Department of Health, which characteristically contributes substantially to the teaching and research costs of the Faculty of Medicine, and on occasion to such faculties as Dentistry, Nursing, and Pharmacy. It also controls the entry into and the conditions of practice in these professions, and is usually their largest single employer. Another area of government which typically makes substantial and regular contributions to a professional sector and employs many of its graduates is the Department of Agriculture, which relates directly to such faculties as Agriculture, Engineering, and, where there is one, Veterinary Science; indeed, the Faculty of Agriculture sometimes contractually constitutes the research arm of the provincial Department of Agriculture. I am not personally familiar with the arrangements where forestry and fisheries are the major resource industries, but I understand they are roughly comparable.

Next is a group of government departments whose financial contributions are less regular and usually rise out of particular projects, but which are in virtually constant interaction with particular university sectors. Energy, Mines, and Resources (nomenclature and organization vary among provinces) depends heavily upon the Faculty of Engineering and the Department of Earth Science, and to a lesser extent upon departments of Landscape Architecture and Planning. Departments such as Highways, Urban Affairs, Housing, and Industry rely upon the same group of faculties and in varying degrees also upon the Faculty of Administrative Studies and the departments of Economics, Geography, Psychology, Applied Mathematics and Statistics. Welfare relates to the School of Social Work and the Department of Psychology, as does the Department of Corrections, which also relates to the Faculty of Law.

Next is a group of government departments whose financial contributions are limited but which have strong and direct professional interdependence with specific faculties: the Department of Education with the Faculties of Education and Physical Education, the Attorney-General's Department with the Faculty of Law.

Then there are some government departments, such as Northern Development, Native Peoples, Tourism, Recreation, and Culture, whose contributions and requirements vary greatly in significance from year to year, and often traverse a number of university sectors.

A relatively recent but now crucial involvement is that of the Department of Labour. It has certain needs which relate it to specific university sectors (for example, Administrative Studies, Law, Economics), but since the advent of unionization in universities it is particularly interested in the university as employer.

This list (in which I have made no attempt to be comprehensive), when added to the "primary" or "constitutional" involvement of the Universities Minister, the advisory committee, and the Premier, may suggest that virtually all departments of the provincial government are involved with the university (and the university president). That would not be
much of an exaggeration, for even those which are not directly involved as exemplified here are, I am told, sometimes vociferous enough in Cabinet when spending or policy is determined.

II

A university's "secondary" relations with government must involve an element of conflict—if not of persons then at least of interests—because even while the parties are working together their responsibilities differ greatly. With determined goodwill and sustained deference to the other side's needs such differences of interest can be prevented from becoming clashes between persons and therefore between the institutions, but this requires adequate motivation, and it will be a theme of this lecture that on the government side such motivation has been on the wane in recent years.

Let us look at some ways in which conflicts in the "secondary" sector may develop. Given the multiplicity of provincial departments with regular or occasional interests in one or other university sector, and the marked preference of government departments for acting on their own rather than channeling their money through a sister (and perhaps competing) department, there will be a tendency for direct lines to develop between government departments and university units, bypassing both the Minister of University Affairs and the university president until some contract or grant requires the latter's approval. Unless the proposed contract clearly violates university policy, this is a bad stage at which to stop it, since expectations will have been raised, plans laid, and often anticipatory money spent or commitments made. On the other hand, each time a contract which has run such a course is approved the path is smoothed for further unreported negotiations leading to faits accomplis, until the point is reached where the coherence of the university, the direction of its development, and the balance of its parts are at risk, and to protect them it becomes necessary to assert the timely presence of the central administration. If, as is likely, this is done by a new president, unencumbered by previous ex post facto approvals, suspicion and resentment are immediately aroused on both the government and university sides: does the new man mean to withdraw the university into an ivory tower? or, if he means it to retain a service function, does he intend to seize all power for his office?

