The Nexus of Equality and Quality in Education: A Framework for Debate

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Valverde (1988) claims that the general public and many educators believe it is extremely difficult if not impossible simultaneously to provide excellent education to majority youngsters and to provide equality of opportunity to ethnic and racial minority students. We explore the paradox these two major goals present, namely that schools should promote both equality and quality but cannot foster both goals at once. We argue that the apparent antithesis of equality and quality results from mutually exclusive definitions obscuring the true relationship between the two constructs. In place of these definitions, we offer a model demonstrating that equality and quality are not only compatible but mutually supportive and enhancing.

Educational policy develops through a complex process of accommodation to competing demands for educational services. These competing demands reflect different visions of society and of schooling’s purpose. In this context, schools become a “symbolic battlefield . . . the ultimate public-policy crucible in which our vision of social purpose is tried” (Paquette, 1991, p. 2). We expect schools to be excellent but equally available to all, goals which many see as inherently contradictory. Savage (1988) describes this paradox thus:

One of the major challenges facing educators today is the creation of school systems which are both equal and excellent. Yet a common perception is that educators must make an either-or choice about excellence and equality, and that a major problem of educational policy is to negotiate the conflict between them. (p. 9)
In this paradigm, people see equality and quality as polar opposites on a linear continuum. To move toward one is to move away from the other; when you accommodate one, you do so at the other’s expense.

We associate the pursuit of equality as an educational policy goal providing compensatory education and special education for students viewed as “educationally disadvantaged” because of various factors, including poverty, social class, race, disability, or gender. Conversely, we associate the pursuit of quality with educating majority-group students, especially those thought to have “superior ability.” Given the presumed linear relation between equality and quality, advocates of each compete with each other for scarce educational resources in what we call the “E-Quality” debate. As complex issues distil into slogans, the debate is often reduced to demands, in the name of equality, for neighbourhood schools that include all students, versus the call in the name of quality for specialized classes, curricula, and schools for selected students.

Our purpose in this article is to contribute to an understanding of this debate by exploring the constructs of equality and quality. In particular, we hope to resolve the paradox these two major goals present, namely that schools should promote both equality and quality but cannot foster both goals at once. This brief discussion is divided into three parts. In the first two, we discuss the constructs of equality and quality, with a view to understanding each part of the paradox. In the third, we offer a synthesis of these two constructs, and, we believe, a resolution of the paradox.

THE CONSTRUCT OF EQUALITY

The notion of equality is as old as human thought but despite its universal appeal, it still remains an “elusive ideal”; in the words of Lucas (1965): “Equality is the great political issue of our time. . . . The demand for equality obsesses all our political thought. We are not sure what it is . . . but we are sure that whatever it is, we want it” (p. 296). The very concept of equality is a paradox. On the one hand, we often assert that all persons are equal but yet we realize that all people are not in fact equal, as stated by Blits (1990): “Every individual inherits some of the advantages or disadvantages of his ancestors and is largely influenced by the social conditions (education, family environment, and the like) in which fortune places him” (p. 309).

When governments attempt to define equality in law, they are no longer engaged in philosophical discourse, as their deliberations will result in the creation of various rights and obligations enforceable by the courts. Legal equality, however, does not mean treating everyone alike; rather, it means the distinctions laws make between groups are relevant to acceptable public purposes.

Equality is often a rhetorical and ideological battleground, where the interests of majority and minority groups are fought out, where rights of the individual are
pitted against rights of the collectivity. Equality can thus be used to describe various forms of distributive justice which, according to Rawls (1971), should be consistent with principles of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity. Equal citizenship assumes that although people may possess different qualities, and therefore be unequal in terms of merit, they are all of equal worth. “Equality of opportunity” refers to such divergent circumstances as the freedom to exercise one’s natural abilities and the redistribution of social or economic benefits.