Let us assume that after some time the president has succeeded in having referred to his office for early scrutiny all major proposals that seem to have a chance of materializing. To allay the suspicion and resentment which the inauguration of such a procedure will cause, he is likely to lean over backward to try to support projects a faculty wants. Some will give him no trouble: there are research and service agreements in effect which bring important benefits to both sides, with few if any adverse consequences. But many proposals will give him trouble: trouble of one sort if he approves, trouble of another sort if he doesn't. Suppose, for example, an inherently desirable project is jointly developed by a government department and a university faculty and put forward as a three-year pilot—to put, let us say, a field section of Social Work into a remote northern area full of social problems. The university would learn a good deal about northern social conditions, the northern community would benefit, a promising educational experiment would be undertaken; and the only real criticism is that funding beyond the initial three years is not in the proposed contract. The government department explains unofficially that it is against policy to make longer com-
mitments, but that if the experiment goes well continued support may be expected. If the president holds out for firmer guarantees he is likely to thwart a good undertaking, frustrate the faculty, and alienate an influential government department. He will probably accept the financial risk. Three years later, when the experiment is seen to be successful, the university may be told that the financial situation has changed, the government department must retrench, no funds are available to subsidize the project further, and the university ought to regard it as an established feature of its program to be carried on its own budget. Of course if the government is retrenching it is all too likely that the university is already feeling the results directly, and carrying the project on its own budget will be at the expense of its established operations. Nevertheless, since winding the project up would be an educational loss and would upset the faculty, hurt the affected communities, and anger the government (and not only the department in question), the likelihood is that the university will keep the project going at its own cost, with some of its other operations diminished.

To take another kind of situation: suppose a government department refuses to recognize an important element of university policy — let us say its commitment to the freedom of publication by its researchers of the results of their research. Suppose the difference surfaces only after a highly desirable but politically explosive project is well under way, say an impact study of the proposed flooding, for hydro-electric development, of an area populated by native peoples. Suppose this has led to a hard, damaging struggle, partly public, in which the university manages to maintain its position, but despite this outcome the government department continues to reject the university’s policy of research openness. Suppose a later joint venture is proposed, again an inherently desirable one, and the university insists this time on spelling out in advance the policy of openness and its practical implementation; there may well be a threatening and punitive response from the government department.

There may also be proposals which are simply unacceptable and would never be considered were it not that they emanate from government. Suppose a government department has, at substantial cost and using independently contracted personnel, developed a special instructional package, say on labour history and economics, designed for a particular target, such as remote-area industrial workers, and then, finding that the targeted consumers are not interested unless they get university credit for the course, tries to arrange with one of the province’s universities to give such credit. Suppose that university’s senate rejects the proposal because of certain biases and defects in the material, and the department tries the other universities, whose presidents reject it. An offer by the universities to provide, at cost and for academic credit, the kind of instruction desired, but using the universities’ own staffs and materials (including anything academically acceptable in the specially-prepared package) is unlikely to allay the resentment of the thwarted department.

An opposite situation leading to conflict is where one government department, say Education, makes an essentially good decision, for example to increase the academic requirements for public-school teacher certification, and then its sister department of University Affairs refuses to assist the university in meeting the resultant increase in workload (for the “provincial” university cannot think of refusing such a burden). The university, which may not have been properly consulted about the action, is likely to find the situation particularly galling if the same minister presides over both departments.

In some jurisdictions government ideology may be a fruitful source of conflict, for example where the Minister of Labour is seen by most of the government’s supporters (and sees
himself) as the Minister for labour, particularly organized labour. Because of its history and nature, the university is likely everywhere to be the slowest really large employer to be unionized. In a particular university there may also have been, at an earlier time (or it may be suspected that there were), deliberate efforts to prevent unionization. If so, when a new thrust for unionization comes, most likely first from the non-academic staff, organizers are likely to want the open assistance of the Labour Minister, which may come in a very rough form. Assistance in the unionization of the academic staff, which may be demanded next, may require more than blunderbuss attacks on the university (although these may well continue); among other things it may require legislation, with attendant hearings and debates, and perhaps protracted proceedings in the Department’s Labour Board. After unionization there may be further occasions for assisting unions during negotiations and strikes, all of which is likely to add materially to the tension between the Department and the university, or at least those sectors of the university not favored by the Department.

Another example of conflict bred of ideology may be found in those jurisdictions where there is a history of mistrust between the governing party and certain professions. The health area is a particularly visible, although by no means unique, example. If a no-deterrent, fully government-paid medicare system has been installed, there will probably have been government pressure for great and rapid expansion of the medical faculty. When the costs grow burdensome, however, a government suspicious of the medical profession is likely to try to force reductions in the earnings and changes in the method of compensation for the full- and part-time medical faculty, to change the Faculty’s distribution of specialties and the balance between specialists and generalists, and to reduce the number of research fields and the attention and space devoted to research. Hostility between the government and the medical profession will make the president’s involvement in such issues all the more difficult.

These are some examples of how conflict may develop between the university and those departments which constitute the university’s “secondary” involvement with government. Sometimes the president will be seen by the government department as the cause of conflict, particularly when it is he who says no to a proposal or insists upon implementing university policy against the wishes of a minister. But whether the president is seen in this way or not, ministers who have been in conflict with the university, or whose departments have been, are not very likely to urge their colleague the Minister of University Affairs to be generous in the grant to the university, or advise restraint in any harsh measures he wishes to take beyond the financial area. There will usually also be examples of successful co-operation and good relations in the secondary sector, but in my own experience the conflicts rising from this sector were much the more influential in determining the government’s attitude toward the University. It is possible that this was due to local factors and accidents of personality, but I think that ministerial conflict with a faculty or with the president is always more likely to be generalized into hostility to the university than ministerial co-operation into support for the university as a whole.

III

I turn now to the “primary” sector of the university’s involvement with government, the Ministry of University Affairs, the advisory committee, and the Premier. I have time only to illustrate what in my experience has been the main trend of recent years. Were I to give
a balanced account of the whole relationship there would be a number of positive aspects to report, particularly in the opening years of the decade, but all I can hope to do in the remainder of this paper is indicate the direction in which the relationship has moved, which is downward.

It is now an old story that the hopes of much of society focused during the late 1950’s and much of the 1960’s on education, particularly higher education. As a result, universities acquired great influence with governments, which expected to use them for both social and political gains. In addition to this direct influence of the universities there was their indirect power through their influence with the public: governments were very wary of incurring voter disapproval either by holding back on university support or by taking actions which might be denounced by universities as harmful to their nature or function. (At the time, most segments of the university community were still reasonably united in their view of how government should relate to the universities, although some students and support staff were beginning to depart from this consensus.) Accordingly, in addition to giving universities a steadily increasing share of resources, governments went to great lengths to avoid the appearance of interfering with universities, and to almost equal lengths to avoid the reality. Certainly I found this to be true in Ontario, and I believe it was true in most other provinces. When I went to Manitoba in 1970, where a new government had recently been elected, the Minister of Colleges and Universities Affairs told me, only half in jest, that he understood he was not supposed even to phone me lest it seem an intervention. On several occasions in the next year or so he spoke of his unwillingness to take actions which some successor less committed to university autonomy could treat as precedents for a policy of intervention.

But by the early 1970’s the reaction which had begun with the radical student movement of the 1960’s and was intensified by other forms of campus strife and by the under-employment of university graduates, the slowing of enrolment growth, the universities’ increased contribution to the tax burden, and other factors, had stripped the universities of much of their magic in the public eye, and with it a good deal of their influence with politicians and governments. Furthermore, the earlier near-consensus of the university community about how government should relate to the universities had largely disintegrated, and some voices within the universities were calling for governments to intervene in various ways in matters which had been earlier thought to be internal responsibilities. These voices could be heard in Manitoba as elsewhere, and the response to one such call of the Minister of Universities Affairs (the same person who had two or three years earlier been so scrupulous about university autonomy) is most instructive.