Contemporary authors often discuss equality in terms of “fair play,” also known as procedural equality, and “fair shares,” also known as substantive equality. According to Vickers (1983), “fair play” aims at removing external barriers to allow people an equal opportunity to compete in “life’s race.” Gibson (1990) sees this as encompassing a wide variety of treatments:

Stingily applied, the fair play . . . model represents a stern and unsympathetic form of rugged individualism. Generously applied, it can accommodate a considerable measure of humanitarianism. (p. 63)

Vickers (1983) describes “fair shares” as a more expansive form of equality which promotes the collective welfare of all members of the community, regardless of their ability to compete in “life’s race.” Otherwise, disadvantaged individuals will still finish last, if they finish the race at all. As Bayefsky (1985) says, “Free to try. Born to lose” (p. 5).

Equality in the school setting is often termed equal educational opportunity (EEO), a construct that has evolved over time and that is defined differently by different commentators (Coleman, 1968). EEO begins with consideration of these similarities and differences among the children who come to school; these reflect internal factors, such as ability and interest, and external factors, such as socioeconomic status and cultural values, as well as interaction between the two. Inequalities can arise from inappropriate treatment of similarities and differences; that is, when we act on the basis of factors not relevant to the school context or fail to act on the basis of relevant factors. For example, EEO is denied or diminished when educators act on the basis of skin colour (irrelevant factor) or fail to compensate for a child whose home offers very little stimulation (relevant factor).

The provision of EEO can be analyzed in terms of inputs, throughputs, and outputs (Sutton, 1991). Inputs are the “raw material” of the educational process (e.g., human resources). Throughputs include what happens within the school as students are educated (e.g., how students are treated by teachers). The interaction of throughputs on inputs produces outputs (e.g., academic achievement). Murphy (1988) states that the emerging construct of EEO is access to learning, which is concerned more with how inputs are directed toward achieving school success. This perspective places the focus for EEO at the school level.
Much EEO literature is premised on the belief that students’ success in school should be determined by ability and effort, not class or wealth. There is considerable divergence, however, concerning the extent to which schools should attempt to compensate for such inequalities, from the neo-conservative position of simply protecting basic rights to the social-democratic position of redistributing economic benefits (Salomone, 1986). There is similar divergence on the means to achieve such goals and on whether equality can be achieved, or at least maximized, by dealing with diverse students together or separately, a quandary Minow (1990) describes as the “dilemma of difference.”

EEO aims, then, at reducing if not eliminating the *educational disadvantage* of *minority groups*. Once again, these terms are assigned different meanings by different authors (Pallas, Natriello, & McDill, 1989) and need to be qualified. For purposes of this discussion, “educational disadvantage” refers to conditions that impair a student’s ability to benefit from a meaningful educational experience. A “minority group” is understood as an identifiable sub-set of society, characterized by having less power and receiving pejorative treatment, and which is generally, but not always, a numerical minority compared to the dominant/majority group.

Although only educational disadvantages warrant the provision of EEO, in practice educational disadvantage usually stems from more general social and economic disadvantage. The narrow focus on education, however, recognizes that not all minority groups experience educational disadvantage and not every member of a disadvantaged group requires special treatment. Similarly, EEO policy must accommodate individuals who are not members of such groups but who require such treatment.

Students with disabilities are one group who have experienced unequal conditions and treatment for many years. These students, like those from other minority groups, have been excluded from and marginalized by the education system. The pursuit of equality for these students began with the right of access to the public school system. Once they are admitted to the system, emphasis shifts to appropriate placement and educational services. At present, the issue is framed largely in terms of their equal right to be educated in the *mainstream* with their age-appropriate peers and to receive an appropriate education.

Policy talk about educating students with disabilities reveals the range of meanings of equality discussed above, as well as the wider E-Quality debate. For example, some people believe equality for students with disabilities is fostered by a separate special education system. Others believe equality is best promoted by integrating these students in the mainstream of regular education. Opposition to integration is also voiced by those who fear it will be detrimental to non-disabled children. They argue that the attention and resources lavished, some would say wasted, upon students with disabilities compromise the *quality* of education offered to other students.
Defining quality or excellence is at least as problematic as defining equality or equity. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1975) defines “quality” as, *inter alia,* “the nature, kind, or character (of something); hence, the degree of excellence, etc. possessed by a thing” (Vol. 2, p. 1724). It defines “excellence” as “the state or fact of excelling; the possession of good qualities in an unusual degree” (Vol. 1, p. 695), where “excel” means “to be superior or preeminent, usually in good qualities or praiseworthy actions; to surpass others” (Vol. 1, p. 695). If we think of education as an input-throughput-output system, we can begin to think about superior resources (e.g., teachers), superior processes (e.g., classroom instruction), and superior products (e.g., graduation results). As suggested by the Oxford definitions, however, this conceptualization immediately begs the question—superior in relation to what, or to whom?