A difficult and painful tenure case had disturbed the University of Manitoba for almost two years. A negative decision, taken on the recommendation of the departmental and faculty tenure committees, had been appealed (as provided for under the University of Manitoba Act) to the Board of Governors, and after a marathon hearing the Board had sustained the withholding of tenure but ruled that there be a special twelve-month extension of appointment, with a new tenure hearing before a new committee. Getting a new committee within the university seemed impossible because of the narrowness of the specialty and the number of persons who had already been involved, so a proposal was made to the Board for an Advisory Committee from outside. This was approved, and in due course the committee visited the University, made its assessment, and advised negatively; the faculty tenure committee, by now reconstituted according to the request of the Faculty Association
as modified by Senate, supported the recommendation, and tenure was once again denied. The candidate, supported by the Faculty Association, asked the Board to hear another appeal, and the Board, pointing out that under the Act it had a discretion on hearing appeals and that its intention in arranging a new tenure hearing by a new committee would be frustrated if it thereafter heard a new appeal, rejected the request. The Executive of the Faculty Association, accompanied by the Executive Secretary of the Canadian Association of University Teachers, then went to the Minister, argued that the decision by the Board not to hear a second appeal was unjust, said that if the Faculty Association achieved unionization it would insist that such matters go to binding arbitration by an external panel, and asked him to require the University to submit to such an arbitration in the present case. The Minister urgently summoned the Chancellor and me (he was unwilling to wait until the Chairman of the Board, who lived out of town, could arrive), informed us of the Faculty Association—CAUT action, said that he had not intended to intervene but the Faculty Association request had changed his mind, said that he didn’t doubt the University’s integrity but that “justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done,” and asked the University forthwith to submit the case to arbitration. If it did not do so, he said, he would; he had not looked to see whether he had the legal power, but if he hadn’t he would get it, which would have much graver consequences for the University’s autonomy than a “voluntary” use of arbitration. I asked why, if what the Faculty Association wanted was justice, it didn’t use the courts, a procedure widely followed elsewhere in such matters and one which might circumscribe but did not threaten university autonomy and the special and valuable status of tenure. His reply was prompt and revealing: because the professor “wouldn’t stand a chance in court.”

When all this was reported to an emergency meeting of the Board of Governors, it decided that the damage to the University of submitting to the Minister’s will, although great, was less than would otherwise ensue. I will not trouble you with the extreme difficulty then encountered in reaching an arbitration agreement, the University finding itself dealing with three parties simultaneously who were not always in accord: the professor (whose salary was, at the Minister’s demand, continued, although he had no duties), the Faculty Association, and the CAUT. When, after a very long time, and acting always through legal counsel on both sides, the agreement was completed, each side named a member of the panel and the Chief Justice of Canada named the chairman. There were lengthy hearings, conducted over a two-month period. The decision, when it finally came, was unanimous: even the complainant’s nominee agreed that tenure should not be given. Since the case had given the University a great deal of bad publicity and cost it an enormous amount of money, time, and turmoil (along with even more serious consequences), I sent the report to the man who had been the Universities Minister at the time (he had since been moved to another portfolio). He wrote back a three-liner congratulating the University: “justice had both been done and been seen to be done!” He did not offer to compensate the University for the costs of this visibility.

It is important to recognize that what is involved is a change in attitude, not just a disposition to intervene (although that may also have been present). There are many evidences that there was such a change; I choose one because of its illuminating chronology. In 1970 a joint Board/Senate Committee recommended an increase in tuition fees. There was not at the time much financial pressure on the University, but some members of the Board, anti-
anticipating that there would be, thought the recommendation should be implemented. Others were unconvinced, and some thought it would be contrary to government wishes and therefore counter-productive. At a meeting with the Universities Grants Commission we asked whether the Commission or the government had a position on the matter. The UGC's answer was that fees were in the jurisdiction of the University. At the time I thought a fee increase unwise, and the Board accepted this view. By 1972 the financial situation had changed enough for the question to be raised again with the UGC, since despite the earlier response it would be imprudent to increase fees contrary to government wishes. The answer was superficially the same: it was up to the University. There were, however, some indirect indications that a fee increase would not be welcome to the government, and the University took no action. In the following year, when the University was experiencing considerable financial pressure, there was renewed discussion of a possible increase, Manitoba's fees being by that time considerably lower than most. In a newspaper interview the Minister (the same man who had a few years earlier been so scrupulous about the University's autonomy) stated that "unequivocally there will not be any tuition fee increases"! The University learned about this from the newspaper story, and the university community, together with the public, drew appropriate inferences about the government's changed attitude, not only toward the University's autonomy but toward the University itself, to which it could find no less damaging a way to reveal its will than through the press.

My most educational encounter with politicians was very complex and protracted, and fully reflected the changing government attitude. During 1973 inflation was heating up, the unionization of the support staff was in effect completed, and that of the faculty was slowly moving forward. In October there was a 23-day strike of the second-largest union, and the settlement affected all staff costs. The University made appropriate representations to the UGC concerning increased operating costs for the coming year, explaining that the alternative, a reduction in staff, would not only mean a decline in quality but would be regarded as intimidation by the new and nascent unions, and arguing that by comparison with other major universities the University of Manitoba was underfunded and its salary structure too low. When the grant for 1974-75 was announced the Board of Governors, the majority of whom were government appointees, took the position that it was inadequate, and that to remain within it would mean a serious decline in the quality of the University, which the government had not indicated that it intended. The Board therefore adopted a "Phase One budget" which implied a large deficit for the coming year if salary settlements approximated current levels, and sent the Chairman and me to brief the Chairman of the UGC and then see the Minister (no longer the man involved in the incidents reported earlier), explain the situation to him, and report his reaction to the Board.

After we had briefed the Chairman and Vice-chairman of the UGC, we met with the Minister. When we had put the full situation before him, emphasizing the deficit implications of the Board's action and the alternatives, and explaining that we were to report his response to the Board, he said that the government did not desire a reduction in the quality of the University and that he was not disturbed by our budget plan. He told us of parallel situations (some of which had in fact influenced the Board's discussion); for example, he pointed out that the province's major hospital had been left in a potential deficit position until its negotiations with its unions were finished, and then been given a supplementary grant to enable it to meet the new levels; and he mentioned other analogous situations. So far as the Uni-
versity was concerned, he said, "if we have to go into deficit financing, we’ll go into deficit financing."

We reported the Minister’s response to the Board and the implementation of the budget began. The Chairman of the UGC started at once to work with our financial officers analyzing the most recent years from budget to expenditure, and told me just before his retirement at the end of June that he was getting the information he needed. However, we heard nothing through the summer, so in September a delegation of the Board met with the Minister and the Acting-Chairman of the UGC (the former Vice-Chairman), and formally requested that the Minister underwrite the deficit he had encouraged and bring the level of University funding to that of the expenditure we had previously shown him. Ten days later we got his reply: if we had a financial problem we should approach the UGC!

When we asked the UGC for a meeting they said that first they required new financial analyses for recent years, this time budget-to-budget. These took us two months working flat out to supply. Finally, late in December (three-quarters through the fiscal year), they saw us. They asked why, knowing that we were developing a deficit, we had not reduced our level of expenditure. When we replied by reporting the position taken in April by the Minister, the UGC said it had not been advised to that effect by the Minister.

At the end of February, after consultation with government, the UGC (whose new Chairman had until two months earlier been the University’s senior financial officer) announced its decision: it would assume half the deficit and give us five years to liquidate the other half, provided, among other conditions, we balanced the budget in fiscal 1975-76 (a month away). Taking into account the impact of the grant for 1975-76, announced at the same meeting, and comparing it with the level of current expenditures, we concluded that we would have to get almost $4 million out of the base for the immediately upcoming budget before allowing for salary and other essential increases. Because we had no option, we tried to do it, and one of the results was that we were unable to prevent a strike of our largest support staff union, due in part to a feeling of insecurity which affected everyone. There were other results, but I need not go into them here.