Strike (1985) contributes to our understanding of the E-Quality debate by exploring the meaning of quality as it applies to “norm-referenced” or “criterion-referenced” testing. In a norm-referenced definition, quality is understood in relation to a normalized distribution of performance with respect to some particular measure of quality. Quality thus becomes a “high score” compared to the norm. It is axiomatic, therefore, that only a limited number of schools or students can be excellent. As Strike (1985) puts it: “That only some can be excellent is true for the same reason that not everyone can be better than average” (p. 410). Before this approach can be used, however, one must first decide the reference group upon which to “norm the test.” Will it be schools in the province, in Canada, in North America, in the world? Will the reference group include all schools, only public schools, only academic schools?

The alternative approach is to define quality by some criterion (or criteria) that, at least in theory, is attainable by all, or most, schools. Obviously, the criterion can be set high enough that very few will meet it, or low enough that all will meet it. If this approach is used for some purpose other than to control the percentage of schools qualifying as excellent, however, the criterion must be defined in terms of schooling’s purpose. Thus, for example, if people are being trained to operate a piece of equipment, quality can be defined according to that purpose. Given the complex purposes of public education, defining such standards is not easy.

Whereas norm-referenced measures are concerned with meeting a relative standard (dependent benchmark), criterion-referenced measures are concerned with meeting some absolute standard (independent benchmark). In both approaches, one is confronted by two underlying questions: What is the purpose of education? What is the substance of the measure of quality, be the measure relative or absolute?

According to Wirt, Mitchell, and Marshall (1988), “the history of education has been driven by this search for Quality, whether in curriculum, teaching
As alluded to above, however, given the variety of interrelated and sometimes contradictory purposes of education, this quest has never been easy. The OECD report *Schools and Quality* describes this dilemma:

Despite the need for focus, a single, tight definition of “quality” would require making two questionable assumptions, first, that underlying the complexity of education systems is a set of relatively clear and non-conflicting goals that provide the measure of whether quality is being achieved, second, that it should be possible to apply these goals across OECD countries despite their diverse traditions and cultures and the variety of conditions prevailing even within national frontiers. It would also entail assuming that educational improvement is to be achieved through a standard model or plan that can be implemented in a “top-down” fashion. (OECD, 1988, cited in Freeland, 1991, p. 61)

Canada has no national report — not even a Royal Commission — to galvanize the educational community and the general public around the search for quality education. This is not surprising, given the federal government’s conspicuous absence from the educational policy scene in Canada. More activity has occurred at the provincial level; much policy talk on quality education used to stimulate reform in Canada, however, comes from the United States (Wideen, 1988).

In the United States, the reform movement is often described in terms of successive “waves of reform” (Lunenburg, 1992). The first wave was based on the assumption that the country’s educational problems could be attributed to low scholastic standards and poor teaching. Increased student testing and the establishment of curriculum standards and frameworks were the preferred vehicles of change to address problems of academic content. It is not surprising, therefore, that quality came to be defined by normative test scores. According to Howe (1987), this approach was simplistically presented by the media and accepted by the public to mean that “if scores go up, the schools are fine, if they go down, the schools are losing quality” (p. 200).

The second wave of reform was almost a mirror image of the first. As Hanson (1991) states, “if the first wave of educational reforms identified teachers as the problem, the second wave identified them as the solution” (p. 34). Models for restructuring schools, including an emphasis on school-based management and the “empowerment” of teachers, became the second wave’s currency. This decentralization of the solution to school improvement fostered increased diversity in the definition of its substance.

While reform waves have ebbed and flowed, John Goodlad has systematically thought and written about educational quality, as illustrated by the following extract from *A Place Called School* (1984):

[In order to improve the quality of schooling, we] need to involve students in a variety of ways of thinking, to introduce students to concepts and not just facts, to provide situations that provoke and evoke curiosity, to develop in students concern for one’s own
What emerges from the work of Goodlad (1984, 1990) and others is that quality is much more elusive than anything that can be measured on a standardized test. Contemporary thinking about educational quality emphasizes the process occurring in schools, using the principles of “total quality management” of W. Edwards Deming (Bonstingl, 1992). In this vision of educational quality, the student is both a consumer and a producer, who both benefits from and contributes to his or her own intellectual, personal, and social development. Educators must examine the whole range of effects current assessment practices have on students and on their capacity to learn and grow. This paradigm recognizes that the potential for success—and for failure—is much more closely associated with processes comprising the system than with individuals’ actions. It is the responsibility of educational leaders to provide the environment in which continuous improvement—that is, quality education—can be delivered.

This construct of educational quality (continuous improvement) is a visionary departure from the definition of educational quality in terms of competitive excellence, measured by norm-referenced achievement test scores. As set forth by Glasser (1992a):

> While a complete definition of quality is elusive, it certainly would include usefulness in the real world. And useful need not be restricted to practical or utilitarian. That which is useful can be aesthetically or spiritually useful or useful in some other way that is meaningful to the student—but it can never be nonsense. . . .

> What we want to develop are students who have the skills to become active contributors to society, who are enthusiastic about what they have learned, and who are aware of how learning can be of use to them in the future. (pp. 692, 694)

This construct is not Utopian or unconnected with the “real world”; on the contrary, it seeks to establish the school’s place in that world.

**SYNTHESIS OF EQUALITY AND QUALITY**

As we have shown, both equality and quality are difficult to define and mean different things to different people. In summary, equality, or equity, denotes fairness or justice and subsumes the notions of procedural and substantive equality. In the context of public schooling, it is often referred to as *equal educational opportunity* or *EEO*. EEO considers both similarities and differences among students and attempts, through various inputs, throughputs, and outputs, to provide an appropriate education to all students. EEO aims at reducing, if not eliminating, minority groups’ educational disadvantage. Disadvantage arises from both internal and external factors, such as skin colour and socioeconomic con-
Quality, or excellence, is generally understood to mean attainment that is superior based on some measure. In education, the concept has thus come to mean superior inputs, throughputs, and outputs of schooling. Describing anything as a measure of some attribute implies a reference point or scale, be it absolute or relative. We have seen that excellence is a key by-word of the reform movement. At first, and still for many, quality was measured by test scores — typically on standardized achievement tests, used to compare one school, school system, or jurisdiction to the larger group on which the test was normed. Increasingly today, quality is given a much broader meaning, one recognizing not only the measurable and non-measurable outputs of education, but also the process by which education takes place.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this article, the current debate portrays equality and quality as if they were linearly related, where a move toward one necessarily means a move away from the other. This presumed antithesis has been applied at the level of the system to exclude students altogether, within the system to track students into different programs and schools, and within programs and schools to group students by various ability-based criteria. As alluded to above, the evolution of policy for educating students with disabilities encompasses all three of these variations.

The defence of tracking, ability grouping, and a special education typically uses a linear conceptualization of equality and quality. Although some argue that such practices benefit all students, others suggest this claim often masks the “hidden agenda” of promoting the welfare of the most able. As Cummins (1986) states, “within democratic societies, contradictions between the rhetoric of equality and the reality of domination must be obscured” (p. 25).