After some weeks the strike became a serious worry to government, for it loomed very large in the Manitoba context: in its 45 days it amounted to about one-seventh of all man-days lost in the province through strike or lockout action during the whole of 1975. Besides, although the essential work of the University continued, there was considerable turmoil on the campus, including some fairly spectacular incidents. There had therefore been growing demands that the Premier either settle the strike or make it possible for the University to do so. Finally, on April 25, the strikers marched on the Legislature demanding to see him; but at that moment he was, together with the Minister and the Chairman of the UGC, meeting with the Vice-Chairman of the Board and me, and an accommodation was worked out, subject however to being recommended by the UGC. It involved reducing the budget base (and with it of course the quality of the University) but spreading the required reduction about equally over two budgets instead of insisting on the ruinous instantaneity of the February dictum; and there would be a supplementary grant to meet the resultant deficit in the upcoming year. On the strength of this understanding we were able to come to terms with the striking union. The understanding seemed imperilled several times during the following weeks (when the strike was settled the government’s concern seemed to diminish), but in the end it held, and on June 20 the University was officially told that it could proceed with
its budget for the fiscal year then already a quarter finished, and that the further substantial
deficit it showed would be met by a supplementary grant.

For me this denouement of a turbulent and damaging, but highly instructive, action came
just in time. I believe that when a university president voluntarily retires from office he
should give a full year’s notice to enable the university to find and install a successor without
an interregnum; and my appointment period ran from July 1. With the strike settled (and
on reasonable terms), the deficit budget and supplementary grant approved, the term for
the liquidation of the remainder of the carryover deficit extended to ten years, and the inter-
nal situation much calmed, I felt that I had recovered a personal freedom of choice which I
could not have exercised during a crisis; and the crucial letter confirming the government’s
decision was in hand with ten days to spare before the talismanic twelve-month period would
begin. I promptly gave my year’s notice. I felt that I had completed my general education in
university-government relations. During the following year I did have something of a post-
graduate course, but I will not try to include anything from it here.

The most significant and ominous thing about the events I’ve narrated is that they brought
no great outcry, either from the general public or even (except concerning the tightness of
funds) from the campus itself. This quiescence has a number of causes. In the case of the
general public there is the reaction beginning in the late 1960’s to which I’ve already referred,
with its multiple sources. As this reaction gained momentum it revealed, and strengthened,
an always powerful current of anti-intellectualism in the society, characteristically hostile to
what it sees as unfounded pretensions on the part of the university (such as autonomy, aca-
demic freedom, and certain employment practices), and quick to believe that anyway the
university is too expensive. For this sector of the public the spectacle of the “over-privileged”
university getting its come-uppance was not unattractive. Certain elements in the media shared
this position and catered to it, not always with much regard to accuracy or proportion, and,
as is often the way with the media, devising villains and heroes. Many less hostile members of
the public were kept neutral by the bad publicity, especially concerning the purported tax
burden. There were some friends of the University willing to take a more supportive view,
and a very few spoke out, but most were puzzled and deterred by the cross-currents in the
university community itself, emphasized and exaggerated as they were by the media.

These internal differences were related to differences of interest. For example, although
a resolution was adopted in Senate condemning the Minister’s imposition of arbitration in
the tenure case, it was naturally opposed by the Faculty Association, which had sought the
action, and therefore was seen from outside (and especially by government) less as a protest
against the invasion of university autonomy than as part of the struggle over faculty unioni-
ization. Again, there were denunciations of the Minister’s dictum on tuition fees, but many
student representatives were pleased by it and said so, and certain other groups, which want-
ed the Student Union’s or the Minister’s support for their own ends, also defended it. As
for the long-drawn-out budget issue, the clash and swirl of interest and faction were almost
infinitely varied, encompassing the hostilities engendered by two major strikes, the polariza-
tion accompanying the partial unionization of the faculty, and panic fears and struggles
which broke out when the paper deficit suddenly turned into a real financial crisis. In short,
at a time of great change in the University, many divergent interests were struggling for pre-
ponderance and advantage, some of them using tactics which were effective for their imme-
diate purpose but seriously weakened the university’s influence with both public and govern-
ment, and therefore left it more exposed to pressure and reduced the support it could expect.

For if I have a general conclusion to draw from my experiences with politicians it is that (with allowance made for exceptional individuals) a university’s relations with government (or a university president’s with the “politicians”) reflect primarily the realities of power and influence of the moment. A corollary of this is that if politicians or governments do not wish to be bound by earlier commitments their promises are unenforceable by universities at a time of low influence.