Critics of the “most able” vision of quality point out its harmful effects on disadvantaged students — hence the characterization of critics as pro-equality, anti-quality. In fact, these critics are not opposed to quality, only to a vision of quality which is exclusionary. They argue that norm-referenced criteria for defining quality are inherently exclusionary because only those who are (significantly) above the mean are deemed to have attained quality standards. They assert that quality standards must instead embrace all students. Consider this statement by McCollum and Walker (1992):

Large scale reform efforts that lump all groups together by intent or by default will result in less than adequate responses to those students with other linguistic, cultural, or ability characteristics. . . . New attention must be directed to the diversity of our schools, recognizing that there can be excellence in diversity. . . . The long-term effects of unidimensional policies that ignore our increasingly pluralistic society suggest that we are headed for a future very different from the one painted in America 2000. Perhaps a true pursuit of excellence might better be served by a focus on the need for the more specialized and
If these visions are irreconcilably antithetical, the conflict arises not from opposing equality and quality, but from contrasting socio-political visions of society.

On the one hand are those who espouse a neo-conservative agenda, one characterized by maximum individual liberty, competition, self-sufficiency, minimum government intervention, and procedural equality. On the other hand, those advancing the social democratic agenda advocate substantive equality, cooperation, and community responsibility and accept, or even desire, considerable government intervention to accomplish their goals. In moderate forms, each agenda seeks a “level playing field” for all and the differences between them become shades of grey. In their extreme forms, the neo-conservative agenda promotes social Darwinism and the social democratic agenda promotes socialism. Shades of grey are replaced by starkly contrasting blacks and whites. Marcoulides and Heck (1990) express the effect of this conflict on education:

The dilemma posed for policymakers concerned with mediating the demands for both equity and excellence is suggested by a basic dichotomy in American education: whether education is to be viewed as a tool of empowerment or an instrument of selective mobility. (p. 307)

It is no accident that the ascendancy of the neo-conservative agenda and the advocacy of quality over equality have developed in a period of economic recession. In times of economic prosperity, stakeholders are more likely to view the equality agenda as something which can be accommodated, at least partially, with additional funds. In hard times, such demands are more likely viewed as competing for existing funds. As self-interest is not a fashionable slogan, the rhetoric of reform prefers the pursuit of quality as the symbol of its agenda.

When the more eclectic view of quality — that is, continuous learning for all — envisaged by Goodlad (1984, 1990), Glasser (1992b), Lezotte (1992), and others replaces the notion of equality linked to standardized achievement tests, the antithesis of equality and quality tends to dissipate, even if it does not disappear. This analysis leads us to conclude that equality and quality are in fact orthogonally related, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Using this paradigm, one can move toward or away from either equality or quality without necessarily moving toward or away from the other. Put another way, equality begs the question “Equitable for what?” whereas quality begs the question “Excellent for whom?” The orthogonal relation creates four quadrants that define the nexus of equality and quality. Using this approach, educational policies can be characterized as one of four types, according to how they promote equality and quality.
Type I policies are low on equality and low on quality. It is difficult to imagine policy makers consciously pursuing such policies but they do exist in practice. For example, a school board may separate students into two different streams or programs and virtually deny various students access to certain types of learning experiences. Policy makers may believe they are offering quality services to one or both of these streams, while in fact they are providing mediocre quality in each.

Type II policies pursue quality at the expense of equality, and exclude those who do not, or cannot, achieve the standards used to define quality. We do this when, for example, we create magnet or alternative schools, provide these schools with superior resources, and then restrict access to them to those students who meet predetermined academic prerequisites and can afford supplementary fees for extra-curricular activities.

Alternatively, one can pursue a type III policy; in this case, we aim at achieving equality at the expense of quality and include all students, without regard for any standards of quality. This approach is exemplified when we “dump” students with disabilities in a regular class without providing appropriate support.

Of greater interest, therefore, is whether, and if so how, one can pursue a type IV policy, one which maximizes both equality and quality. In this instance, we seek to provide a quality educational experience to all students, as discussed below.

This analysis shows that the apparent contradiction between equality and quality is a function of the particular definitions used to describe each construct. As soon as one accepts that each construct may be defined variously, then the conflict between equality and quality can be seen as a result, rather than a cause, of the debate. If quality is defined as by high achievement scores on normalized tests, it is impossible to provide EEO to all students. One can accommodate procedural equality but not substantive equality. If one wishes to pursue substantive equality, then one must sacrifice the normalized standard of quality. This dichot-
omy may be mitigated by a criterion-referenced definition of quality, depending on the reference point used to define quality. The presumed antithesis, however, can be resolved only when quality is defined as continuous improvement.

The analysis also exposes the fact that quality has been appropriated by one side in a socio-political debate, a side whose real agenda is better expressed by the slogan “quality for my group, but not for yours.” Some would argue that this posture reflects overt prejudice and the use of schools to maintain class domination (Shujaa, 1993), a recurrent theme in the EEO literature (e.g., Hurn, 1985; Porter, 1979).

This synthesis suggests that type IV policies, which we call E-Quality policies, are not only desirable but attainable. E-Quality education does not mean the same education, either in form or in content, for all students. Not all students need or want to learn exactly the same facts and skills, any more than they all have the same aspirations, be they personal, social, academic or vocational. E-Quality education occurs when such diversity is accepted, and when curriculum and teaching methods, to name but two variables, are adapted to meet these individual needs. Skrtic (1991) states that student diversity is a problem only in schools “premised on standardization and thus configure themselves as performance organizations that perfect student programs for known contingencies” (p. 177). By contrast, he asserts, “student diversity is not a liability in a problem-solving organization; it is an asset, an enduring uncertainty, and thus the driving force behind innovation, growth of knowledge, and progress” (p. 177).

It is important to emphasize the in-school interactions which occur between students themselves, as well as those which occur between students and adults, as these interactions represent a dimension of E-Quality schooling that cannot be ignored. These interactions are a critical element in preparing students to live and work in the global economy of the future. Reich (1990) describes the importance of collaboration in this new world:

Ideally, individual skills are integrated into a group; this collective capacity to innovate becomes something greater than the sum of its parts. Over time, as group members work through various problems and approaches, they learn about each others’ abilities. They learn how they can help one another perform better, what each can contribute to a particular project, and how they can best take advantage of one another’s experience. (p. 201)

The E-Quality school fosters such interactions, thereby promoting both quality and equality. In this vision of education, equality and quality are not merely compatible: each is a precondition for the other.

CONCLUSION

Our purpose in this article was to advance discussion of an important contemporary policy issue—the pursuit of equality and quality. More specifically, we
have attempted to resolve the paradox these two major goals present, namely that schools should promote both equality and quality but cannot foster both goals at once. To accomplish this task, we proposed a model showing that the relationship between equality and quality is orthogonal, not linear, and that four policy types can be envisaged. Using this model, we have shown that the apparent incompatibility of these two goals results from acceptance of mutually exclusive definitions judging quality on a norm-referenced basis. This definitional base creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of “irreconcilable difference” between the two constructs.

When quality is understood on the basis of continuous improvement for all students, the irreconcilable is resolved. Not only is it possible to pursue equality and quality simultaneously, such an approach is the essence of school improvement in the post-industrial age. As Schaefer (1990) argues, there is no quality without equality and equality without quality is not worth having. Equality and quality are, in fact, complementary aspects of a global vision of public education, which, if not essential to each other, are mutually supportive and enhancing:

If one identifies high standards as an aspect of excellence and diversity as an aspect of equity, then excellence and equity complement each other. It is this combination of characteristics that results in educational eminence. Neither excellence alone, with its excluding policy, nor equity alone, with its including policy, is sufficient for the attainment of educational eminence. Indeed, excellence, without a commitment to equity could result in arrogance. And equity, without a commitment to excellence could result in mediocrity. Since excellence and equity and equity complement each other to their mutual benefit, one wonders how they were ever thought to be contradictory or in opposition to each other. (Willie, 1987, p. 205)

Achieving both equality and quality requires new approaches. As stated by Haywood, Burns, Arbitman-Smith, and Delclos (1983–1984): ‘‘Back to basics’ in the traditional sense should be replaced by ‘forward to fundamentals,’ reflecting a redefinition of what is basic or fundamental to school learning” (p. 17).

Some recent research provides some answers as to how to develop such schools, but certainly not all the answers. We are, however, far more likely to find these answers if we begin with the premise that E-Quality schools are not only desirable but attainable.

REFERENCES


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